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This thesis explores the possibility of a modern consumption distinct from discussions of 
the ‘consumer,’ ‘consumption,’ ‘consumerism’ and the ‘consumer society’ and rejects the 
possibility of a universal or ‘human’ consumption-activity rooted in use that merely varies 
with space and time. This is done by exploring the roots of these terms in the philosophical 
anthropology of economic theory, specifically the concept of homo œconomicus. The 
economic inheritance within contemporary accounts of the capitalist consumption-relation 
is then pursued through a review of the disciplinary approaches to the topic made by 
historical accounts of ‘consumer culture,’ the study of patterns of use across the social 
sciences, from psychology, through geography to marketing and anthropology. Finally, the 
contemporary sociological investigation of ‘consumption’ is critiqued and its broad 
reliance upon a utilitarian-derived cost/benefit model adapted to incorporate ‘sign-value’ 
and discussions of postmodernism are rejected. 
 
This prompts the proposal of a ‘postphenomenological’ approach to the study of modern 
consumption and the ‘terrain’ upon which it is available to experience. The bulk of the 
thesis, chapters three, four and five, are taken up with a review of the contemporary 
commodity-form using the phenomenological categories of space, time and causality, 
respectively. This allows a historical perspective to be employed in the analysis of the role 
of material factors in the constitution of subjective experience and its role within the 
emergence of modern consumption. The theory of modern consumption and the socio-
spatial terrain upon which it unfolds is developed through the concept of ‘affordance,’ 
adapted from environmental psychology and a re-definition of ‘possession’ that arises from 
the inter-relation of being and having. This allows the rejection of the orthodox models and 
theories of ‘consumption’ outlined in chapter two. The thesis concludes by advocating an 
engagement in a ‘playful’ modern consumption that engages with the commodity-form as 
the medium within which contemporary ‘experience’ is transmitted and, which, 
consequently, forms the of the phenomenal forms of subjective experience derived from 
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Introduction: Expressing ‘Consumption’ 
 
Don’t call this nothing, 
This might be all 
We ever have. 
- Nothing, Uncle Tupelo 
 
 
There may have been a time when one could encapsulate the relationship of 
reality and play in the harmless antithesis, that life is serious, but art is 
cheerful. But just as increasing development magnifies the antitheses 
everywhere, driving asunder into opposition what was uniformly joined in 
the embryonic state, so too life has also become terrible, fearful and tragic, 
and it is merely the extension of this – the unavoidable reverse of this state 
of affairs – if recreation and play become satyr-like, orgiastic and sensually 
intoxicated.  
- Simmel (1997: 260), Infelices Possidentes! (Unhappy Dwellers) 
 
The Context of ‘Use’ 
Marx, it would appear, was right all along: the investigation of the capitalist mode of 
production and the forms of social interaction – or ‘sociation’ (Simmel) – which it 
facilitates does, indeed, begin with an analysis of the commodity, that seemingly ‘trivial’ 
thing. Consequently, this thesis seeks to account for the historical development and 
contemporary importance of what is commonly termed ‘consumption,’ that is, the various 
uses to which the commodified products of the capitalist division of labour are put in 
everyday life. However, rather than investigate accounts of the historical evolution of 
‘consumer society’ or the role of ‘consumption’ in the identity politics of ‘consumers,’ this 
analysis proposes to investigate a definitively modern consumption and the ‘terrain’ upon 
which it makes available historically novel forms of experience to its participants. This 
requires re-thinking the socio-spatial relationship between people and things, between 
‘subjective and objective culture’ (Simmel), and the role of capitalist modernity in 
profoundly altering the conditions under which the phenomenal forms of subjective 
experience emerge. Consequently, the historical and material processes through which the 
forms of ‘lived experience’ (Minkowski, 1970) of capitalist modernity have emerged are 
seen as crucial to the theorisation of modern consumption, its transformation of 
phenomenal experience and the relationship between being and having, expressed as 
‘possession.’   
 
What emerges is an attempt at a ‘postphenomenological’ (Verbeek, 2005) sociology of the 
relationship between people and things in which the Cartesian privileging of the human 
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subject is circumvented through an analysis of the ‘ontological relationship’ of affordance 
forged between ‘organism and environment’ (Costall, 2004). Specifically, this requires that 
the mutually constitutive relationship between people and things, identified by Verbeek as 
the basis of a postphenomenological approach, be located within a material and historical 
explanatory framework. Rather than pursuing an account of the psychological motives for 
‘consumption’ or the emergence of various social groupings within ‘consumer society,’ 
this study focuses upon the intersection of the political, economic, social and technological 
processes that constitute capitalist modernity, and the ‘technical mediation’ (Latour) of 
experience by the commodity-form. Consequently, the transmission of traditional forms of 
experience, such as proverbs or fables (Agamben, 1993; 1999), is confounded by the 
ubiquity of the commodity-form as a medium of experience. However, this modernisation 
of the medium of experience – the objective component of the relation between subjective 
and objective culture – brings consequences: it alters the phenomenal forms of subjective 
experience born of the contemporary relationship between being and having. 
 
The Affordance of ‘Consumption’ 
The commodity-form – and its ‘special case’ the money-form, or ‘universal equivalent’ 
(Marx) – is a technology geared towards the circulation and exchange of value in tangible 
form. Dodd (1994) sees the money-form as possessing both a symbolic and a material 
aspect, and functioning as an ‘informational’ and ‘chronically mediatized’ phenomenon 
within a network of objects, practices and institutions. The same is true of the commodity-
form, regardless of whether it is a product, service, system or experience: both commodity 
and money-forms are relational phenomena; both re-present the relations between 
(economic) phenomena in abstracted form. The economic juxtaposition of use-value 
(subjective) and exchange-value (objective) can be supplemented by the ‘representational’ 
(Buck-Morss, 1993) or ‘staging value’ (Böhme, 2003; 2006) of the commodity-form, 
which is inter-subjective in its constitution. Such an ‘aestheticization of the real’ produced 
by those who labour ‘to give an appearance to things and people, cities and landscapes, to 
endow them with an aura, to lend them an atmosphere in ensembles’ ultimately erodes ‘the 
distinction, so essential to the culture industry theory, between art and kitsch’ (Böhme, 
2003: 71-2). It also reinforces the primacy of the relationship between people and things, 
particularly its aesthetic or immaterial dimension.  
 
Böhme’s (2006) discussion of the ‘aesthetic economy’  – techno-centric and borderline 
determinist as it is – reveals the inadequacy of mainstream sociological studies of 
‘consumption,’ ‘consumerism’ or the ‘consumer society.’ Such studies do not address the 
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historical novelty of contemporary existence, and fail to grasp, interrogate or account for 
the consequences of the relationship between people and things within capitalist 
modernity. The underlying utilitarian presuppositions inherited from economic theory deny 
the possibility of formulating a sociological approach to the capitalist consumption-relation 
capable of replacing the cost/benefit analysis of a ‘desiring subject’ with an emphasis upon 
the experiential possibilities offered by an engagement with the world. In considering the 
market as merely the empty space within which commodities are presented to ‘consumers’ 
(who are either acquisitive or duped depending upon theoretical orientation), rather than a 
complex terrain composed of ‘networks’ of human and nonhuman ‘actants’ (Latour) 
stretching back hundreds of years, the socio-spatial dimension of modern consumption is 
ignored. Likewise, the commodity-form’s role as the medium for communicating 
‘experience’ necessitates a re-conceptualisation of contemporary subjectivity and its 
relationship to temporality, memory and identity, rather than a descent into the perennial 
debate between Erlebnis and Erfahrung. Inevitably, then, the changed character of spatial 
and temporal experience demands a reappraisal of causality as it has traditionally been 
applied to the pursuit, use and ‘consumption’ of objects, services and experiences. Indeed, 
in asserting the relation of mutual constitution between people and things the concept of 
causality must be rethought. Instead, it is affordance, the relationship between organism 
and environment, which determines the spatial, temporal and causal possibilities 
constituted by any situation,  
 
Producing modern consumption 
The rejection of conventional accounts of the sociological investigation of ‘consumption,’ 
which lies at the heart of this thesis, begins with the critique of economic theory found in 
Chapter One. Economic theory’s attempts to document and define the nature and role of 
the capitalist consumption-relation are instructive in that they re-present the historical 
evolution of the commodity-form within the capitalist mode of production. For instance, in 
pre-classical political economy ownership of valuable objects conferred wealth, since 
value always assumed substantial form, such as gold or precious metals, and was created 
by either God or nature. However, in classical political economy, epitomised by Smith and 
Ricardo, the labour expended in manufacture was acknowledged as contributing to the 
creation of the value of a commodity and, as such, was required to be rewarded for this 
contribution. While Bentham’s formulation of a ‘hedonic calculus’ allowed the 
quantification of subjective utility and its expression as price, which, itself, became the 
basis for the neo-classical theorisation of ‘marginal utility,’ and underpinned the 
comparative evaluation of ‘consumer’ choices in a world of scarce resources. In turn, this 
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led to homo œconomicus, or economic man, the agent of rational choice in pursuit of 
maximum utility. 
 
Neo-classical economic theory understood the ‘consumer’ either as a solitary monad in 
pursuit of maximum utility, calculated through a cost/benefit analysis, or as an abstract and 
aggregated ideal-type generated by the demand of groups, classes or society at large. 
‘Consumer’ choices became the basis for the re-presentation of ‘revealed preferences,’ the 
psychological manifestation of utilitarian and aesthetic judgements (Gagnier, 2000) 
between commodities based upon their relative or ‘marginal’ utility. Therefore, 
commodities were understood as the signs of taste and discrimination of individual egos, 
markers of class distinction and an index of civilisation through their embodiment of the 
doctrine of progress (discerned in the exercise of rational thought and its technical 
deployment). However, this was only possible if economics became a science of words 
rather than figures, if value was understood to exist as more than simply utility (von 
Wieser, 1889). Thereafter, economic activity could be considered to incorporate the task of 
representing social relations and the structuring of interaction, through the explanation of 
lifestyle groupings and identity politics discerned in ‘consumer’ choices and ‘consumption’ 
patterns. In this manner neo-classical economic theory intersected with bourgeois 
psychology in charting the project(ion) of the self, or ‘personnation’ (Seltzer, 1992), 
through the annexation and manipulation of the contents of the sphere of circulation and 
exchange. 
 
The ‘consumer’ of marginalist theory began to resemble the figure of the bourgeois 
collector (Stewart, 1998) in that both revealed (constructed) their personal preferences 
(taste) through the acquisition of commodities. The narration of desire (for utility) became 
the basis of the ‘biographical fiction of the self’ (Ferguson, 1990), while the ‘reification of 
exchange’ within the ‘mature money-economy’ (Simmel, 1990) re-presented volition as 
causality. The inherent exchangeability (Mead, 1901) of the contents of the sphere of 
circulation and exchange underpinned the commodity-form’s function as a ‘technical 
mediation’ or ‘translation’ (Latour, 1993; Verbeek, 2005) device, shifting goods from the 
realm of production to that of ‘consumption.’ However, it did not do so in a vacuum: 
 
… the concept of mediation helps to show that technologies actively shape 
the character of human-world relations. Human contact with reality is 
always mediated, and technologies offer one possible form of mediation. 
[However…] any particular mediation can arise only within specific 
contexts of use and interpretation. Technologies do not control processes of 
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mediation all by themselves, for the forms of mediation are always context-
dependent […].  
- Verbeek, 2005: 11 
 
Both Marx and Keynes insist upon a distinction between productive and final 
‘consumption,’ dependent upon the purpose of the purchase: as the commodity exits the 
sphere of exchange the question of its use arises. Expenditure for productive 
‘consumption’ must be considered as investment, while expenditure for final 
‘consumption’ – consummation – exhausts or depletes the commodity-object. These two 
approaches have the merit of not reducing the consumption-relation to ‘consumption’ – the 
realm of individual desire – and of asserting the ‘totality’ of the capitalist mode of 
production as a series of social relations (Marx, 1973). However, they do imply that future 
production, either of other commodities or the psychological individual of bourgeois 
philosophy, is the systemic raison d’etre of exchange relations. Later Marxist attempts at 
revising political economy, as part of a ‘sociology of consumption’ or ‘consumer society’ 
(Clarke, 1982; Fine, 2002; Haug, 1986), or ‘system of provision’ approach (Fine, 1995; 
2002; Fine & Leopold, 1993), have sought to unpick the commodification process and the 
fetish it bestows by tracing the origins of goods in the social relations of production and 
distribution. This allows the ‘consumer’ to act as a reflexive agent who constructs an 
identity in the intersection of utilitarian, aesthetic and moral considerations expressed as 
choice. It does not question the ‘evolution of the consumer into a master category of 
collective and individual identity’ (Trentmann, 2006: 2) or the economic infrastructure or 
discursive framework that maintains this category as the focal point of ‘consumption’ 
activity.  
 
The manufacture of the ‘consumer’ and its role within the practice of ‘consumption’ 
emerges at the intersection of economic theory – the pursuit of utility in all its forms – and 
bourgeois psychology – the construction of psychological individuality, or ego – as the 
teleological project of identity through re-presentation, or ‘personnation’ (Seltzer, 1992). 
However, such a conception of identity is outdated, belonging to the age of neo-classical 
economics and grands magasins, and fails to acknowledge the contemporary relationship 
between being and having and the phenomenal forms of subjective experience generated 
by the interplay between ‘organism and environment’ as affordance (Costall, 2004). The 
extension of the capitalist sphere of circulation and exchange to ever-more aspects of 
contemporary existence highlights the role of the commodity-form in supplanting 
traditional forms of the transmission of ‘experience.’ Crucially, in place of the precious 
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metals discussed by pre-classical political economy, the rent theorised by its successor or 
the utility calculated by neo-classical marginalists, contemporary theorists now discuss an 
‘experience economy’ (Pine & Gilmore, 1999) or an economy based upon access to goods 
and, in particular, services (Massumi, 1993; 2003; Rifkin, 2000). In doing so, they 
highlight the increasing emphasis upon the immaterial and ‘experiential’ dimension of the 
contemporary commodity-form facilitated by the sphere of circulation and exchange 
within capitalist modernity.  
 
The apparent permeation of contemporary existence by the relations of exchange, rather 
than simply the money economy, prompts Vattimo (1988) to propose an ‘ontology of the 
present’ devoid of any nostalgic attempt to recover some, presently absent, form of 
authentic experience. Such ‘nihilism,’ which ‘is the consumption of use-value in 
exchange-value,’ where ‘Being is completely dissolved in the discoursing of value, in the 
indefinite transformation of universal experience’ (Vattimo, 1988: 22), signals the 
dissolution of the humanist concept of being within contemporary technologies of 
exchange and representation, epitomised by the money economy. Here the ‘formlessness’ 
identified by Simmel (1990: 272) as a fundamental attribute of the money-form finds its 
correlate within the ‘informational’ and ‘chronically mediatized’ (Dodd, 1994) exchange 
technologies of contemporary capitalist society. The flows of information and value 
around the ‘circuits’ of capitalist modernity tend to emphasise the economic premium 
placed upon novelty and innovation, of the ‘new-ness’ of things, and the role of nouveauté 
within the constitution of subjective experience. The accentuation of the temporal 
dimension of the commodity-form, as either the anticipation of the future delivered into 
the present (fashion) or a nostalgic evocation of an absent past (heritage), reveals the 
present to be a ‘fictive’ construction born of a narrative of ‘exaggeration’ (Stewart, 1998) 
and experienced as the representation of difference.  
 
The commodity-form constitutes the ‘hinge’ (Massumi, 1993) which allows the 
interpenetration of subjective and objective culture (Simmel), within it the experience of 
space and time is re-presented as the experience of difference – the ‘elsewhere’ and 
‘elsewhen’ discussed by Friedberg (1993). The subjective experience of the present, born 
of the relationship of ‘coshaping’ between humanity and the world (Verbeek, 2005), 
resembles ‘the garden of forking paths’ described by Borges, in that space and time 
collapse into the subjective experience of the present as it is constituted by participation. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the utilitarian psychology of economic theory – the 
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hedonic impulse – harnessed by the rational faculties in the service of identity production 
could no longer causally explain the subject’s actions: 
 
The classical bourgeois world view can be understood as a process of 
individuation, as the pursuit of pleasure. The pursuit of pleasure is the 
pursuit of the self; and the self, like the cosmos, is a system of relations 
tending towards a unique equilibrium. This has long since ceased to be 
a plausible view of either psyche or cosmos.  
– Ferguson, 1990: 199 
  
As a result, homo œconomicus, the homunculus of the ‘consumer,’ was rendered redundant 
just as the figure of the ‘consumer’ was adopted by discourses as varied as law, political 
theory, marketing and sociology as the basis of an explanation of the particularly modern 
incarnation of ‘consumption. 
 
From ‘consumption’ to modern consumption 
The marriage of economic theory and humanist psychology, of homo œconomicus and 
Cartesian subjectivity, filtered through bourgeois property relations ensured the centrality 
of the ‘consumer’ and his or her ‘consumption’ to accounts of contemporary 
‘consumerism’ and the ‘consumer society.’ This intermingled terminology has reinforced 
certain assumptions concerning the social, cultural and economic motivations of human 
actors and their pursuit of status, meaning and pleasure through an engagement with the 
object world. Equally, different academic disciplines have constructed their investigations 
of ‘consumption’ and its affines in strikingly different ways: historical studies went in 
search of origins; psychologists matched ‘rationality assumptions’ to personality traits; 
anthropologists sought to uncover the meaning and significance of artefacts through use; 
political economists traced ‘systems of provision’; geographers charted the spaces formed 
around ‘consumer’ habits, such as shopping; sociologists sought to discern society; while 
marketers just tried to sell people more things. Chapter Two provides an overview of these 
disciplinary engagements within the broad context of western European and North 
American culture, in particular the increasingly metropolitan culture of capitalist 
modernity and the diffusion of market relations. 
 
The critique of these disciplinary approaches reveals their reliance on an engagement with 
a universal conception of ‘consumption’ seen through the lens of the contemporary 
capitalist consumption-relation. For instance, despite Trentmann having asked ‘how and 
why the consumer has developed as an identifiable subject and object in the modern 
period’ and insisting that any account move beyond the purchase, symbolism or use of 
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‘things to ask about the subjectivities of “the consumer”,’ he still sees an essential cultural 
activity: 
 
Put simply, all human societies have been engaged in consumption and 
have purchased, exchanged, gifted or used objects and services, but it has 
only been in specific contexts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that 
some (not all) practices of consumption have been connected to a sense of 
being a ‘consumer,’ as an identity, audience or category of analysis. 
– 2006: 2 
  
Only Campbell (1987) attempted to formulate a definition of ‘modern consumption,’ 
which will be considered to be analytically distinct from the modern consumption 
discussed in this thesis. However, even Campbell’s attempt to describe the modernisation 
of the consumption-relation falls far short of what is required because of its insistence 
upon a ‘consumer ethic’ born of the ‘consumer revolution.’  
 
Chapter Two documents a variety of disciplinary approaches to the study of 
‘consumption,’ from historical accounts of origins and development to the contemporary 
formulation offered by disciplines such as psychology, geography, marketing and 
anthropology, before addressing the ‘sociology of consumption.’ The historical accounts of 
the genesis of ‘consumption’ offered by the discipline of consumer studies centres upon 
uncovering an original moment, either as a ‘consumer revolution’ (Slater, 1997) or the 
emergence of a ‘consumer society’ (Campbell, 1987; McKendrick, Brewer & Plumb, 
1982; Shammas, 1990, 1993) and its modernisation (Trentmann, 2002). Even Fine’s 
(2006) apparent opposition of  ‘consumer’ and ‘consumer culture,’ a veritable his and hers 
of ‘consumption,’ fails to avoid an emphasis upon the psychological individual: 
 
At one extreme stands the discipline of economics and its fabled homo 
œconomicus, rational economic man rarely acknowledged as female. He 
sets about maximising utility subject to budget […] A simple, single-
minded calculus of pleasure (spending money) and pain (earning it) is 
presumed to suffice to explain consumption, essentially understood as 
equivalent to market demand. [While] at the other extreme to economics 
stands old-time consumer studies. It has been eclectic in method and wide 
in scope, closely aligned to the study of marketing and advertising and 
more concerned with the psyche of the consumer and with her spending 
power. Given a radical twist, the sovereign consumer [of economic theory] 
is deposed and becomes victim to the manipulative hidden persuaders in 
pursuit of what are deemed to be artificially created, even false needs.  
- Fine, 2006: 291-2 
 
The expansion of exchange-relations saw the ‘consumer’ emerge as the discursive entity 
mediating the relationship between the subject and the commodified products of the 
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capitalist division of labour. This ‘trickle-down effect’ (McCracken, 1990; Veblen, 1994; 
orig. 1899) of ‘consumer goods’ or the ‘democratization of luxury’ (Williams, 1982) has 
been questioned by those who highlight the seasonal expenditure of agricultural and 
transient workers (Glennie, 1995), rather than the rational accumulation of the ‘middling 
classes.’ The spread of a retail network, detailed in Chapter Three, underpinned the 
capacity of the commodity-form to assume the task of representing value and allowed 
‘consumers’ to engage in emulative spending and express wealth, power, taste and 
distinction through the display of commodities.  
 
The desiring ‘consumer’ can be seen as the lodestone of a nascent ‘consumerism’ and 
‘consumer society,’ a harbinger of modernity and the ‘mass consumer society’ 
(Trentmann, 2002, 2006) of contemporary culture. In doing so, alternative forms of 
exchange – non-modern, non-market forms, such as gift-giving – became the focus of a 
nostalgic privileging of the archaic that functioned as a fantasy of the ‘real’ and the 
‘authentic.’ Essential to historical accounts of the emergence of contemporary ‘consumer 
society’ was the active involvement of the ‘consumer,’ the desiring subject, inherited from 
economic theory, who sought both symbolic and material satisfaction in the commodity-
form. As a result, contemporary ‘consumption’ appears as the technical refinement of a 
long-term historical process geared towards offering ‘consumers’ the necessary materials 
for the construction of biographical narratives. 
 
With its price tag the commodity enters the market. If its substantive 
quality and individuality create the incentive to buy, for the social 
evaluation of its worth this is totally unimportant. The commodity has 
become an abstraction. Once it has escaped from the hands of its producers 
and is freed from its real particularity, it has ceased to be a product 
controlled by human beings. It has taken on a ‘phantom-like objectivity’ 
and leads its own life.  
– Marx, cited in Otte Rühle (1928), Buck-Morss, 1993: 245 
  
Unlike the historical accounts of the rise, emergence or evolution of ‘consumption’ the 
social sciences have focused upon the use(s) of the commodity-form by ‘consumers’ after 
it has entered the sphere of circulation and exchange. The utilisation of the commodity-
form within the identity projects of reflexive individuals allowed the attribution of a 
psychological dimension to the utility-seeking monads of neo-classical economic theory. 
 
This focus upon the meaningful dimension of the commodity-form, its capacity to signify 
difference, has been pursued by psychology as an expression of selfhood, by geographers 
as a negotiation of social and temporal engagement, by marketing as a means of selling 
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people more stuff, and by anthropology as the basis of charting the cultural categories that 
express social relationships in any culture. Social science approaches to ‘consumption’ 
have proven adept at documenting the relations of ‘co-presence’ between subjects and 
objects and the possibilities that such relations render possible. For instance, socio-spatial 
practices, such as shopping, reveal the means by which personal identity is performed and 
provide an arena in which aesthetic, economic and moral decisions are made and 
communicated to others (Jackson & Thrift, 1995: 213; Miller, 1999; 2002). Further, social 
science has proven very effective in exploring the symbolic uses of commodities within the 
life-projects of individuals, groups and social strata and, in doing so, has highlighted the 
limitations of the concept of ‘final consumption’ inherited from political economy. 
Specifically, disciplines such as anthropology and marketing distinguish between use and 
utility in the negotiation of meaning, although they do not always avoid reducing sign-
value to old-fashioned marginal utility (Carrier, 2006). 
 
However, the bulk of Chapter Two is concerned with a critique of contemporary 
sociological approaches to the investigation of the capitalist consumption-relation and, 
specifically, the seemingly uncritical acceptance of the centrality of the ‘consumer’ and its 
associated identity project. While social science added psychological and socio-spatial 
meat to the bones of homo œconomicus, the ‘consumer’ remained the product of the 
intersection of bourgeois psychology and utilitarian thought. The subject was considered 
an active agent who organised the world of inert matter, commodities pressed into use by a 
desiring self. The Frankfurt School saw the realisation of an authentic selfhood stymied by 
the denigration of experience inherent in the ‘culture industry’ and an ‘ersatz individuality’ 
as the result of a ‘corrupted’ libidinal economy (Marcuse, 1964, 1973). The manipulation 
of commodities to manufacture personal identity (Giddens, 1991; Warde, 1994) can 
involve a degree of ‘risk’ (Beck, 1993) for the subject, as unstable identity formations, 
contingent upon ‘consumption’ habits and practices, solidify into ‘lifestyles.’ Such 
frameworks for ensuring ‘ontological security’ (Giddens) echo the sub-cultural strategies 
discussed by ‘cultural studies’ (Fiske, 1989; Hebdige, 1979; McGuigan, 1992) or attempts 
at social ‘distinction’ (Bourdieu, 1984) through the manipulation of commodified ‘sign-
values’ (Baudrillard).  
 
This thesis rejects the construction of the ‘consumer’ as an active user of the passive 
commodity-form in the pursuit of identity, in favour of an anti-humanist position that 
echoes Latour’s discussion of ‘hybrid’ phenomena (1993), in which networks of human 
and non-human actants constitute phenomena that are neither completely ‘natural’ 
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(authentic) nor ‘cultural’ (inauthentic). This sidesteps the post-Hegelian lament concerning 
the absence of ‘authentic’ being and the Debord-inspired complaints concerning the 
ubiquity of ‘representations’ and the reduction of ‘life’ to looking. Instead, the commodity-
form is considered to possess both material and immaterial dimensions, both of which are 
‘realised’ in the relation of affordance. The ‘mutual constitution’ of subject and object 
born of the relation of ‘coshaping’ (Verbeek, 2005) sees the commodity-form ‘mediate’ 
(Dant, 1999) social interaction (between all actants). However, the lingering temptation to 
privilege humans over their material culture, indulged in by Dant, must be resisted and 
affordances viewed as relational phenomena that do not merely extend the ‘consuming’ 
subject but define and transform the individual through the (re-)structuring of the 
phenomenal forms of subjective experience.  
 
Latour’s (2001) re-discovery of Tarde and his subsequent rejection of a ‘primordial 
identity’ in favour of a constant process of differentiation of being through ‘avidity,’ or 
having, implies that every actant is an ‘unstable aggregate’ defined by the qualities it 
possesses.  
 
Subjectivity, corporeality is no more a property of humans, of individuals, 
of intentional subjects, than being an outside reality is a property of nature 
[…]. Subjectivity seems also to be a circulating capacity, something that is 
partially gained or lost by hooking up to certain bodies of practice.  
– Latour, 1997: 5 
 
Consequently, the continuous transformation of subjectivity through the experience of 
difference is exacerbated by participation in the contemporary sphere of circulation and 
exchange. Such a ‘topology’ or terrain functions as a medium within which being is 
articulated to having not through ‘final consumption,’ but as an affordance that re-defines 
subjective experience. The relationship between people and things on the experiential 
terrain formed by the relation between the subject and the medium of the commodity-form 
is the basis of modern consumption: this transmission of experience allows the 
differentiation of the monad, or actant, from itself, through the mediation of its 
relationship to the world under the historical and material conditions of capitalist 
modernity.  
 
The discursive construction of the ‘consumer’ as subject-position by liberal theory denies 
the equivalence between people and things, actants, in favour of the calculation of relative 
advantage (cost/benefit analysis) by humanity. However, the adoption of a 
‘postphenomenological vocabulary for analyzing the mediating role of artifacts’ in which 
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‘technology codetermines both human subjectivity and the objectivity of the world’ and 
describes the ‘transformations of the ways in which reality can be present for humans’ 
(Verbeek, 2005: 195, 196, 197) accords affordance a role within the constitution of 
subjective experience. Specifically, this is the sensorial appreciation of aesthetic 
experience, rather than the disinterested experience of beauty, since it involves the 
transformation of the subject. Or, as Simmel puts it: 
 
All sense interest connects with the perceptible…. Aesthetic judgement, 
however, connects with the mere image of things, with their appearance 
and form, regardless of whether they are supported by an apprehendable 
reality. – Simmel, cited Frisby, 1992: 135 
 
Only in the playful performance of identity, as lifestyle, does the ‘consumer’ experience a 
temporary ‘escape’ (Rojek, 1993) from the utilitarian and teleological psychology upon 
which identity relies. The ‘technical mediation’ (Latour) of the relation between people and 
things, provided by the commodity-form, here resembles Simmel’s discussion of 
sociability as the play-form of sociation (interaction) as an interruption of ‘reality.’ The 
transmission of aesthetic and sensory experience, as well as utility, through the relation of 
affordance makes sociability into the modification of the subjective experience of 
‘possession.’ Here possession is not purchase, acquisition or ownership but the re-
formulation of the relationship between being and having and the dissolution of the realist 
ontology of the ‘consumer.’ Therefore, the ‘subject’ of modern consumption begins to 
resemble the ‘dividual’ in whom ‘becoming-singular […] exceeds specification’ at the 
same time as ‘a becoming-generic […] splinters the form of identity’ (Massumi, 1993: 35). 
 
In the Playground 
Chapter Three contributes to a ‘postphenomenological’ sociological approach by 
addressing the spatial dimension of modern consumption, aesthetic experience and the 
relationship between being and having. At the heart of this investigation lies the concept of 
terrain, distinct from both ‘place’ and ‘space,’ and inseparable from the sphere of 
circulation and exchange of capitalist modernity. Consequently, the aims of the chapter are 
threefold: firstly, to define the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption, by supplementing 
Simmel’s (1997, [1903]) analysis of ‘space’ with Harvey’s (2001 [1975]) discussion of a 
capitalist ‘logic of accumulation’; secondly, to trace the historical development of the 
‘spaces of consumption’ from eighteenth century arcade, through the department store to 
the shopping mall and themed environments of today; thirdly, to identify the role played by 
the terrain of modern consumption in the constitution of the phenomenal forms of 
subjective experience within capitalist modernity. The ‘terrain’ that emerges is a ‘de-
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formation’ of abstract space as imagined by Newtonian mechanics (Ferguson, 1990; 
Massumi, 1993), a space ‘warped’ into a series space-time events. These ‘events’ are the 
form that experience assumes upon the terrain of modern consumption, here the subject 
experiences the world through the ‘technical mediation’ of the commodity-form as the 
traversal of boundary or threshold ‘events’ (Benjamin, 1999; Cacciari, 1993, Massumi, 
1993; 2003). 
 
The relationship between contemporary space and ‘terrain’ is understood by 
supplementing Simmel’s fivefold typology of social space (1997, [1903]) with Harvey’s 
(2001 [1975]) discussion of a capitalist ‘logic of accumulation.’ On this reading, space is 
characterised by the forms of sociological interaction (sociation) it contains; it is the 
‘spatial expression’ of  ‘a sociological fact’ (Simmel) and born of the ‘dialectical 
integration’ (Harvey, 2001) of the spheres of production and ‘consumption.’ Therefore, the 
sphere of circulation and exchange is fundamental to the spatial experience of the 
inhabitants of capitalist modernity: the five ‘fundamental qualities’ of space (Simmel) are 
de-formed into commodity-events through the ‘intensification’ and ‘expansion’ of the 
social relations of the capitalist mode of production (Harvey). This results in an ‘expanded 
plane’ of circulation and exchange sustained by the physical landscape of objectified social 
wealth, public and private buildings, travel infrastructure, factories and retail outlets. 
Reminiscent of the techniques and processes associated with post-Fordist ‘flexible 
accumulation,’ which emphasise cheap labour, service and experience-based commodity 
production, the (spatial) ‘physical conditions of exchange’ are ‘annihilated’ by time (Marx, 
1973).  The terrain of modern consumption emerges as a networked (Latour) infrastructure 
increasingly devoid of spatial barriers to exchange or ‘consumption’; epitomised in the 
‘digital convergence’ of 3G ‘phones, which provide calls, e-mails, web-browsing, data-
transfer, word-processing, music, computer games and photography among other 
‘services.’ 
 
The history of the ‘spaces of consumption’ began with the retail network of the eighteenth 
century and ran from ‘scotch drapers’ through the arcades and the grand magasin to the 
shopping mall and beyond to the themed environments and Urban Entertainment 
Destinations (UEDs) of today. These material instances of the capitalist sphere of 
circulation and exchange represented a technical fine-tuning of the mechanism that brought 
commodities to the attention of prospective ‘consumers.’ These spaces pioneered and 
disseminated a number of techniques and strategies aimed at increasing the aesthetic 
impact of the commodity-form in an attempt to stimulate ‘consumer’ desire. The 
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department store functioned as a laboratory for the manufacture of aesthetically affective 
commodity-events geared towards circumventing the cost/benefit analysis of ‘consumers’ 
and the promotion of irrational pleasures. Immaterial and experiential aspects of the 
commodity-form were highlighted, such as novelty value, and the ‘leçons de choses’ were 
learned by a ‘mass consumer society’ (Trentmann, 2002). The ‘commodity landscape’ and 
the events of which it was composed revealed a ‘capitalist production of space’ (Lefebvre) 
in which goods were no longer the passive recipients of the ‘consumer’ gaze and its 
calculation of utility.  
 
The history of ‘consumer’ interiors, from the arcades to the contemporary shopping mall 
asserted the visual dimension of the commodity-form and its centrality to the ‘aesthetic 
economy’ (Böhme, 2003; 2006). Within this economy the individual commodity-form as a 
space-time event within which the subject participates is fashioned by the ‘aesthetic 
productivity’ (Simmel) of artisans, designers, window-dressers and advertisers in addition 
to its physical manufacture. However, with Haussmann’s modernisation of urban space 
and the destruction of pre-modern ‘place’ the effects cultivated within ‘consumer’ interiors 
were externalised and pressed into the service of the metropolitan municipality. 
Haussmann’s Paris echoed the ‘space of consumption’ on a massive scale; here, too, the 
spatial experience of totality was unavailable to the observer’s rational appreciation or 
disinterested contemplation and, instead, appeared as a fragmentary phenomenon re-
presented through the techniques of distance, abstraction and sublimation. In this the 
‘spaces of consumption’ and Haussmann’s Paris prefigured the shopping mall or themed 
environment of today, in such ‘quintessential postmodern play-space[s]’ (Slater, 1997) the 
distraction, even misdirection, of visitors is not unheard of.  
 
Analyses of the ‘space(s) of consumption’ have tended to view it as a rationally structured 
but aesthetically designed environment that has spawned ‘walking rhetorics’ or ‘spatial 
narratives’ (De Certeau, 1984), or shopping as a form of updated flânerie (Falk & 
Campbell, 1997) rooted in the idea of ‘consumer’ leisure and pleasure. Descriptions of the 
‘co-presence’ and ‘intimate encounter’ of ‘consumers’ and commodities engaged in 
shopping usually take as their unit of analysis the experiential space involved, such as the 
café, department store or shopping mall. However, this approach extends beyond shops to 
the themed environments of malls (Shields, 1992), NikeTown and Times Square 
(Hannigan, 1998), airports (Augé, 1999) or Las Vegas (Gottdiener et al, 1999; Ritzer, 
2001). Such spaces represent the ‘commodification of space’ through a carefully 
engineered theming of ‘consumer’ experience structured as an ‘extension of advertising’ 
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and its representation of meaning ‘disconnected form use-value’ (Gottdiener). These ‘new 
means of consumption’ (Ritzer) echo the ‘imagineering’ of Disney, the faux nostalgia 
pedalled by Nike or ‘escape’ from the everyday offered by UEDs (Hannigan, 1998). 
Accounts of such spaces tend to focus upon the metaphor of tourism and associated 
experiences, such as heritage sites or events (Rojek, 1993), while tangible objects of 
manufacture feature as souvenirs.  
 
This implies that the discourses centred upon the ‘consumer’ and the ‘spaces of 
consumption’ find it difficult to discuss either the experience of space or the spatiality of 
experience other than in terms of what is purchased – travel, hotel rooms, meals, 
admission and the postcards sent home. However, the specific nature of the experience 
appears to escape either description or analysis, precisely because it is intangible despite 
having been purchased as a commodity-event. When the spatial is experienced in 
immaterial form – such as tourism – it seems to evade sociological re-presentation, even 
when spatial metaphors, such as ‘landscape,’ ‘terrain’ and ‘environment’ are utilised. In 
this, spatial experience resembles Lyotard’s (1992) description of the postmodern as the 
‘experience of the unpresentable’ in an attempt to capture aesthetic experience. Rather than 
reduce the experience of space to the ‘consumption’ of differential sign-values, such as 
that offered by a loft apartment in a formerly industrial area (Zukin, 1982), and the pursuit 
of ‘distinction’ or social status, it is advisable to consider it a (com)modification of the 
relationship between being and having. Thus avoiding the reduction of the sites of human 
history to a nostalgic evocation of lost authenticity and a prompt for the aspirations of 
bourgeois ‘consumers.’ 
 
Finally, Chapter Three identifies the role of the terrain of modern consumption within the 
relationship of affordance generated between people and things and its effect upon 
‘possession’ as the relationship between being and having. In doing so, it exposes the myth 
of an unmediated referentiality between the sign and its referent, and the distance between 
the two upon which desire is predicated (as overcoming). ‘The spaces of consumption’ 
provided arenas for the ‘staging’ (Böhme, 2003) of the objects of ‘consumer’ desire as 
examples of temporal (novelty) and spatial (exotica) difference, which ‘enable[d] spatial 
differences to be overcome by time’ (Frisby, 1992: 107). In these spaces of the sphere of 
circulation and exchange the components of the bourgeois identity project participation 
were available for purchase as the appropriation of alienated objects, elements in a 
teleological endeavour premised upon the collection. Consequently, the quantitative 
aspects of such spaces were emphasised – they were the largest of their kind, they offered 
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more than any similar enterprise (Benjamin, 1999). Within the display areas of these 
spaces ‘consumer’ existence was represented as use underpinned by desire and expressed 
as tasteful ‘consumption,’ most notably in the utilisation of increasingly lifelike 
mannequins. This was ‘consumerism’ as ‘still life’ (Seltzer, 1992) or ‘panoramic 
experience’ (de Cauter, 1993): as interested, rather than disinterested, contemplation.  
 
The terrain of modern consumption, however, is irreducible to the material ‘spaces of 
consumption’ and, instead, is the participation in certain behaviours, practices and 
phenomenological experiences found within the sphere of circulation and exchange. While 
‘consumer’ identity relied upon the possibility of overcoming of distance – unmediated 
referentiality between sign and referent – the subject of modern consumption is constantly 
reformulated through ‘possession’ (the relation between being and having) born of 
affordance. Consequently, the experience of spatiality rather than ‘space’ is paramount, 
while a focus upon the fluctuating form of the boundary or ‘threshold’ allows an 
appreciation of the ‘spaces of transition’ and the access to ‘elsewhere and elsewhen’ that 
these confer (Friedberg, 1993). The analytical emancipation of the subject from the socio-
spatial confines of ‘consumer’ behaviour and its emphasis upon use allows consideration 
of spatial experience and the technologies or apparatuses that facilitate it. This is vital 
when considering the ‘black-boxing’ (Latour) of contemporary technology, where 
denotative utility vanishes into interface, and functionality, materiality and form bear no 
necessary relation to use. Consequently, the space-time event of the commodity-form, as 
the transmission of ‘sensorial’ experience (Verbeek, 2005) upon the terrain of modern 
consumption, is an aesthetic rather than merely prosthetic phenomenon. Consequently, it 




Chapter Four considers the forms of temporal experience available within the terrain of 
modern consumption and their consequences for the phenomenal forms of subjective 
experience. Specifically, it considers the inability of traditional forms of interaction to 
communicate ‘experience’ within capitalist modernity and the consequences this has for 
the figure of the ‘consumer’ when viewed as a collector of such experiences. This, in turn, 
raises the question of whether ‘experience,’ as historically understood, is actually available 
to the inhabitants of contemporary culture, or whether the contemporary commodity-form 
precludes this (Agamben, 1993). The temporal experience of difference, as novelty, and 
the communication of aesthetic experience by the commodity-form as a space-time event is 
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compared to the interplay of ‘empty‘ and ‘peak moments’ within the ‘drift’ (Charney, 
1998) of subjective experience. The commodity-form as the locus of ‘excitement’ 
(Ferguson, 1990) is revealed as the medium for the transmission of aesthetic and sensorial 
experience within the de-formation of the sphere of circulation and exchange that is the 
terrain of modern consumption. The concentration of such forms of temporal experience 
upon the terrain of modern consumption is demonstrated through the use of Barber’s 
(2001) ‘new ethnography’ of Tokyo, in which the urban fabric is animated both by its 
inhabitants and also by the technologies that constitute the ‘aesthetic economy’ (Böhme, 
2003, 2006). The ‘hybrid’ entity (Latour) of the metropolis amalgamates people and 
things, money and information, within an ‘informational’ and ‘chronically mediatized’ 
terrain that transforms the relation between being and having and the experience of 
‘possession.’ 
 
Modernity as the self-conscious interruption of the continuity of tradition fractures the 
‘constant authority’ (Osborne, 1995) by which signs and referents were wedded together, 
such as the socially cohesive rituals and rites of passage of ‘traditional’ societies. 
Participation in such ‘rites of passage’ was individual, occurred over a period of time and 
culminated a maturity, that concluded, ultimately, with death. The advent of capitalist 
modernity, however, saw ‘man’ (sic) ‘deprived of his biography’ and the capacity to 
construct a narrative that contained, explained and communicated the experience of being 
(Agamben, 1993: 13). The number and variety of mass-produced commodities refuted the 
sustained engagement with the external world, which Agamben deemed necessary for 
‘experience’ in its traditional form: in a sense, there were too many experiences available 
for them to translate into ‘experience.’ Today experiences are ‘enacted outside the 
individual’ and observed ‘with relief’ (ibid, 14-5). Consequently, when the bourgeois 
individuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth century engaged with the world, as the basis of 
‘experience,’ they did so within the framework of a linear narrative that mirrored the life-
course, whether the phenomena confronted arose within everyday life experience or the 
nascent retail network of industrial capitalism, such as the arcades.  
 
The production of the contents of the world by the capitalist division of labour, however, 
reduced ‘experience’ to the experience of an engagement with manufactured phenomena, 
while the trade networks of imperial Europe privileged the artefacts salvaged from cultures 
distant in time and space; as modern experience came to mean the experience of difference. 
The ‘consumer’ as collector understood the ‘souvenirs’ rescued from history as a material 
memory that linked lost origins to the present and implied a forward movement of history 
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as ‘progress,’ both personal and societal. The creation of individual identity by nineteenth 
century ‘consumers,’ therefore, became a project organised around the accumulation, 
collection, of objects imbued with meaning and significance, especially rarity, so as to 
narrate their owner. The communication of discriminating taste and personal distinction 
through the ‘revealed preferences’ of personal choice relies upon the abbreviation of the 
market, either through inheritance, ‘sumptuary’ laws or sheer expense. The narration of the 
individual life project was exacerbated by the advent of mass production and the 
‘democratization of luxury’ (Williams, 1982) which, in the finish and visual styling of 
articles, reduced the ease with which the ‘value’ of a commodity could be ascertained.  
 
The ‘mass consumer society’ of modernity (Trentmann, 2002) was built upon the 
expansion of the sphere of circulation and exchange and an exponential increase in the 
number and variety of goods available to the buying public. The experience of temporality 
within the commodity-from ceased to be an evocation of the historical past and became the 
participation in the present exemplified by fashionable novelty. In this sense modernity 
self-consciously ‘interrupted’ traditional life (Osborne, 1995), an interruption that formed 
the basis of a nostalgic longing for a lost authenticity of experience on behalf of the 
bourgeoisie (Stewart, 1998). The bourgeois individual engaged in the project of the self 
looked both backward to a lost Arcadia and forward in anticipation of Utopia (Ferguson, 
1990), while the commodity-form, offered an experience of ‘empty homogeneous 
moments’ (Benjamin) and formlessness (Simmel) inimical to traditional forms of 
experience. This was the ‘paradox of the modern’ (Benjamin) the impossibility of 
experiencing ‘experience’ as it had been understood. The resulting ‘shock-experience’ 
(Erlebnis) was deferred onto the body and rendered unavailable to consciousness; modern 
experience, therefore, was necessarily partial when measured against its traditional 
counterpart.  
 
Charney (1998) offered a description of experience on the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption 
that had subjective participation in contemporary life represented as ‘drift’ (Charney, 
1998). This was a succession of ‘empty moments’ interrupted by ‘peak moments,’ which 
in their intensity counterpoint the absence of cognitive stimulation that constitutes the rest 
of existence. In such ‘peak moments’ the self was ‘realised’ in the temporal present, just as 
the cinematic close-up foreshortens both space and time into a significant event. For 
Charney, the majority of contemporary ‘experience’ is unavailable to the cognate subject, 
but is registered physiologically; this is the necessary corollary of the ‘peak’ experience 
and the moments of identification it facilitates. In this way the problematic aspect of the 
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‘paradox of the modern’ (Benjamin) is resolved precisely because the body is present to 
experience, both spatially and temporally: the ‘unexperienced’ dimension of modern 
experience is the precondition for that which is experienced. Contemporary experience, 
claims Charney, resembles the cinematic mode of spectatorship by functioning as a 
machinery of serial narration capable of producing sudden and intense aesthetic events. 
This, in turn, echoes the contemporary commodity-form within which all economic goods 
share the principle of ‘exchangeability’ (Mead) but are only activated as ‘peak’ moments 
available to the subject through the relation of affordance.   
 
The transmission of modern experience through the medium of the commodity-form 
occurs within the terrain of modern consumption because it is in the relationship of 
affordance that spatial and temporal experience most completely escape their traditional 
formulation. The interruption of tradition by modern consumption is premised upon the 
production of ‘peak moments’ of experience within the episodic narrative ‘serialisation’ of 
contemporary existence. This results in the ‘decomposition of the bourgeois subject’ and 
demise of the ‘biographical fiction of the self’ pursued as an identity project in favour of 
the search for ‘excitement’ (Ferguson, 1990). The manufacture of ‘sudden’ (Bohrer, 1994) 
moments of intense aesthetic experience counterpointed to the drift of ‘empty 
homogeneous time,’ space and money reveal the commodity-form to be the medium for 
the ‘transmission’ of a space-time event. In this event the mutual constitution of subject 
and object born of affordance creates a relation of ‘possession,’ which through the 
phenomenal forms of subjective experiences modifies the relationship between being and 
having expressed as ‘identity.’  
 
The critique of ‘modern experience’ as ‘inexperiencable experience’ associated with 
Agamben, Benjamin and the Frankfurt School-inspired critique of the in-authenticity of 
modern life is seen to derive from their privileging of cognitive over sensorial and 
aesthetic experience in accordance with a Cartesian ontology. The forms of experience 
communicated by the contemporary commodity-form are unable to fuel the personal 
development of the bourgeois ego, as the movement towards totality or perfection, 
precisely because in their modification of the relationship between subjective and objective 
culture they lack direction, and function much as the rhizome (Deleuze) does, in being 
governed by context. This form of experience is endemic to the commodity-form, and its 
dissemination within the sphere of circulation and exchange; however, it is upon the terrain 
of modern consumption, where the traditional forms of the transmission of experience are 
interrupted, that the subjective experience of temporality is most radically altered. 
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Barber’s (2001) ‘new ethnography’ of Tokyo offers an empirical account of this 
transformed temporality and the vertiginous experiences it induces, which emphasises the 
temporal transformation of the spatial fabric of the city by the socio-economic practices 
that constitute the field of modern consumption. Tokyo is a space-time event, similar to the 
contemporary commodity-form itself, in which the material environment merges with the 
sphere of circulation and exchange (rather than housing its processes) constantly 
formulating possible ‘peak moments’ that require a subject to realise themselves in 
affordance. This ‘terrain’ of modern consumption is ‘formed’ from the accumulated 
behaviours of its constituent actants, a melding of the symbolic and the material, the 
‘informational’ and the ‘chronically mediatized’ (Dodd, 1994), that comprises a networked 
phenomenon rather than any definable totality. Upon such a terrain the temporal 
consistency and coherent spatial boundaries that demarcated the bourgeois subject are 
interrupted, there is neither ‘belonging’ nor the nostalgic longing to be expressed in the 
desire for traditional experience. The sustained production of ‘peak moments,’ in which 
the subject is telescoped into spatial and temporal proximity with the commodity-form (the 
space-time event), highlights the constant re-staging of affordance as an aesthetic event, 
rather than simply a relationship between subject and object. Consequently, the 
relationship between being and having, and its vertiginous re-formulation of identification 
through aesthetic experience, begins to resemble both ‘exaggeration’ (Stewart, 1998) and 
sociability (Simmel). Both phenomena turn upon the construction of distance in relation to 
existing social conventions, rather than spatial or temporal distance, and, as such possess 
no inherent telos other than the signification of difference. 
 
A body doesn’t coincide with itself. It’s not present to itself. […] bringing 
its past up to date in the present, through memory, habit, reflex […] means 
you can’t even say that a body ever coincides with its affective dimension.  
– Massumi, 2003: 4 
 
These autotelic play-forms offer moments of ‘abductive participation’ (Massumi, 2003) 
from the everyday through the ‘interruption’ of ‘drift’ by aesthetic experience and the 
opportunity for the subject to move along ‘a horizon of transformation and metamorphosis’ 
(Charney, 1998: 138).  
 
The immersive participation in the contemporary commodity-form obliged the human 
body to become the repository for the forms of experience that were born of modern 
culture: the aesthetic and sensorial experience generated in the relation of affordance acted 
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to transform cognitive capacity, as anyone who has ever looked through a microscope or a 
telescope can testify. In this physiologically-inspired transformation of the relation of 
being and having, the notion of a single, stable identity capable of gradual refinement over 
time (a teleological project) surrendered to its own ‘play-form’ – identification. However, 
the commodity-form’s role as the medium for the transmission of experience within 
contemporary culture is problematic, since this implies that the range of experiences 
available tend to vary with income (although not always, obviously). This is particularly so 
where ‘technology’ is involved, although the proliferation of mobile telephones in the UK 
provides an intriguing counter-argument. However, in the main, access to experience 
within the ‘aesthetic economy’ (Böhme, 2003, 2006) of capitalist modernity is contingent 
upon access to disposable income (outside of the division of labour) and, so, the ‘rites of 
passage’ that previously conferred ‘experience’ have now become a question of ‘rights of 
passage’ and subject to capitalist property relations. Consequently, the access to ‘affective 
moments’ (Massumi, 2003) of experience that allow ‘identification’ are either restricted to 
the wealthier sections of our society, available through criminal actions or so unusual as to 
breed suspicion or fear. 
 
Never to Return 
Ultimately, Chapter Five argues that the changed character of both spatial and temporal 
experience, attributed to modern consumption and its terrain in chapters Three and Four, 
inevitably alters the contemporary experience of causality. Therefore, the 
‘postphenomenological’ analysis of causality and the terrain of modern consumption must 
be distinguished from that of the traditional narrative of causality within the sphere of 
circulation and exchange. The distinction turns upon the role of the relationship between 
being and having and its consequences for the phenomenal forms of subjective experience. 
Within the sphere of circulation and exchange subjective desire is traditionally understood 
as the modification of being by having, and the appropriation of commodities signifies the 
linear progression of an identity project towards completion, progress. Upon the terrain of 
modern consumption the communication of experience by the commodity-form as space-
time event, or affordance, de-forms the subject by re-formulating the relation between 
being and having as  ‘possession.’  
 
Unlike the teleological production of identity by the bourgeois individual the experience of 
identification by the inhabitant of the terrain of modern consumption more closely 
resembles the autotelic character of play. Play signals a retreat from the world of purposive 
action; a continual de-formation of the temporal and spatial relations of ‘reality’ in which 
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causality resembles the ‘accident-event’ (Massumi, 1993), ‘sudden’ instants of intense 
aesthetic (Bohrer, 1999) or sensorial experience (Verbeek, 2005) that assume the form of 
‘peak’ (Charney, 1998) or ‘affective moments’ (Massumi, 2003). Unlike the empty space 
of bourgeois subjectivity and its linear temporality, in which identity unfolds, the 
subjective experience of the inhabitant of the terrain of modern consumption ‘mutates’ 
within the context of the contemporary commodity form. The transmission of experience 
in the form of the space-time event of affordance, formed by the mutual constitution 
(coshaping) of subject and object, denies the possibility of desire as causal phenomenon 
and frustrates the possibility of an identity carved from the expression of choice. Instead, 
in the isomorphic relation of affordance, as a conjunction of people and things, the 
interiority and agency claimed by bourgeois psychology for the theory of the individual 
‘consumer’ is confounded. Upon the terrain forged between the commodity-form and the 
phenomenal forms of subjective experience causality is experienced as an interruption or 
deformation of the presently constituted subject – as an ‘accident-event.’ 
 
Desire for the completion of the self as the pre-condition for the experience of identity 
caused the bourgeois individual to seek its refinement through the appropriation of use-
values as exchange-values via the sphere of circulation and exchange. The marriage of 
economic rationality and utilitarian psychology allowed the narration of the life-course to 
echo the cataloguing of a collection (Stewart, 1998), the imposition of an ordered 
arrangement upon the fragments or ‘souvenirs’ of a longed for totality, which was 
presently absent. The sphere of circulation and exchange allowed for the re-collection of 
disparate commodities and experiences to be marshalled through memory to describe the 
‘biographical fiction of the self’ (Ferguson, 1990) and underpin the production of identity 
as an on-going project. In the transformation of each commodity into a souvenir, the 
material instance of memory, another step was taken towards the re-unification of ‘biology 
and symbol,’ meaning and materiality,’ and the overcoming of the ‘general alienation’ 
(Marx) of the subject inherent to capitalist social relations. However, the abstraction, 
quantification and ‘destruction’ of form attributed to the money-form continually 
undermined any such attempt, by severing the commodity from its origins in production 
and re-presenting it as a sign upon which individual desire could impress itself. Therefore, 
‘consumption’ was the attempt to appropriate use-values from the sphere of exchange as an 
extension (spatial) or progression (temporal) modification of being through having.  
 
This ‘cyborg’ (Sheller, 2004) or ‘prosthetic’ (Shaviro) logic is premised upon the 
production of pleasure as the overcoming of the distance constructed between subject and 
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object as desire. Here, the identity project proceeds as an attempt to overcome the absence 
of traditional experience through an escape from the ‘paramount reality’ (Rojek, 1993) of 
everyday existence into the ‘elsewhere’ and ‘elsewhen’ of tourism or shopping 
expeditions. Therefore, the motivation of the ‘consumer’ understood as desire, as the 
longing for identity, ensures that the commodity-signs within the sphere of circulation and 
exchange are in constant demand, despite the fact that they offer no possibility of 
overcoming the experiential and existential distance that motivates and structures their 
‘consumption.’  
 
Latour’s (1997) description of ‘the social’ as a ‘type of circulation’ composed of myriad 
over-lapping networks of actants that function as ‘nodes and connections’ represents the 
most viable sociological attempt to describe the operation of the terrain of modern 
consumption. However, Latour fails to grasp the function and significance of the 
transmission of modern experience within the commodity-form and the role of affordance 
as the basis for the re-formulation of the relationship between being and having. It is in 
affordance that the contingency of subjective experience and of the staccato rhythm of 
identification is revealed, and with it the redundancy of the bourgeois project of identity, 
founded upon a nostalgic longing for that which never was. Upon this ‘terrain’ each space-
time event of experience is incommensurable – despite the mass (re-)production processes 
of contemporary capitalism – precisely because it is forged as an affordance. Simply put, 
the ‘subject’ undergoing each affordance-event is individuated to the degree that only a 
notional concept of ‘species being’ (Darwin) based upon zoological classification 
underpins the possibility of a comparison of their respective experiences. Life upon the 
terrain of modern consumption consists of the further differentiation of the monad from all 
other monads, despite their shared inhabitation of this topography and participation in the 
medium of the transmission of experience – the contemporary commodity-form. 
 
The consequences of the playful logic of modern consumption is the surrender of the 
relation between sign and referent, and the project of re-uniting these that underpins the 
‘collector’ of commodity-signs, the ‘consumer.’ The construction of the linear narrative 
progression of biography, either as evolutionary overcoming or as reversible pathway, is 
predicted upon the nostalgic longing for the recovery of tradition, the restoration of 
harmonious and pre-capitalist social relations. Such an option is unavailable to the 
inhabitants of the terrain of modern consumption; they are unable to return to yesterday or 
even the preceding moment, for they always fall ‘away’ in every direction. Each moment, 
each space-time event of experience further distinguishes them from any putative 
 29 
‘primordial identity’ (Tarde). History as a causal principle, which can actively shape 
events, is experienced only through the commodity-form as a manifestation of the socio-
economic factors that structure the ‘terrain.’ Instead, the aesthetic instant, the relation of 
affordance that through its possession modulates the relation between being and having, 
appears accidental: 
 
The commodity stands (in) for our existence. The ground(lessness) it stands 
on is the accident in its most general expression – the accident-form, 
exemplified as downfall, the unqualified or generic founding event. Our 
generic identity (our subject-form, or humanity) is the generic event (the 
accident-form); our specific identity (the content of which is our 
“individuality” or “self”) is the sum total of our purchases. […] 
contingency is the form of identity, and identity is determined (given 
content) through the serial commission of the act of groundless 
consumption.  
– Massumi, 1993: 7 
 
The interruption of traditional forms of experience, the hallmark of modernity, does not 
just prompt a nostalgic longing – as a one-off catastrophe from which bourgeois culture 
seeks to recover – it becomes a continuous event, or series of events. It is in this sense that 
Adorno’s description of the ‘recent past always present[ing] itself as though annihilated by 
catastrophes’ (letter, cited by Benjamin, 1999: 397) demonstrates the demise of the 
‘bourgeois word view’ (Ferguson) with desire as it causal relation.   
 
If the contemporary condition of possibility of being human is 
disequilibrium, continuity and balance are no longer relevant concepts, 
even when they are subordinated to the notion of catastrophe.  
– Massumi, 1993: 30-1 
 
Consequently, the human and its biography gives way to the ‘monsters’ (Haraway) and 
‘mutants’ (Baudrillard) that are the nodal points of differentiation at the heart of the terrain 
of modern consumption. Identity as the ‘consumption’ of commodity-signs is sundered 
from its referent – reality – as the concept of the adventure, as the search for the last 
vestiges of ‘authentic’ experience, is shredded within the space-time events of the terrain 
of modern consumption and its playful transmogrification of the phenomenological forms 
of subjective experience.  
 
The difficulties in discussing modern consumption and the vertiginous assertion of 
aesthetic and sensorial experience that it suggests underpin the subjective experience of the 
sphere of circulation and exchange of capitalist modernity are many and various. The 
fundamental problem is the ‘economistic’ inheritance that has reduced any discussion of 
the relationship between subjects and objects to a humanist assertion of a bourgeois 
 30 
concept of identity – people do, things are done to. The attempt to formulate a 
‘postphenomenological’ analysis of the capitalist consumption-relation seeks to remedy 
this by acknowledging the role of ‘stuff’ in the constitution of subjective experience. 
However, ‘postphenomenology’ and its re-thinking of the categories of experience is not 
without problems of its own. Interrogating the categories of ‘experience,’ ‘temporality,’ 
spatiality,’ and ‘causality,’ while attempting to construct a materialist and historical 
account of changes to the understanding of these very categories is deeply taxing. A 
reliance upon quotation marks, parentheses and italics as a means of distinguishing 




Chapter One: Changing the Subject 
 
What is highly questionable is whether in economics, or in any other 
branch of social science, if one pays attention to the economic content of a 
theory as distinct from its analytical framework, any part of the theory can 
preserve the independence and neutrality claimed (and with some reason) 
for the formal analysis itself.  
Maurice Dobb, Theories of Value and Distribution since Adam Smith: 
Ideology and Economic Theory (1973: 6) 
 
This chapter seeks to review and critique the contribution made to sociological analyses of 
‘consumption,’ ‘consumerism’ and ‘consumer society’ by economic theory. Primarily, this 
means that the description of both production and ‘consumption’ within the capitalist mode 
of production by economic theory will be treated as a theory of representation: that is, as a 
re-presentation of experiential reality, rather than an unmediated and literal description of 
historical events and processes. Secondly, in reviewing the historical development of 
economic theory, as a discipline, the different positions it has adopted are seen as rooted in 
material factors and historical change. Therefore, the tendency towards the increased 
abstraction of the commodity-form within capitalist modernity is seen to echo the shift 
from agriculture to industrial manufacture and, latterly, services and experiences within a 
‘knowledge’ or ‘information’ economy. Thirdly, the increasing abstraction of value within 
the commodity-form and its separation from its ‘origins’ in the realm of production places 
an emphasis upon the subjective or phenomenal experience of the individual ‘consumer’ in 
the explanation of economic action. Within the neoclassical economic orthodoxy 
production appears marginalised, something for which it has been criticised by both 
historical and contemporary writers (Clark, 1899; Fine, 2002; Keynes, 1936; Marx, 1973; 
1976; Veblen, 1994; orig. 1899). This, in turn, necessitates a re-consideration of the 
concept of the ‘sphere of circulation and exchange,’ derived from classical political 
economy, and its modification via the concept of the ‘terrain’ of a qualitatively distinct 
modern consumption and the consequences for the phenomenal forms of subjective 
experience that this affords. The ostensibly free-floating terrain of modern consumption 
appears, at first glance, to possess only a formal connection to the social relations of 
production. As a result the role of exchange-relations and, in particular, the role of the 
capitalist money-form is seen as crucial to any critical engagement with the role of modern 
consumption in the constitution of contemporary life.  
 
The seeming separation of production and ‘consumption’ requires the formulation of a 
twofold approach. Firstly, the apparent autonomy of the realm of ‘consumption’ and the 
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forms of subjective experience made available there require to be explained and accounted 
for within the context of the capitalist mode of production and its historical evolution. 
Secondly, the role of economic theory in explaining and justifying the operation of the 
capitalist mode of production has led to an ‘economic inheritance’ by sociological attempts 
at theorising contemporary forms of ‘consumption.’ In uncritically accepting the use of 
terms, such as ‘consumer,’ consumer society’ and ‘consumerism’ from the discourse of 
economics sociological accounts of ‘consumption’ presume an a-historical continuity 
between vastly different historical periods and the social relations that pertained within 
them. All too often ‘consumption’ appears as a neutral activity, merely the exit point from 
the economic realm and the incorporation of the commodity-object into the personal 
project and biography of the individual. This implies that the commodity-form functions in 
the same or similar manner today as it did three hundred years ago and fulfils the same role 
within subjective experience. Patently, this is not the case, as any tourist, web-surfing 
schoolchild or ‘personal shopper’ to the stars can testify. Such a view, grounded in the 
concept of utility expressed as function or use, forms the central core of economic theory’s 
bequest to sociological theories of ‘consumption.’ However, the sociological analysis of 
modern consumption and the forms of phenomenal experience it affords the subject are 
rooted in aesthetic rather than utilitarian experience. Consequently, the inability of 
economic theory to explain the dynamic relationship between the commodity-form and 
subjective experience, particularly as it is manifested in the shift from sphere of circulation 
and exchange to terrain, must form the starting point of a sociological analysis of modern 
consumption.  
 
The pre-classical political economy of the Mercantilists and the Physiocrats considered 
value to be stored in material form, as substance, and was typified by precious metals or 
the nutrition provided by foodstuffs. Consequently, value was considered as being created 
by God or Nature, albeit with the active participation of human labour in the mines or the 
fields, rather than as an abstract category. Only with the formulation of utilitarian theory, 
most notably by Bentham, did value acquire an abstract dimension and lend itself to 
quantitative calculation. Utility theory allowed classical political economists, like Adam 
Smith or David Ricardo, to formulate the beginnings of a theory of value (Blaug, 1970), 
which saw that the labour expended in the production of commodities required to 
rewarded, even if the origin of value itself lay with God’s creation of the world. For the 
first time price, as a reflection of value, had to encompass the efforts expended in its 
production, thus allowing trade and industrial manufacture to enter the compass of 
economic thought. This explicit link between the realm of production and that of 
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circulation and exchange (consumption) appeared to be severed by the ‘marginalist 
revolution’ of neo-classical economics, which saw utility reside not in the material form of 
the commodity – as a potential satisfaction – but in the subjective appraisal of the 
prospective ‘consumer’ who must choose between differing and competing potential 
sources of satisfaction depending upon the calculation of the marginal utility each would 
provide. Bentham’s ‘hedonic calculus’ became the metric by which all economic action 
was to be measured since all individuals were presumed to be in selfish pursuit of 
maximum utility. Crucially, this allowed value to be quantified as price at the intersection 
of supply and demand 
 
Neo-classical economics extended the classical concept of utility, theorised by Bentham, 
using it to calculate the differential or marginal utility between competing consumption-
choices. This incorporation of subjective ‘desire’ – the ‘hedonic calculus’ – into the 
calculation of value allowed price to be quantified, thereby, effectively, freeing the 
commodity-form from the constraints of the classical cost-of-production thesis. The advent 
of neo-classical economics and its calculation of marginal utility, based upon the 
substitutability of similar commodities, breathed life into the figure of the ‘consumer,’ who 
had formerly been a mere destination for the commodity-form’s utility. These ‘consumers’ 
could be glimpsed frequenting the nascent retail network of imperial Europe’s fledgling 
modernity, the bazaars, arcades and magasins des nouveautés of Britain (Jevons), Austria 
(Menger) and France (Walras). In these spaces the elasticity of subjective demand and its 
aggregation as the market found concrete expression, and the inter-subjective, or social, 
dimension of ‘consumer society’ revealed itself (von Wieser, 1889) in phenomena such as 
fashion (Simmel, 1997). The ‘pleasures’ promised by commodities were not confined to 
either the ‘use-values’ deliberately instilled during production or to the subjective 
calculation of utility based upon a subjective appreciation of these use-values. Instead, the 
supra-individual (social) qualities of the commodity-form became apparent in the ‘revealed 
preferences’ of individuals seeking to display their taste and discrimination: the absence of 
sumptuary laws obliged the commodity-form to assume the burden of representing the 
differences between individuals through their ‘consumption.’ This ‘representational’ 
(Buck-Morss, 1993) or ‘supra-economic’ (Simmel, 1990) value of the commodity-form 
allowed it to signify subjective culture through the arrangement of objective culture – 
‘consumption goods’ (Jevons) became the hallmark of personal development and societal 
progress.   
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The failure of classical political economy to theorise value fully had obliged neo-classical 
economics to figure it as marginal utility – as the consequence of subjective experience. 
This marriage of humanism and utilitarian psychology tied self-development as individual 
identity to the acquisition of goods via the sphere of exchange and circulation, the absence 
of which could be used to explain the lack of such virtues among the poor, the mad and the 
primitive. Economic action, therefore, became an index of rationality and reason that was 
materialised within the commodity-from and its tasteful ‘consumption.’ Membership and 
participation in ‘consumer society’ appeared, therefore, to consist in the exchange of 
money for commodities: thereby denying the role of the relations of production or of 
distribution (wages) in the constitution of the capitalist consumption-relation. Indeed, this 
formed the basis of Marx’s critique of political economy and its extension in recent times 
(Fine & Leopold, 1993; Fine, 1995; Fine, 2002) through the ‘system of provision 
approach.’ Likewise, Keynes identified in the relationship between the spheres of 
production and ‘consumption’ – and its impact upon the distribution of money-wealth – a 
key component of ‘aggregate demand’ as an inter-subjective phenomenon capable of 
impacting the realm of production – as a prompt to supply. Keynes, along with the 
Institutionalist School in the USA, represents an attempt to explain the subjective and 
objective constraints upon the ‘propensity to consume,’ as money earned, spent or saved, 
to align desire with demand and disposable income. However, even here the limitations of 
the ‘economic approach’ are evident in that the centrality of exchange-relations in the 
transformation of subjectivity hinted at by Simmel (1990), and developed by recent 
theorists of technology (Latour, 1993; Massumi, 1993; 2003; Vattimo, 1988; Verbeek, 
2005), is absent.  
 
The apparent autonomy of the sphere of circulation and exchange allowed the bourgeois 
subject to pursue its belief in individual identity through the construction of a unique self 
(Ferguson, 1990) from among the ‘fragments’ of capitalist modernity: the commodity-
form. The bourgeois subject, recast as homo œconomicus, patrols the sphere of circulation 
and exchange in search of satisfactions that further refine the personality, through the 
development of taste and distinction: the commodity-form appropriated through ‘final 
consumption’ is expressed as material utility (function or physiological gratification) and 
immaterial significance (meaning or status). In this way the sphere of circulation and 
exchange is conflated with the money-economy and its socio-spatial settings (from 
shopping malls to Ebay) and exchange is perceived to be merely the prelude to (final) 
‘consumption. The reification of exchange within the money-form can be seen to advance 
beyond the conception held by neo-classical economics, 'value becomes supra-subjective, 
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supra-individual, yet without becoming an objective quality and reality of the things 
themselves' (Simmel, 1990: 42) Here the value of an object appears to the ego as a 
'demand' for a 'corresponding' value, that is, as an autonomous entity rather than simply a 
subjective valuation based on desire. The money-form, as a particular technology of 
exchange that has developed within the capitalist mode of production, underpins the 
‘general alienation of values’ discussed by Marx (1973) and transforms the subjective 
experience of objective culture – of things, services and experiences. The capitalist money-
form as a technology of exchange facilitates an increasingly de-materialised and 
informational realm that transforms the relationship between subjects and objects, between 
being and having: 
 
No ambition, however extravagant, no fantasy, however outlandish, can 
any longer be dismissed as crazy or impossible. This is the age when you 
can finally do it all. Suddenly technology has given us powers with which 
we can manipulate not only external reality – the physical world – but also, 
and much more portentously, ourselves. You can become whatever you 
want to be.  
- Ed Regis, on ‘extropians,’ cited, Plunkett & Rossetto, 1996: 2.10 
 
The ‘chronically mediatized’ form of the modern money-form (Dodd, 1994) upon which 
such ‘techno-futurist’ claims are predicated is born of the principle of ‘exchangeability’ 
(Mead). Money, as the ‘ultimate means’ and the ‘unifying’ point of innumerable sequences 
of purposes (and possessions) reveals a ‘significant relationship to the notion of God’ 
(Simmel, 1990: 236-7), in that it appears to make all things possible.  
 
Money, in its unity of diversity, individuality and contradiction is an abstraction that 
hovers ‘above’ that which it contains and, as the means to attainment of goods and 
services, possesses an apparent autonomy and ‘spectral objectivity’ (Marx). This bestows 
upon the ‘culture of things’ a freedom from the subjective desires of mere ‘consumers’ - at 
least as they are conceived of by economic theory. The infinite exchangeability of all 
things within the medium of the money-economy (Mead) is exacerbated when exchange-
value is re-presented as immaterial information freed of physical constraint and external 
causality. Within the ostensible infinity of exchange that constitutes the ‘terrain’ of modern 
consumption no foundational value survives, as God, the experience of time and space, and 
the bourgeois subject and its desiring ‘self’ are relativised (Vattimo, 1988).  
 
The ‘new life’ of bourgeois culture began to be studied for its ‘laws of operation’ by men 
of science, letters and philosophy and the comprehension of the world through the 
scientific method, therefore, was the re-presentation of the world as theoretical abstraction. 
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Consequently, the ‘independence and neutrality’ of the ‘formal analysis’ mooted by Dobb, 
above, must be rejected in favour of its interrogation as representation, as itself the product 
of the bourgeois world view. The capacity of material culture, as well as the history of 
ideas, to impinge upon and shape the ‘scientific’ description of the objective world or the 
inter-subjective operation of society means that the value-free or ‘objective’ account of 
disciplines such as economics must be interrogated. The central concern of this chapter is 
the ways in which the representations of economic theory seek to explain all economic 
activity, but, in particular, ‘consumption’ as the outcome of innate human faculties being 
made manifest. 
 
The representation of the capitalist market and its medium – the money-form – as a neutral 
arena and technical mechanism for the exchange and circulation of values is rejected and 
the capitalist sphere of circulation and exchange is viewed as a historically and culturally 
specific mode of production that has expanded to span the globe. Otherwise, the 
‘consumption’ found within the global economy of contemporary capitalism might be 
understood as a liberation of humanity, the apparatus by virtue of which the material 
requirements of existence are catered to. This would be to conceive of the abundance of 
goods, services and experiences made available by contemporary capitalism as answering 
a lack within the human subject – a conceit beloved of bourgeois psychology and capitalist 
economic theory. The capitalist mode of production must not be viewed as a response to an 
a-historical aspect – or flaw – in a putative human nature, rather it should be seen as a 
constitutive element of modern subjectivity and born of a particular historical tradition. 
This chapter attempts to identify the economic ‘bequest’ that sociological ‘theories of 
consumption’ inherited from economic theory’s accounts of ‘consumption’ and 
‘consumers’ within the capitalist mode of production.  The construction of a fundamentally 
rational and utility–seeking individual as the ideal-type ‘consumer’ emerged in economic 
theory as a constituent element of the bourgeois world view which capitalism had carried 
to prominence. The ‘consumer’ of economic theory - homo œconomicus – and his or her 
‘consumer activity’ tended to be viewed as politically neutral, simply the external 
manifestation of the rationality and Reason inherent within the subject.   
 
Simmel’s focus upon exchange and its contemporary review by Dodd highlight the active 
role of the money-form in linking production to circulation and exchange within capitalist 
economics.  The money-form must be viewed as a technological rather than a neutral 
device; its role is transformative rather than merely passively communicative.  The active 
role accorded the money-form allows the re-theorisation of the relationship between 
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subject and object in capitalist modernity and their interaction within the sphere of 
circulation and exchange.  The money-form’s role as the medium for the managed 
exchange of values, viewed as a technology, allows the philosophical examination of 
Value (Vattimo, 1988) to be discussed within the realm of exchange (Baudrillard). This, 
then, allows the critique of economic theory to reveal the disparity between the framework 
for phenomenological experience, provided by the capitalist mode of production’s 
constituent elements – the division of labour, the commodity form and the mature money 
economy – and the forms which that phenomenon assumes.  Marx’s distinction between 
phenomenological forms and essential relations must now be bridged by recourse to a 
sociological approach that echoes Simmel’s ‘sounding depth’ in its capacity to 
conceptually unite that which appears separate.  Only in this manner can the analysis of 
modern consumption and the phenomenological forms of subjective experience it affords 
be accessed by a sociology that has abandoned the individualist preconception of a 
utilitarian psychology of the ‘consumer’ and ‘consumer activity.’ 
 
The analytical distinction between what is termed modern consumption and the description 
of ‘consumption’, ‘the consumer’ and ‘consumer activity’ within the discourse of 
economic theory provides the basis for a review of sociology accounts of ‘consumption’ – 
as distinct from modern consumption – in Chapter Two.  This distinction is achieved 
through a review of the historical schools and movements within economic theory and the 
account of capitalist economic practice that these provide.  The post-Renaissance 
Mercantilist school, with its emphasis upon national autarchy, is succeeded by the 
Physiocrats, who formulate a model that describes the circulation of goods in terms of the 
human body.  The centrality of the ‘physiological’ concept to early capitalist economic 
theory continues with Classical political economy, especially that of Adam Smith. Marx’s 
critique of the classical political economists and their failure to fully comprehend the social 
nature of production and its consequences for demand – the absence of a comprehensive 
theory of value – is extended in the attempt by the first generation of Neo-classical 
political economists to see demand as an epiphenomenon of utilitarian psychology.  
 
Beginning with Simmel, who is influenced by both the ‘second generation’ of the neo-
classical movement and the ‘historical’ school of Schmoller (see Frisby, 1990), the 
centrality of the mature money-form within the capitalist mode of production is examined. 
The generalised exchange of commodities made possible by the money-form bequeaths to 
the objects of exchange a ‘semblance of autonomy’ (Marx) not as quantities of use-value, 
but as representations of subjective desire capable of being realised through exchange. 
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That is, they appear as representations of exchange-value divorced from the processes of 
production that brought them to the market.  
Commodities appear before their prospective consumers, in the capitalist sphere of 
exchange and circulation, as free-floating entities whose use-values consist entirely in their 
perceived utility. This value is represented as the sacrifice of exchange-value (the money 
price) necessary to conquer the distance between the desiring subject and the desired 
object. This is what allows Mead (1901), when discussing Simmel’s Philosophy of Money 
to assert that the exchangeability of all values within the money-form is their determining 
characteristic.  Here Dodd’s discussion of the conjunction of technology, specifically 
information or mass media technology, and the money-form is pertinent.  Dodd’s (1994) 
attempt to formulate a ‘postmodern economics’ that encapsulates the money-form’s ‘dual 
character’ – it has both a material basis in the exchange of goods and services, and a 
symbolic dimension – leads him to an ‘informational’ understanding of a ‘chronically 
mediatized’ money-form.  Dodd’s debt to Baudrillard, particularly the Baudrillard of For a 
Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, indicates the relationship between Being as a 
philosophical value and ‘value’ as a category that circulates in exchange Where previously 
Being was guaranteed by God, as the foundation of all values, that which is never 
relativised, within the money-form all values are made relative to each other through the 
quantitative expression of their exchange value. 
 
 
The privileged role of the sphere of circulation and exchange in explaining modern 
consumption within capitalist modernity is revealed by extending Mead’s observation of 
the exchangeability of all things within the mature money-form to include the 
consequences for the subject.  And this is precisely what economic theory cannot do - 
economic theory presumes upon the inherent rationality of the actors that it seeks to 
describe, even if allowing for that rationality to be bounded, partial or susceptible to the 
temptation of its opposite.  Economic theory’s axiomatic adherence to the rational pursuit 
of satisfaction, whether understood as utility in the narrowest sense or not, has bequeathed 
to the sociology study of ‘consumption’ the pursuit of accumulated instances of ‘consumer 
behaviour’ or the task of documenting the process of identity or lifestyle ‘construction’.  
The failure of such approaches is detailed in Chapter Two, for now it is the inadequacies of 
economic thought that require attention. 
 
The qualitative distinction, insisted upon by Marx as well as his inheritors, is based upon a 
(productive) incorporation into the on-going process of production of existing 
 39 
commodities, as opposed to a (final) ‘consumption’ that exhausts the commodity in its use 
but does not lead directly to further production. Effectively, ‘final consumption’ is the 
private and individual acquisition of a commodity and is said to involve 'the exit of its 
values from continuing circulation, its role is no longer defined by the internal logic of 
capital and its laws' (Fine, 1995). This is problematic in as much as ‘final consumption’ - 
as the material exhaustion of the use value(s) of a commodity - would remain a part of the 
process of the reproduction of both the labour power of the ‘consumer’ and the system of 
cultural meaning that informs this process. Fine & Leopold accept that ‘final consumption’ 
has a role to play in the reproduction of labour power but reject the positing of 
consumption as merely a relationship between economic agents. What they do not do is 
extend their analysis of the structural integration of productive and ‘final consumption’ 
into an analysis of the forms which final ‘consumption’ assumes. The focus on the sphere 
of exchange can often lead to an analysis of consumption that concentrates on what Fine & 
Leopold (1993: 264) call 'the ideological construction of the use value of a commodity,' 
which they associate with advertising or brand image. The social construction of these use 
values occurs within the relations of capitalist production, circulation and exchange though 
this is not always adequately reflected by non-Marxist analyses of consumption. For Fine 
& Leopold (1993: 265-7), the work of Baudrillard epitomises this trend where 'the 
determination of use value tends to become freed from its material foundations,' leading to 
a neglect of the object’s physical properties. 
 
Once again economic theory is confronted by an apparent disjunction between 'surface 
phenomena' and 'essential relations' (Marx), between representation and reality. Political 
economy, even in its revised versions, finds it very difficult to explain the reasons why 
‘consumer’s’ want the things they do, other than the assertion of a tautological need for 
them. There is a tendency to assign the ‘consumer's’ desire for a commodity a readily 
explicable source, that of 'false need' stimulated by advertising, or want based on social 
emulation or even, in the case of Bourdieu's 'New Institutionalism' (Gagnier, 2000), a taste 
built along class lines. None of these approaches can assign definitive and specific reasons 
as to why ‘consumers’ desire particular products or commodity services. The revised 
political economy and its 'system of provision approach' espoused by Fine and Leopold 
(1993) among others provides an invaluable insight into the product history of any 
commodity. It allows a complex path to be traced, one that highlights the myriad 
connections forged between individuals, groups, nations and corporations in the 
production, distribution and exchange of commodities. What it can not provide is any real 
insight into the way in which ‘consumption,’ as a moment in the extended process that is 
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the capitalist mode of production, is also a highly charged and socially significant form of 
interaction beyond the moment of purchase. Political economy, classical or revised, 
remains rooted in an approach based upon the physical as opposed to the representational 
(social) qualities of the commodity-form. 
 
Fine & Leopold (1993) attempted to correct the absence of an analysis of the 'surface 
phenomena' of exchange, through an explanation of the system of provision of the 
commodity-form. This allows a focus on the inter-relationship between production, 
distribution, exchange and circulation, between the market and the global division of 
labour and, thereby, to understand ‘consumption’ as an extended sociology-spatial process. 
This ‘system of provision' approach was reiterated by Fine (1995: 134-9) and developed to 
encompass the emphasis of classical political economy on the 'social properties that [those] 
goods command,' while rejecting neo-classical theory’s consideration of 'consumption in 
the abstract across all goods simultaneously.' This ensures an investigation of the 
'analytical determinants' rather than simply the 'immediate aspects of consumption’ and 
necessitates an explanation of the motives for acts of ‘consumption’ rather than an 
assumption of the 'imperative of variety' associated with the neo-classical theorisation of 
demand for goods. This attempt to re-impose the categorical distinction between use- and 
exchange-value, apparently lost in the description of the money-form's operation offered 
by Simmel, and the problems it faces are addressed by Dodd, in The Sociology of Money: 
Economics, Reason and Contemporary Society (1994). For Dodd, the money-form 
possesses a 'dual character,' having both a basis in the exchange of goods and services, and 
a symbolic dimension. As part of his attempt to formulate a 'postmodern economics,' Dodd 
rejects the 'structuralism' of Habermas' system and the 'functionalism' of Parsons. Instead, 
Dodd formulates an 'informational' understanding of money, claiming it is redolent of 
Baudrillard's (1983) description of the ‘commodity-sign.’ This leads to a 'chronically 
mediatized' conception of money that promotes forms of sociation that are distinctively 
modern and reminiscent of the characterisation of (post)modernity given by Vattimo, in 
The End of Modernity (1988). 
 
This, however, far from stripping all sense from the notion of value… 
instead liberates that notion in all its vertiginous potentiality: only where 
there is no terminal or interrupting instance of the highest value (God) to 
block the process may values be displayed in their true nature, namely as 
possessing the capacity for convertibility and an infinite transformability 
or processuality.  




Pre-Classical Economic Theory: 
The attempt to describe and explain the operation of the world and its inhabitants animates 
all social science endeavours. For post-Renaissance Europe this required addressing the 
increasing importance and prevalence of trade (Braudel, 1982), the loosening or 
dissolution of feudal ties to the land and the aristocracy (Hilton, 1976; Holton, 1985) and 
the movement towards the formation of the modern nation-state. Where the feudal world 
had appeared ‘static’ and unchanging, tied to God’ s will and its incarnation as the social 
order, the Renaissance self-consciously embraced the transformations inherent in history 
by addressing the culture and knowledge of antiquity. Against the ‘static’ world of the 
feudal period the mobility of the then contemporary era stood out, for the precursors of 
modern economic thought, the Mercantilists and Physiocrats, the human body and its 
physiognomy provided a model with which to describe the world, particularly the 
circulatory system, or Nature itself through the cyclical patterns of the seasons and the 
inevitability of their return – a concern of the astronomy of the time. A contemporary 
understanding of this system and its internal dynamics began to be theorised, a theory of 
society and the relations that pertained between its constituent elements (Ferguson, 1990).  
 
Mercantilism was concerned less with theories of production or ‘consumption’ than with 
the accumulation of wealth. It had arisen, as a loose affiliation of theories, at the close of 
the sixteenth century and held sway until the mid-eighteenth century (Blaug 1970: 10). The 
basic tenet was the desirability of a favourable balance of trade: expressed as a surplus of 
production (export) over the level of ‘consumption’ (import) for both a country and an 
individual. This would then lead to an accumulation of wealth, which in its turn was to 
lead to an empowering and safeguarding of the nation and its interests. However, as Blaug 
(1970: 12) bluntly notes, 'the idea that an export surplus is the index of economic welfare 
may be described as the basic fallacy that runs through the whole of the mercantilist 
literature.' This is false since a permanent 'favourable' balance of trade, of exports 
surpassing imports in money value (especially when such international transactions were 
conducted in precious metals), resulted in an influx of coin to the domestic realm. This 
then acted as an inflationary pressure and forced up prices so impoverishing domestic 
‘consumers’ and, in turn, fuelling increased wage-levels, which would then reduce the 
profit margin on goods sold at home and force up the price of exports, thereby reducing 
their volume. 
 
The French Physiocrats, with whom Adam Smith’s theories of rent and wages shared an 
affinity (Clarke, 1982: 27-9), believed that it was the social and economic conditions, 
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experienced as objective entities which regulated behaviour and the forms that economic 
action took. Smith shared with, or borrowed from, the Physiocrats the notion of capital as 
'an advance' that is made up or repaid from the 'yield' of a surplus, although the formula for 
the calculation of wages used by Smith and the Physiocrats differed markedly (Dobb, 
1973: 40). The Physiocratic doctrine opposed Mercantilism as protectionist, believing that 
wealth resided in the transformative powers of labour and nature. In agriculture, the action 
of labour upon Nature acted to multiply value, thereby creating a surplus that could not be 
achieved in manufacture or trade, since these forms of economic activity were held merely 
to add or combine those elements in which value already consisted. For the first time, 
wealth is depicted as a social relation, as something more complicated than a mere quantity 
of valuable commodities. Interestingly, this wealth was thought of as supra-individual, 
although probably still in terms of the nation rather than the individual, and there is no 
notion that wealth could translate into a demand for goods and services. Such a theory 
betrays a lack of an understanding of demand acting as a determinant of the value of a 
commodity, of the kind seen in political economy. 
 
Marx described the Physiocrats as the ‘fathers of modern economics’ because they could 
identify, separately, money and capital. However, they failed to follow this through, 
theorising this distinction only in terms of 'the simple production process' (Marx, 1973: 
328). The definitive text of the Physiocratic School was Quesnay’s Tableau Économique, 
published in 1758, in which Asendorf (1993: 8), observes the description of abstract 
economic processes in terms 'derived from the model of the circulation of blood in the 
human body.' This he says has the inevitable consequence of limiting the explanatory 
power of the analogy: 
 
With economic life taken to be a natural process, with only land and soil, 
but not trade and industry, understood as productive forces, [the 
Physiocratic school] cannot conceive such an important category as labor, 
nor the distinction between the natural price and the market price, that is, 
between use value and exchange value. 
 
The Mercantilists rooted their thought in the accumulation of riches as wealth, reminiscent 
of the primitive accumulation that Marx saw as a prerequisite for the emergence of a mode 
of production that relied upon capital: in short, the Mercantilists failed to conceive of the 
abstract existence of ‘value,’ which could have been better represented as an activity of the 
mind rather than the body. The Physiocrats, with whom Adam Smith had such an affinity, 
were concerned to explain the nature of productivity within a society that was increasingly 
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coming to be dominated by the market, and this they did by an analysis of capitalist 
agriculture during the early eighteenth century. 
 
The Enlightenment had bequeathed a 'shared humanity' (Ferguson, 1990), but the portion 
of the wealth of the world to which each individual, class or nation was deemed entitled 
remained to be established. This task fell mainly to the new science of political economy. 
Where Mercantilism saw the wealth of a nation in its riches, its stock of money and its 
hoard of treasure, Adam Smith had a different opinion as to the location and origins of 
national wealth. Political economy’s stress upon the varying rates of return to the different 
factors engaged in production, epitomised by Ricardo, makes explicit the centrality of a 
capitalist division of labour and the increased scale of commodity production which 
derived from this. Classical political economy differed from previous economic theories in 
that it conceived of the economy as a mechanism for the production of goods, as an 
abstract entity subject to laws of operation that could be discerned by rational analysis. 
Furthermore, what these laws of operation actually governed was the interaction of rational 
individuals acting in pursuit of their own self-interest. The description of the economy 
offered by political economy can be seen to be intimately connected to other forms of 
understanding, especially those that concern themselves with ideas about human 
motivation and behavioural make-up. Adam Smith prior to formulating his theory of 
political economy had published The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), which contained 
the outline of his conception of human nature and the determinant factors of behaviour. 
The number and variety of these economic agents acted to generate the mechanism that 
was the early capitalist economy. The economy, however, was not comprised solely of 
selfish atoms maximising their self-interest; it also included the unintended consequences 
of these intentional actions and the objective social reality that they constituted (Dobb, 
1973: 38-9). The economy was historically grounded and socially segregated rather than a 
simple aggregate of individuals, as it would become for neo-classical thought. The 
discussion of ‘production’ as the labour of work can also be usefully distinguished from 
‘exchange’ as the expenditure of effort in play, and the absence of productive activity that 
apparently characterises the latter (Caillois, 2001). 
 
Classical political economy’s focus on production was complemented by its attention to 
the factors of production and, notably, on the supply of these factors and its consequent 
effect upon their price. Through the study and explanation of the dynamic process that 
comprised supply the workings of the capitalist economy, what Marx would call 'its laws 
of operation,' emerged. Unlike the Physiocrats, the political economists could distinguish 
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between embodied and commanded labour and, therefore, acknowledged a distinction 
between the price commanded by a commodity in the market and the value of the labour 
which a commodity embodied as a result of its process of production. This represented the 
first attempt to engage with value understood as an abstraction, as a distinction between 
‘natural’ and ‘market’ price. While both Smith and, particularly, Ricardo had demonstrated 
an interest in social class and, arguably, ‘consumption’ by examining the rewards offered 
by production to the social classes involved, their main interest lay in the creation of 
wealth. Despite this obvious interest in the capitalist production process neither Smith nor 
Ricardo developed fully-fledged theories of value (Veblen, 1969: 144). Dobb (1973: 32) 
notes of Ricardo that his theory of profit preceded his theory of value, while Blaug  (1970; 
42) says of Smith, and specifically his cost-of-production theory, that he had 'no theory of 
value whatever.' It was Marx who first pointed out the shortcomings in the political 
economists’ conception of value, especially their understanding of exchange-value. Marx 
focused upon the wage-relation as a social relation rather than simply as a generalised 
factor of production (cost).  This revealed that although the return to labour for its role in 
production appeared as a ‘surface phenomenon,’ part of the realm of circulation and 
exchange, it was actually a part of the distributive relations that derived from the social 
organisation of production. Access to income was largely dictated through the relationship 
to the means of production; therefore, social class governed ‘consumption.’   
 
Classical Political Economy: Smith and Ricardo 
The role of labour within the capitalist mode of production was central to classical political 
economy. However, the role accorded to the labouring classes by theorists such as Smith 
and Ricardo is, in retrospect, somewhat limited in that they were restricted to a role within 
production, rather than acknowledged as ‘consumers’ of anything but corn. 
 
This is the fundamental proposition which forms the basis of the doctrine 
of the Physiocrats that all non-agricultural labour is unproductive. For the 
professional economist it is irrefutable. 
“This method of adding to one particular object the value of numerous 
others of as it were heaping up various values in layers on top of one 
single value, has the result that this value grows to the same extent… The 
expression ‘addition’ gives a very clear picture of the way in which the 
price of a manufactured product is formed; this price is only the sum of a 
number of values which have been consumed, and it is arrived at by 
adding them together; however, addition is not multiplication.” 




Where the political economists dissent from the Physiocrats is in finding manufacturing to 
be equally as productive of wealth as agriculture. Blaug’s  (1970, 41-2) description of 
Smith’s cost-of-production theory is useful here. The value of a commodity is the sum of 
the normal amounts payable to all the factors used in making it.  So, the ‘natural price’ of 
an article in the real world is determined by the money costs of production as made up of 
wages, rents and profits, themselves the ‘natural price’ of labour, land and capital. This is, 
simultaneously, a rejection of the reduction of value (or price) to the labour expended in its 
production, that is, embodied, and an acknowledgement that price and value are distinct 
and also relative. Smith here extends the Physiocratic notion of a 'multiplication' of value 
from agriculture into manufacturing (implicitly through the division of labour). What this 
does not allow Smith to do is to offer a theory that can account for the price of productive 
services. 
 
For Smith 'effectual demand' is the demand for a commodity at its 'natural' or 'long-run 
equilibrium price.'  In order that this price is maintained 'the quantity of every commodity 
brought to the market naturally suits itself to the effectual demand,' that is, the supply will 
alter to ensure that the price is maintained. Demand, in political economy, has no influence 
upon the determination of the 'natural price' of a commodity or, more importantly, upon the 
factors of production. Classical political economy accepted that labour was a commodity 
that was sold, exchanged, by the labouring classes in return for their means of subsistence. 
Instead labour, for political economy, was a factor of production that required to be 
rewarded for its role in the process of production. The reward or payment of labour was 
not calculated on the transformative role of labour expended in production, but, rather, 
upon its belonging to a tripartite relationship that also involved capital and land. On this 
reading ‘demand’ has no lasting effect upon either supply or Nature, merely inducing a 
fluctuation in price that was perceived as a temporary deviation: therefore, demand is 
merely social. So, the value of labour, as with all commodities, was determined by its 
supply, which would fluctuate around its 'long-run equilibrium price.' The demand for 
labour by the production process would be answered, in the short term, by the recruitment 
of the then unemployed, and in the long term by the increased labour population which an 
increase in real wages – the increased demand for labour had effected – had brought about. 
Malthus demonstrated the reverse of this thesis when he envisaged poverty and starvation 
as being the limit-factors on the labour population as a consequence of a decline in demand 
for their product. Both versions of this thesis prioritised supply over demand and 
production over ‘consumption.’  
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What political economy, explicitly, did not consider was that labour, as a social class, 
might have demands which it would make. Demand being based upon apparently natural 
or social needs was by definition inelastic, leading to Adam Smith’s assertion that 'the 
desire of food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity of the human stomach' (cited 
Blaug, 1970: 86). Here social or human need is grounded in biology; it is given fixed and 
bodily limits rather than an expansive or even infinite quality. This was necessary if the 
supply price of labour, its 'natural' price at which it would reproduce itself, was to be 
calculated. The assumption of a bodily limit to ‘consumption,’ governed by the size of the 
stomach, allowed Smith to formulate his 'unit of social account' as a relation between the 
money price of corn and silver. In this way the general welfare of a society in general 
could be judged by calculating the fluctuating price of labour against either the short-term 
stability of silver or the long-term stability of corn (Blaug, 1970: 53). Such a society, 
despite these periodic and temporary fluctuations, is relatively static and its general well-
being is maintained by the perceived ‘disutility’ of labour. The subjective experience of the 
labour process as 'task and toil' (Smith) means that productive labour is a sacrifice of free 
time in exchange for money. This makes Smith akin to Ricardo, in that 'improving welfare 
[is] a negative function of human effort per unit of output; or to put it plainly, we are better 
off if we work less to produce one unit of output' (Blaug, 1970: 53-4). Society, therefore, 
tends towards the same type of equilibrium as the price of silver or corn because of the 
‘natural’ dis-inclination to work when basic bodily needs, measured by the stomach, are 
satisfied. Society is forced from its Edenic equilibrium when productive expenditure 
(work) is not geared towards physiological limits.  
 
This leaves Smith with a very particular distinction between productive and unproductive 
labour. Productive labour results in an increase in the stock of vendible goods and so 
contributes to the national wealth through the production of a surplus, usually in the form 
of increased capital although it could mean higher profits or wages (disposable income). 
Unproductive labour, was ‘consumption’ paid for from revenue, either aristocratic or 
governmental, and was epitomised by 'menial servants' whose labour is an expense 
incurred by their masters for a series of services rendered, none of which Smith deemed to 
act towards the increase of the stock of exchangeable goods, wherein Smith believed the 
wealth of any nation resided. Smith insisted that productive labour manifested itself in a 
'vendible commodity,' possessed of an objective existence, and, therefore, of an exchange 
value - that it was capable of being (re)sold, as opposed to the unproductive labour 
involved in 'services' which perished' in the act of their performance. Marx refined this 
position by conceiving of 'services' as generating surplus value when the labourer was 
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employed by a capitalist who acted as middle-man.  For Marx, it is labour’s character as a 
social relation, its form, rather than its particular content that defines its importance - 
whenever wage-labour generates a surplus, and so expands the stock of capital it is, for 
Marx, productive labour. 
 
The purchase of ‘unproductive labour’ or luxury, usually by government or aristocracy, in 
the form of ‘menial services’ (Smith) itself represents a dis-utility of labour, in that it 
prevents an increase in national wealth – measured in vendible goods. In this Smith’s 
conception of ‘unproductive labour’ is a precursor of Marx’s distinction between 
productive and final ‘consumption,’ where the latter term signals a private utilisation of a 
commodity. Luxurious or aristocratic ‘consumption’ (including that of government 
bureaucracy) has, as its outcome, only its own furtherance, rather than an increase in the 
division of labour or stocks of material goods, yet despite his condemnation of such 
‘consumption’ Smith never tried 'to formulate any thing properly called a labor theory of 
value,' either ‘commanded’ or ‘embodied’ (Blaug, 1970: 54). Such a theory of commanded 
or embodied labour would have entailed the commodity having some means of 
guaranteeing its exchange value, resulting in an objectivist theory of value; this would 
have been contrary to the explicitly social nature of production and exchange, which 
political economy laid such stress upon. 
 
Smith theorised the optimum allocation of resources within and between industries; he did 
not theorise the conditions under which the ‘consumer’ had access to goods. His belief in 
the market, especially the price mechanism, as an efficient means of allocating and 
distributing the goods and wealth created, rested upon capitalist exchange widening the 
scope of the market and extending the division of labour, so promoting the growth of 
capital, volume of goods and income distribution. Likewise, Ricardo’s theory of 
Differential Rent, and later profit, is an analysis of the returns owed to the various factors 
of production. While the Law of Diminishing Returns, which Ricardo develops from 
Smith’s theory of optimum resource allocation, is the first incarnation of a theory of 
marginal productivity it is formulated as a determinant of the role of supply in production - 
rather than as an element that will partly determine demand through its effect upon price. 
This stance derived from Ricardo’s theory of Rent in which, due to its fixed (or, at best, 
extremely inelastic) supply, land was committed to production only when the marginal 
productivity of its yield would ensure a surplus relative to its cost (rent) as a reward for its 
role in production. Land is not a 'free gift of nature' as the classical political economists 
believed but, instead, is a capital good, which entails development and maintenance costs. 
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Land is a product of past labour, just as machines are: it constitutes a factor of production 
only in as much as it consists of an inheritance of accumulated effort and improvements 
bequeathed to the present by the past; it has been produced in its present form through a 
history of investment. This can at least partly be attributed to the fact that classical political 
economy sought to analyse agricultural production rather than manufacturing: classical 
political economy’s analysis was of land (as a generalised abstraction of place) rather than 
space and revolved around specific intrinsic qualities such as fertility and yield. Part of the 
movement from classical to neo-classical political economy is encapsulated in the 
increased abstraction of place (land) as the particular into space, as the generalised and 
empty (this will be of consequence in the discussion of the metropolis). 
 
In an analysis of manufacturing land ceases to have any specific input into the production 
process other than as its spatial location - whose only manifestation as rent revolves around 
its relative proximity to other enterprises, and which is incurred as a cost of production 
that, for Marx, exists in the sphere of exchange. The production of land becomes the 
production of space (a distinctively modern category); it ceases to be either a theological or 
natural matter and becomes an economic one. Land as an element in the constitution of 
value begins to assume a functional rather than a substantial significance. In this it is 
indicative of the wider social and economic changes occurring during this period, value is 
increasingly conceived of as an abstract social relation rather than a physical object or 
commodity, and more readily conforms to the description of capitalist ‘services’ given by 
Marx in Grundrisse. In sacrificing accuracy for convenience of comparison, Ricardo 
 
assumed not only that wages are fixed in terms of wheat but also that they 
are entirely spent on wheat. All agricultural products are wage goods, and 
all manufactured products are luxuries never consumed by workers. 
- Ibid.  
 
This exclusion of the rural labouring classes from the ‘circuits of consumption’ is 
contradicted by a number of historical studies (Glennie 1995; Shammas, 1990, 1993; 
Weatherill, 1988) that reveal expenditure upon ‘luxury’ items, often those geared to 
capitalist self-regulation – such as pocket watches (Thompson, 1967).  Classical political 
economy here fails to align its theory of the supply of the factors of production, which 
labour was included within, with the actual behaviour of the labouring classes, which 
manifested itself as a demand for goods other than those necessary for physiological 
sustenance. This apparent disjunction between physiology and psychology, between bodily 
limits expressed as needs and a desire for a pleasurable excess over utility, reveals the 
labouring classes to be subjects, rather than simply components of a factor of production. 
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Value was a perennial problem for classical political economy, and Ricardo was heavily 
criticised for his notion of 'absolute value, and with it the notion of an invariable standard' 
(Dobb, 1973: 99). Both Dobb and Clarke (1982) stress the need to understand classical 
political economy within the social and historical conditions of the period. The equating of 
a capitalist division of labour increasingly premised on industrial rather than agricultural 
production, allied to the concept of progress, can be seen to reflect the concerns of a 
nascent bourgeoisie keen to legitimate itself and its wealth. The justification for the market 
economy derived, in large part, from Liberal political theory, and its discussion of the 
individual, which in abstract form became the foundation of economic interaction in the 
market. This explains why classical political economy could not formulate a coherent 
concept of class. In as much as land, labour and capital were held to exist in a functional, 
though accidental, relation there could be no investigation of the ownership of private 
property and its consequences. The individual’s emergence as a social form served to mask 
the social relations that determined the particular form that each individual’s socio-
economic situation would assume. 
 
The theorisation of the category of Value by classical economics is deficient. Since the 
labour theory of value did not address the particular social relations of production under 
which value was created, distributed and consumed it could not hope to portray the concept 
of value accurately. It is commodity-producing labour which is the measure of value under 
the capitalist mode of production (Clarke, 1982). This failure to locate the source of value 
within the social relations surrounding the division of labour allowed them to appear 
natural. The disjunction between price and value, which Clarke describes as a 'necessary 
characteristic' of commodity production, is the result of this failure to appreciate the social 
basis of production. For Clarke (1982: 101), it is only Marx’s critique of political economy 
which establishes 'that value and price are concepts that are both valid, but that are 
appropriate to the investigation of different social processes which have to be analysed at 
different levels of abstraction.' What, for Marx, were contradictions inherent to the 
capitalist mode of production appeared to classical political economy as imperfections. For 
Clarke, the role of the State, as intermediary between capital and labour, was to act as 
guarantor of an equitable distribution of the surplus from production among the factors of 
production. The state apparatus is, then, the tool of the bourgeoisie, administering the 




Neo-Classical Political Economy: the role of demand 
Although, as Dobb (1973: 111-2) notes, not all classical political economists were unaware 
of the antagonistic relationship between wages and profit that lay at the heart of capitalist 
relations of production. The pre-cursors of neo-classical economics, such as Senior, had 
identified such antagonism as being dangerous to the social status quo and it is, perhaps, to 
such as they that Clarke should direct his ire. The fundamental problem with the 
explanation of economic activity offered by classical political economy is its failure to 
engage with ‘consumption’ in any way. It fails to do so, in part at least, because classical 
economics believed in the inelasticity of demand, in an absolute standard of value and in 
the failure to grasp that there might be situations in which human appetites could be stirred 
beyond that which political economy considered their natural and fixed limits. Neo-
classical political economy dispensed with classical political economy’s stress upon supply 
and the conditions that governed it. The focus upon production and the distribution of the 
surplus generated to the various factors of production, as their reward, which lay at the 
heart of classical political economy was replaced in neo-classical political economy by an 
emphasis on exchange value as a subjective measure of the perceived use value of 
commodities. Variously described as the 'Jevonian' or 'Marginalist Revolution' 
consumption here became a distinct moment in the economic cycle. Importantly, it is here 
in the movement to neo-classical economics that we first see the recognition, albeit 
implicit, of ‘excess’ in the sense that Bataille (1991) might use the term. In the focus upon 
demand rather than supply the expansiveness of desire (the elasticity of demand) comes to 
the fore. 
 
Within Neo-classical political economy, individual choices as expressions of a desire for 
utility became the subject matter of economics. This extended to the production process 
itself, in which the various factors of production were broken down into productive 
services each possessed of a marginal productivity relative to their cost. The rewarding of 
the factors of production became a function of their contribution to final utility. Therefore, 
the pricing of the various productive services is seen as the exchange value of their 
contribution rather than being linked to the cost of their social and historical generation 
and reproduction. As Dobb (1973: 35) puts it: 
 
Classically, income distribution (e.g. the wage-profit ratio) was a pre-
condition of the formation of relative prices. Per contra, in post-
Jevonian and Austrian theory income-distribution is derived as part of 
the general pricing process… 
 
 51 
Labour is denied the privileged role that classical political economy had assigned it, 
becoming instead one more element of production requiring purchase. Immediately the 
human element that underpinned the labour theory of value is placed in a new relationship 
to its products. Labour as the transformative operation performed upon raw materials 
during the production process is no longer a qualitative category but a quantitative 
phenomenon. Labour now adds (or nominally subtracts), even multiplies (or divides) 
value, it does not create value. As such, the move from classical to neo-classical 
economics can be seen to prefigure the relativisation of (human) Being into exchange 
value described by Vattimo (1988). 
 
The ‘Marginalist Revolution’ 
 
The essence of the economic problem was to search for the conditions 
under which given productive services were allocated with optimal results 
among the competing uses, optimal in the sense of maximizing consumers’ 
satisfactions. This ruled out consideration of the effects of increases in the 
quantity and quality of resources, as well as the dynamic expansion of 
wants, effects that the classical economists had regarded as the sine qua 
non of improvements in economic welfare. 
- Blaug, 1970, 299 
 
The Marginal 'revolution,' which economic theory underwent in the 1860s and ‘70s, 
centred on a change in the emphasis of its investigations. By abandoning classical political 
economy’s preoccupation with the constitution of price through the cost of the factors of 
production, neo-classical political economy effectively re-imagined the world that it sought 
to investigate. The theory of the ‘marginal utility’ of the commodity, focused, instead, on 
the subjective element in the formation of needs and wants, which could then be 
objectively rendered as the cost or sacrifice deemed equivalent to the utility derived from 
the commodity. Neo-classical theory also developed new, subjectively oriented methods 
and procedures, epitomised by Jevons’ attempt to give to the new economics a 
mathematical character. Not only was demand rather than supply to be the determinant 
factor in the formation of price but the varying levels that demand occupied were to be 
charted numerically and open to rational calculation. The emphasis on Value’s subjective 
character and its objective manifestation in the money form, and the primacy of exchange, 
formed the link between the three main theorists of the 'revolution,' Jevons (Britain), 
Walras (France) and Menger (Austria). The national bases for these theorists will be 
relevant when in Chapter Three a ‘geography of luxury’ emerges in the metropolitan 
modernity of Paris, London and Vienna. 
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It is a fundamental precept of neo-classical economics that subjective qualities can be 
rendered objectively, that Value as a rational individual conceives it of can be measured 
and contained by quantitative means - in this case, the money form. This was elaborated on 
by Jevons in Money and the Mechanism of Exchange (1883); it is the money form’s 
embodiment of standardised units of value in a universally acceptable medium and 
denomination that facilitates exchange and, therefore, the satiation of needs and wants. It is 
these functional attributes of the money form, rather than any substantial significance 
deriving from the material in which it consists, that allow value to coalesce into an 
exchangeable form and, thus, satiate human wants and needs. The exchange of values, as 
the exchange of quantities of utility, is the means by which, in modern capitalist societies, 
pleasures are sought and pains alleviated - at least, insofar as economics is concerned. The 
subjective appropriation or 'employment' of goods aimed at the maximisation of utility or 
minimisation of disutility on the basis of a deliberate (rational) calculation of their 
marginal utility for the individual is the starting point of modern economic analysis. These 
analyses consider certain things to be axiomatic: that exchange is exchange between equal 
(free) individuals; that individuals do rationally calculate their self-interest; and that all 
economic action, all exchanges, are attempts to maximise that self-interest. For Jevons, 
pleasure and pain, the subjective manifestations of the economic categories of utility and 
disutility, are feelings possessed of two dimensions - duration and intensity.  
 
Jevons described a decline in intensity of feeling over time in spatial form, specifically that 
of a linear curve. Such a representation of the subjective state is achieved by defining 
pleasure as positive and pain as its negative – as a subtraction from pleasure. ‘Consumer 
subjectivity’ begins at the intersection, or Origin, of the axes, and experiences pleasure 
(utility) or pain (dis-utility) in quantifiable ‘episodes’ that trace the displacement of the 
subject along the axes of the graph, the continuum stretched between pleasure and pain. 
 
The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of 
pleasure and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire of 
happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but 
leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent. […] Self-
imposed in elemental space, he spins symmetrically about his own spiritual 
axis until the parallelogram of forces bears down upon him […]. When the 
force of the impact is spent, he comes to a rest, a self-contained globule of 
desire as before.  
– Veblen, (1969: 73-8)  
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For all his active desire for utility, the ‘consumer’ of neo-classical economic theory 
appears to be ‘subject’ to the oscillations of the market, moved along the axes of libidinal 
life by differential amounts of (dis)utility of varying intensity and duration.  
In view of these hedonistic impulses the over-riding rationality of the bourgeois 
‘consumer’ was fundamental, and the management of the temporal moments between 
satisfactions was vital. Anticipation of 'future actual feeling and of the intervening time,' 
form an inverse relation - anticipation increasing as the temporal interval decreases. Upon 
such anticipation ‘is based all accumulations of stocks of commodity to be consumed at a 
future time' (Jevons, 1970: 98). The pleasure or utility to be derived from any commodity 
was not inherent in that object or experience, utility being a 'circumstance of things' rather 
than an intrinsic quality or substantial property and 'must be considered as measured by, or 
even as actually identical with, the addition made to a person’s happiness' (ibid: 105-6). 
Jevons’ Law of the Variation of Utility (ibid: 106-8) discussed the role that market 
conditions played in the construction of this utility and the marginal satisfactions to be 
gleaned, since utility tended to decrease over time. The needs of the body appeared to be 
satisfied relatively easily, unlike those of the mind, which seemed to individuate the 
subject: 'the more refined our needs become, the less are they capable of satiety. To the 
desire for articles of taste, science or curiosity, when once excited, there is hardly a limit' 
(Jevons, 1970: 111). The refined palate is capable of collecting ever-more exotic tastes, 
sensations and experiences, while those on the periphery of bourgeois conceptions of 
rationality can not conceive of the teleological trajectory necessary for such rarefied 
pleasures: 
 
The untutored savage, like the child, is wholly occupied with the 
pleasures and the troubles of the moment; the morrow is dimly felt; the 
limit of his horizon is but a few days off. The wants of a future year, or 
of a lifetime are wholly unforeseen.  
- Ibid: 99 
 
Jevons, in the preface to his Theory of Political Economy (1871), aspires to 'treat economy 
as a calculus of pleasure and pain,’ as ‘a mathematical science.’ And this in turn reveals, 
through the exchange of equivalents, what Menger (1950: 180) sees as the ‘motive’ of all 
economic activity, namely, 'the endeavour to ensure the fullest possible satisfaction 
of…needs.' As the range of needs expanded the requirement for a broader range of 
economic activity – the division of labour – became evident: 
 
unlike the savage or barbarian, modern economic man's instinctive aversion 
to labor was offset by his desire for wealth, or, in his sexual economy, his 
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instinct for immediate gratification was offset by the sublimation of his 
sexual appetite ("saving" rather than "spending"). 
- Gagnier, 2000: 97 
 
Quite quickly, it would appear, the satisfaction of needs gave way to the pursuit of an 
increasingly ‘refined’ set of wants, by the 1870s – the age of the department store – Jevons 
thinks it necessary to revise Senior’s Law of Variety (1836): 
 
The necessaries of life are so few and simple that a man is soon satisfied in 
regard to these, and desires to extend his range of enjoyment. His first 
object is to vary his food; but there soon arises the desire of variety and 
elegance in dress; and to this succeeds the desire to build, to ornament and 
to furnish - tastes which, where they exist, are absolutely insatiable, and 
seem to increase with every improvement in civilization. 
- Jevons 1970: 103, cited in Falk 1994: 110 
 
What begins as a search for variety ends up as the quest for discrimination. The neo-
classical 'creation myth' described two fairly isolated producers each seeking to maximise 
gain through mutual exchange, which they continue to do until the attainment of a limit-
point beyond which one of those involved will no longer esteem the other’s goods 
sufficiently to trade for them (Menger). The logical extension of such an origin is 
summarised, but more importantly epitomised, by Jevons; while Menger (1950: 187) is 
prepared to assert that a 'social economy is made up of individual economies.' Barter is 
inadequate because it relies upon a 'double coincidence' of wants, and does not always or 
usually operate within a given or objective standard of value (1883: 3-5). This, in turn, 
makes the exchange of goods through barter difficult due to the difficulty of the 
subdivision of the object of exchange - simple enough in the case of a bag of corn less so 
for a tailor made suit (1883: 6-7). 
 
The complexities demanded of the exchange system by a ‘consumer’ population self-
consciously seeking to differentiate themselves through ‘consumer activity’ led Jevons 
(1970: 128) to observe that it was pointless to believe that commodities ‘commanded’ a 
value. Instead, '[v]alue in exchange expresses nothing but a ratio, and the term should not 
be used in any other sense.' This conception of value in exchange being expressed as, and 
only as, a ratio is central to Jevons’ formulation of the Law of Indifference (1970: 137), 
which states that 'in the same open market, at any one moment, there cannot be two prices 
for the same kind of article.' Unless 'extraneous circumstances' act to differentiate identical 
objects of exchange in some way, thereby creating a ratio of exchange (difference), 
identical objects will exchange for identical values. While this is a perfectly adequate 
theoretical explanation it addresses only the instant of exchange rather than the long-term, 
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assumes that exchange takes place under perfect conditions and that the ‘consumer’ 
approaches the market free of restraint or compulsion, while possessed of perfect product 
knowledge.  
 
This, of course, is the reduction of ‘consumption’ to the act of acquisition via economic 
exchange – the act of purchase – and, as such, is an inadequate theorisation, although it has 
the virtue of highlighting the role of the money-form as the medium that expresses the ratio 
between subjective desire and the exchange-value (price) of the commodity. In this way 
subjective desire and the perception of utility are rendered as quantitative phenomena and 
are reducible to the individual’s particular psychology, while remaining generalisable as 
part of a de-individualised aggregate of macro-economic demand. Implicit in this 
conception of consumption-as-purchase (in a money economy) is that ‘consumption’ is 
based around alienable goods privately possessed. For Menger (1950: 227-8), Value itself 
had an opportunity cost based on the foregoing of the satisfaction of some other use: this 
develops from his thesis that in the ur-economy of two individuals engaged in exchange a 
choice must be made between direct (use) value and indirect (exchange) value. Simmel 
(1990), more interestingly developed the notion of exchange as the ‘indirect’ use of an 
object or commodity. This is important to Menger’s description of exchange because 
through money the economic good is removed from the sphere of exchange, and deprived 
of its commodity status: 
 
Commodity-character is therefore not only no property of goods but 
usually only a transitory relationship between goods and economizing 
individuals. Certain goods are intended by their owners to be exchanged 
for the goods of other economizing individuals. During their passage, 
sometimes through several hands, from the possession of the first into 
the possession of the last owner, we call them ‘commodities,’ but as 
soon as they have reached their economic destination (that is, as soon as 
they are in the hands of the ultimate consumer) they obviously cease to 
be commodities and become "consumption goods" in the narrow sense 
in which this term is opposed to the concept of "commodity." 
- Menger, 1950: 240-1 
 
While Menger anticipates the ‘anthropological turn’ of recent years (see Appadurai, 1986; 
Miller, 1987), by implying a ‘biography’ of various phases or stages for economic goods 
his analysis relies upon an equation between ‘purchase’ and ‘use’ and fails examine the 
‘purpose’ to which any good is put when it attains ‘consumption good’ status. Value is 
expressed purely as the marginal utility it is deemed to promise, as the ratio expressing 
subjective desire measured against price. Unlike the Classical position, labour has only a 
limited role here – it is only one of several factors of production that must be accounted for 
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through price. Labour, says Jevons (1970: 187), is a 'determining circumstance' of value, 
but never its cause. Neither classical political economy, nor its neo-classical successor has 
proven itself capable of explaining economic activities in any other way than a search for 
utility: value as anything other than a quantitatively expressed ratio remains opaque. 
 
The Second Generation: from von Wieser to Simmel and sociology 
 
The explanation of social formations is a task that the theory of value is no 
longer able to achieve with its means. Economic theory is certainly not 
capable of completely mastering this, rather only a theory of society which 
takes into account factors other than the merely economic. 
- Friedrich von Wieser, Der Natuerlich Werth (1889), cited Frisby, 
(1992:80). 
 
Von Wieser represents what might be called the second generation of neo-classical 
political economy. In 1903 he succeeded Carl Menger to the Chair of Economics at Vienna 
University after his Natural Value (1893) was published in English, originally having been 
published in German in 1889. In his preface to this work he states that: 
 
The obscure conception of value is to be made clear; all its manifold forms 
are to be described; the service of value in economic life is to be analysed; 
the connection of value with so many other economic phenomena is to be 
shown; in short, we have to give a philosophy of value which needs words, 
not numbers. 
 
Here the attempt to advance marginal analysis beyond the 'mathematical character' and its 
role of a 'calculus of pleasure and pain' first takes shape. Von Wieser betrays an affinity 
with the attempt to understand economic life from the philosophical and sociological 
viewpoint, which Simmel presents in his Philosophy of Money (first published in German 
in 1900 and revised in 1907). The focus was upon the impact that economic activity had 
caused in various spheres of life. This represented a marked change of tone from the earlier 
generation of theorists who, epitomised by Jevons, saw society as an aggregate of 
individuals and the economy as the aggregate of all economic actions. 
 
The ‘dismal’ science of economics shifted its emphasis from production to become a study 
of ‘consumption’: the political economy of pleasure. The social construction of wants, as 
opposed to physiologically-based conceptions of need, emerged as an object of enquiry – 
taste and the mark of distinction it conferred upon the individual (or society) was now 
inseparable from an analysis of the world of goods in the age of the ‘democratization of 
luxury’ (Williams, 1982). The theorisation of degrees of marginal utility, to which Jevons 
had given a mathematical and graphic character, was formulated by von Wieser (1893: 7-
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10) as Gossen’s Law of the Satiation of Wants, wherein desire decreases as satisfaction 
increases to the 'satiation point.' However, von Wieser (1893: 8) also noted the persistence, 
even the strengthening, of certain wants: 
 
Alongside of the weakening effect which continued satisfaction has upon 
desire, we find also, in certain circumstances, the opposite tendency; that 
the desire grows by repetition and exercise, inasmuch as it is thus 
developed, gets to know itself, its own end and its own means, becomes 
purified and elevated. 
 
Von Wieser (1893: 9) stressed the need to 'distinguish between the want as a whole and the 
several feelings of want which are included in it,' the want as a whole 'retains its strength 
[…] satisfaction does not weaken but rather stimulates it by constantly contributing to its 
development, and, particularly, by giving rise to a desire for variety. It is otherwise with 
the separate sensations of the want. These are narrowly limited both in point of time and in 
point of matter' (1893: 9). For von Wieser, what wealth allows is for the want to develop 
fully. The rich and their wants are not subject to the same urgency of satisfaction as the 
poor; instead, their wants can develop a variety of forms, their palate, so to speak, becomes 
refined over a period of time, their wants becoming more particular as their satisfactions 
become more numerous. 
 
The cultivation of such wants might appear as 'infinite and subject to no diminution,' but 
this, says von Wieser (1893: 9-10), is not the case. The example of a collector is used: here 
the desire to collect grows stronger while the desire for a duplicate, or a repeat experience, 
is weak. There is, in such an example, no immediately discernible limit-point, no horizon 
to the development of the general structure of the need. The nature of such wants leads von 
Wieser (1893: 11) to the relativist observation of 'the contradiction between usefulness and 
value.' This arises through the grouping of sensations of wants as a 'class of wants,' a 
typology that allows for the discussion of certain apparently irrational ‘consumption 
habits,’ whether in the form of collecting objects or experiences or a predilection for 
particular commodities in close succession. The tendency for the degree of utility to vary 
and, importantly, decrease over time as availability of the commodity increases leads to the 
assertion that: 'All our appetites are capable of satisfaction or satiety sooner or later,' 'that 
we can have “enough”. ' Von Wieser, as we shall see, goes on to develop this some years 
later. While here the bodily needs remain bounded (limited), the desires of the mind do 
not, and, so, become bound up with the ‘anticipation’ discussed by Jevons and of the 
‘refinement’ or ‘development’ of the individual as their palates became capable of ever-
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greater discernment. The insatiability of bourgeois desire thus ceased to be a physiological 
matter and became, instead, a different category of want, one born in the mind. 
 
Modern man would henceforth be known by the insatiability of his desires, 
and Others on the road to modernity needed only to be inspired by envy to 
desire his desires, to imitate his wants, to be on the road to his progress and 
his civilization. His nature, insatiability, was henceforth human nature 
itself. His mode, consumer society, was no longer one stage of human 
progress but its culmination and end. 
- Gagnier 2000: 94 
 
‘Progress’ from the ‘primitive’ or natural state could now be measured through ‘consumer 
activity’ and the taste it displayed: the absence of taste (discerning consumer preferences) 
signified either ‘the savage’ (non-European) or the ‘barbarian’ (British/European). Both 
were distinguished by their lack of refinement and continued engagement with the 
‘physiological’ category of ‘need’ and the inability to pursue by rational means their own 
development. This absence of bourgeois rationality and the deferred gratification of 
pleasure signified the failure of morality to reign in the passions (Hirschman, 1977), to 
direct them towards a productive telos. Neither the exotic savage nor the impoverished 
barbarian saw fit to order their needs, passions or desires in the manner that economic 
theory or bourgeois etiquette insisted upon, both seemed innately resistant to the hierarchy 
of satisfactions that this would require.  'The importance of the entire class is measured by 
the entire scale of satiation, especially by its highest degree.' Within each class of wants a 
hierarchy of possible satisfactions is deemed to exist, while each class of wants, itself, is 
involved in a hierarchy. The example used by von Wieser (1893: 12) is that of food being 
more important than finery, as a class, though not necessarily in any individual instance. 
So von Wieser’s hierarchy extends from the base needs of the body to the discriminating 
pleasures of the mind (as types or forms) calculated according to their marginal utility.  
 
MARGINAL UTILITY 
Whereas Jevons, at least implicitly, had given each and any want a scale of satiation with 
equivalent increments of utility (rendered graphically), von Wieser (1893: 15) notes that, 
'wants have not each an equal but each a peculiar satiation scale.' That is, they cannot be 
simply, uniformly or democratically compared to, or substituted for, each other. This 
means that the extension of the scale of marginal utility in the employment of a good 
towards maximised satisfaction does not result in a greater reduction in satisfaction in 
other areas: the opportunity cost can not exceed the increased utility gained. Von Wieser 
(1893: 16-20) again differs from Jevons in his discussion of anticipation. For von Wieser 
(1893: 17), future wants are 'preceded by a psychical reflection, and this reflection is of a 
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totally different nature from the want itself. It is far finer, more innerlich, and, even in the 
case of purely bodily wants, is always mental. […] the desiring is different. Instead of a 
want we have an interest in.' Here, for the first time, there is a movement away from the 
idea that a want is merely an absence or a lack – there is, instead, the introduction of a non-
physical element, an intellectual and moral dimension. That section of society which von 
Wieser (1893: 17-18) termed 'civilised' may have their 'high-water mark of development' 
measured by consideration of their economic actions: ‘Do most people sacrifice their 
means for the pleasure of the moment, or do they lay by for future needs?’ Hence, 
profligacy or hedonism is 'this weakness in human nature,' a departure from rational or 
reasonable behaviour, a lapse in moral fortitude. Immorality and irrationality, thus, become 
commensurate with a failure to understand or adhere to capitalism’s logic of accumulation 
and investment; it represents a privileging of the use of an object over its (exchange-) 
value. And yet, such Earthly folly was perfectly understandable in the afterlife: 
 
In Paradise nothing would have value but satisfactions - neither things nor 
goods. Because there one could have everything, one would not be 
dependent on anything. 
 
This was, for von Wieser, merely a restatement of neo-classicism’s relativist position – that 
use did not equal value. Rather (1893: 34): 'Value is the form in which utility is calculated, 
and this renders calculation infinitely more easy.' So the money-form, as the store and 
denominator of value, appears as the exchange-value of anticipated utility. Any form of 
expenditure, therefore, represents the sacrifice of that amount of value paid as price for a 
commodity, and which now cannot be exchanged for any other quantity of utility. The 
inhabitants of a 'civilised' society (Gagnier, 2000) exercise self-discipline and discernment, 
as their culture develops materially so they develop taste or an aesthetic disposition, 
similar to that which they will require in the afterlife. 
 
Thus, both exchange- and use-values are subjectively calculated and vary with 
circumstance, although there remains an objective sense of exchange-value that derives 
from the costs involved in production, which is discussed by Frisby (1992: 88) as an 
objective transactional value (Verkehrswert) – and today referred to as the ‘China effect’). 
The primacy of exchange-value over use-value, of price over utility, in such instances is 
based upon the ease of replacement of the commodity and its perceived utility. In this 
sense von Wieser can be seen, implicitly, to prefigure Simmel’s (1990: 256-7) discussion 
of the blasé attitude. Wherein, 'the more the acquisition is carried out in a mechanical and 
indifferent way, the more the object appears to be colourless and without interest,' because 
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the purchase of commodities by such 'an indifferent method effaces their specific value.' 
The money-price, then, in no way reflects the value which an object may have for an 
individual or group, it is, instead, the quantitative expression of the sacrifice they will be 
asked to make in order to procure that object. This leads von Wieser (1893: 58) to give an 
example: 
 
The beggar and the millionaire eat the same bread and pay the same price 
for it; the beggar according to the measure of his hunger, and the 
millionaire according to the same measure - that is, according to the 
beggar’s hunger. 
 
This seems to be trapped at the level of abstraction, of a market in which the beggar and 
millionaire both frequent the same bakery. While it is true that the cost of the bread 
measured in its utility to each against its money-price reveals a gross disparity it is more 
likely that the beggar and the millionaire shop separately and pay, relatively, different 
prices. The subjects of economics, those who actually congregate in the market, do so not 
as the Robinsonades envisaged by abstract theory (Marx) but as individuals whose 
relationship to the market is governed in a very real way by the social relations of 
production and the asymmetries of wealth which are their result. 
 
The Marxist Critique 
Neo-classical political economy, marginal utility theory, gives expression in quantitative 
form to the level of demand which exists for a commodity at a certain price, from which 
will be derived a certain level or quantity of utility. The failure of such an economic theory 
lies in its failure to engage with the world, as it is constituted in ‘actuality.’ Just as Marx 
(1973: 83) declared that individual producers 'must be numbered among the unimaginative 
conceits of the eighteenth-century Robinsonades,' and rejected in favour of socially 
determined production then so, too, must the anonymous, a-historical and abstract 
‘consumer’ imagined by economic theory. Neo-classical economics falls prey to the same 
error as its classical predecessor – it fails to acknowledge adequately the social relations 
within which production and ‘consumption’ occur. Marginalist economics, unlike its 
forebearer, does acknowledge the specifically capitalist social relations in which 
‘consumption’ and production take place but it has no place for the other determining 
factors which comprise the decision-making process that it has termed ‘consumption.’ The 
reduction of all economic activity to a cost-benefit analysis is simultaneously the equating 
of production, circulation and ‘consumption.’ Each of these moments in the economic 
cycle is made to appear indifferent (Clarke, 1982; Fine & Leopold, 1993; Fine, 1995). 
Production is rendered as the series of costs incurred by capital in the production and 
 61 
exchange of goods and profit is measured as one of the alternative uses of capital, based on 
their marginal productivity. While ‘consumption’ is the marginal utility measured against 
the cost or sacrifice for either the ‘consumer’ or the producing agent. 
 
Needs, of course, are social and vary historically. The increase in the production of goods 
and services, which the agricultural and industrial revolutions heralded, and which 
economic theory attempted to explain, can not be satisfactorily accounted for by 
economics. An increase in the division of labour in production, and its accompanying 
transformation of the sexual and domestic division of labour, necessarily entails an 
increase in the division of labour in ‘consumption’ aimed at the satisfaction of needs and 
wants. The problem of explaining the transformation of needs and wants which lay at the 
heart of neo-classical political economy’s theory of the individual becomes, instead, for 
Clarke (1982: 184), an integral part of the fabric of modern capitalist society. 'Capitalist 
accumulation whose form is the constant overcoming of natural barriers to the satisfaction 
of human wants, depends on the reproduction of social barriers to that satisfaction. Its 
content is the reproduction of social relations based on an ever-increasing polarisation 
between super-abundance and want.' 
 
The neo-classical abandonment of Ricardo’s pre-occupation with the role and relevance of 
distribution has inescapable consequences for the attempt to theorise both production and 
‘consumption.’ Unless distribution is recognised, as it is by Marx in Grundrisse (1973: 94-
6), as being of determining importance in the relationship between production and 
‘consumption,’ as to the level and form which the latter will assume then any analysis will 
remain incomplete. The centrality of distribution for the classical economists, as well as for 
Marx, is underlined by Dobb (1973: 31-2), when he says that the paramount importance 
accorded to the social and economic conditions which resulted in the emergence of modern 
class-based society meant that 'Political Economy was a theory of distribution before it 
was a theory of exchange-value…' The failure of the neo-classical or ‘marginalist’ school 
to explain ‘consumption’ in economic terms is now exposed as a failure to recognise 
modern consumption as a social phenomenon that derives its form and content from the 
social relations which have shaped its evolution. This point is apparent when considering 
the inadequacy of neo-classical formulations of needs and wants. The attempt to quantify a 
level of need distinct from that of a want is reminiscent of the theological problem of how 




The ‘Marginalists’ favoured an emphasis upon demand either as an aggregate total of 
society or as the expression of the desire or will of a rational, utility-maximising individual 
who would pursue these ends by the means best calculated to achieve them. 
‘Consumption’ in this model became the purchase of utility, subject to a cost-benefit 
analysis of the various choices available and the sacrifice that these would entail. The 
effective 'naturalisation' of market relations (Clarke, 1982), which marginalist analyses 
presented as a theory of individual action, when generalised across society makes the 
capitalist mode of production appear less as a complex socio-economic mechanism for the 
delivery of goods and services (built upon a complex division of labour and the primacy of 
private property sustained by the political actions of a class and their vested interests) than 
as a straight-forward and quite accidental, though fortuitous, state of affairs which allow 
everyone an equal access to the market limited only by their disposable income. Contra 
Marx, for the neo-classical economists, access to ‘consumption’ was not seen as being 
related to production, through social class, but was simply dependent upon income earned 
by virtue of choice of occupation. Marx, in Grundrisse (1973), written between 1857-8, 
and Capital (1976, orig. pub 1867), attempted to set matters straight. These two texts 
stressed the interdependency of production, distribution, circulation and exchange, which 
the concept of the mode of production necessarily entailed. This placed the relation 
between the possession of capital and the necessity of selling one’s labour at the centre of 
any investigation of social relations and demonstrated the fundamental inter-relation of 
production, distribution, circulation and exchange. The market, which, to the neo-
classicists, had appeared as merely a technical device for allocation of resources and their 
exchange, was now exposed as an integral part of the mode of production and of its 
reproduction over time. 
 
Political Economy After Marx 
An updated and revised version of Marxian political economy has sought to critique neo-
classical economics and the theories of ‘consumers’ and ‘consumerism’ that they underpin 
(Clarke, 1982; Fine & Leopold, 1993; Fine, 1995). Starting from Marx’s discussion of the 
interconnected ‘totality’ of production, distribution, exchange and circulation and the 
social relations of the capitalist mode of production they represent a critique of the liberal 
political agenda and its equation of market relations with democratic rights, and seek to 
locate ‘consumers’ and ‘consumption practices’ within the wider framework of a global 
capitalist economy and its 'system of provision' which supplies each commodity and acts 
upon the form of their ‘consumption’ (Fine & Leopold, 1993: Fine, 1995). 
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The 'class blind' analysis offered by neo-classical economics is partly remedied by this 
revised political economy. However, the apparent autonomy of the sphere of exchange and 
circulation and the 'commodity fetishism' that it makes possible is best understood by 
recourse to the writings of Simmel. Here the relationships, which arise under modern 
conditions of production and ‘consumption,’ are examined as the relationships between 
subjects and objects, even when such relations assume the form of relations between 
objects (including the labour of other subjects). Simmel’s analysis, its explication by Poggi 
(1993) and, especially, Frisby (1988; 1990; 1992) will be of particular relevance the 
investigation of specific social forms which modern consumption takes and the conditions 
under which it does so. While classical theory's philosophical anthropology held that, after 
Smith, a man laboured only to fill his belly, and neo-classical theory believed man's (sic) 
desires to be limitless, with wants springing up in the places of satiated needs, both saw 
labour as the means by which deferred gratification enabled satisfaction. The satisfaction 
of desires became a Sisyphean task, embarked upon daily, never-ending and always an 
uphill struggle that was doomed to re-occur. Classical theory saw the social and economic 
arrangement as historical and mutable, and the outcome of particular factors that were 
subject to alteration - specifically, the distribution of the economic surplus. Neo-classical 
economics, by contrast, was less inclined to admit of its historicity and sought to naturalise 
socio-economic arrangements by shifting 'the analysis of economic phenomena from a 
methodology based on factors of production and class to one based on the individual' 
(Gagnier, 2000: 51). The absurdity that characterises marginal utility theorists’ conception 
of ‘consumption’ and ‘consumers’ originates in the extreme abstraction of their 
formulation. Either every individual’s ‘consumer preferences’ are sublimated under the 
preferences of one, representative, ‘consumer’; or each ‘consumer’ represents a 
microcosmic economy bereft of shared preferences. As Fine (1995: 129), points out this 
results in: 
 
extraordinarily narrow analytical boundaries, in terms of both the 
motivational assumptions (confined to self-satisfaction) and the 
behavioural assumptions (pursued with ruthless efficiency). In effect, 
rational economic ‘man’ combines the basest instincts of a selfish beast 
with the highest forms of commercial calculation. 
 
It is this basis in utilitarian psychology that prevents neo-classical or marginal utility 
theory from adequately explaining ‘consumption’ as a process rather than a series of utility 
maximising choices. Rather, as Frisby (1990: xx-i; 1992: 85-6) in his appraisal of Mead’s 
(1901: 616-9) review of Simmel’s The Philosophy of Money observes: 
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…what determines the value of objects is not the impulse to eat or drink or 
love or get gain, but the relations of exchangeability. From this it follows 
that the exchangeability is not based upon a like value, but is the source of 
that like value. 
 
While Mead argues that 'utility or usefulness is a presupposition of all economic activity… 
it cannot be made the standard of value. … The standard of value must be found in the 
objective equations between things that are exchanged in this economic world. This is a 
statement of interest in view of the futile character of the psychological calculations of the 
utilitarians, on the one hand, and the Austrian school, on the other.' 
 
The money-form need not possess any intrinsic value; instead, its value is symbolic. Frisby 
(1992: 85) sees Mead draw a distinction between ' “the subjective world of impulse and 
feeling" that "conditions our desire for objects and an objective world of values” in which 
things  “as distinct from feelings can exist".' It is in this relationship between objects, 
abstracted from the subjective world of feeling, that exchangeability becomes 'the essential 
relation.' Exchangeability is the presupposition of the continuing possibility of exchange: 
that is, the functional significance of the money-form is its defining characteristic. The 
culmination of both neo-classical economics and Mead’s interpretation of Simmel results 
in 'thing-thing relationships' (Frisby, 1992: 87-8). However, the expression of these 
relationships could take different forms: for von Wieser they tended toward a subjective 
conception of value derived from the significance a good held for the individual, thus 
allowing value to appear as a calculable form of utility. But this does not mean that the 
price individuals are be asked to pay for the good will alter in response to their subjective 
evaluation: as described in Jevons’ Law of Indifference. 
 
Simmel’s importance for the analysis of both ‘consumption’ and modern consumption lies 
in his departure from neo-classical orthodoxy, which allowed him to engage with what 
Marx and his inheritors had filed under ‘final consumption.’ While his theory of value 
shares much with the subjective and ‘marginalist’ assumptions of neo-classical political 
economy his distinctly sociological analysis points the way forward. Frisby (1992: 89) 
stresses Simmel’s focus on 'the radical consequences of economic exchange relations, the 
reification of social relations, the shift in focus from individual social action to social 
interaction (which is exchange) and to its reified form, money exchange…' Simmel 
describes how commodities, as values, confront us from the 'intermediate realm' of 
exchange as objective entities. This is what Marx in Capital and, especially, Grundrisse 
sets out to examine through an analysis of the ‘sphere of circulation and exchange.’ This is 
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the manner in which the commodity-form appears to the inhabitant of capitalist society is a 
‘mysterious’ entity bereft of history (causality) and free of the social relations that 
underpinned its physical production. Indeed, insofar as the commodity-object is valued 
‘subjectively’ it appears to shed its material dimension and derive its significance and 
value purely from its relationship to other instances of the commodity-form – as ‘thing-
thing relationships.’  
 
Simmel, Money and the ‘sphere of circulation and exchange.’ 
In Grundrisse (1973: 90), Marx states: 'Production is also immediately consumption. Two 
fold consumption, subjective and objective.' The ‘consumer’ of political economy is 
interpellated within the capitalist mode of production both as the ‘choosing’ individual and 
the abstract endpoint of the whole system, as telos. The ‘consumer’ and the act of 
‘consumption’ are, therefore, inseparable from capitalist production, and its attendant 
social relations. So, Marx (1973: 92) can claim that production 'thus produces the object of 
consumption, the manner of consumption and the motive of consumption. Consumption 
likewise produces the producer’s inclination by beckoning to him as an aim-determining 
need.' By the same token, circulation is either 'a specific moment of exchange' or else 
'exchange regarded in its totality.' For Marx (1973: 99), the production of goods involves 
'the exchange of activities and abilities' and the 'exchange of products' within the 
manufacturing process and, thirdly, 'the exchange between dealers,' which is 'itself a 
producing activity.' Exchange appears apart from production 'only in the final phase where 
the product is exchanged directly for consumption,' that is, where exchange is privatised 
and individuated as ‘consumer activity’ – a prelude to ‘consumption.’ Production, 
distribution, exchange and ‘consumption’ together comprise 'the members of a totality, 
distinctions within a unity,’ – the capitalist mode of production – defined by the 'definite 
relations between these different moments.' The contemporary understanding of 
‘consumption’ is determined by its relationship to these other ‘moments’ of the mode of 
production: 
 
The precondition of commodity circulation is that they be produced as 
exchange values, not as immediate use values, but as mediated through 
exchange value. Appropriation through and by means of divestiture 
[Entausserung] and alienation [Verausserung] is the fundamental 
condition. … Circulation is the movement in which the general alienation 
appears as general appropriation and general appropriation as general 
alienation. 
- Marx, 1973: 196 
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For individuals this gives to circulation the appearance of an 'objective interrelation' which 
then assumes the form of 'an alien social power standing above them.'  
Commodities in circulation, immediately prior to their ‘consumption,’ seem to have little 
to do with production, appearing as 'the daily traffic of bourgeois life' which 'proceeds on 
the surface of the bourgeois world, there and there alone does the motion of exchange 
values, their circulation, proceed in its pure form.' However, this circulation is itself 
dependent upon the continuing production of new values, as commodities, through the 
conjunction of labour and capital. Circulation is, therefore, a 'mediation' governed by the 
social relations of production. 'Its immediate being is therefore pure semblance. It is the 
phenomenon of a process taking place behind it' (Marx, 1973: 255). Through the money-
form exchange value appears to have assumed a form that is independent of circulation 
(what Simmel described as the reification of exchange). In fact this is not the case, only in 
the motion of circulation does money fulfil its roles, both as measure of exchange value 
and medium of exchange - money, as a social form, can have no role outside of economic 
exchange. It is through the possession of money, of exchange value, that the worker enters 
into the apparently autonomous sphere of circulation in order to satisfy his needs or wants. 
The satisfaction of needs through the sphere of circulation, described above, is necessarily 
the ‘consumption’ of use-values produced by labour-power in the process of production; it 
is the ‘consumption’ (consommation) of production, and its reproduction. 
 
On the basis of the distinction that Marx (1976) in Capital draws between 'productive 
consumption' and 'final consumption,' Fine & Leopold attempt to reinvigorate the study of 
‘consumption’ by political economy. The separation of productive from final 
‘consumption’ is necessary to remedy the neo-classical error, which fails to distinguish 
between the use of commodities in production and ‘consumption.’ While both forms of 
‘consumption’ are based on the commodity-form they are integrated into the capitalist 
mode of production in structurally different ways – at different moments – and it is this that 
the neo-classical position fails to appreciate. Final ‘consumption’ occurs upon the exit of 
the commodity from the realm of circulation. The distinction between 'final consumption' 
and 'productive consumption' rests on their differing place on the circuit of (re)production: 
while productive ‘consumption’ is obviously a part of the 'producing activity' Marx 
describes in Grundrisse, final ‘consumption’ as 'the removal of use values from the process 
of circulation' (Fine & Leopold, 1993: 260) has come to be understood as ‘consumption,’ 
as consommation, the expenditure or exhaustion of a value. Thus, ‘final consumption’ 
involves 'the exit of its values from continuing circulation, its role is no longer defined by 
the internal logic of capital and its laws.' This is problematic in as much as ‘final 
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consumption’ - as the material exhaustion of the use value(s) of a commodity - would 
remain a part of the process of the reproduction of both the labour power of the ‘consumer’ 
and the system of cultural meaning which informs this process. While Fine & Leopold 
accept that ‘final consumption’ has a role to play in the reproduction of labour power they 
reject the positing of ‘consumption’ as merely a relationship between economic agents. 
What they do not do is extend their analysis of the structural integration of productive and 
‘final consumption’ into an analysis of the forms which final ‘consumption’ assumes. 
 
While it can be argued (and with some validity) that Simmel examined the ‘mature money-
form’ rather than the role of the capitalist money-form, as a special instance of the 
commodity-form his analysis remains pertinent. The money-form’s reification of 
exchange, epitomised most fully, firstly, by currency or fiat money, which entailed the 
fiduciary involvement of the State and, secondly, the ‘de-materialisation’ of money into 
information (Dodd, 1994) extended the subjective will through the telescoping of steps in 
the teleological sequence. This subjective freedom was realised through the extension of a 
money-price to each and every good or service within capitalist modernity: the acquisition 
and possession of such goods became a means of demonstrating individual freedom, 
revealing for Simmel a ‘mutual dependence between having and being.’ Possession, 
therefore, is not a static or passive condition but an activity (1990:  304), and possession of 
the money-form ‘extends’ being. Simmel saw the individual emerge and develop from the 
interplay between subject and object, through an engagement with the particular properties 
or qualities that constitute the object owned by the subject. Possession of the ‘colourless’ 
object of money, the form that contains all other objects as possibilities, serves to 
‘dissolve’ the particularities of being otherwise conferred by ownership only to reformulate 
this link between being and having ‘on a higher plane’ (1990: 321). This is because the 
possessions of the Ego serve to extend it, the money-form extends the ego further and 
across a wider range of goods, services and experiences than any other object outside of 
the sphere of alchemy, at least it does so potentially, virtually, as possibility (for further 
discussion see Massumi, 1993; 2003; and Chapter Five of this thesis).  
 
‘Possession’ for Simmel is not reducible to ownership, instead it is indicated by the 
subservience of an object to the will of the Ego that possesses it, and extends to include the 
disposal of an object, either in exchange or as a gift: so ‘possession’ is an expression of 
interaction between the ego and the world around it (1990: 322-4).  This spatialisation of 
the ego, its extension into ‘possessions,’ is most apparent when money allows the 
acquisition of experiences rather than objects. Money’s ability to ‘merge’ completely with 
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the purposes of the will or ego allows the emergence of personality types such as the miser 
or extravagant individual, for these ‘types,’ however, the money-form allows – or affords – 
pleasures that do not depend upon the acquisition of goods or services and the utility that 
neo-classical economics would suggest as the rationale for their purchase. This leads 
Simmel (1990: 328) to consider the ‘aesthetic contemplation’ of objects facilitated by the 
money-form through the removal of the barrier between ‘self’ and ‘object.’  
 
Hence the feeling of liberation which is part of the aesthetic mood, the 
release from the dull pressure of things, the expansion of the joyful and free 
self into things, the reality of which usually oppresses it.  
– Ibid 
 
 The ‘psychological flavour of the enjoyment of merely owning money,’ and the ‘peculiar 
coalescence, abstraction and anticipation of actual ownership’ afford ‘to consciousness that 
free scope and ominous self-extension through an unresisting medium, that self-absorption 
of all possibilities without doing violence or denying reality at all’ (ibid). So, Simmel ties 
anticipation to aesthetic pleasure rather than merely the anticipation of utility in ‘final 
consumption.’ 
 
Nowhere is this more evident than in Simmel’s discussion of the handle of a vase or jug, 
an object possessed of both utility and aesthetic or formal beauty (1959: 267-275). 
Simmel’s discussion of the ‘hand’ as the ‘tool’ of the ‘soul’ is reminiscent of the role he 
attributes to the money-form in respect of the ego:  
 
… life reaches out beyond the immediate circumference of the body and 
assimilates the “tool” to itself; or better still, a foreign substance becomes a 
tool in that the soul pulls it into its life, into that zone around it which 
fulfils its impulses. The distinction being external to the soul and being 
within it – simultaneously important for the body and of no significance – 
is, for the things beyond the body, both retained and resolved in a single act 
by the great motif of the tool in the stream of life that is unified and 
transcends itself.  
– Ibid: 269 
 
Entry into realms that are ‘superpersonal,’ therefore, demands the maintenance of ‘the 
integrity of our self-centred being’ since such ‘external’ realms are possessed of their own 
logic and ‘teleology’ (ibid: 274).  The intermingling of subjects and objects mentioned 
here by Simmel anticipates the discussion of the relation between ‘having’ and ‘being’ 
formulated by Latour in his re-reading of Tarde (2001). It is this way that the mature 
money-form comes to resemble both God, as the resolution of all contradictions and the 
locus of causality in contemporary society, and an enormous ‘metaphysical’ mind in which 
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existence is experienced through the abstraction away from material form that 
commodification and its pleasures afford. This is why, for Simmel (1990: 389), there can 
be no sharp distinction between being and owning for this, too, is simply a ‘value concept’ 
determined by the perceived proximity to the ego.  
 
Therefore, the ‘sale of personal values,’ of one’s being or self, in exchange for something, 
most likely cash, implies a diminution or contravention of the ideal of distinction, which 
presupposes the inexchangeability of being.  
 
The distinguished person is the very person who completely reserves his 
personality. Distinction represents a quite unique combination of senses of 
differences that are based upon and yet reject any comparison at all.  
– Simmel, 1990: 390 
 
Distinction, as an ideal, is, therefore, defined by its opposition to the monetised relation 
between having and being, distinction runs counters to a money-price and entry into 
exchange. Distinction is, then, a truly bourgeois concept, the preserve of those who will 
never be obliged to exchange their being as labour and who enjoy the privilege of 
purchasing the alienated being of others. The extension of the money-economy to address 
every aspect of existence, discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, thus reveals the 
contradiction at the heart of the bourgeois world view: the industrialisation of production 
and the consequent ‘mass consumption’ of goods and services, over which they as a class 
presided, ensured that the ‘signs’ of distinction were available to all, just as the deluge of 
etiquette books during the 1840s had made aristocratic manners available to them (Perrot, 
1994).  
 
Simmel’s demonstration of the link between being and having, and the aesthetic rather 
than utilitarian dimension of anticipation that this reveals, highlights the necessity of any 
sociological theory of ‘consumption’ possessing a theory of the money-economy as an 
integral component of the capitalist mode of production, rather than the neutral, technical 
device envisaged by neo-classical theory. The ‘sphere of circulation and exchange’ (Marx) 
of capitalist modernity, therefore, must be seen as the arena within which Marx’s 
distinction between ‘productive’ and ‘final consumption’ is achieved and organised – even 
it is never satisfactorily resolved. Simmel’s refusal to describe the capitalist money 
economy thus requires that the theory of exchange relations he proposes be supplemented 
by a sustained engagement with the capitalist mode of production. Only this can remedy 
the neo-classical error of reducing society and the economy to an aggregate of utility-
seeking individuals in pursuit of purely personal goals. By addressing the money-economy 
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within the context of capitalist social relations, the distinction between ‘productive’ and 
‘final consumption,’ the constraints upon ‘consumption’ (as economic theory has it) are 
revealed as those deriving from the distribution of the total wealth of society, that is, of 
social class. Participation in the modern consumption of capitalist modernity, the 
relationship between being and having, is constrained by access to the money-form and the 
possibilities that Simmel sees it contain. The final economic theory that bears upon the 
sociological investigation of ‘consumption’ attempts to do just this, and is to be found in 
the writings of John Maynard Keynes. 
 
Keynes and the limits to ‘consumption.’ 
Keynes attempted to describe the relationship between the structural integration of 
productive and final ‘consumption’ within the capitalist economy in The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest and Money. By distinguishing between 'consumer-purchase' and 
'investor-purchase' Keynes explicitly integrates different types of purchases into capitalist 
economic activity, while acknowledging the different functions that these two forms of 
acquisition have in economic life. As with Marx, Keynes sees ‘consumption’ and 
production as moments within a cycle or process: 
 
capital is not a self-subsistent entity existing apart from consumption. On 
the contrary, every weakening in the propensity to consume regarded as a 
permanent habit must weaken the demand for capital as well as the demand 
for consumption.  
- Keynes (1936: 106) 
 
Equally, the relationship between spending and investment, ‘consumption’ and saving is 
seen as a linked phenomenon and directly tied to the workings of the economy in general. 
For Keynes, ‘the consumer’ is always a reasonable ‘consumer’ whose 'propensity to 
consume' is always constrained by both subjective and objective factors. Therefore, he 
proposes a modification to the desiring subject of neo-classical economics: 
 
The fundamental psychological law, upon which we are entitled to depend 
with great confidence both a priori from our knowledge of human nature 
and from the detailed facts of experience, is that men are disposed, as a rule 
and on the average, to increase their consumption as their income increases, 
but not by as much as their increase in their income.  
- Keynes 1936 : 96 
 
A careful, even cautious ‘consumer’ replaces Jevons’ hedonist. The subjective constraints 
upon ‘consumption’ tend towards the prudent - 'Precaution, Foresight, Calculation, 
Improvement, Independence, Enterprise, Pride and Avarice' - while 'a corresponding list of 
motives to consumption such as Enjoyment, Short-sightedness, Generosity, 
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Miscalculation, Ostentation and Extravagance,' appear ever so slightly misguided (Keynes, 
1936: 108). Keynes also identifies 4 motives, 'largely analogous to, but not identical with, 
those actuating individuals,' which Central or Local Government or Business Corporations 
adhere to - individuals operating as rational enterprises, aware of the need for fiscal 
prudence. Here, again, we see the assertion of a deferred gratification and sublimation of 
the drives associated with utilitarian psychology as the means to financial success.  
 
 
Keynes, writing in the context of the economic depression of the 1930s, was seeking a 
means to rein in the more unruly elements of capitalist economics, much as the rational 
individual of bourgeois society marshalled ‘his’ passions through morality in search of 
moral, material and aesthetic refinement. The desire for goods, and the utility or pleasure 
therein, required rational action rather then headlong pursuit and Keynes’ contribution to 
the ‘sociology of consumption’ is to steer economic theory back towards an appreciation of 
the factors that govern and constrain ‘consumer activity.’ The promise of material progress 
and its equitable distribution, which is implicit in Keynes’ formulation, had also run 
through economic theory since Adam Smith, although in very different ways. Primarily, 
the ‘civilisation’ of bourgeois society that was epitomised in the distinction of its 
individuals signalled the attainment of Progress through the technical refinement of the 
capitalist system and its laws of operation. The role of ‘consumption,’ at least as economic 
theory understood its translation into social interaction, was to reveal the tasteful and 
discriminating interior of bourgeois individuality to the external world – epitomised in the 
figure of the collector (see Stewart, 1998). Despite the nominal opposition of distinction to 
exchange (particularly as money) mentioned by Simmel, the modern individual tied 
‘being’ to ‘having’ not through the search for maximum utility measured through a 
physiological register of bodily needs (that gradually refined themselves into wants), but as 
the display, by a connoisseur, of knowledge – through the display of signs.  
 
The key elements of modernity, then, are, first, consumption - not only of 
time, as in the past, but also of space, [exemplified by imperialist 
exoticism] - and, second, a kind of individual or self produced by this 
ability to consume time and space.' 
- Gagnier (2000: 91)  
 
‘Consumption,’ as theorised by economics, was an act of judgement, the rational exercise 
of the critical faculty and the absence of such discernment betrayed a lack of social 
refinement – therefore, the structural limitations upon access to the role of ‘consumer,’ 
identified by Keynes, serves as a vital corrective to the discussion of ‘consumption’ 
 72 
offered by economic theory. However, the role of class in the discussion of ‘consumption’ 
and the attempt to theorise modern consumption is not limited to the actions of 
‘consumers.’ Inhabitants of contemporary society are both ‘consumers’ and producers and 
it is this dual role that contemporary variations upon Marxism seek to explore. 
 
Towards an economic sociology 
In the revised political economy influenced by Marx, especially Clark (1982) Fine (1995; 
2002), Fine and Leopold (1993), there is a tendency to see producers who enter the sphere 
of circulation and exchange to do so at the expense of their role as producers, either 
through the mystification of the commodification process or the ideological power of 
‘commodity fetishism.’ What Fine & Leopold do not offer an analysis of ‘consumption’ 
firmly rooted in the relations of production that have informed the system of provision – 
the means by which the ‘consumer’ is granted access to the goods and services they wish 
to purchase. Instead, we find an analysis of ‘consumption’ under the sign of production. 
No credence is given to the relationship between ‘consumer’ and commodity-object (final 
consumption) other than that such a relationship is necessarily built upon the misleading or 
exaggerative tendencies of the capitalist advertising and marketing concerns. However, not 
all ‘consumers’ inhabit the sphere of circulation and exchange, and they do not purchase 
every commodity that they ‘consume,’ and the properties attributed to the commodity 
either by the 'brand image' or the ‘consumer’ may not conform to Fine & Leopold’s idea of 
the physical or semiotic properties of the commodity. 
 
For Clarke (1982), Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism is central to his critique of 
political economy because since commodities are produced for exchange they are 
produced as ‘values.’ If the social character of the commodity fails to be recognised, its 
status as a value, then the commodity becomes thing-like and is ‘consumed’ through its 
appropriation via the money-form. Classical political economy attempted but failed to 
grasp this, neo-classical economics with its focus on the subjective evaluation of utility 
could not conceive of it. For both the outcome is that the commodity assumes an 
independent existence, its production can be understood economically, by both classical 
and neo-classical political economy, but its ‘consumption’ can not be grasped as a 
definitively social act - although classical political economy, especially in its updated 
version, makes an attempt to do so. The problem with this approach, based on the work of 
Haug (1986), is that this relationship is reduced, at worst, to an indictment of advertising 
or, at best, an assertion of commodity fetishism. Neither of these options can be said to 
have nothing to do with the constitution of ‘consumption,’ nor can they in any way be 
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deemed satisfactory explanations. The admission by von Wieser in 1889 that economic 
theory could no longer pretend to explain the operation of society and social interaction 
without consideration of other factors is borne out by this discussion. Only a sociological 
theory of the capitalist consumption-relation can retain any aspirations to the analysis of 
modern consumption: however, economic theory has had a definite influence on the 
formation of sociological theories of ‘consumption’ and ‘consumer society.’ 
 
Fine & Leopold (1993: 46-9) reject contemporary theories of ‘consumer society,’ believing 
them to be rooted in economistic presuppositions such as the utility-maximising individual 
acting through rational calculation, and the failure to develop a theory of ‘consumption’ 
that distinguishes between the specific goods and services being ‘consumed.’ Such an 
explanation represents, for them, 'the most extreme version of a horizontal theory of 
consumption.' ‘Consumer theory’ is reduced to demand theory, with the ‘consumer’ 
indistinguishable from the firm. In such theories 'little attention is paid to the necessity for 
consumer behaviour to take place over time, combining together a number of discrete 
activities, not least the carrying out of purchases and their consumption, as well as the 
process of decision-making itself' (Fine & Leopold, 1993: 49). Theories of ‘consumer 
society,’ in this way, tend to become theories that examine the purchasing activities of 
‘consumers,’ and so only interrogate ‘consumption’ at the level of the sphere of circulation 
and exchange. Simmel’s investigation of the mature money economy falls into this 
category for Fine and Leopold. The motives for purchases, then, become the province of a 
‘psychology of consumption’ based around a form of 'commodity fetishism' in which 
'commodities and individuals are endowed with a variety of properties that motivate or 
trigger a consumption relation between them' (Fine & Leopold, 1993: 55). Such a 
psychological approach reduces ‘consumption’ to the factors involved in the decision 
making process, operating around an expanded model of rationality which can account for 
the influence exerted by the emotions and past experience. Psychology’s multiplication of 
the factors bearing upon the decision-making process simply dilutes the potency of the 
core of rational utility maximisation posited by economic theory. The unsuitability of such 
theories is highlighted by their inability to explain addiction, habit-forming ‘consumption,’ 
or excessive over- or ‘under-consumption’ other than by recourse to a 'personality trait' or 
a somewhat spurious 'addictive gene.' 
 
Fine & Leopold (1993: 72) overplay the importance of structural elements to the detriment 
of the autonomy of social actors when they affirm the importance of not neglecting 'the 
immanence of trends acting indirectly upon consumption - through mass production and 
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modes of retailing and distribution.' This euphemistic dismissal of meaningful human 
action in its interaction with objective culture exposes the economistic and productive bias 
that mars an otherwise excellent contribution to the ‘sociology of consumption.’ Fine 
(1995: 139) appreciates that while the level and variety of ‘consumption’ can no longer be 
crudely reduced to social class or level of income these factors retain some importance, 
even distinguishing certain social strata. This would moderate any explanation of 
‘consumption’ through a ‘trickle-down’ theory, such as that commonly associated with 
Veblen (1994). While this process may occur in certain instances it is an effect not the 
cause of ‘consumption activity.’ This merely reinforces, for Fine & Leopold, the necessity 
of the 'system of provision' model, which is, essentially, a revised and updated political 
economy. However, as outlined above, the corrections that such a model provides to 
economic theory tend to occur at the expense of an ability to explain or analyse the ‘daily 
traffic of bourgeois life’ (Marx) precisely because in the rejection of ‘exchange-relations’ 
theorists, such as Simmel, or ‘psychological’ explanations of behaviour they ‘throw the 
baby out with the bathwater.’  
 
The Role of Exchange 
The same tension and inadequacy that Dodd (1994) sees in Marx’s theory of money and 
explanation of economic behaviour can be discerned in Fine & Leopold’s revision of 
classical political economy: where the distinction between the use and exchange value 
carries over into a distinction between the functional and the symbolic. One is instilled 
during production, the other in circulation and exchange. Although Dodd does not directly 
address the ‘sociology of consumption,’ his analysis of the modern money economy, in 
particular the examination of the circulation and exchange of the money-form as a 
commodity on the international currency markets, is of relevance to this debate. Money as 
the tool that facilitates the exchange of values in contemporary capitalist culture is the 
focus of his investigation. Money as the means by which values may be appropriated is, 
however, alienating to the extent that this very exchangeability necessitates the demise of 
the unique, the acquiescence in the quantification of qualities and the affirmation of a 
money-equivalent for all values. The money form has a dual character; it empowers by 
virtue of the very property by which it alienates: by offering all values in exchange the 
money-form negates the possibility of an ultimate value and, so, necessitates that the 
promise of happiness, of satisfaction, that it holds out is not illusory as some would have 
us believe but which is, inevitably, temporary. 
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Dodd (1994: 55-7) argues that if the desire for money rests on its difference from other 
objects this derives from an abstraction and utility which is definitive of money alone, 
through its role as the universal medium. Dodd attributes to the money-form a symbolic 
and a technical function ‘[…] money has a dual character consisting of a base, relating to 
real goods and services, and code, relating to symbols' (1994: 62). Failure to appreciate this 
dual character leads to an over statement of the symbolic function of money at the expense 
of its role in the attainment and maximisation of utility. Taken to an extreme this would 
negate the rational pursuit of self-interest that is deemed central to economic theorisations 
of economic action. Similarly, Dodd (1994: 63) objects to the 
 
contention that money encodes not merely prices but values and norms 
derived from the function of latent pattern maintenance [since this] relies 
on the proposition that the economy does not constitute the core or 
infrastructure of society but is interdependent with three other sub-systems 
of equal status making up the social system. 
 
This, he claims, is to over emphasise the importance of the symbolic aspect of money as a 
medium and, in turn, to under emphasise the way in which access to money governs access 
to goods and services; money may be the universal medium of exchange but its 
distribution in society is tied to the social relations of the mode of production and the 
consequent division of labour.  
 
The indeterminacy that Dodd (1994: 81) considers money’s 'most essential property' 
makes a Habermasian distinction between system and lifeworld deeply problematic: since 
this problematises the assumptions of rationality which economic theory holds so dear. 
Dodd (1994: 118-9) invokes 'postmodern economics' and their post-Fordist models of 
production and flexible accumulation (see Harvey, 1989; 2001; Baudrillard, 1981: 1983: 
1988: 1990) or 'postmodern commentators' such as Jameson (1991) to account for the role 
of information in the operation of modern economies. Information must be seen to play 
both a mediating and a constitutive role in the reproduction of monetary networks. This 
entails an appreciation of role of the media industries in the production and operation of 
contemporary capitalist society and the economic enterprises it engages in. The financial 
and entertainment industries both propagate and disseminate the idea of the market, its role 
as a 'metaphysical entity.' In liberal and neo-liberal philosophy, the 'market is deemed to 
embody a form of social organization in which the basic imperatives of human nature can 
be freely expressed, both of themselves and in such a way as to generate an ordered social 
whole.' The market becomes a means for the organisation, even the repression of the 
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human passions (Hirschman) and of defining the nature and form of modern freedom 
(Simmel). 
 
For Dodd (1994: 121), attitudes to money 'are not only inherently reflexive but chronically 
mediatized: not simply filtered through the media industry… but formed through the 
media, being dependent on and constitutive of this industry as a form of life. It is this 
development, not “consumerism” as such, which is novel, distinctively postmodern if this 
terminology must be used, in so far as not merely the objects of consumers’ desire but the 
very concepts of money and markets informing consumer behaviour have become 
inextricably entwined’ [emphasis added].  The 'chronically mediatized' attitudes to money, 
which Dodd feels may be characteristic of the postmodern era, constitute part of the 
contemporary incarnation of the relationships between subjects and objects – between 
being and having. These technologically-mediated forms of sociation extend the relation of 
possession, as described by Simmel (1990: 321-9), and the transformation of subjective 
being through its inter-relation with ‘objective culture,’ and anticipate Vattimo’s (1988) 
discussion of the relation between being and ‘exchange.’ Drawing on Jameson’s 
Postmodernism, Dodd (1994: 124) suggests that the media and the market have undergone 
a 'process of transcoding' in which they come together to form a kind of synthetic unity. 
This implies that the ‘consumption’ of media images has 'increasingly been based on their 
form, the techniques and technology used, as much as their content, what the images 
portray.' Resulting in 'a set of practices which express the relationship both structurally 
and, no less importantly, symbolically,' this, in turn, means that ‘consumerism’ (for Dodd 
the term is interchangeable with ‘consumption’) is not only a monetary phenomenon, as he 
says it is for Simmel, but is based upon 'the mediatization of consumption itself.' This 
emphasis upon the symbolic dimension, the incorporation of the ‘sign-value’ (Baudrillard), 
neither denies the role played by the perceived physical properties of the object, image or 
commodity, nor determines that the pursuit of the perceived gratification is achieved 
through the adherence to rational principles. 
 
The problem with postmodern accounts of ‘consumption’ and ‘consumer behaviour’ is that 
in their haste to posit a break or rupture between the modern and its successor a version of 
modernity rooted in the rational and calculating pursuit of utility by economic man who 
appraises the real, the physical (that is, non-symbolic) aspects of commodities is advanced. 
This is then juxtaposed with the infiltration or corruption of this world by a virus-like 
symbolic or semiotic component, the implication is always of the transgression of formerly 
rigid and distinct boundaries, and this is then deemed to be characteristic of the 
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postmodern. This, of course, is to erroneously project or add-on a symbolic dimension to 
objects in the belief that such a dimension is not, in actual fact, integral to all cultural 
objects and practices - including the disposal of income in ‘consumption.’ Dodd (1994: 
130) rejects this 'core rational domain of economic reasoning and action' not on the basis 
of its being either rational or irrational, but because 'the binary oppositions underpinning 
economic reasoning are unworkable.' Even allowing for an actor possessing adequate 
knowledge of a situation there may be no obvious utility-yielding choice. There may be 
several options which will yield equal satisfactions; or the different options that comprise a 
choice may be incommensurable – so radically different that any choice between the two 
would appear arbitrary rather than rational. 
 
A society based around the money-economy generalises, universalises, a certain kind of 
trust that arises from and relies upon such assumptions of trust between ‘transactors,’ 
either individual or corporate. Giddens’ (1990) depiction of high modernity in The 
Consequences of Modernity – as the world capitalist economy; the international division of 
labour; the nation-state system; the world military order – epitomises the descriptions 
offered by classical sociological theory. The consequences of modernity for individuals are 
an increase in impersonal, monetised contacts with other people, and in the numerical 
range of these contacts over an increasingly extended, and often abstract, conception of 
geographical space – what will be examined in Chapter Three as ‘terrain.’ 
 
Ideas, expectations and symbolic associations play an integral role within, 
rather than simply being a reflection upon, real economic activity; on the 
way in which money in fact works in society, on the way it is in fact 
administered by governments, and on the consequences its operation in fact 
has right across society […]. Information is part of that world, which is 
therefore neither material nor symbolic but something other; an other 
which cannot be grasped within the language of economics, nor indeed 
within any language which derives its structure from the dualism of the 
material and the symbolic, of concepts and the reality which they are 
supposed to depict. 
- Dodd, 1994: 157-8 
 
Unfortunately, Dodd’s cultural reading of the processes of purchase and their determining 
and constitutive elements, only extends to the point of purchase. What Dodd fails to fully 
theorise is that ‘consumption’ is not merely purchase, it is the relationships that subjects 
have with objects in modernity. Dodd (1994: 166) contends that 'economic reasoning has 
no meaning other than as a part of the fiduciary character of economic life,’ that it offers 
no external criterion by which this form of life can be examined. It is rather part of its 
content, part of the frameworks of meaning and discursive practices chronically implicated 
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in the reproduction of monetary networks over time. Under these conditions, as everything 
and everyone enters into exchange and is relativised in the process, the possibility of the 
unique, distinct, bounded entity is problematised. Neither subject nor object can remain 
discrete and apart from its surroundings (including the market). The particular qualities 
that define an object or individual can be separated out from the whole and quantified 
(priced). 
 
Formlessness and a purely quantitative character are one and the same…. 
Therefore, money as such is the most terrible destroyer of form.  
- Simmel, 1990 : 272 
 
The ease of acquisition allowed by the mature money economy in tandem with the 
capitalist mode of production creates a link between Oscar Wilde’s ‘Dorian Gray,’  - the 
‘ideal consumer of the nineteenth century’ (Gagnier, 2000) – and the contemporary world 
discussed by Dodd. Today the 'freedom' conferred by the money economy demonstrates 
the extension of the market to encompass every desire; a traffic in everything and 
anything: 
 
Modern consumers no longer subscribed to the hierarchy of goods as they 
pursued markets in everything from music to education to babies to blood, 
opting for individualism over evolution or progress.  
- Gagnier, 2000: 114 
 
Likewise, Wilde described the cigarette as the perfect commodity because it always leaves 
one unsatisfied and wanting more (Gagnier, 2000: 122). The cigarette is, thus, like any 
other 'addictive' commodity or commodity-experience, its finite duration and its 
'experiential' character ensure that part of its appeal is that it is never quite enough. 
‘Possession’ of such a commodity, as a relation between being and having, underscores the 
role of ‘experience’ within what will be termed modern consumption and the importance of 
an analytical approach capable of unifying the structural approach of political economy 
with a description of the phenomenal forms that subjective experience assumes in the 
sphere of circulation and exchange of capitalist modernity.  
 
The mediation of experience through the money-form, as the manifestation of the sphere of 
circulation and exchange, including the absence of ‘form,’ described by Simmel (1990), 
imply an analysis of the sublime dimension of aesthetic experience. The attempt by 
nineteenth century empiricists to ground the experience of reality in the sense-data of 
subjective experience reduced aesthetic judgements to pleasurable personal responses to 
phenomena.  Indeed, 
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[Alexander] Bain banished everything but pleasure from aesthetics. [While] 
in Physiological Aesthetics (1877) Grant Allen defined the beautiful as that 
which afforded the maximum of stimulation with the minimum of fatigue 
or waste, in processes not directly connected with life-serving functions. 
- Gagnier 2000: 136 
 
On this reading it is difficult to sustain any qualitative difference between aesthetic objects 
and the commodities populating the marketplace. The formal separation of art from 
(everyday) life becomes deeply problematic as the language used to describe the two 
experiences becomes increasingly similar, predicated upon the same lexicon. The 
distinction between the beautiful and the sublime is rendered ever-more untenable: 
 
… Bousanquet alludes to the end of Burke's and Woolf's bourgeois beauty, 
the beauty of order and civility, of the romanticized countryside, of stable 
hierarchical relations, and predicts the "terrible beauty" (Yeats) of 
modernity, a beauty that will evoke the feelings of the sublime, the 
overwhelming of the individual in the face of the larger forces (Woolf's 
"person disassembled"). 
- Gagnier, 2000: 144 
 
The subject, of both economic and aesthetic discourse, is confronted by a world whose 
depiction relies upon new forms of representation. In the social sciences, charged with 
describing the experience and constitution of everyday life, and, particularly the emergent 
discipline of economics (neo-classical political economics), methodological individualism 
assumed primacy. Gagnier describes Wilde’s retreat into a (high) bourgeois aesthetic that 
renounced such exchanges, the relativisation of values, as an attempt to delineate a retreat 
from the everyday world of sensual gratification and its physiological locus. In doing so 
Gagnier effectively describes the connoisseurial collector, who seeks to stand apart from 
the world in order to improve his or her view of it – as if before an art-work.  
 
Just as discourses such as aesthetics, economics and philosophy transformed themselves, 
others, such as sociology, were born. Still others, such as (classical) political economy 
passed away, replaced by neo-classical thought, which then naturalised itself and its 
presuppositions by denying its historicity and naming itself Economics. As Gagnier noted, 
the 'bourgeois beauty, the beauty of order and civility, of the romanticized countryside, of 
stable hierarchical relations,' dissolved into flux. The previous age, rooted in tradition, was 
'disassembled' (Woolf) by an encroaching modernity that transformed everything in its 
path, everything that, in its turn constituted it, and saw 'every thing that is solid melt into 
air' (Berman). This left economic theory describing the actions of an individual ‘consumer’ 
or the aggregate of ‘consumers’ – society – rather than the modern consumption argued for 
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above. Even Marxist revisions, (Fine, 1995; Fine & Leopold, 1993) to political economy 
that attempt to unite production, distribution, circulation and exchange to a concept of 
‘final consumption’ are of limited explanatory value. The ‘system of provision’ approach 
endeavours to ‘join the dots’ between those various stages of the capitalist mode of 
production’s social relations of ‘consumption.’ In this way the ‘fetishism’ of the 
commodity-form within capitalist society, which grants apparent autonomy to the products 
of wage-labour, is revealed as part of the system of social relations belonging to the 
capitalist mode of production.  
 
As worthy an aim as this might be, the sphere of circulation and exchange is not a neutral 
entity that merely ‘distorts’ reality (through fetishism or ideology) in the process of (re) 
presenting the commodity-form, it is a vital and active element in the construction of the 
conditions under which the phenomenological forms of subjective experience available 
within contemporary capitalist culture emerge. The subjective experience of modern 
consumption is revealed as something more complex than the revealed preferences of a 
utilitarian individual and their occasional susceptibility to irrational actions in the pursuit 
of pleasure, just as it is irreducible to a consumer dupe who is fooled by the false promises 
of the fetishised commodity. Instead, the consequences of the sphere of circulation and 
exchange of capitalist modernity incorporate the technological dimension discussed by 
Dodd, in respect of the money-form, and Vattimo, concerning the nature of contemporary 
Being. The categories used to describe both economic action and subjective motivation by 
economic theory, whether classical, neoclassical or Marxist, fail to comprehend the role 
and effect of the sphere of circulation and exchange of capitalist modernity, precisely 
because this ‘sphere’ and its operations are considered to act upon, but exist independently 
of, human subjectivity. The sphere of circulation and exchange is thus considered as a 
glorified advertising arena in which otherwise rational ‘consumers’ are seduced into 
moments of madness (purchase) or the fetishistic attribution of meaning and significance 
by an inter-subjective community (lifestyle). Either the ‘consumer’ is ‘fooled’ by the 
commodity-fetish or the commodity-sign possesses a ‘biography’ and follows a ‘pathway’ 
derived from the value-judgements of social groups: the former necessitates a rational, 
usually Marxist, ‘demystification,’ such as that espoused by Haug (1986); while the latter 
sees the commodity as an increasingly ‘free-floating’ sign within a postmodern ‘consumer 
economy’ engaged in a project of ‘identity’ construction. Even the anthropological 
amalgam of these traditions, best represented by Miller (especially 1989, but also 2002) or 
Dant (1999), simply assert a version of the rational subject standing apart from but 
interacting with the world of objects, which has been re-named the ‘material culture’ of 
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contemporary capitalist society. The inadequacy of this economistic inheritance and its 
description of the inter-relationship between the ‘culture of things’ and the ‘culture of 
human beings’ (Simmel), lies at the core of the following chapter. 
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Chapter Two: Making it Modern  
Introduction 
The sociological analysis of the contemporary capitalist consumption-relation requires that 
the ghost of economic theory – homo œconomicus – be exorcised, and with it the related 
terms of ‘consumer,’ ‘consumerism,’ ‘consumer society’ and, most pernicious of all, 
‘consumption.’ This amalgam of economic theory, Cartesian dualism and Newtonian 
mechanics underpins a ‘bourgeois world view’ (Ferguson, 1990) that sees the human 
subject as opposed to and separate from the world of objects, resulting in the subjective 
pursuit of utility being expressed as the desire for objects. This discursive arrangement has, 
as its telos, the production of individual identity or ego: the satiation of subjective desire 
within the sphere of circulation and exchange of the capitalist mode of production. 
However, this emphasis upon pursuit, purchase and ownership fails to grasp the historical 
specificity of capitalist modernity and the changed relationship between subjective and 
objective culture (Simmel, 1990) that this social formation entails. Instead, the focus must 
be upon modern consumption and its ‘terrain’ and the ways in which subjects and objects 
are mutually constituted in a ‘relational ontology’ (Costall, 2004) of ‘affordance’ (Gibson, 
1977; 1986, Dant, 1999) that redefines the relationship between being and having 
organised around ‘possession’ (Simmel, 1990, Latour, 2001). 
 
This requires a renunciation of ‘historical’ explanations of ‘consumption’ and 
‘consumerism’ which presume an extension of monetised market relations, either gradual 
(Fine, 1998; Glennie, 1995; McCracken, 1990) or revolutionary (McKendrick et al., 1982), 
as the basis of the psychological individual pursuit of ‘identity.’ Such a project(ion) of the 
self reduces ‘consumption’ to the discriminations of ‘taste’ and ‘distinction’ (Bourdieu, 
1984), or attempts at manufacturing postmodern ‘identity-positions’ – both of which are 
merely ‘symbolically’ updated versions of homo œconomicus. Here the ‘trickle-down 
effect’ of a mass market is considered as the basis of ‘consumption’ and ‘consumer’ 
activities, as socio-spatial practices that describe the teleological pursuit of satisfaction 
through the sphere of circulation and exchange, whether as shopping (Miller, 1999; 2002), 
the tactics of the everyday (de Certeau, 1988; Lefebvre, 1991) or ‘ordinary consumption’ 
(Gronow & Warde, 2001). The ‘consumer’ emerges as a discursive figure governing the 
interaction between social individuals and the capitalist market (Trentmann, 2006), and the 
commodity-form is reduced to a medium that allows the project(ion) of the self as 
‘revealed preferences’ and the transmission of ‘experience’ as display. The ‘consumer’ 
now resembles the collector (Stewart, 1998), as someone who ‘produces’ their existence 
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(and social status) through the accumulation and display of goods that have been charged 
with narrative (biographical) significance. The ‘consumer’ as cyborg-collector ‘progresses’ 
by attaching commodity objects or experiences to the teleological narrative of identity, as a 
prosthetic extension of subjectivity.  
 
The Frankfurt School saw such a reduction of the autonomous individual express the 
labour of ‘consumption’ through an ‘ersatz individuality’ born of the forms of ‘shock-
experience’ (Erlebnis) of modernity and displace the subject of authentic ‘historical 
experience’ (Erfahrung). Their marriage of sociological theory and psychoanalysis sought 
to expose the threat that this pursuit of ‘consumption’ and its ‘irrational’ pleasures posed to 
the goals of the Enlightenment. The dissolution of historical experience (Erfahrung) into 
shock-experience (Erlebnis) and the apparent ‘de-materialisation’ of the commodity-form 
into a semiotic medium – a ‘system’ of signs (Baudrillard, 1989), exchange or 
‘representational’ values (Buck-Morss, 1993) – mirrored the shift from ‘substantial’ to 
‘functional’ significance in the money-form (Simmel, 1990). The demise of historical 
authenticity and its role in the narration of causality (Stewart, 1998) threatened the 
bourgeois concept of subjective individuality (Seltzer, 1992) and the concept of unique 
identity. Instead, identity appeared to be ‘produced’ through the manipulation of 
meaningful commodities, or signs in a postmodern version of the ‘consumer society’ 
thesis. This conflation of materiality and authenticity allowed ‘reality’ to be lost in the 
supposed triumph of immateriality, inauthenticity, or appearance and is exemplified by 
Debord’s lament for the ‘passing’ of things into representation or Baudrillard’s (1988) 
discussion of ‘ecstatic communication.’ 
 
Against this postmodernist espousal of the immaterial significance of the commodity-sign 
the anthropological ‘material culture’ approach insisted upon an analysis of the physical 
constitution object and the cultural forms of its ‘consumption.’ Here the ‘postmodern’ or 
semiotic focus upon the significance of the object (or practice) was seen as inseparable 
from its material existence – shape, function and form – and the cultural practices it 
underpinned. Material culture analyses of ‘consumption’ focused upon social habits and 
their variation in time and space, such as the changes to shopping brought about by 
supermarkets (Miller, 1999) or the impact of mobile telephones (Dant, 1999). This 
emphasis upon the ‘socialness’ of goods and services within social interaction re-asserted 
the political and moral economy within which ‘consumption’ occurs and the commodity-
form’s role in the transmission of cultural categories as a framework for the negotiation of 
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individual action. In this it echoed the ‘politics of consumption’ and ‘vertical’ analysis of 
the ‘system of provision’ approach (Fine, 1995; 1998; 2006, Fine & Leopold, 1993), which 
sought to chart the constitution of the sphere of circulation and exchange – and where the 
emphasis upon the subjective intentions of the ‘consumer,’ as choice (utilitarian, moral or 
political), betray its economic ancestry. 
 
The socio-spatial activities of ‘consumerism’ served to flesh out, psychologically, 
anthropologically and geographically, the abstraction of the ‘consumer’ through an 
analysis of a variety of teleological projects – gift-giving (Belk, 1995), shopping (Falk & 
Campbell, 1997; Miller, 1999; 2001 Thrift, 1994), or eating food. The ‘consumer’s’ pursuit 
of goals – economic, psychological or social – through the interactive mechanism of the 
sphere of circulation and exchange appeared to reveal subjective preferences rendered 
objectively. Consequently, ‘consumerism,’ as the socio-spatial practices of the ‘consumer’ 
collapses the distinction between the social and the economic realms and simply provides a 
cultural context within which an expanded utilitarian individualism is pursued, whether in 
anthropology (Carrier, 2006; Miller, 1999; 2001), psychology (Lunt & Livingstone, 1992; 
Lunt, 1995), marketing (Belk, 1995; 1997) or geography (Jackson & Thrift, 1995). The 
‘consumer,’ as psychological individual, is socialised into ‘consumption,’ where choice 
functions as the means for the production of identity through the activities of 
‘consumerism’ and its meaningful manipulation of goods and services. This extension of 
homo Faber into the realm of ‘consumption’ is a modification rather than a disavowal of 
bourgeois liberal humanism and is the premise upon which the postmodern manipulation 
of ‘meaningful’ commodities occurs. 
 
The postmodern primacy of ‘appearances’ guaranteed by the liberation of the signifier 
from the signified heralded an ontological relativism and the demise of the bourgeois belief 
in progress and the teleological movement of history central to both the Enlightenment and 
the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. Subjectivity, as the teleological expression of 
being, ceased to have ‘identity’ as its goal and, instead, became the phenomenal experience 
of ontological relativism, as flux. However, rather than see the sociological analysis of the 
contemporary capitalist consumption-relation dissolve into postmodern ‘flux’ or a cultural 
studies-inspired effort at consumerist identity politics some attempt at investigating the 
framework within which the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption emerges must be hazarded. 
Such an analysis must include an appreciation of the historical relationship between the 
sphere of circulation and exchange of ‘consumption’ and the ‘terrain’ of modern 
consumption, which lies at the heart of the experience of capitalist modernity, of 
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modernité. By discarding the traditional bourgeois ontology predicated upon the dialectical 
relation between subject and object in favour of a non-humanist discussion of elements or 
‘actants’ within a network, such as that proposed by Actant-Network-Theory (ANT) and 
exemplified by Latour, it is possible avoid the descent into a study of ‘interactions’ of 
more greater or lesser degrees of ‘socialness.’ This avoids both the lament for lost 
authenticity – alienation – and its attempted overcoming, either through nostalgic longing 
(Stewart, 1998) or a utopian pursuit of ‘progress’ (Ferguson, 1990).  
 
Instead of viewing the interactions between subjective and objective culture as the result of 
human intentionality (and its utilitarian presuppositions), the analysis of modern 
consumption focuses upon the exchange between subject and the commodity-form as a 
particular form of ‘sociation’ (Simmel), a specific form of being that is contingent upon 
and shaped by the ‘affordances’ (or having) constituted within this relationship. 
Consequently, the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption resembles a ‘space of circulation’ 
Latour (1993; 2001) where the imminence and immanence of the commodity-form resists 
reduction to a vessel for subjectively sought utility. By failing to become an arena for the 
appropriation and ownership of particular commodities – subject to the political economy 
of access (Fine, 1998; Massumi, 2003; Rifkin, 2000) – this ‘terrain’ avoids becoming an 
element in the modernisation of ‘consumer society’ (Stearns, 1997; Trentmann, 2002) and 
its expansion within the monetised social relations of the trans-national flows of capital. 
Modern consumption offers no role for the ‘consumer’ and its psychological ‘filling-out’ 
of the abstraction that is homo œconomicus through socio-spatial activities such as 
‘shopping’ or ‘consumerism’ (Miles, 1998). 
 
The analysis of modern consumption, rather than ‘consumption,’ allows a focus upon the 
relational interaction or ‘sociation’ between subject and object (service or experience) and 
echoes the expanded reading of Gibson’s (1977) concept of ‘affordance’ by ecological 
psychology (Heft, 2001; Costall, 2004). This insistence upon the investigation of 
contemporary capitalist ‘consumption’ as a relational phenomenon ensures that both the 
phenomenal forms of subjective experience – ‘lived experience’ (Minkowski, 1970) – and 
the socio-economic framework, which is the condition of their possibility, are examined. 
Therefore, it is the experience of novelty rather than its pursuit (as a temporalised utility) – 
as nouveauté – that is a characteristic of modern consumption at both the subjective and the 
inter-subjective level: either as technological innovations or belated personal discoveries. 
Modern consumption represents the site or nodal point of ‘interchange’ between human 
and non-human actants, between subjective and objective culture – it expresses the 
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fluctuating relationship between being and having (Simmel, 1990) defining the 
‘transformation’ of the ‘monad’ through its ‘possession’ of qualities (Latour, 2001) rather 
than the ownership of objects. Modern consumption is the monadological expression of 
difference represents ‘lived experience’ upon the terrain of capitalist modernity, an arena 
in which the commodity-form is subjectively experienced as free of causal relations: 
 
… does not the world of the circulation and exchange of commodities and 
of money exchange create the same illusions as the aesthetic realm? Does 
not this sphere acquire an autonomy in which its individual elements 
achieve a reconciliation? Is there not a parallel between the aesthetic 
judgement associated with the image, appearance and form of things and 
the world of circulation and exchange of commodities (with its creation of 
harmony through a pure function that is indifferent to the reality of all use 
values)?  
– Frisby, 1992: 142 
 
Modern consumption as a form of participation in capitalist modernity, as the experience 
of modernité, is the inhabitation of an apparently autonomous ‘aesthetic realm,’ a sublime 
terrain where the ‘representation of limitlessness’ (Simmel, cited Frisby, 1992: 143) denies 
the ‘consolation of form’ (Lyotard, 1992). The apparent autonomy conferred upon the 
‘objective’ world of commodities, as part of the relational phenomenon that is modern 
consumption, implies a ‘terrain’ upon which the phenomenological categories – space, 
time and causality – that structure subjective experience (being) must be understood as 
derived from the wider social relations of capitalist modernity, specifically the intersection 
between subjective and objective culture (having). Consequently, the inhabitant of the 
‘terrain’ of modern consumption can no longer be conceived of as the ‘citizen consumer’ 
of liberal political theory but, instead, resembles the flâneur in displaying ‘a certain kind of 
aestheticized sensibility that implies the abdication of political, moral or cognitive control 
over the world’ (Gluck, 2003: 53; see also Prendergast, 1992). 
 
Historical Studies 
Economic theory’s reliance upon a philosophical anthropology grounded in utilitarian 
psychology (Gagnier, 2000) and the exchange relations of the capitalist mode of 
production has managed to insinuate itself within a variety of contemporary approaches to 
‘consumption’ – even in the work of those who would claim no kinship with the discipline 
of economics. Historical studies have highlighted the existence of ‘consumer activity’ in 
the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, prior to the advent of industrialisation 
in both Europe (Schivelbusch, 1993; Thirsk, 1978; Weatherill, 1996) and North America 
(Main, 1982; Shammas, 1990, 1993). The extension of market relations to provide an ever-
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greater range of articles as industrialisation took off during the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries has been offered as the dawning of ‘consumer society’ (Campbell, 
1987; McKendrick, Brewer & Plumb, 1982), while ‘mass consumer society’ has been 
located in the late nineteenth century (Fox & Lears, 1983; Fraser, 1981; Stearns, 1997; 
Trentmann, 2002; 2006). This terminological debate must be clarified if a definition of 
modern consumption distinct from its opposite, but not necessarily historically prior, ‘pre-
modern consumption.’  
 
McKendrick et al (1982) claim that the ‘birth’ of the ‘modern consumer’ was located in the 
17th and 18th century ‘consumer society,’ a thesis developed in Brewer & Porter (1993) and 
which has at its core the extension of a fashionable and luxurious ‘consumption’ beyond 
aristocratic court life that ‘trickles down’ first to the ‘middling’ classes and, later, to the 
agrarian and industrial lower classes (McCracken, 1990). Slater (1997) has refined this 
thesis, suggesting, in lieu of a ‘consumer revolution,’ and akin to the agrarian and 
industrial revolutions, a ‘commercial revolution,’ which acknowledges the intertwined 
development of capitalist production and ‘consumption,’ the extension of international 
trade, development of the money-form, contract law and the further penetration of life by 
market relations. However, the degree to which any of these theses, and the description of 
the relationship between commodities and the inhabitants of the societies that ‘consumed’ 
them, actually offers a viable explanation of modern consumption or its ostensible origin is 
debatable. 
 
That Was Then, This Is Now: The Consumer Revolution Thesis. 
The enormous attention that social scientists and historians have dedicated to the 
uncovering of the origins of the ‘consumer revolution’ is sufficient to indicate its 
importance. Any attempt to understand modern consumption as ‘modern’ must renounce 
the all-or-nothing implications of the ‘consumer revolution’ thesis, however it is phrased, 
lest the ‘sociology of consumption’ become lost in a futile search for origins at the expense 
of understanding the social, cultural and historical factors which have shaped 
contemporary ‘consumption’ practices (Kuchta, 1996). The ‘consumer revolution’ thesis, 
as the extension of greater quantity and variety of goods to an increasing ‘consumer 
audience,’ fails to engage with the modern dimensions of the capitalist consumption-
relation and its origins. Further, it denies the complex cultural context against and within 
which the expansion of ‘the world of goods’ (Douglas & Isherwood, 1979) took place. The 
rejection of this perception of a ‘linear development’ (de Grazia 1996: 151-3) allows 
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appreciation of the persistence of socio-spatial patterns and ‘consumption practices’ 
differentiated by class and gender. 
 
The very notion of ‘consumer society’ itself must be subjected to interrogation, and the 
convenient gender-stereotyping of men and women’s roles in its constitution, which de 
Grazia (1996: 2-3) caricatures as ‘Mr. Breadwinner and Mrs. Consumption,’ can 
themselves be seen to be in need of deconstruction through careful historical analysis. Any 
movement from feudal to bourgeois society or a ‘mass consumption’ society, while rooted 
in capitalist exchange networks, must also appreciate the ‘transformation of goods from 
being relatively static symbols around which hierarchies were ordered to being more 
directly constitutive of class, social status, and personal identity’ (ibid: 4). The origins of 
this transformation of the cultural role assigned to the commodity-form cannot be 
distinguished from the origins of the culture of modernity as an historical epoch, nor can 
their consequences for the forms of sociation and subjectivity for the present be 
disregarded. Benjamin’s (1999) archaeology of the Parisian Arcade represents an attempt 
to link an analysis of ‘consumption’ to a larger investigation of capitalist modernity (Buck-
Morss, 1993; Frisby, 1988) and the forms of life that characterised it. Benjamin saw the 
rise and fall of the flâneur, the birth of the department store and the ‘Haussmannisation’ of 
Paris as part of a larger nineteenth century modernity, epitomised in the ‘democratization 
of luxury’ (Williams, 1982).  The particular history of the Parisian department store, or 
grand magasin, can be contrasted to the British experience (Lancaster, 1995) and 
compared to the American (Bronner [ed.], 1989). The developments in the design of 
façades and interiors, which both the Parisian and American stores pioneered, derives 
directly from the World Exhibitions, or World’s Fairs, which sought to portray the 
nineteenth century’s progress towards a material utopia through the use of technology in 
the service of production. 
 
The transformation of the built environment was also, and simultaneously, the 
transformation of the relationship between the built environment and its inhabitants. The 
absence of a theoretical conceptualisation of the phenomenological dimension of 
‘consumer’ activity within the everyday – as ‘lived experience’ (Minkowski, 1970) – 
locates the historical analyses of ‘consumption’ altogether too close to the economistic 
presuppositions rejected in the previous chapter – even if homo œconomicus is now clad in 
‘meaningful’ apparel. Indeed, the gendered experience of ‘consumers,’ pointedly 
referenced by De Grazia & Furlough (1996), is among the most easily overlooked facets of 
the historical evolution of ‘consumption’ and attempts to represent it (Ryan, 1994). The 
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transformation of the definitions of public space which accompanied the rise of the arcades 
and the department stores played a vital role in the introduction of women into the public 
sphere, as workers in the new shopping establishments, as customers, and, on occasion, as 
thieves (Friedberg 1993, Ryan 1994, Wolff 1985, Abelson 1989). Equally, the relationship 
between the individuals involved in ‘consumption’ activities and the goods and services 
they ‘consumed’ was gendered, whether through use or its opposite – prohibition. This 
occurred across the entire spectrum of modern commodities, from fashion (Perrot, 1994;) 
to cigarettes (Schivelbusch, 1993) and prostitution (Benjamin, 1999). 
 
A Politics of ‘Consumption’? 
McCracken’s attempt to refine McKendrick et al.’s thesis (1982), that Elizabethan England 
did not experience the fashion cycle associated with modern consumption, turns upon his 
identifying emulative spending (fashion) in this period, which he links to the monarch’s 
‘use of expenditure as an instrument of government’ (1990:11). The increase in ‘consumer 
spending’ on personal goods is seen as the result of an increased attendance at court in an 
attempt to win the favour of the Queen. Where previously the ‘corporation’ that was the 
Elizabethan noble family displayed its wealth through symbolic goods possessed of the 
patina of age passed down over generations the store of accumulated wealth was now 
expended in pursuit of fashionable novelty. Williams (1982) links French 16th century 
aristocratic consumption to Elias’s ‘civilising process’ and the use of material culture, 
particularly ‘consumer goods’ and fashionable items, in furthering an ideal of civilized 
‘manners’, while insisting that ‘consumption’ and civilization are not identical.  This 
manifested as ‘the suppression of aggressive and instinctual behaviour, an increased self-
consciousness about the perception of one’s actions by others, and a greater emphasis on 
politeness, restraint, and refinement as ideals of conduct’ (Williams, 1982: 24). 
 
Williams’ (1982: 26-7) assertion of a link between the items of ‘material culture’ and the 
political rule by the court of Louis XIV (1638-1715), whom she terms ‘the Consumer 
King,’ marries the manners of the monarch to the daily routines of the king’s body. His 
mécanique, or ‘mechanism,’ was the programmed pattern of his ‘consumption,’ which 
extended, in turn, into an etiquette that governed the activities of those who attended him. 
This rigid systematisation of the king’s and his courtiers’s activities was a deliberate 
attempt to foster an ‘enhancement of political authority’ (ibid: 28) similar to that which 
McCracken (1990) attributes to Elizabeth I. The Sun King turned courtiers into 
‘consumers,’ holding their attention through a series of games and amusements aimed at 
avoiding ennui, the ‘chronic sense of vacuity, frustration, aimlessness and futility’ that 
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characterised life at court. This ‘demonstrates how a system of consumption can develop 
its own imperatives, which bear little relation to the attainment of individual happiness or 
pleasure’ (Williams, 1982: 30), in contrast with the rationale for ‘consumer activity’ 
posited by economic theory. Here it is possible to identify the modern aspects of 
‘consumption’ in the very fact of their departure from economic orthodoxy; it is in the 
‘meaningfulness’ of goods and services and their incorporation into what Habermas (1979) 
would term the ‘lifeworld’ that their importance lies. While the aristocracy consumed 
ostentatiously in pursuit of political opportunity, the bourgeoisie mixed public display with 
private economy in an attempt to accumulate an inheritance for their offspring (Williams, 
1982: 35-7). 
 
The similarity with the French situation described by Williams (1982) is obvious but, as 
Glennie (1995) points out, the stress on ‘emulative consumption’ in McKendrick’s (1982) 
thesis is revised in Barry (1991) and Earle (1989), who both suggest that such 
‘consumption,’ as well as its adaptation, was common to the seventeenth rather than the 
eighteenth century. This suggests a depth to the market and a range of commodities 
available similar to that found in a mass market. However, the constitution of the market is 
difficult to gauge since durable goods, luxury items and the development of a service 
economy are easier to trace empirically than commodities such as clothing and housing 
(Glennie, 1995). ‘Consumption’ of goods by agricultural workers and the seasonal 
labourers who worked alongside them varied greatly.  The incomes of seasonal labourers, 
reasons Glennie (1995: 173-4), due to their irregularity, had ‘a counter-intuitive effect on 
consumption,’ prompting purchases of disproportionately expensive status goods, such as 
pocket watches (Thompson, 1967).  The specific patterns of income disposition which de 
Grazia (1996) notes as varying by gender and class are not accounted for in the type of 
analysis provided by Campbell (1987): for instance, the proceeds from theft tended to fund 
the purchase of ‘consumer goods’ (Styles, 1994).  In Europe prior to the nineteenth 
century, particularly in the Dutch economy which benefited from the Agrarian Revolution, 
the ‘prosperous farmers and tradesman concentrated their growing expenditure on luxury 
goods such as gold, silver, books, clock and paintings’ (Glennie 1995: 175, citing de Vries 
1974, 1975).  
 
Glennie (1995: 177) rejects the tendency for ‘consumption’ to be the focus of discussions 
of the well-to-do and their self-identity and, instead, follows Prude in noting the 
importance of clothing for the construction of identity among the poor:  
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Through clothes, labourers ‘purposefully and self-consciously shaped their 
appearance…visually asserted their own intentions and identities…to 
announce their own priorities and purposes…common folk new 
fashion…palpable evidence that labourers had their own needs and desires’ 
- Prude 1991: 126, 154, 155, cited Glennie, 1995: 177. 
 
Glennie insists that ‘widespread cultures of consumption very nearly always preceded 
mass markets for consumer goods,’ which raises important issues concerning the meanings 
attributed to ‘consumer goods’ and to the motives for their purchase (1995: 177-8). This 
seems to lead Glennie towards the belief that it is the ‘novelty’ of a good or category of 
goods that is their pre-eminent feature in the developing ‘consumer’ economies of the 
period (ibid: 180). However, all the emerging capitalist economies of the early modern 
West had to take on board the fact of ‘consumption’ and locate ‘consumer’ activity within 
their moral and political economies. While Bushman’s (1992) The Refinement of America 
and Barker-Benfield’s (1992) The Culture of Sensibility can be seen as continuing the 
examination, theorised by Elias (1994), of the inter-relationship between the degree of 
refinement of the inner person and their use and possession of commodities during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 
Trickle-Down Identities? 
As Glennie has observed, the absence of sufficient historical evidence is an unfortunate 
hindrance to the investigation of pre-modern ‘consumption patterns’ among those who did 
not belong to the ‘middling classes.’ It is to the eighteenth century and its middle class 
‘consumers’ that historical investigations of ‘consumption’s’ origins have devoted their 
energies. The demise of the feudal organisation of agricultural land and the emergence of a 
capitalist agriculture broadened the range of wage-labour activities and the scope of a 
money economy simultaneously.  The reproduction of labour discussed by classical 
political economy began to assume the form of a ‘consumption of commodities’ of a 
specifically capitalist kind.  During the eighteenth century the ‘world of goods expanded 
dramatically’ (McCracken, 1990: 16), fashion became well established, sustained by 
advertising and the application of marketing techniques that targeted the upper-class trend-
setters.  Through fashion, argues McCracken, ‘aesthetic and stylistic considerations took 
precedence over utilitarian ones’ and status increasingly revolved around novelty since 
‘fashion helped to make consumption a new, more frequent, and taxing activity.’  This 
meant that the ‘consumer’ had to devote time to purchase and, more importantly, to 
‘consumer learning’ (McCracken, 1990: 18-9).  Eighteenth century ‘consumers,’ it would 
appear ‘were becoming semioticians in a new medium, the masters of a new code’ (ibid).  
However, this suggests that ‘consumers’ prior to the eighteenth century had lived in a 
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cultural vacuum, because McCracken never inform us what it is that is so distinctive and 
new about ‘consumption’ in the eighteenth century that justifies the use of such rhetoric. 
Drawing on Braudel’s (1973) discussion of privacy as an eighteenth century phenomenon, 
McCracken terms this the advent of ‘mass consumption,’ and the first period in which 
those beyond the nobility could participate.  The replacement of patina by novelty helped 
ease social mobility, in as much as it made simpler the attainment of socially desirable 
goods and the world of goods became ‘co-extensive’ with social life in which the 
‘consumer revolution’ was a ‘structural feature’. This was based upon the accumulation of 
information surrounding the symbolic importance of the goods that were to be purchased 
by ‘consumers’ (McCracken, 1990: 20-2). Again, this points towards the increasingly 
prominent role that theories of ‘material culture’ have played both in the description of 
contemporary ‘consumption practices’ but, also, in the modification of historical theories 
of the emergence of ‘consumer society’ itself. 
 
Campbell (1987) rejects McKendrick’s thesis describing an extension in the market during 
the eighteenth century based on an increase in the number of ‘consumers.’ Similarly, he 
doubts that any increase in material wealth would be translated into greater leisure time 
rather than a demand for more or different ‘consumer goods,’ as Williams (1982) had 
noted amongst the French bourgeoisie. In McKendrick’s thesis the wealthy indulge 
themselves in pursuit of ‘consumer satisfactions,’ of wants and desires in which they are 
imitated, firstly, by the ‘middle ranks’ and then, over a period of two centuries, by the 
lower classes.  Whereas social emulation is apparent in many cultures and ‘conspicuous 
consumption’ has long been a prerogative of the rich – the extension of these activities to 
the ‘middle’ strata of society requires explanation. This explanation is founded on the role 
of advertising and its relation to the expanded productive capabilities offered by the 
industrial revolution, particularly the evolution of the advertising and marketing 
professions and their application by entrepreneurs such as Josiah Wedgwood in the 
manipulation or creation of desire for goods (McKendrick et al, 1982; McCracken, 1990; 
Richards, 1991).  Campbell (1987: 21) considers McKendrick’s formulation as inadequate 
in explaining why it was that advertising suddenly became so effective in its manipulation 
of the market. 
 
Campbell (1987: 22-3) objects to McKendrick’s insistence upon the pre-eminence of 
fashion stating that, in doing so, ‘the origin of the modern fashion pattern’ is explained ‘in 
terms of a factor, the conscious manipulation of the market, which it has already been 
suggested is itself dependent upon the prior existence of the Western European fashion 
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pattern.’  This account, and those like it, fails to consider the emergence of modern fashion 
or ‘consumption’ as the outcome of the inter-relationship of the factors which they list as 
historically relevant.’ Only a transformation in cultural orientation could explain the 
emergence of a ‘consumer ethic,’ which was directly opposed to the moral asceticism of 
Protestantism and the utilitarian considerations that emerged from its teachings.  It is in 
light of the emergence of such a ‘consumer ethic’ against the ascetic background of post-
Reformation Protestantism that Campbell (1987: 59) notes the centrality of luxury to an 
understanding of ‘modern consumption,’ and of the dual meaning which that term can 
embody.  Firstly, there is the sense which distinguishes luxury from necessity, an excess 
over the amount required or deemed necessary in some way.  This is difficult to define and 
even harder to defend.  Secondly, there is the ‘reference to sensuous or pleasurable 
experience.’ Luxury is not something that can be accommodated within the framework of 
classical economics very easily (although see Bataille, 1991 and Berry, 1994 for its 
discussion). 
 
The Market and its Spaces 
Campbell’s (1987) rebuttal of the ‘consumer revolution’ thesis is insufficient, since it, rests 
upon an a-social theorisation of hedonistic individuals attempting to ‘realise’ the dreams or 
fantasies of their imaginations. As such it discounts both the relevance of the physical 
spaces of any ‘consumer revolution’ (the retail spaces in which goods were available to 
purchase), which have existed, in some form, as long as the principle of economic 
exchange and the class and gender positions of those involved.  Their specific history 
within the money economy has been detailed in many forms (Benson, 1986; Bronner, 
1989; Mui & Mui, 1989; Shields, 1992; Brewer & Porter (eds.), 1993) and will be pursued 
in greater detail in the next chapter. Contra Campbell, accounts of pre-modern 
‘consumption’ have tended to concentrate on the importance of the capital city and the 
court (Williams, 1982; Perrot, 1994; Adburgham, 1981) and the emulative ‘consumption’ 
that this stimulated among the nascent bourgeoisie (McKendrick et al, 1982; McCracken, 
1990).  Beyond these centres of ‘consumer activity,’ scholarly attention has focused on the 
material culture of a mass market (Shammas 1990, 1993), specifically through probate 
analysis (Weatherill, 1988). Likewise there was a failure to consider the existence of a 
network of shops, a regional sphere of circulation and exchange, within which both goods 
and people circulated.  This was premised upon an increase in the volume and variety of 
goods traded, the development of a nationwide carrier system and the availability of credit 
that could underpin the relatively slow turnover of stock.  ‘Consumer’ demand could 
increase during this period due to an upturn in real wage levels (Blaug, 1970; Glennie, 
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1995), an increased division of labour and the widespread introduction of cash wages (Mui 
& Mui, 1989: 12-4). 
 
The ‘consumer goods’ purchased by this increased disposable income consisted largely of 
tea and sugar imported from the colonies and sold to the increasing numbers of the 
population who inhabited ‘the middling ranks’ (for a full discussion see Schivelbusch, 
1993; Mintz, 1985). The ‘circuits of consumption’ (Johnson, 1986) that operated during 
the eighteenth century, were not simply composed of shops in the local towns. On the 
contrary, there existed a flourishing tradition of hawkers and ‘Scotch drapers’ who were 
much resented by their shop-owning competitors (Trentmann, 2002: 11).  This resentment 
was such that the latter part of the eighteenth century saw various attempts to legislate, to 
limit or outlaw aspects of the hawker’s trade, and especially their aggressive sales 
techniques (Mui & Mui, 1989: 73-9).  Despite this often fierce competition the expansion 
of both trade and population during the eighteenth century, combined with improved 
transport and communication networks, and increased agricultural and manufactured 
products ensured that the greater demand for ‘consumer goods’ could be met.  Excise 
records of the time show a ‘considerable expansion in the number and variety of shops’ 
(Mui & Mui, 1989: 291): which lends further credence to the thesis that ‘consumers’ 
preceded the ‘consumer revolution’ (Richards, 1991; Glennie, 1995). 
 
The history of ‘consumption,’ then, can never be the history of the spaces of the ‘consumer 
revolution,’ as imagined by liberal history, and in which the advent of ‘consumer society’ 
is simultaneous with, and dependent upon, the widespread extension of market relations or 
money economy. While acknowledging the centrality of commodity-exchange, the money-
exchange and the process of urbanisation, the foundation for any historical analysis of the 
consumption-relation remains the direct phenomenological experience of the social actors 
involved. So, the crucial dimension of an analysis of contemporary ‘consumption’ must be 
the degree to which it is modern, both as the technologically-driven modernisation of the 
forces of production and, also, as that dimension of the social relations of production and 
‘consumption’ which we experience subjectively, as modernité. By rejecting the 
‘consumer revolution’ thesis wherein, over however long a period, a ‘consumer society’ is 
born as if it were a natural creature, brought into this world whole but immature, it is 
possible to argue instead for the on-going history of modernity as the central structuring 
component of experience. Just as Sayer (1991) rejects the possible existence of class, in the 
modern sense, before capitalism, so too we can not conceive of consumption prior to the 
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modern period, since it would be lacking those elements and characteristics which are 
definitive of the experience of modernité.  
 
Consuming the Modern 
The revolutionary transformations which capitalist production techniques and their 
attendant division of labour brought to western culture is insufficient to assert that the 
modern period is definitively so just because it is characterized by radical transformations, 
as part of an on-going process of modernisation: we must ask what form these 
transformations have assumed and which aspects of modern culture they have, and have 
not, transformed? The study of modern consumption is also the study of those areas and 
aspects of society identifiable as being intrinsically related to ‘consumption’ as part of a 
larger system, and not simply ‘consumer’ activity.  The distinction between ‘consumption,’ 
as a thoroughly modern, contemporary set of socio-spatial practices, the unfolding of 
which, historically, have comprised ‘consumer activity’ is vital. Unless such a distinction 
is asserted then the history and pre-history of contemporary society suffer an elision in 
which neither can be clearly discerned, and all that remains to a would-be ‘sociology of 
consumption’ is a history of the consumer-as-purchaser within the on-going development 
of the market economy. Glennie’s (1995: 165) review of historical studies of 
‘consumption’ identifies three features of such accounts.  
i) …growing per capita consumption of commodities; intensifying production and 
reorganised distribution systems; increasing social divisions of labour and 
increasing social mobility (both symbolised by consumer goods); growing 
individualism in social life; and consumer acquisitiveness tied to fashion and, 
increasingly advertising. 
 
ii) …key transformatory periods, using metaphors of transition… 
 
iii) …the conflation of mass consumption (the size of the market), modern 
consumption (usually defined in terms of consumption practices), and mass 
culture (systematic manipulation by capital of consumer knowledge through 
mass media and advertising images). 
 
The general emphasis upon a moment of social change located in an identifiable historical 
moment or period, whereby one social formation gives way to another, is usually 
formulated upon the extension of exchange relations and their particular form. Such 
formulations often rely on the basis of the evidence available, certain types of material 
culture, probate wills (Weatherill, 1988; 1993) or substantial objects made of durable 
materials, such as wood or metal, which outlast the more fragile ceramics, while the more 
expensive possessions of the upper-classes often linger because of their manufacture in 
precious metals (Glennie, 1995: 171-2). There is also a wide geographical disparity in the 
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types of goods available and their price, which meant that luxury and necessity were 
defined by location. Entry into ‘the world of goods,’ therefore, varied by space and time, 
and in relation to the penetration of the sphere of circulation by capitalist relations of 
production and exchange (Shammas, 1990; 1993). 
 
In addition, the gradual decrease in the price of certain commodities, previously luxuries, 
meant that they became staples of diet and everyday life, ceasing to be ‘status’ goods 
pursued as part of a ‘trickle-down’ effect, notably tea, coffee, chocolate and sugar (Mintz, 
1985; Schivelbusch, 1993). Glennie sees this decrease in price as leading to an increased 
use or purchase of such commodities. In a similar way, the market in second or third-hand 
goods extended the market economy without committing ‘consumers’ to the desire for 
luxuries – they were simply able to buy more of the same, or similar (1995: 172-4). Hence, 
this extension of capitalist exchange relations and the goods being exchanged meant that 
even those without the wherewithal to buy were exposed to the articles available – for 
some such goods were staples, for others dreamed of future purchases – complicating the 
symbolic, social and cultural meanings of goods. This added complication to the 
theorisation of ‘consumption activity’ remains problematic for accounts such as the 
‘system of provision’ approach where the emphasis is upon ‘final consumption’ by the 
purchaser (Fine & Leopold, 1993; Fine, 1995; 2002, 2006), but it has been addressed by 
‘material culture’ analyses (Dant, 1999; Miller, 1999). As Glennie observes: 
 
Goods usually had multiple meanings, frequently combining utilitarian, 
ornamental and private associations, and these meanings connected to 
notions of identity and social ideology. Divisions between private use and 
public display were far from clear cut…. Meanings and uses were ascribed 
to objects as they were incorporated into practices, which might be 
ritualised or spontaneous, and whose character changed over time.  
– Glennie, 1995: 179 
 
The world of goods gradually acquired the capacity to map social relations, whether as 
fashion growing up around the increasingly novel goods available for purchase or in the 
allocation of gender roles (the wife ‘provisioning’ her home) or the evolution of genteel 
culture around ‘consumer goods’ (Barker-Benfield, 1992; Bushman, 1992; Elias, 1990). 
The ‘nascent capitalisms’ of the ‘early-modern West’ (Glennie, 1995: 181) experienced the 
social tensions produced by the symbolic character and capacity of commodities, by their 
display of an increasingly individuated display of inequalities in wealth. The commodity-
form gradually acquired a representational role, and increasingly threatened to move from 
the symbolic to the semiotic, as the medium rather than the particular commodity-objects 
became its most meaningful aspect. 
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Units of Analysis 
Those, such as Trentmann (2002; 2006), who argue for a differentiation between ‘mass 
consumer society,’ emerging in the later nineteenth century, following on from the type of 
‘modern consumer society’ outlined above, acknowledge the role of industrialisation: the 
increased proliferation of commodities in circulation; the further penetration of every 
aspect of existence by the money economy; the increasingly important part played by 
fashion and the sheer spectacle of invention and Progress that the commodity-form came to 
represent. A distinction appears between the former’s focus upon a ‘modern’ desire for 
commodities and novelties, while the latter sees modern ‘consumer’ society emerging only 
with mass participation in an economy based upon want not need, abundance rather than 
scarcity. Such theories argue for the commodification of life across a variety of media. On 
this reading, ‘mass consumer society’ represents an intersection of capitalism and 
modernity; it is a ‘post-traditional society’ that raises issues of ‘post-modernism’ and the 
‘problem’ of identity (Trentmann, 2002: 2). 
 
Here, obviously, the role of the grand magasin (France) or department store (Britain and 
America) is crucial (although not uncontested, see Glennie, 1995). The extensive literature 
on this subject (Miller, 1999; Williams, 1982; Laermans, 1993; Lancaster, 1995) and its 
place in the post-Haussmann modern metropolis (Ryan, 1994; Prendergast, 1992; de 
Cauter, 1993) represented the department store as a ‘space of consumption,’ the 
implications of which will be further explored in the next chapter. The extension of the 
‘world of goods’ to the mass of the population through distributive mechanisms, such as 
the department store, is insufficient to argue for a whole new phase of society. While this 
thesis acknowledges the experience of the extension of the world of goods and the 
conditions under which a transformation in the relationship between subjective and 
objective culture occurred (at least implicitly) it does nothing more. However, this strand 
of historical investigation is important because it allows for discussion of the spaces within 
which the prospective ‘consumers’ and the objects that they hope to ‘consume’ encounter 
each other.  
 
Stearns (1997) outlined a two-stage model, linking an increased desire for commodities, 
such as clothing and household items, in early modern Europe to a later, mid-nineteenth 
century, expansion of ‘consumer activity’ across all classes based around the department 
store. Trentmann objects to Stearns’ ‘two-interrelated a priori ways of viewing the subject: 
the definition of an acquisitive individualist mentality as the defining feature of modern 
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consumer behaviour and, since this originated in the West, a view of expansion that looks 
from the epi-centre (West) outwards’ (Trentmann, 2002: 6). Stearns’ reliance upon an 
essentialist view of human need, formulated around subsistence, reveals a yearning for a 
traditional way of life that appears, at this distance, to be more authentic and rooted in 
necessary activities and display. As Trentmann points out, it also denies ‘consumption’ 
activity that is based in or around experiences rather than objects, services rather than 
goods, and the multiple meanings that such activities assume for the various participants. 
As a result it falls short of exactly those issues addressed by Miller (2001) when the 
commodity-form is considered anthropologically, as an embodiment not only of abstract 
values but also personal feelings, kinship networks and social and inter-subjective relations 
of work, play and personal identity. 
 
Trentmann (2002: 7) rejects Stearns’ thesis as tautological: a sufficiently narrow definition 
of ‘consumerism’ leaves itself nothing to describe but the acquisitive actions of a desiring 
and selfish subject, advocating a wider, comparative assessment encompassing the social 
and political organisations of other societies, distant in both time and space. While 
correctly identifying the importance of political and social forms of resistance to 
‘consumerism’ and their role in shaping the contemporary experience of ‘consumer 
society,’ Trentmann, in his focus upon the movements that embodied this resistance, fails 
to identify and define exactly what is being resisted – consumption itself. The second 
criterion for dismissing Stearns is the association of ‘dynamic consumption’ with 
modernising Western societies and the absence of such dynamism in ‘traditional’ Eastern 
societies. Trentmann contradicts the belief in an acquisitive, selfish ‘consumer’ in which 
Stearns has such faith. 
 
The advance of Western Europe might have had much less to do with some 
originary European revolution of consumerist desire than with other 
sources, such as access to coal and the exploitation of the New World.  
- Trentmann, 2002: 8  
 
From this, it would appear that the forms of ‘consumption’ – and their motive force – are 
intrinsically bound up with socio-economic conditions in an emerging technologically-
enabled modernity, rather than some variation on human nature peculiar to Europe at this 
time and afterwards. 
 
Trentmann attempts to re-integrate historical studies of ‘consumption’ and ‘consumer 
activity’ within the wider field often associated with the social sciences, and the questions 
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that these address in contemporary society (such as the relationship between ‘consumer’ 
and ‘citizen’) requires an investigation of the ‘pre-history’ of contemporary society and its 
relationship to ‘consumption.’ In extending Glennie’s (1995) reservations about the 
centrality of the grands magasins, Trentmann points out that ‘the spread of the department 
store was not an automatic reaction to urbanisation and industrialisation […] France was 
advanced in the first, but not in the latter’ (Trentmann, 2002: 11). This does raise the 
question as to how the relationship between the sphere of production and the sphere of 
circulation and exchange was configured, since Trentmann also notes that the rise of the 
department store was paralleled, in Britain at least, by an increase in the number of 
travelling salesmen and hawkers. The various mechanisms for the distribution and 
exchange of capitalist commodities changed both qualitatively (arcades, department stores) 
and quantitatively (hawkers and costermongers), along class lines: more commodities of 
increasing variety met more ‘consumers’ in a variety of increasingly diverse socio-spatial 
situations. This leads Trentmann to urge historical studies to abandon ‘the nation-state as 
the natural unit of inquiry and instead to compare phenomena across societies, such as the 
distinct conditions that favoured the emergence of particular retail organisations in some 
cities but not in others’ (Trentmann, 2002: 11). However, this is to leave the study of 
‘consumption,’ nineteenth or twentieth century, ‘consumer’ or ‘mass consumer,’ stuck at 
the level of systems of provision or as a study of retail forms rather than as an active series 
of forms of sociation.  
 
Trentmann acknowledges the limitations of the conceptual distinction between ‘consumer 
society’ and ‘mass consumer society,’ since such a social formation was inevitably ‘limited 
to particular regions and cities as well as to particular classes’ (Trentmann, 2002: 12). This 
point is most evident when the experience of, and participation in, ‘consumption’ is 
determined by access to disposable income, although the metropolitan nature of much 
‘consumption’ forced an awareness, and often a participation through labour, upon those 
who could never be called consumers – something that Trentmann does not discuss but 
which is evident from the literature around the department stores (from Zola to Miller or 
Lancaster). This ‘uneven’ participation might even be considered one of the defining 
characteristics of modern consumption, for it is precisely in the temporally and spatially 
bounded nature of the experience of ‘consumption,’ rather than solely in the objects 
themselves, that its modernity lies. Trentmann’s historian’s focus upon the particularities 
of ‘consumption’ and ‘consumer societies’ in different regions and at different times tends 
to result in a dual focus. On the one hand, there is an appreciation of the specific 
experience of time and place; on the other, there is a tendency to produce a unit of analysis 
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such as the national, the supra-national (European) or intra-national (European and 
American), which appear capable of encompassing contradiction and often extreme 
instances of differentiated experience – but which do highlight the role of the state and of 
international organisations. However, what is lacking is a theoretically coherent framework 
which, in varying manifestations, is capable of describing characteristics across societies, 
space and time. 
 
The Subjects of Consumption 
Increasingly, historical studies have attempted to address the more ‘culturalist’ 
implications of recent developments within the social sciences, issues around post-
structuralist discussions of meaning, action, gender and identity: 
 
Any serious discussion of consumer society must trace the practices and 
meanings of consumption as they are woven into social structures and 
actions that lie beyond the shop counter… [Hence] the ideological 
valorisation of consumption… reflected in Erika Rappaport’s significant 
study of shopping in London’s West End…. Instead of commercial 
exploitation or oppression, Shopping for Pleasure is a story of consumers’ 
agency. … an emancipatory activity through which middle-class women 
defined a new sense of bourgeois feminine identity, carved out new public 
spaces, and became energised as political actors.  
- Trentmann (2002: 18). 
 
Rappaport’s (2000) revision of existing theories of ‘consumer activities’ and motivations, 
such as Veblen’s ‘conspicuous consumption’ thesis, serves to demonstrate the way in 
which consumption becomes a medium within which social, political and gender issues 
were both animated and, provisionally at least, resolved. Rappaport’s discussion of the 
flâneuse and her relationship to the magazines of the period extends shopping outwith the 
confines of the department store, to address ‘the spatial and emotional dimension of 
consumption beyond the materiality of commodities’ (Trentmann, 2002: 19). In addition to 
allowing discussion of the flâneuse, such an approach creates the opportunity to address 
other ‘physiognomies’ such as the ‘irrational’ female shoplifter described by Abelson 
(1989). Such a discussion goes to the heart of contemporary discussions of the ‘consumer’ 
as subject, as individual and citizen, through its address to governmentality and the 
constitution of the self through the act of choice as participant in a liberal democracy 
(Trentmann, 2002).  ‘Consumption,’ in this way, becomes the contested arena between 
individual rights, collective will and corporate power, exemplified through discussions of 
the food chain (Schlosser, 2002; Ritzer, 1999). As Trentmann points out, this discussion is 
directed less at an analysis of what ‘consumption’ is or the historical conditions that 
ushered in its modern manifestation and, instead, is about ‘the changing meanings and 
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functions of consumption and how these transformed the politics of space, community, 
and, eventually, the democratic imagination itself’ (Trentmann, 2002: 23). The ‘consumer’ 
of ‘consumer society’ becomes the locus for a set of democratic rights realised through 
market relations and the money-form, the exercise of which is represented as individual 
and collective liberty: 
 
The task ahead is to write histories of consumption, not consumerism. 
Consumerism, or the lure of material goods for individuals, is only one 
point on a broad cultural spectrum in which consumption operated in 
modern and contemporary societies.  
- Trentmann, 2002: 31 
 
Trentmann wishes to see the writing of a ‘history of consumption’ that avoids moving 
from stage to stage, from need to desire (want), and to conceive of this history as a 
specifically Western experience rather than an account of how humans ‘consume.’ This 
requires moving beyond analyses of shopping and the market to analyse ‘what sociologists 
have called “ordinary consumption”, to social services and to systems of public provision’ 
(Trentmann, 2002: 31). The question becomes: what, if anything, is not consumption 
today? And, how are we to investigate the role of ‘consumption’ in which apparently every 
aspect of life is governed by and described this terminology (Trentmann, 2006)?  
 
Despite the important evidence that historical studies have contributed to the study of 
‘consumption’ and the steps taken, by those such as Trentmann, to marry this evidence to 
contemporary debates within the social sciences the study of history, as an academic 
discipline and practice, still hinges upon the passing of time, from the past to the present. 
This linear aspect of historical studies will be addressed, below, in the section discussing 
the relationship between ‘consumption,’ ‘consumer society’ and postmodernism and their 
focus upon meaning, action and identity. 
 
The Social Sciences 
It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which 
assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things…I 
call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon 
as they are produced as commodities.  
- Marx, 1976: 165, cited Lee, 2000: xiii 
 
The attempt by the social sciences to circumvent the focus by historical studies upon ‘units 
of analysis,’ such as the ‘consumer revolution,’ ‘consumer society’ or national studies 
thereof, entails a concentration upon the actions of individual subjects, either singularly or 
in groups, and the social relations that provide the context for action. The social sciences 
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provide the opportunity to investigate ‘consumption’ as a phenomenon born of the 
capitalist mode of production, but which is not limited to an analysis of its sphere of 
circulation and exchange to the detriment of the intentional actions of social actors. Unlike 
the utilitarian psychology that is presumed to animate inhabitants of capitalist society 
during its nascent modern stage the social sciences provide an opportunity to consider 
needs as being social in character and historically derived. So, both Marx’s ‘Robinsonade’ 
and Adam Smith’s contention that 'the desire of food is limited in every man by the narrow 
capacity of the human stomach' (cited Blaug, 1970: 86) are revealed as conceptions of an 
inelasticity of desire (need) that is perceived as natural and grounded in the fixed bodily 
limits of human biology. However, the advent of the ‘marginalist revolution’ of neo-
classical political economy saw ‘consumption’ cease to be measured by ‘the vendible stock 
of goods’ (Adam Smith) and located, instead, in subjective desire manifest through 
exchange-value (money) sacrificed for satisfaction (price paid). This shift in emphasis, to 
the subjective calculation of satisfaction measured against the ‘opportunity cost’ of 
alternative uses of exchange-values and of the ‘marginal utility’ to be derived, put the 
rational, utility-calculating ‘consumer’ at the heart of economic analysis – and he, homo 
œconomicus, has never departed. 
 
Likewise, social science has broken with historical studies of the origins of ‘consumer 
society’ and the beginnings of modern or mass ‘consumerism’ in its engagement with 
theories of ‘postmodernity’ and the ‘postmodern.’ The lengthy process of the birth and 
evolution of the ‘consumer society’ (Bauman, 1983; Brewer and Porter, 1993; Campbell, 
1987, 1995; McKendrick et al., 1982; Thirsk, 1978) can be juxtaposed with its 
contemporary manifestation, in terms of the spatial, temporal and subjective forms 
assumed. The continual maintenance of the sphere of circulation and exchange that 
underpins the experience of modern consumption is revealed as the particular outcome of 
historical events, social formations, economic imperatives, technological innovations and 
cultural dispositions – the result of a series of overlapping processes and networks. The 
ostensible shift in sensibility ushered in by a ‘postmodern consumer culture’ (Bauman, 
1999; Featherstone, 1999; Harvey, 1989; Huyssen, 1986) is examined in an attempt to 
delineate the putative relationship between a ‘postmodernism,’ marked by transformation 
of the role of information and knowledge within economic and cultural structures (Lyotard, 
1984), and the emergence of new psychological formations in response to the changed 
conditions of contemporary capitalist society – the absences and ruptures of 




No reasonable person would give away a value without receiving an equal 
value in return, and it would be a perverted world in which the desired 
object attained its value only as a result of the price that had to be paid for 
it […] so far as our immediate consciousness is concerned […] the value 
that a subject sacrifices can never be greater, in the particular 
circumstances of the moment, than the value that he receives in return.  
- Simmel, 1990 
 
Psychology represents the most coherent and sustained disciplinary engagement with 
nineteenth century economic theory by the social sciences and it is here that the rational 
and utilitarian legacy is most clearly evident. The desire to maximise utility, marginal or 
otherwise, which utilitarian psychology bequeaths to social science analyses of 
‘consumption activity’ causes problems when the ‘unit of analysis’ ceases to be a discrete 
individual. The social and historical character of ‘needs’ outlined above reveals their 
contingency and freedom from the dictates of reasonable behaviour. The apparent excesses 
of phenomena as diverse as fashion and addiction are inexplicable when considered as 
expressions of an immutable rationality, however, when considered within the contingent 
‘circumstances of the moment’ (Simmel) the satisfactions they proffer might well 
outweigh all others immediately available. Psychological explanations of ‘consumption 
activity’ have struggled with the imminent dissolution of rational, law-following homo 
œconomicus into a fickle, irrational and possibly hedonistic ‘consumer’ motivated not only 
by subjective desire (as in neo-classical theory) but also by physiological addiction and 
social habit. The subjective susceptibility to the stuff of the world reveals the problem of 
‘normative beliefs’ within a ‘theory of reasoned action’ (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). The 
social and subjective significance of ‘consumption-objects,’ whether derived through their 
material form (such as a precious metal), the labour-process (skill), popular taste (fashion) 
or simple rarity (experience) all conspire to complicate the cost/benefit analysis beloved of 
the rational actor of economic theory, the explanation of which has been undertaken by 
psychology. The ‘perfect knowledge’ of economic actors dissolves into a variety of 
psychologically perceived, contextualising ‘rationality assumptions’ (Lunt, 1995), which 
lend themselves to a psychological ‘typology of the consumer’ (Lunt & Livingstone, 1992) 
that is, itself, constructed from the revealed preferences demonstrated through purchasing 
activity. 
 
The hedonistic ‘calculus’ of pleasure and pain depicted by Bentham must either bow 
before the physiological imperative of a heroin high or give way to a ‘social economics’ 
(von Wieser, 1889) capable of refining nineteenth century economic theory’s rational 
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individual capable of appreciating the semiotic role and significance of ‘consumption 
activity’ and its objects (and services). Psychology’s attempts to do so (Katona, 1951; 
Csikszentmihalyi & Rochberg-Halton, 1981) have relied upon the attribution of 
‘personality traits’ and psychological dispositions that extend the conception of rationality. 
Lunt (1995) views Katona’s (1951) Psychological Analysis of Economic Behaviour as the 
foundation of such a modern psychological study of ‘consumption activity.’ Within this 
theory ‘mediating psychological variables’ shape the response to economic stimuli, these 
responses then allow the study of individual and group behaviour (1995: 240) – 
effectively, revealed preferences. Almost inevitably, the psychological investigation of 
economic behaviour, of which ‘consumption’ figures as a subset returns to the theory of 
the rational individual in pursuit of maximum satisfaction within a framework that forces 
choice, sacrifice and the calculation of marginal utility. The range of choices and the social 
factors that underpin individual calculations of utility are never satisfactorily theorised. As 
a result even psychology’s embrace of ‘the symbolic functions of objects’ (Lunt, 1995: 
247) fails to transcend the explanation of ‘consumer activity’ as a series of purchasing 
decisions that represent the combination of rational calculation of utility and individual 
preference driven by ‘personality traits.’ This, as with economic theory, denotes a failure 
to conceptualise the inter-subjective, socio-spatial, definitively modern dimensions of 
contemporary ‘consumption.’  
 
The dynamic relationship between subjects and objects can be seen in the role and 
operation of the money-form, to which Simmel (1990) attributes the capacity to engender 
personality types through its transformation – and radical extension – of the teleological 
chain, its ability to place objects and experiences within reach of the subject. This 
capability of the money-form to compress the apparent distances contained within the 
experience of space and time bestows upon the commodity-form the power to transform 
subjective experience through its extension: 
 
Money evenly complies with every directive concerning the object of its 
expenditure; its extent, the speed with which it is expended or retained. In 
this manner it affords the Ego the most committed and unreserved manner 
of expressing itself in an object […]. All that it is and it has, money 
surrenders fully to the human will, becoming totally absorbed within it.  
– Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes: 436-7, cited Poggi, 1993: 325 
 
This capacity will be explored through the recent insights afforded to the study of modern 
consumption by ecological psychology in the final sections of this chapter. For now, it is 
sufficient to observe the money-form’s mediation of the relationship between being and 
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having and the incorporation of the object-world within the subjective realm. The 
possibility of the object realm possessing a transformative power over the subjective 
represents a break with orthodox psychology’s explanations of the modern ‘consumer’ and 
‘consumer culture’ (Livingston, 1998). Having inherited from economic theory the ‘empty 
subjectivity’ of homo œconomicus - seemingly devoid of gender yet resolutely male – 
which is threatened by the emergence of the ‘feminine’ aspect of mass culture (Huyssen, 
1986) and the sublime pleasures of ‘consumption,’ which would ultimately lead to a 
‘desublimated female desire, free at last of its bonds to maternal reality, [which] could 
circulate and so create new sources of subjectivity for men and women alike’ (Livingston, 
1998: 429). Psychological studies of ‘consumption’ and ‘consumer activity’ are 
increasingly confounded by the failure of actors to adhere to the rational pursuit of 
maximum utility, other than as a ‘deviation’ that is, to varying degrees, pathological. The 
deliberate pursuit of momentary satisfactions, which more closely resemble ‘whim’ than 
‘need,’ merely underscores the irrational aspect of modern consumption when viewed from 
the standpoints of economic theory and utilitarian psychology. The social, contextual and 
inter-subjective dimension of contemporary consumption-relations refutes both the cost-
benefit analyses of homo œconomicus and the individualistic presuppositions of the 
theories of ‘consumer society.’  
 
Geographies of Space & Time 
Techniques such as ‘time geography,’ pioneered by Hagerstrand (discussed in Jackson & 
Thrift, 1995), represent an attempt to avoid the reduction of ‘consumption’ to the activities 
of an isolated ‘consumer’ and the economistic assumptions that this entails. By mapping 
the temporal routines through which individuals navigate social space it is possible to 
analytically distinguish between various ‘time-allocations,’ both for particular individuals 
and for specific actions undertaken by a variety of individuals. ‘Consumer activities’ 
become socially-embedded practices discernible in space and time (Jackson & Thrift, 
1995: 213; Miller, 1999; 2001), which allow a circumvention of utilitarian preconceptions, 
and the psychological flourishes of ‘personality traits,’ thereby revealing choice to be a 
social relation, rather than a purely personal preference. This allows time-geography’s field 
of analysis to include ‘moments of consumption’ where there is no exchange of money for 
goods or services (direct purchase), such as the enjoyment of images or views, 
participation in leisure pursuits or watching television, which in escaping quantitative 
measurement remained ‘invisible’ to traditional economic theory. This qualitative 
approach plots ‘consumer activity’ as a variety of modes or types of interaction, which are 
limited to neither subjects nor objects (Jackson & Thrift, 1995: 214-5). In this time-
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geography anticipates both ANT (Callon, 1994; Latour, 1993) and the recent revival of 
ecological psychology (Costall, 2004; Dant, 1999; Heft: 2001), which both reject an 
‘ontological difference’ between subjects and objects in favour of an ‘ontology of 
difference’ – a disavowal of Cartesian dualism – underpinned by a vitalist conception of 
‘monism, self-reproduction and becoming’ common to much recent sociology (Lash, 2006: 
2-3). This reconfigured ontological arrangement avoids the reduction of geographical 
analyses of ‘consumption’ to interrogations of spaces, such as shopping malls, in which 
certain site-specific activities related to the purchase of objects and services occur. Instead, 
by linking temporal moments with spatial practices (Jackson & Thrift, 1995: 210-11) a 
framework for analysis emerges in which dynamic social relations resemble the ‘networks’ 
of both Castells (1996) and Latour (passim).  
 
Pred (1990; Pred & Watts, 1992) traces the possibility of ‘consumer resistance’ through 
‘symbolic discontent’ within the spaces of capitalist modernity. ‘Consumption’ becomes 
an event within the ‘circuits of consumption’ (Johnson, 1986), which, in turn, is related to 
the circuit of capital and can be conceptualised through a tri-partite analysis: ‘the changing 
sites of consumption; the chains that link consumption’s multiple locations; and the spaces 
and places of contemporary consumerism’ (Jackson & Thrift, 1995: 206). However, the 
advantages offered by this conceptualisation and the methodological approach outlined by 
time-geography, above, must be married to an appreciation of systems of production and 
distribution (including marketing and advertising) of the kind described by the ‘systems of 
provision’ approach (Fine & Leopold, 1993; Fine, 1995; 2002) and the historical analyses 
of commodities’ arrival and incorporation into culture (Mintz, 1985; Schivelbusch, 1993). 
By connecting the sites, chains, spaces and places of ‘consumption’ with the systems of 
production, distribution and marketing that bring people into proximity with the goods, 
services and experiences that make up the capitalist economy the geographical analysis of 
‘consumption’ avoids its prior tendency to focus upon systems and production. The ‘unit’ 
of analysis becomes a socio-spatial practice – shopping – and bears an affinity with the 
material culture approach of a revised anthropology (see Falk & Campbell, 1997, who, in 
their appendix outline a brief typology of approaches to ‘shopping’). By uniting 
production, distribution and ‘consumption’ theoretically the recent literature on ‘shopping’ 
(Falk & Campbell, 1997; Miller, 2001; Shields, 1992) reintroduces a debate around how 
individuals and groups operate within the ‘circuit of consumption’ and, implicitly, the 
sphere of circulation and exchange. Shopping as a practice links recent anthropological 
(Miller, 2001) and ‘material culture’ (Dant, 1999, 2002) work with a discussion of the 
more abstract ‘consumer’ (Keat et al, 1994; Miller & Rose, 1997) and his or her 
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‘consumerism’ (Lodziak, 2002; Miles, 1998; Sulkunen et al, 1997) and the forms of 
sociation available in a ‘consumer society.’ ‘Shopping’ becomes the meaningful 
participation within certain socio-spatial practices geared towards specific goals, whether 
motivated by physiological need, hedonistic desire or status-seeking ‘conspicuous 
consumption.’  
 
This, in turn, prompts a consideration over the role and meaning of the objects that must 
now be considered within an ‘ontology of difference’ (Lash, 2006), rather than occupying 
a discrete realm in which they are ‘activated’ purely by purposive human action. While the 
symbolic dimension of material objects and (immaterial) practices is accepted by virtually 
every social science discipline (with the possible exception of Lodziak’s (2002) take on 
‘the production of consumption’ approach) the particular production and manifestation of 
this aspect in the culture of capitalist modernity is the province of marketing. Marketing’s 
centrality to the capitalist mode of production coincided with its accreditation as an 
academic discipline during the shift from ‘Fordist’ to ‘post-Fordist’ production (Belk, 
1995) and the regime of flexible accumulation that accompanied this process. Initially 
conceived as a psychological interpretation of economic theory, which evolved to 
incorporate the latent emotional meanings of objects revealed by Dichter’s Freudian-
influenced ‘motivation research’ (Belk, 1995: 59), only the recent ‘new consumer 
research’ (NCR) has comprehensively rejected the utilitarian assumptions of economistic 
psychology and embraced a notion of ‘the social’ that goes beyond the aggregation of 
individuals. Analyses of ‘consumption’ tend to operate as a functionalist anthropology-lite 
in which social factors, such as class, are granted a ‘reality’ insofar as they determine both 
desire for and access to specific goods. This reduces ‘consumption activity’ to an extended 
conception of use that incorporates status – as a varied range of ‘final consumption’ 
alternatives – either for individuals or groups (lifestyle). Indeed, Belk euphemistically 
describes ‘the under-consumption of problems of homelessness, poverty and starvation,’ 
and ‘dysfunctional consumer behaviours,’ such as compulsive buying, gambling, 
alcoholism, drug-use and prostitution (1995: 67). By allowing commodities a ‘biography’ 
(Kopytoff, 1986), marketing avoids recourse to ‘final consumption’ (Fine & Leopold, 
1993) through an acknowledgement of the ‘after-life’ of objects, purchased, found, gifted 
or inherited and appreciate the psychological attachments that such objects could inspire 
(Richins & Bloch, 1986). However, marketing theory’s most influential exponent can not 
avoid reducing the subject of ‘consumption’ to a ‘collector’ of objects and experiences, an 
‘extended self’ (Belk, 1995: 73) who evaluates objects or services within the emotional 




Marketing saw the ‘consumer’ seek satisfactions beyond the crudely utilitarian and extend 
the concept of use to include symbolic considerations and, by rejecting the a-historical 
dictates of physiological need, displays an affinity with the revised political economy of 
the ‘system of provision’ (Fine & Leopold, 1993; Fine, 1995), which links Marx to the 
cultural histories of commodities, such as sugar, chocolate or spices (Schivelbusch 1993; 
Mintz, 1985). The narration of the biography of the commodity is comprised of the series 
of practices that link the social relations of production and distribution within a ‘global’ or 
post-Fordist economy to the construction of ‘symbolic’ or sign-value within the sphere of 
circulation and exchange. This redress of the abstraction of ‘virtualism’ (Carrier & Miller, 
1998) exposes the social relations and material structures that underpin the ideological 
representation of the world as a series of ‘consumer’ choices. This description of the 
commodity-form prior to the moment of ‘final consumption,’ when the commodity leaves 
the ‘economic’ realm and re-asserts its use-value, rather than its exchange-value, 
overplays the importance of structural elements to the detriment of the autonomy of social 
actors. The euphemistic dismissal of deliberate strategies, such as marketing, as ‘the 
immanence of trends acting indirectly upon consumption - through mass production and 
modes of retailing and distribution’ (Fine & Leopold, 1993: 72), also marginalises the 
factors that determine the level of involvement in ‘consumption activities,’ such as social 
class and the possibility of a ‘trickle-down’ effects, such as that commonly associated with 
Veblen (1994). However, the ‘system of provision’ approach does offer a means to unite 
the otherwise analytically distinct realms of ‘production’ and ‘circulation and exchange’ 
within a larger totality. Therefore, the extended concept of use allows the circumvention of 
the utilitarian psychology inherited from economic theory and a surpassing of the 
ontological distinction between human and non-human. The biographical narration of the 
commodity-form grants it an apparent autonomy, derived from its inhabitation of the 
sphere of circulation and exchange, which requires that the socio-spatial analysis of 
modern consumption include both subjects and objects.  
 
More or Less Recent Sociologies  
The emphasis upon the extension of market relations by historical studies of ‘consumption’ 
has been diluted by the social sciences and their emphasis upon the use to which the 
commodity-form is put within contemporary forms of social interaction. However, a 
sustained analysis of modern consumption, as a socio-spatial practice comprising both 
subjects and objects, actants (Latour), within a network that sees ontological distinctions 
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dissolve into degrees of difference, into properties, has not yet emerged. In surrendering 
the ontological separation between human and non-human the question of human agency 
and subjective ‘identity’ is thrown into question, as socio-spatial practices – or ways of 
behaving – can be viewed as the causes of social phenomena, or effects. Classical 
sociology attempted to chart the shift from feudalism to capitalism (see Hilton, 1976; 
Holton, 1985), from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft (Tonnies), and the onset of modernity 
and its transformation of experience, and the consequences for the individual. These 
analyses were based upon the social relations of the mode of production (Marx) and its 
generation of material surplus understood as luxury (Sombart), or the consequences of 
these for individual development (Weber) or social cohesion (Durkheim). However, 
perhaps only Tarde and Simmel conceived of truly new ways of analysing the emergence 
of a definitively modern culture – although their shared preoccupation with the metropolis 
and society as a form of exchange may colour this.  
 
Psychoanalysis in Reverse 
The consequences of the changes described by the ‘founding fathers’ of sociology 
continued to preoccupy their successors, notably the critical theorists of the Frankfurt 
School, Adorno, Horkheimer, Lowenthal, Marcuse and associates such as Walter 
Benjamin. One such consequence of the shift from traditional to ‘post-traditional’ or 
modern society is the ‘problem’ of the production of an identity, or self. Slater (1997) sees 
modernity as an ‘expert’ culture, which attempts to solve its problems through technical 
knowledge, offered in the case of ‘consumption’ by post-traditional discourses such as 
advertising or ‘lifestyle’ – effectively, the acquisition of meaningful goods, services and 
experiences. This, for Adorno, is the basis of ‘non-identity’ thinking, a compensatory 
activity, organised by the culture industry’s marriage of capitalist commodity culture and 
bureaucratic or instrumental rationality, which represents the ‘dark side’ of the ‘dialectic of 
Enlightenment’ (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979). The alienated subject of capitalist 
modernity attempts to compensate and overcome this alienation through the problematic 
notion of the satisfaction of ‘false’ needs, created by the rationalisation of every aspect of 
social life. The resulting reification of sociality within an ‘administered world’ results in a 
negative or ‘consumer’ freedom that denies the formulation of a whole or rounded 
subjectivity (identity) through the fetishistic, alienating and commodified culture of 
modern capitalism.  
 
The Frankfurt School’s combination of Marxist critique with Freudian psychoanalysis 
represents an attempt to diagnose and combat the perceived excesses of a capitalist 
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‘consumer culture’ and its consequences for subjectivity in the face of an apparently 
overwhelming ‘objective culture.’ Lowenthal’s description of ‘consumer culture’ as 
‘psychoanalysis in reverse’ (Slater, 1997: 122) and Marcuse’s critique of the ‘happiness’ 
available within a ‘consumer culture’ develop the theme of unreal or false satisfactions that 
produce an ‘ersatz individuality’ in lieu of the conception of individual identity common to 
Hegelian philosophy, the ‘bourgeois world view’ (Ferguson, 1990) or ‘market individual’ 
(Seltzer, 1992). The result is that participants in modern ‘consumer culture’ cannot 
conceive of themselves as individuals (Marcuse, 1964; 1973) or actively resist the 
restrictions, sublimations and domination enforced by the capitalist division of labour, 
which results in a ‘corrupted’ libidinal economy incapable of fulfilling the Enlightenment 
project’s dream of human advancement as individual development. The Frankfurt School’s 
vision of ‘consumption’ as the endpoint or logical conclusion, the ‘final consumption,’ of 
commodities precludes the subjective refinement of the self. In this sense the Frankfurt 
School bridge the gap between the analyses of Marx and those of Bourdieu (1984), in 
which the ideals of distinction can be reduced to a cultural and symbolic capital that the 
sociologist can read off in ‘consumption’ practices. So, the formal rationality of the 
‘culture industry’ ultimately results in an inauthentic selfhood that can only be manifested 
through participation in the commodity culture of modernity. Such thinking remains 
influential, permeating many varieties of cultural studies (Fiske, 1989; McGuigan, 1992) 
or acting as the means for a critique of such positions (Lodziak, 2002: 90-1). Indeed, 
Lodziak’s amalgam of Frankfurt School critique and post-industrial (Gorz, 1982), ‘post-
scarcity’ theory in a ‘production of consumption perspective’ continues the lament 
concerning the ‘passivity’ and acquiescence of a populace that has become merely 
‘consumers.’  
 
The Complications of Identity 
Recent sociological analyses of the capitalist consumption-relation extend beyond the 
utilitarian inflections of economic theory and the ideological mis-direction of ‘ersatz’ 
satisfactions or ‘libidinal corruptions’ discussed by the Frankfurt School and their 
successors. The role of ‘consumer’ has assumed a political dimension as a manifestation of 
the rights of western citizenship (Miller, 1995; Trentmann, 2006) and the construction of 
contemporary forms of ‘identity’ (Bauman, 1992; Featherstone, 1991). Nowhere has this 
tradition been more evident than in the annals of ‘cultural studies,’ whether of a modern or 
postmodern ilk, where the practises, habits, routines and tactics of ‘consumption’ are 
presented as the battleground for a resistance to an otherwise hegemonic society (de 
Certeau, 2002; Fiske, 1989; Hebdige, 1979; McGuigan, 1992). The role of commodity 
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culture in the construction of contemporary identity(-positions) and the production of 
‘lived’ experience is informed by a post-Frankfurt School address to mass culture and, in 
particular, the possibilities made available by mass media technologies – firstly those of 
the industrial age and, then, the digital. Some, such as Lodziak (2002), reject the resistance 
and liberation afforded by the commodity-form to a postmodern identity or selfhood, while 
others, postmodernists and cultural studies theorists alike, see in contemporary 
‘consumption’ the possibility of identity or lifestyle construction, much as Barthes viewed 
the bricoleur, an active subject manipulating a world of objects, services and experiences 
as part of a teleological project. Whereas Slater (1997: 127) identifies a French ‘school,’ 
including Lefebvre, the Situationists and Baudrillard, highlighting the centrality of the 
experience of ennui, anomie and reification to life in ‘consumer society.’ For sociology, 
then, the analysis of the experiential dimension of contemporary ‘consumption’ is vital in 
explaining its relation to capitalist modernity. 
 
If subjectivity is severed from an ‘authentic’ relationship with objective culture, if 
experience is mediated rather than ‘lived,’ through an engagement with commodity-signs 
rather than commodity-objects then the fears of the Frankfurt School, and their successors, 
for the possibility of self-realisation appear to be realised. Here contemporary 
‘consumption’ is governed by the abstraction and immateriality of the commodity-sign and 
its divorce of desire from its ‘human’ origin in the form of the fetish. The opportunities for 
the construction or development of a ‘self’ are now bounded by the possibilities of the 
sphere of circulation and exchange, by the commodity-form and its variegated instances 
(Bauman, 1988). Knowledge of this external ‘limit’ upon the development of the subject 
allows certain authors (Bauman, 1990; 1992; Giddens, 1991) to see life in ‘post-
traditional’ social formations complicating the possibility of producing a stable identity 
and endangering the ‘ontological security’ (Giddens) this promises. On this reading, 
identity or selfhood are the products of critical acts of ‘consumption’ understood as choice, 
and which for Bourdieu (1984) can be read off as indicators of social position, rather than 
ideological deceptions achieved through the fetish. This liberal reformulation of traditional 
humanist conceptions of the ‘self’ can be an anxiety-inducing process (Warde, 1994) – 
however, the implicit utilitarian rationality underpinning this position is not without its 
critics (Hush & Rahman, 2000).  
 
The perceived lack of ‘material’ for the production of identity – the bourgeois ego – 
prompted by the immanent dissipation of value into the commodity-sign tends to be 
associated with a simultaneous absence of ‘lived’ or authentic experience, usually 
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attributed to the pervasive influence of (contemporary) technology. So the metaphors of 
the cinema screen (Debord), the computer screen, digital or genetic ‘code’ (Baudrillard) 
can be seen as attempts to narrate the apparent disappearance of that which was once 
‘really’ there, but which has now vanished into 2-d or ‘information.’ The role of the image, 
whether in the ‘society of the spectacle’ or as the form that value takes when reflected in 
the ‘mirror of production,’ is that of absent ‘imago,’ the evocation of a longed for mise en 
scène. Therefore, the ostensible loss of materiality of the commodity-form and the 
transubstantiation of desire into the wish can be seen to reflect both bourgeois 
philosophy’s deep unease over the constitution of the subject, its identity-positions and the 
forms that phenomenal experience assumes in capitalist modernity. The ‘spectral 
objectivity’ of the commodity (Marx) and the fetish form assumed by the social relations 
of modern consumption merely re-enforce a belief in an increasingly immaterial and 
inauthentic ‘hypostatisised world’ (Hetherington, 2003) of signs, otherwise known as the 
sphere of circulation and exchange of capitalist modernity.  
 
The ‘alienation’ of the subject of capitalist modernity that runs through the Hegelian and 
Marxian tradition, via the Frankfurt School to Debord, is a lament for the passing of an 
apparently autonomous individual, itself a product of Cartesian dualism. The ‘anxiety’ this 
arouses is an indication of the transformed ‘modality’ of the subject and the ontological 
status it previously enjoyed. The consequent ‘disintegration’ of the unified ego of 
bourgeois culture, which Ferguson (1990) locates in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, coincides with both the ‘democratization of luxury’ (Williams, 1982) and the rise 
of fledgling forms of cinematic narration (Charney, 1998; Friedberg, 1993). The fleeting, 
fortuitous and contingent arrangement of ‘things’ and people appears to be born of their 
proximity, and the narration of this spatial and temporal intermingling accompanies the 
emergence of historically novel strategies for the re-presentation of these experiences. The 
sphere of circulation and exchange is the pre-condition of the terrain of capitalist 
modernity, home to the socio-spatial relation that is modern consumption. The emergence 
of an increasingly ‘affluent society’ (Galbraith, 1984 [1959]) and a proliferation of 
‘technologies’ and their affects (McLuhan, passim) as the twentieth century progressed can 
be seen to have played a part in the influential descriptions of ‘consumption’ by both 
Debord and Baudrillard without, ultimately, having achieved their aims. However, both 
theorists, in their break with the prevailing sociological orthodoxies concerning capitalist 
consumption-relations and the social formation within which these occurred ensured that 
future analyses could no longer be reduced to a ‘fetishistic’ desire for commodities by 
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individuals or the pursuit of satisfaction by alienated individuals within ‘consumer 
society.’  
 
The ‘immaterial’ information that is re-presented upon cinema, television or computer 
screens, which circulates on the internet or appears briefly upon advertising hoardings 
retains, of course, a material dimension, however flat they may be. Historically recent 
technologies have assisted in the de-materialisation, abstraction and transmission (or 
circulation) of ‘values’ as information or images. This facilitation of exchange and the 
apparent diminution of the realm of production appear to liberate the commodity-form 
from the constraints under which it was originally manufactured, prior to its entry into the 
sphere of circulation and exchange. The terrain of capitalist modernity can, therefore, be 
revealed as part of a post-Fordist economy (Harvey, 1989) supported by a ‘globalised’ 
capitalist division of labour, while appearing to its inhabitants to be entirely distinct from 
such phenomena. Modern consumption, as the subtly but infinitely variegated practise that 
allows inhabitation of the terrain of capitalist modernity is also the means by which origins 
and ‘authenticity’ are lost, necessitating a re-conceptualisation of the relationship between 
the subject and objective culture.  
 
Where is ‘Consumption’? 
Contemporary society, whether modern or postmodern, in engaging in consumption-
relations bereft of obvious origins and answering to ostensibly inauthentic needs or wants 
appears removed from an underlying reality. The actions of the inhabitants of 
contemporary society betray no discernible cause or motive; they escape the rationality 
bequeathed by economic theory even in the expanded form discussed by the social 
sciences in general. Any attempt to reduce the choices of social actors to the revealed 
preferences of utilitarian psychology, either as ‘consumerism as a way of life’ (Miles, 
1999) or the schizophrenic’s (Jameson, 1984) attempt to navigate a ‘depthless world’ 
merely re-enforces the absence of a putative link between the subject and the world of 
objects. Instead, at best, the ‘consumer’ is represented as a tourist, permanently estranged 
from an underlying, original and authentic reality and the possibility of identity that this 
would confer (see Rojek’s (1993) discussion of Goffman and a ‘paramount reality’). The 
spatial relationship between ‘production’ and ‘consumption’ and its arrangement within 
both the ‘global economy’ and the socially-stratified neighbourhoods of the western city 
necessarily informs the ease of access to and frequency of such ‘consumption’ events 
(unless we understand urban ‘regeneration’ to equate to gentrification). The terrain of 
capitalist modernity, upon which the modern subject engages with contemporary value-
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form, allows an analytical re-articulation of ‘consumption’ and ‘production’ through an 
appreciation of the material structures that support the immaterial exchanges contained 
within the ‘chronically mediatized’ money-form (Dodd, 1994). The ‘spectral’ 
agglomeration of commodity-signs of which both ‘consumer’ and postmodern society are 
ostensibly composed implies a conflation of being with looking: 
 
The dynamics of capitalist production, alienating in their effects, shift from 
(i) an alienation of being to having in early capitalism to (ii) an alienation 
of having to appearing in the late twentieth century (#17). In this respect, 
mediated rather than lived experience can be said to be all encompassing. 
The totality of mediated experience, spectacle, becomes the negation of 
human activity (#27), the isolation of the individual from communal life 
(pace Tonnies) except through mediated communal life, and the source of a 
contemplative culture of consumption. Contemplation becomes the only 
possible activity for the spectator in Debord’ view (#30). 
– Hetherington 2003: 18-9 
 
The reduction of authentic or ‘lived’ experience to an ostensibly inauthentic or ‘mediated’ 
experience is the denial of embodied or ‘kinaesthetic’ experience and presents the body as 
a vessel for consciousness, thus denying the role of both the emotions and the senses. This 
is the ‘postmodern’ culture of the ‘consumer society’ in which the fetish is reduced to 
ideological complication or uncomplicated pleasure, rather than being viewed as a social 
relation with a material component (Hetherington, 2003). This disregard for the material 
component of any artefact immediately limits the consideration of the range of uses it 
might afford and the forms of sociation under which such uses emerge. As a socio-spatial 
relation that exists in time the ‘fetish relation’ is an expression of use that extends beyond 
functionality that does not simply disappear when an object enters the realm of exchange: 
 
The carved handle, the beautifully turned bowl, the paint on the walls of a 
habitat whether a pre-historic cave or a pomo condominium exhibit a 
recognition of the fetish character of use values as sources of mediation 
that makes up a society.  
- Hetherington, 2003: 35. 
 
The commodity-form retains its material existence, derived from ‘production,’ when 
entering the terrain of capitalist modernity, and does not disappear into the sign-value 
assigned by a marketing or branding strategy, or the fashionable significance bestowed by 
a particular ‘consumer’ demographic. However, the fetish character or relation must be 
recognised as a form, as a value that ‘affords’ multiple interpretations and possible uses – 
some overt, others dependent upon context. By avoiding the reduction of contemporary 
‘consumption’ practises to an engagement with ‘images’ or immaterial re-presentations of 
value, and acknowledging the material dimension of the commodity-form – object, service 
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and experience – it is possible to foreground a theory of modern consumption, inseparable 
from capitalist modernity. 
 
Nostalgia for the Impossible 
In denying the existence of a postmodern ‘culture of consumption’ it is important to retain 
an understanding of a shift from the bourgeois era to modernity proper, despite both 
periods comprising part of the history of the capitalist mode of production. The 
fundamental difference between these two eras is in the role of the concept of identity and 
its relation to the value-form as it enters the sphere of circulation and exchange. The 
bourgeois ‘world view’ (Ferguson, 1990) saw the self emerge as the telos of a project of 
identity construction, a developed and refined ego capable of exercising choice in relation 
to the contents of the world. For the ‘postmodern’ sensibility the unified totality of the 
bourgeois identity becomes a problematic concept (Featherstone, 1991; Bauman, 1992 and 
to a lesser extent 2001; Clarke, 1998; Lyon, 1999; Loudermilk, 2003), as the unique ego 
‘fragments’ into a variety of subject-positions, which no longer adhere to the linear 
narrative of personal biography. However, the dissolution of the bourgeois self, its 
fragmentation, was not its disappearance but its transformation, and its subsequent failure 
to remain the site of the accumulation of ‘experience’ across the life course (Agamben, 
1993). As a result the ‘project’ of selfhood, the ‘development’ of an identity (Ferguson, 
1990), became impossible, prompting Shaviro (1997) to speak, after Deleuze, of a process 
of ‘identification’ that ‘proceeds by prosthesis. Therefore, the emergence of a ‘postmodern 
culture’ signalling the return of modernity’s ‘repressed’ (Foster) implies a rupture in the 
discursive fabric of the modern era and a changed relationship between subjects and 
objects.  
 
For Lyotard (1984), the break with the ‘grands narratives’ of modernity, the discourses 
that had structured the operation of the world, signal the ‘predominance of technoscience,’ 
which, rather than simply being ‘the effects of power,’ is an agreement by scientific 
knowledge and capitalist economics concerning the representation of the world (Lyotard, 
1992: 18). This reveals a ‘marriage of Idea and Form’ that ‘define[s] the limit of the 
concept of the beautiful, that is, the unpresentable or, following Kant, the absence of form’ 
(ibid: 20) in contemporary culture. Aesthetically at least, the postmodern is a moment in 
the modern, it is ‘not modernism at its end, but in a nascent state, and this state is 
recurrent’ (ibid: 22). Modernity, as ‘the retreat of the real’ expressed ‘according to the 
sublime relationship of the presentable with the conceivable’ is caught in two modes 
distinguished by their nuance, which ‘often coexist almost indiscernibly in the same piece, 
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and yet they attest to a différend [an incommensurable difference of opinion] within which 
the fate of thought has, for a long time, been played out – a différend between regret and 
experimentation’ (ibid). So, the modern aesthetic is an aesthetic of the sublime but it is 
nostalgic, invoking the unpresentable as absent (impossible) content, while its form offers 
consolation and pleasure – as a longing for absent content. The ‘postmodern’ aesthetic 
experience is the opposite of the beautiful form, a sublime overflowing of ‘presentable’ 
form, it recalls the novelty promised by fashion, rather than a ‘nostalgia for the 
impossible’ of content. The presentation of the unpresentable becomes a means of 
objectifying the experience of temporal novelty, nouveauté as an identification that 
‘proceeds by prosthesis,’ never attaining identity. This sublime over-flowing of ‘correct 
form’ (Lyotard) resembles the discussion of ‘radiation’ used by Simmel in describing 
adornment, through which an ineffable quality is transmitted, quite the opposite of the 
utilitarian description of ‘desire’ inherited from economic theory and which underpins 
contemporary accounts of ‘consumer society’ and its inhabitants. 
  
The Allure of the Immaterial 
The commodification of nouveauté as the presentation of the ‘unpresentable’ is the 
temporalisation of form and materiality, and their subordination, epitomised in the logo of 
the ‘branded good,’ which distinguishes itself from all other similar goods in this 
infinitesimal fashion. The seeming primacy of the immaterial aspect or ‘sign-value’ within 
the contemporary commodity-form reveals an apparent affinity between theories of the 
‘postmodern’ and those of ‘consumer culture.’ Both tend to emphasise the subjective 
‘participation,’ even immersion, in the experience or event of ‘consumption’ and the 
importance of novelty as temporal difference, as nouveauté. Nowhere is this truer than in 
the service sector, as food (Ritzer, 1999; 2001), tourism (Rojek, 1993; Hannigan, 1998) or 
‘themed’ experiences (Gottdiener, 2001), where the commodification of experience can be 
presented as the ‘aestheticisation’ of life (Featherstone, 1991). Both the ‘marketing’ and 
the ‘system of provision’ approaches to ‘consumption’ agree that the physical manufacture 
of the commodity-event is incomplete as it leaves the sphere of ‘production’ and the 
‘social life’ of the commodity (Appadurai, 1986) within the sphere of circulation and 
exchange – the packaging, marketing, display and branding – finishes it, prior to ‘final 
consumption.’ The ‘aesthetic’ labour of certain service sector occupations, the ‘aesthetic 
productivity’ (Simmel) of those who dress the commodity-form in the garb of an 
‘informational’ good, becomes the means of ‘de-differentiating’ one instance of the 
commodity-form from another – the logic of difference and repetition applied as branding 
 117 
strategy. The commodity-form becomes the medium for the communication of nouveauté, 
the signification of a social relation (difference) as a temporal relation. 
 
Novelty is a quality that is ‘afforded’ as nouveauté, whether material or immaterial, part of 
the ‘bundle of functions’ (Massumi, 2003) that constitute it as a particular social relation 
within the (general) social relation of the commodity-form. The transformation of the 
phenomenal experience of temporality that accompanies existence upon the terrain of 
capitalist modernity is undergone through participation in modern consumption. Within 
this new and modern temporality there are only the moments of the present, adrift from 
both past and future, arranged in contingent constellation. As such there is no destination 
for the bourgeois self, no attainable outcome for the project of identity; neither backwards 
to an Arcadian idyll, nor forwards to an anticipated utopia. Instead, there are only ‘ways of 
escape’ (Rojek, 1993) from the present moment – and the moments of the present – the 
continual exposure to the experience of nouveauté, through an immersive participation in 
the commodity-form of capitalist modernity. For such a culture, nostalgia, as a longing for 
an absent past, is impossible: the bourgeois world view, which had been predicated upon 
just such a longing (Stewart, 1998), has succumbed to modernity, to modernité. 
Consequently, the attempt to construct the unique identity of a bourgeois self, practiced by 
figures such as the ‘collector,’ is equally unrealisable since it is not a modern concept. 
Where the ‘collector’ accumulates objects, as fragments of a lost social reality, the 
inhabitant of modernity pursues experiences, undergoes modernité; the bourgeois pursuit 
of distinction has been replaced by the search for difference (nouveauté). As such, seen 
from a bourgeois perspective contemporary ‘consumers’ are in search of the distractions 
offered by kitsch: 
 
kitsch objects have been designed to satisfy a momentary, suddenly arisen 
need. They are commemorative and ornamental objects which are useless 
in themselves; placed on the mantelpiece or shelf, they keep the memory of 
a ceremonial moment or institution, yet at the same time make it trivial by 
turning it into an article of daily use (a provincial coat-of-arms reproduced 
on the handle of a spoon, for example).  
– Gronow, 1997: 42-3 
 
Gronow’s debt to Bourdieu’s nostalgic ‘sociology of consumption’ is evident in the 
description of objects or experiences as ‘trivial’ on the basis that they do not conform to 
the strategies necessary for the manufacture of identity, the manipulation of the object 
world through the dictates of taste and refinement. Bourdieu’s attempt at an 
anthropological theory of ‘consumption’ relies upon, as Fowler acknowledges (1994: 149-
50, 154), ‘strategies of distinction,’ albeit at the expense of a sustained engagement with 
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mass culture and media. Bourdieu’s emphasis upon the role of form in the ‘reading’ of the 
meaning and significance of consumer goods, as signs of cultural capital, functions as a 
critique of Kant’s theory of the beautiful and the sublime along class and social lines 
(Gronow, 1997: 10). ‘Consumerism’ as the active participation in ‘consumer society’ is 
simply a means of production of self, singular or plural (Bourdieu, 1984; Gronow, 1997)  – 
even ‘tribal’ (Bauman, 1992; Maffesoli, 1991; 1993) – to be deciphered in the revealed 
preferences of tasteful ‘consumption.’ Choice, as the basis for self-making, reveals a 
hankering after ‘distinction’ within a culture of difference that is displayed as taste and 
pursued through sociality (Clarke, 1998; Lury, 1996). 
 
At Home We Are Tourists 
Postmodern society’s ostensible separation from the modern is characterised by ‘play,’ 
parody and a tendency to pastiche, as it distinguishes itself from the ‘real’ of modernity 
and the referents that lingered there. However, the end of the bourgeois era does not 
necessarily imply the emergence of the postmodern, rather something has changed: 
 
Everything that was pending has been finished, and whatever else comes 
from this point will be part of a supplementary existence, separated from 
the other one by this moment of lightness, of emptiness, of astonishment 
and relief.  
- Baudrillard, 1990c: 231 
 
This ‘supplementary existence’ signals the divorce of signs from referents and reveals the 
necessity of re-thinking contemporary notions of subjectivity within this context. The 
bourgeois subject, identity as ego, can never attain its nostalgic aim, the arrangement of the 
world in accordance with its desires and the consequent resolution of class conflict through 
the re-discovery of Arcadia or the building of utopia. Both ‘postmodern consumerism’ and 
the ‘consumer’ of postmodern culture represent attempts to re-found the bourgeois 
conception of identity in contemporary guise, as a collection of ‘signs’ rather than objects 
(the material products of social relations). Such accounts merely re-describe the bourgeois 
subject as a ‘consumer’ of postmodern artefacts (signs without referents) rather than 
acknowledging the changed historical circumstances that have transformed subjectivity. 
The bourgeois subject is 
 
… an ideological structure, a historical form correlative with the 
commodity form (exchange value) and the object form (use value). The 
individual is nothing but the subject thought in economic terms, rethought, 
simplified, and abstracted by the economy. The entire history of 
consciousness and ethics (all the categories of occidental psycho-
metaphysics) is only the history of the political economy of the subject.  
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- Baudrillard, 1983b: 133 
 
This, for Baudrillard (1983c: 25), indicates the absence of landscape to be re-presented, 
reality has now been surrendered to a ‘playful’ pastiche of itself: it has become fictive. 
‘Disneyland is there to conceal the fact that it is the “real” country, all of “real” America, 
which is Disneyland.’ The dissipation of ‘reality’ into the sphere of circulation and 
exchange, its divorce from historical causes and the realm of production sees the ‘radical 
symbolic insistence’ of the contemporary subject ‘sublimated in value’ through the 
commodity-form, which is the ‘incarnation of the sublime in the economic order’ 
(Baudrillard, 1983b: 207). The subject no longer ‘solidifies’ into an identity, even when 
deploying the logic of ‘consumerism,’ instead the inhabitants of a seemingly limitless 
‘Disneyland’ are immersed in appearances, signs or images, which do not contribute to any 
teleological project. Such an approach reduces the ‘consumer’ to the ‘consumption’ of 
signs and images, to ‘spectacle’ or ‘code,’ and denies sociality, inter-subjective relations 




While Baudrillard was content to explore Disneyland’s role in the constitution of an ‘astral 
America’ (1989) others advocated a more anthropological approach to the analysis of 
contemporary culture and its consumption-relations. Defining itself against the abstraction 
of postmodernism there emerged, during the 1980s, a revised ‘anthropological’ tradition 
that emphasised ethnographic accounts of ‘consumer activity’ and its social relations. 
Clearly indebted to Durkheim, Mauss and Bataille, as well as the more recent work around 
‘consumption’ as the materialisation of cultural categories (Douglas & Isherwood, 1979; 
Miller, 1989), the ‘material culture’ approach combined archaeology with an appreciation 
of the physical substances and processes that went into the make-up of tangible objects and 
practices, rather than an insistence upon their meaning and significance. This was an 
attempt to avoid commodities being seen as inhabiting ‘a self-referential system of 
signifiers’ (Campbell, 1995: 103) with no link to the social institutions that inform 
everyday ‘consumption experience,’ such as the body (Falk, 1994), the family (Miller, 
1995; 1998; 2001; Silverstone, 1992) or particular moral rituals and frameworks. The 
postmodern assertion of the semiotic over the symbolic, of the sphere of circulation and 
exchange over that of production, failed to critique the apparent ‘de-materialisation’ of the 
commodity-form, its dissolution into units of exchange-value that would be measured 
subjectively (the ghost of homo œconomicus). The material culture approach sought to 
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unite the meaningful and the material dimensions of the commodity-form within a single 
analytical framework, to link causes with effects without recourse to a primordial 
‘symbolic’ such as death (Baudrillard, 1989 [1976]). This allowed the marriage of analyses 
of ‘everyday life’ (Lefebvre, 1991 [1976]; De Certeau, 2002) to the study of the ‘world of 
goods’ (Douglas & Isherwood, 1979) and an appreciation of the role played by an 
engagement with increasingly sophisticated forms of technology and mass media in 
contemporary capitalist culture. In turn, this encouraged a re-evaluation of the relationship 
between subjective and objective culture: 
 
[The] material world of man-made things modifies the natural world to 
provide a material environment as the context in which social interaction 
takes place. Things, both natural and man-made, are appropriated into 
human culture in such a way that they re-present the social relations of 
culture, standing in for other human beings, carrying values, ideas and 
emotions…. But unlike images, ideas, talk and text, things are not just 
representations, but also have a physical presence in the world which has 
material consequences… 
- Dant, 1999: 1-2 
 
The resistance to the de-materialisation of the commodity-form within the ‘cash-nexus’ of 
the capitalist money-form was also pursued by Miller (1995, [1987]); first as a relationship 
between material culture and ‘mass consumption’ and, latterly, in The Dialectics of 
Shopping (2001), where Hegel’s theory of ‘objectification’ was reconciled with the 
ethnographic specificities of contemporary life. Miller strove to write, 
 
a book about shopping that treats commodities in the way that Mauss 
treated the gift, as forms that implicate every aspect of social life, such that 
kinship and political economy are brought together within the same 
volume.  
– 2001: 2 
 
Material culture analyses sought to assert a Durkheim-like concept of society, in which a 
discernible relationship between structure and agency could be observed in the symbolic 
uses to which material objects were put. The individual (or group) thus became an 
‘embedded’ entity that both performed and embodied cultural values and categories, which 
were revealed in the apparently insignificant details of social life.  
 
Kula Memories: material culture and mediating value 
Objects possessed of a ‘biography’ (Kopytoff) assume the status of quasi-subjects, material 
entities exhibiting a meaningful dimension capable of acting upon the world of human 
purposes. The commodity-form extends the concept of use to become a medium for the 
communication of value (Dant, 1999: 153), circumventing the utilitarian psychology of 
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economically-derived analyses in favour of socially constructed routines, habits and 
practises. The commodity-form objectifies ‘human’ requirements, for instance, through the 
mobile ‘phone: 
 
The materials, shape and functionality of a particular telephone will locate 
it within the material culture of a particular time and place but not usually 
limit those who can use it. Out of date telephones or those from other 
countries look different but work in recognizably similar ways. The most 
recent mobile telephones have switches and screens that require new skills 
but this has not held back the rapid adoption of the ‘mobile’ throughout he 
world.  
– Dant, 1999: 162 
 
The mobile telephone mediates across social and spatial distances, embodies a global 
division of labour in its production and ‘consumption,’ and literally incorporates 
temporality within its styling. However, the mobile telephone mediates in a manner 
unacknowledged by Dant, despite his reference to the concept of ‘affordance’ (Gibson, 
1986). The ‘mobile’ is a link within a network comprised of other telephones, other users, 
masts, computer systems, orbital satellites and social protocols (such as ‘texting’ and its 
linguistic abbreviations). As such, the (mobile) telephone is not just an object that 
communicates (ostensibly from anywhere), but is a means of facilitating socially and 
historically novel forms of being. Dant simply sees the mobile extend opportunities for 
use, social, temporal or spatial – they ‘mediate,’ they ‘extend or stand in for direct, face-to-
face social interaction’ (1999: 172-3) – he does not recognise in this intimate embrace 
between people and things new ways of being human.  
 
Affording ‘Consumption’ 
The commodity-form, as  ‘object’ or sign,’ combines physical properties and a variety of 
social meanings or values depending upon its context, both within the realm of production 
and the sphere of circulation and exchange. An obvious example of this is the case of 
clothing, which the wearer animates; while prosthetic limbs provide extended functional 
opportunities to users; and surgical implants, such as respiratory or cardiac devices, extend 
or preserve life itself. Material culture analyses utilise the concept of ‘affordances’ 
(Gibson, 1977; 1986) developed by ecological psychology and an extended notion of use, 
which surpasses merely the material and denotative functions of the object, traditionally 
understood as the outcome of the labour process. 
 
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it 
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in 
the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not… [It] refers to both the 
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environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies 
the complementarity of the animal and the environment.  
– Gibson, 1986: 127 
  
This re-combination of subject and object as an ‘inseparable pair’ (Gibson) constituting a 
‘process’ that unites both organism and environment attempts to avoid the reification of the 
physical dimension of existence, as the location of ‘affordances.’ However, some such as 
Heft (2001) or Gaver (1996) lapse into this over-emphasis upon the material, which is then 
considered to reveal the interior states of actors as preferences, in much the same fashion 
as economic theory – or, for that matter, the culturally contextual analyses of material 
culture.  
 
Material culture is still human culture; the autonomy of objects is very 
limited. Things do not have social relations with each other: they are our 
products and the culture of which they are a part is unequivocally the 
culture of human society. […] The system of objects in a modern 
industrialized society is vastly greater and more complex than that in a pre-
industrialized society. Things are important, although not as important as 
other people, and their importance increases as they become more 
intertwined with the way we live our social lives.  
- Dant, 1999: 200 
 
This insistence upon an active subject at the ‘core’ of any interaction who utilises the stuff 
of the world in multifarious fashions is Cartesian dualism in dilute form, and echoes the 
bourgeois individual in its desire to mould the material world through its will. Instead, 
‘affordances’ should be viewed as relational phenomena, the properties not of objects but 
of the environment, which is comprised of both subjects and objects, thus avoiding the 
reduction of social life to a series of interactions.  
 
Sheller (2003) has applied the concept of affordances to the ‘consumption’ of cars, 
proposing that the marriage of subject and object, of body and technology in an 
‘environment’ requires an analysis of ‘feeling’ and the ‘kinaesthetic’ engagement with the 
world. Subjective experience becomes a series of ‘embodied dispositions’ that vary with 
time and space depending upon the affordances available to the ‘complex hybrid’ of car 
and occupant. The ‘quasi-biological car’ or ‘cyborg’ affords the possibility of new and 
different forms of experience, unavailable outwith this combination of technology and 
humanity that allows ‘inhabitation’ of the ‘suspended’ ‘spatio-temporal continuum of “in-
between” ’ (2003: 17-9). Likewise, Haldrup & Larsen (2004) investigate the ‘tourist 
experience’ as a material culture of ‘affordances.’ Again, the overt combination of 
humanity and technology, subject and object, is prominent in this ‘performance’ of 
‘leisured consumption’ and the role of the commodity-form (as an aspect of objective 
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culture) in enhancing the range of experiences available. Culture is seen as a phenomenon 
comprising both humans and non-humans, which allows the ‘emergent property’ of this 
relationship – agency – to be viewed as a choreography of heterogeneous elements that 
combine to produce effects and affects. However, Haldrup & Larsen (2004: 3) echo both 
Sheller and Rojek (1993), in his reading of Goffman, when they imply a ‘paramount 
reality’ that functions as a departure-point for ‘touristic’ experience and the affordance of a 
temporary extension to human faculties: 
 
The ‘dramaturgical landscapes’ of tourism’s material culture comprises 
physical places, fantasylands and mediaworlds in a single human world of 
possibilities, of experiments with identities, social roles and relations, and 
interactions with places.  
– 2004: 3 
 
Human experience is ‘mediated’ (Dant, 1999) through such technological interactions, but 
the subject – as ‘consumer’ – is affected only briefly, before returning to ‘normal.’ This 
tendency to see the ‘cyborg’ expansion in the possibilities or ‘affordances’ offered by the 
commodity-form as a temporary phenomenon, limited by the duration of any particular 
subject-object interaction, implies that historical novelty is a property of the commodity-
form – and a consequence of an industrial or digital ‘revolution’ – rather than the 
experience of a form of sociation.  
 
While acknowledging the role of affordances, material culture analyses limit themselves to 
describing the novel affordances offered to the subject, such as the kinaesthetic dimension 
of experience. This, however, is to fail to theorise the way in which the contemporary is 
not ‘extended’ by technology but is, rather, un-realisable without it. The failure of material 
culture analyses is to emphasise the ‘socialness’ (Appadurai (ed), 1986; Riggins, 1994) of 
things as a by-product of human interaction and their accretion as culture. This is 
particularly true in the case of an engagement with ‘consumer culture,’ which is invariably 
seen as a ‘particular form of material culture,’ incorporating non-market relations, that has 
as its hallmark a ‘process of stylization’ resulting in an ‘organization’ of personal and 
collective identity based upon the maintenance and tourist-like traversal of social and 
cultural categories that define participation (Lury, 1996).  
Actants and Assemblages 
Actant-Network-Theory (ANT) seeks to avoid the reduction of the social to ‘socialness’ 
based upon interaction between subjects and objects as ontologically distinct entities. For 
ANT, the distinction between people and things is irrelevant and misleading in its re-
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assertion of the supposed primacy of the human over the non-human and the consequent 
reification of ‘the social’ as the meaningful actions of human beings. Failure to discuss the 
‘missing masses’ of contemporary culture – the objects, services, experiences, machinery 
and operations that comprise the non-human component of modern life – facilitates the 
reification of (social) interaction as society. For ANT there is no society, only ‘the social’: 
a ‘tiny set of narrow standardised connections which occupies only some of the monads 
some of the time,’ it is these connections between monads, between networks of actants 
that constitute social life (Latour, 2001: 8). In rejecting the concept of society as something 
that congeals in objective culture for the mediation of subjective purposes – the limit-point 
of material culture analyses – ANT, and Latour in particular, deny the possibility of 
‘consumer society.’ If ‘the social’ is the totality of interactions occurring within a 
‘network’ then the consumer interactions of market relations can hardly be considered to 
determine the character of ‘society.’ Instead, it is the actions of individual actors, and the 
actants that make these actions possible, which must become the focus of sociological 
analyses. For Latour, this means a re-discovery of Tarde’s Sociology & Monadology, in 
which ‘any social production having some marked characteristics, be it an industrial good, 
a verse, a formula, a political idea […] dreams like Alexander of conquering the world, 
tries to multiply itself by thousands and millions of copies in every place where there exist 
human beings’ (Tarde, Sociologie et Monadologie p. 96, cited Latour, 2001: 11).  
 
Rather than human agents, objective culture or social structures it is monads, and ‘their 
efforts to constitute unstable aggregates,’ ‘actants or world building entelechies’ (ibid), 
which serve as the conduit for the ‘super-social’ principle of imitation, participation in 
which is the means of accumulating qualities (Borch, 2005).  
 
To exist is to differ; difference, in one sense, is the substantial side of 
things, what they have most in common and what makes them most 
different. One has to start from this difference and to abstain from trying to 
explain it, especially by starting with identity, as so many persons wrongly 
do. Because identity is a minimum and, hence, a type of difference, and a 
very rare type at that, in the same way as rest is a type of movement and the 
circle a type of ellipse. To begin with some primordial identity implies at 
the origin a prodigiously unlikely singularity, or else the obscure mystery 
of one simple being then dividing for no special reason.  
– Tarde, Monadologie et Sociologie p. 73, cited Latour, 2001: 12 
 
Tarde’s dismissal of a ‘primordial’ unity that differentiates, through deviation, from an 
original identity, in favour of difference as the condition of life makes the monad the 
unique manifestation in space and time of individuated being – defined through its 
qualities, its having or avidity. This allows Tarde to circumvent a philosophical legacy that 
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focuses upon being and the verb ‘to be,’ in favour of an investigation that starts from the 
fact of possession, of ‘having.’ The ‘universal fact’ (Tarde) of possession differentiates 
monads through their qualities, making specificity or identity extrinsic, that is, in no way 
deriving from essence – thus dissolving the qualitative distinction between human and 
non-human being. A monad is, therefore, an ‘unstable aggregate’ (Latour) of qualities or 
possessions capable of modification through the acquisition of new capacities – through 
transformation. Subjectivity is irredeemably relative; it is a performance or incarnation of 
difference at a specific point in time and space. The sphere of circulation and exchange of 
capitalist modernity is the most obvious means by which new qualities can be possessed, 
however, it is far from the only one. Indeed, one of the virtues of Tarde, and Latour’s re-
reading of his work, is the implicit acceptance of the existence and operation of ‘qualities’ 
that lie outside of formal market relationships, but which, at some point, may well be 
incorporated (something that theories of the ‘consumer society’ can be considered to 
struggle with, at best).  
 
On this reading the study of consumption-relations and the study of the social appear to be 
inseparable, since the ideal medium for the ‘communication’ of imitation, claims Borch 
(2005: 87), is the modern metropolis and its spatial relations. So, for Tarde, Paris was the 
topographical pinnacle of France, which through the mass media of the day – newspaper, 
telegraph and railway – ‘exerted[ed] over this vast territory’ a ‘suggestive and imperious 
fascination’ (Tarde, cited ibid). Paris as the concentration of imitation becomes the site of 
the most rapid innovation of contemporary fashions, or ‘inventions,’ from child murders to 
clothing styles. This leads Tarde to consider the modern metropolitan phenomenon of the 
crowd, or ‘mob,’ in which the links between imitation and sociality are most evident. The 
city communicates to disparate inhabitants a common purpose, which emerges in the 
association of the ‘self-organizing power of the crowd,’ a ‘common suggestion’ that 
‘spontaneously’ generates ‘the most radical, yet simultaneously the most momentary, 
manifestation and materialization of sociality in modern society’ (Borch, 2005: 90). The 
circulation and association of monads in modern metropolitan phenomena, such as the 
crowd, pre-empt ANT’s intention ‘to [transform] the social from a surface, from a 
territory, from a province of reality, to a circulation’ (Latour, 1997: 4). ANT was never 
intended as a theory of the social, but as ‘a theory of space in which the social has become 
a certain type of circulation’ (ibid). This prompts a reconsideration of what, not who, 
inhabits this space of circulation: 
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Subjectivity, corporeality is no more a property of humans, of individuals, 
of intentional subjects, than being an outside reality is a property of nature 
[…]. Subjectivity seems also to be a circulating capacity, something that is 
partially gained or lost by hooking up to certain bodies of practice.  
– Latour, 1997: 5 
 
The ‘extreme sociality’ manifested in crowds is an ‘interspiritual’ (Tarde) or inter-
subjective phenomenon, a temporally fleeting and circulating capacity, rather than the 
‘possession’ of any monad or network of monads. Imitation is a social phenomenon 
capable of being communicated by human and non-human actants alike, as such it recalls 
Dant’s insistence upon the role of material culture as a medium – the perfect example of 
which is fashion. For ANT this implies the ‘radical indeterminacy of the actor’ (Callon, 
1991), since the human actant is merely an element within a vast assemblage of people and 
things, power-relations, processes and dispositions that have no discrete existence (being), 
but are, rather, realised as temporally unstable aggregates (accumulations of having). The 
social space in which modern consumption appears, then, is no more that of the ‘consumer 
society’ than it is the sphere of circulation and exchange proposed by political economy.  
 
Towards a Theory of ‘Terrain’ 
ANT’s ‘change in topology’ requires thinking not in the dimensions of Newtonian 
mechanics but ‘in terms of nodes that have as many dimensions as they have connections’ 
(Latour, 1997b: 2). This helps ‘lift the tyranny of geographers in defining space and offers 
us a notion which is neither social nor “real” space, but simply associations’ (ibid: 3). The 
space of ‘the social’ is the totality of those ‘nodes’ or actants that constitute it, they are the 
‘stuff out of which socialness is made (Latour & Lemonier, 1994)’ (Latour, 1999: 8). The 
subjective experience of the human actant becomes central, whether it is that of someone 
engaged in ‘consumption’ or a windsurfer on a Swiss lake exploring: 
 
the multiplicity of ways of being, he goes from some to many, from boring 
to alert ones, from a little wind to a fierce gale, from a low intensity to a 
higher intensity. …moving into enjoyment, intensity, ways of being, 
alterations, and if I want to calculate his speed, I can, but I won’t define the 
depth of his world, the backdrop of all existence….  
- Latour, 1996: 2-3 
 
Subjective experience becomes the outcome of a relationship between transportation 
(displacement) and transformation (as the production of difference, of metamorphosis). 
Latour uses the example of a train journey to illustrate this, the apparently effortless 
movement through time and space achieved through transportation involves a minimum of 
transformation because of the ‘obedience’ of the environment to the wish expressed 
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through the purchase of a train ticket. However, if this transportation were to be 
interrupted and some or all of the hitherto unseen actants within the network (and the 
displacements and mediations they perform) be revealed, then the experience of 
transformation would devolve onto the subject onboard the train. The apparent autonomy 
of the subject, as passenger, relies upon the transformations produced by other actants, as 
work. A network that produces transportation without displacement now resembles the 
‘virtualist’ systems (Carrier & Miller, 1998) in which the mediation of experience is 
seemingly without cause.  
 
So, what Latour and theorists of ANT describes as the space of ‘the social’ is revealed as 
an effect of hidden or, at least, unapparent causes, it presents itself as a ‘virtual’ system of 
effects within which the subject is immersed. As such, it is best considered as a terrain in 
which the actions of actants, discrete in space and time, coincide, resulting in ‘an event-
producing topos’ (Latour, 1996: 13), to the extent that a landscape including a mediaeval 
castle can become a contemporary tourist destination. The experience of ‘the social’ is, 
therefore, the experience of ‘effects of isochrony and isotopy, produced by the carefully 
monitored and heavily institutionalised circulation of objects that remain relatively 
untransformed through transportation: high speed trains, rulers, standards, canons, weight, 
constant relations, bullets, ballistic missiles, falling stones, accounts, and various other 
rods, hands of clocks, gears and structural isomorphies’ (ibid: 17). ANT’s discussion of 
‘the social’ as a topology of interactions within which a Tarde-like ‘microsociology’ 
(Borch, 2005) reveals the processes that constitute experience can now be seen to provide a 
model for the analysis of modern consumption that circumvents the shortcomings of both 
the ‘consumer society’ thesis and the semiotic soup of ‘postmodern’ society. 
 
Life in Traffic 
The sociological analysis of modern consumption must not be reduced to the study of the 
historical expansion of market relations, and the availability of goods and services. Only 
by abandoning homo œconomicus, even in its expanded ‘psychological’ form, and its 
aggregation as ‘consumer society,’ is it possible to identify modern consumption as a 
historically and socio-spatially distinct phenomenon born of capitalist modernity. There is 
no requirement out seek out the cause of ‘consumerism’ or ‘consumer society,’ whether in 
theories of ‘trickle-down’ wealth and desire for variety (McKendrick et al, 1982), or the 
hedonistic aspirations of individuals (Campbell, 1987) in search of identity (Ferguson, 
1990). Nor can ‘consumer activity’ be explained away as a manifestation of the ‘civilising 
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process’ (Elias, 1994) or the interpellation of individuals within the capitalist system, 
either as historical phenomenon (McCracken, 1990) or the ‘dark side’ of Enlightenment 
rationality (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979; Debord, 1999). Modern consumption is a socio-
spatial relation particular to capitalist modernity, a manifestation of the sphere of 
circulation and exchange of the capitalist mode of production, although its role and 
relationship to this have remained woefully under-theorised even by political economists, 
from Marx to the present day (Clarke, 1982; Fine & Leopold, 1993; Fine, 1995; 2002). The 
description of the capitalist consumption-relation as the circulation of the commodity-
form, as a prelude to its exiting the realm of exchange in ‘final consumption,’ fails to grasp 
the subjective import of commodity-objects and the role of the commodity-form in the 
constitution of contemporary subjectivity (see Vattimo, 1988).   
 
Similarly, Adorno and Horkheimer’s fear that the abstraction and reification inherent to the 
commodity-culture underpinning capitalist ‘consumption’ threatens the autonomous 
human subject implies a nostalgic yearning for authentic existence defined in opposition to 
the shock-experience (Erlebnis) of the present. The inauthenticity of the immaterial, of 
exchange privileged over use, found in the ‘totalised’ culture of commodity-signs or 
‘representation’ described by both Debord and Baudrillard, simply becomes the hallmark 
of contemporary society and its preoccupation with the signification of identity. This logic 
can be discerned in a ‘postmodern culture’ that is, effectively, divorced from the historical 
processes of capitalist modernity, so allowing the negotiation or construction of self to 
resemble semiotic bricolâge. Here postmodernism can be understood as a particular 
manifestation of the sphere of circulation and exchange of a post-Fordist global economy. 
However, such analyses rarely, if ever, consider the constitution of the subject under such 
conditions, or the partial, temporary and contingent forms that such participation consists 
in. The ‘totalised’ capitalist society feared by the Frankfurt School authors, and sketched 
by Debord and Baudrillard, is now revealed as resembling a postmodern version of 
‘consumer society’ supported by the post-Fordist techniques of ‘flexible accumulation’ 
(Harvey, 1989). The de-materialisation of commodities into ‘services’ and the apparent 
primacy of ‘lifestyle’ issues seem to echo the disappearance of ‘lived’ into ‘mediated 
experience’ – as ‘representation’ (Debord) or ‘code’ (Baudrillard). Similarly, the 
expansion in the role and significance of mass media technologies threatens to confirm the 
‘disappearance’ of life into discrete experiences made available within global ‘flows’ of 




The ‘material culture’ approach of anthropology responded to this apparent de-
materialisation of commodified objects by re-asserting the seemingly forgotten material 
aspect of both the commodity-form and its embodiment of social relations. Against the 
dissolution of materiality into an immaterial ‘significance’ the physical objects of 
contemporary culture assumed the task of incorporating meaning and communicating 
cultural categories (Dant, 1999; Miller, 1989; 2001). However, this intellectual re-
engagement with the material aspect of the commodity-form and its representation of value 
does not sufficiently revise the postmodern or ‘semiotic’ position and its attendant theory 
of a ‘consumer society’ composed of individuals making (culturally contextualised) 
choices about commodity-objects. The emphasis by material culture analyses upon the 
physical ‘affordances’ (Gibson, 1977; 1986) of the commodity-form relies upon a desiring 
subject at the heart of all social interactions, both inter-subjective and those between 
subjects and objects. In so doing, the anthropological approach denies a definition of ‘the 
social’ that extends beyond the inter-subjective and, as a result, is unable to produce an 
analysis of the relational ‘affordances’ offered by the commodity-form. This results in an 
anthropocentric prioritising of human subjectivity conceived of as agency and theorised as 
‘consumer choice,’ even while acknowledging the ‘extension’ of the subject through both 
the material and immaterial aspects of the commodity-form. The shortcomings of the 
material culture perspective, specifically its prioritising of a reified conception of 
‘socialness’ at the expense of a critical theorisation of the social, indicates the contribution 
made to a theory of modern consumption by adapting ANT. By highlighting the reciprocal 
relationship between subjects and objects (actants), ANT extends the analysis of ‘the 
social’ to the relation between having and being discussed by both Simmel and Tarde in 
their writings on the experience of metropolitan modernity.  
 
This consensus regarding the inter-relation between being and having as the means of both 
articulating the individual to a ‘network’ actants, beliefs and practices (Latour), and of 
differentiating the specific individual from other actants inhabiting the terrain of ‘the 
social’ is epitomised in Simmel’s discussion of modern culture and the ‘superfluous’ role 
of adornment (1997). The body becomes the site of aesthetic experience, specifically its 
sublime aspect – the locus for the intersection of subjective and objective culture for the 
inhabitants of the metropolitan modernity. Simmel describes adornment as the ‘radiations’ 
emanating from the material object that conjure up ‘sensuous attention’ through the 
‘enlargement or intensification’ of the ‘sphere’ of the ‘personality.’ The ‘synthesis of the 
individual’s having and being’ ‘transforms mere possession into sensuous and emphatic 
perceivability of the individual himself.’ However, this is only true of unusual or extra-
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ordinary dress, particularly jewellery, which acts as a ‘focal point’ for the visible (re-
)presentation of the individual precisely because adornment is superfluous and ‘flows over’ 
the individual. The object of adornment ‘communicates’ (Dant, 1999) or ‘radiates’ 
(Simmel) the personality, linking it ‘to points which are far removed from its origin’ – the 
conjunction of body and ‘object’ – and articulates it to ‘a vaster precinct which, in 
principle, is limitless.’ The subject is now intermingled with the sphere of circulation and 
exchange, its ‘personality’ realised through this particular medium and free of the 
restraints of ‘necessity’ imposed by the physiological constraints of Cartesian dualism. The 
subject extends itself through the ‘affordances’ it acquires through this participation, 
revealing the affinity between being and having in the constitution of modern consumption. 
 
The study of modern consumption is now revealed as the analysis of the terrain of 
capitalist modernity, rather than the investigation of the sphere of circulation and exchange 
or a putative ‘consumer society.’ However, the relationship between the ‘spheres’ of 
exchange and production proposed by political economy must not be discounted, since this 
relationship allows the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption to be viewed as a historically 
novel form of social life within the capitalist mode of production. As such, an account of 
the relation between the realms of production and ‘consumption’ must also include a study 
of the forms of phenomenological experience and their consequences for the constitution 
of subjectivity in contemporary culture. The negotiation of subjective identification upon 
the terrain of ‘consumption’ is an immersion in modern experience, modernité, rather than 
an identity born of production. The sphere of circulation and exchange is no longer the 
realm in which ‘fragments’ of a lost totality are to be re-collected, the nostalgic desire for 
an irrecoverable identity, but has become the terrain upon which identification is achieved 
through the pursuit of  ‘prosthetic’ experiences or events – of durations (Bergson). The 
subjective experience of modern consumption and the forms of phenomenal experience 
that it facilitates – the non-teleological or ‘playful’ prosthetic transformation of subjectivity 
– can be opposed to the rational, productive and teleological relations of work, and the self-
mastery it implies. The conception of the money-form as the extension of the subjective 
will – epitomised by Simmel (1990) –allows theories of ‘consumerism’ and ‘consumer 
society’ to see in the consumption-relation the possible re-construction of the unified 
bourgeois ego, as a lifestyle project, through its intersection with the world of goods 
(Gronow, 1997). 
 
So, modern consumption constitutes the subject as an expression of the ontological relation 
between being and having, where possession, rather than ‘ownership,’ mediates and 
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governs the appropriation of ‘properties’ that distinguish the individual from both itself 
(temporally) and other actants (spatially). Both subjects and objects, as actants within a 
network, can be considered as being involved in a ‘relational ontology’ (Costall, 2004) that 
determines the ‘affordances’ or qualities they possess. The temporalisation of difference 
(and the experience thereof), as nouveauté, and its commodification illuminates the supra-
physical affordances available to the human subject in a world of actants and networks. 
Specifically, by conceiving of affordances as social relations rather than physical 
properties it is possible to see their affect as being in no way circumscribed by their 
physical existence, in much the same manner that semiotic analyses of ‘consumer culture’ 
saw meaning prioritised over materiality (but without the consequent disregard for material 
existence): 
 
All sense interest connects with the perceptible…. Aesthetic judgement, 
however, connects with the mere image of things, with their appearance 
and form, regardless of whether they are supported by an apprehendable 
reality.  
– Simmel, cited Frisby, 1992: 135 
 
Economic theory sees the commodity-form as the embodiment of (potential) utility moving 
within the sphere of circulation and exchange allowing the subject-as-consumer to engage 
in a labour of self-creation. However, attention must be focused on the ‘actants’ inhabiting 
the terrain of modern consumption: here the inter-relation between subjective and objective 
culture turns upon ‘image,’ ‘appearance’ and ‘form,’ and the ‘affordances’ expressed 
through this ‘relational ontology’ (Costall). Therefore, the ‘significance’ of any 
commodity-object is irreducible to either its material manifestation or a subjective 
calculation of utility and is found, instead, in the phenomenal forms of subjective 
experience it ‘affords.’ The commodity-form ceases to be the ‘contents’ of either the 
consumption-relation or an objective reality to be manipulated by a teleological subject.  
 
Gronow (1997: 161-2) comes close to appreciating this in his combination of Lash (1994) 
and Schulze’s Die Erlebnisgesellschaft, when he implies that ‘lifestyle’ can be viewed as 
an aestheticised cultural pursuit that is played or performed. However, in conceiving of 
play as a departure from a ‘paramount reality’ Gronow views ‘consumption’ as a deviation 
from an underlying or ‘authentic’ reality or identity. This failure to see in Simmel’s 
discussion of sociability as the ‘play-form’ of sociation – the temporary suspension or 
circumspection of ‘real’ life – the basis for the analysis of modern consumption, hinges 
upon the conception of reality as the point of origin and return. The departure from reality 
inherent to play is deemed to be temporary, a hiatus prior to the resumption of ‘real life,’ or 
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everyday normality. However, in modern consumption the ‘play-form’ (sociability) of 
modern life (sociation) severs its connection with an underlying reality, and, consequently, 
becomes the play-form of the play-form, possessed of neither teleology nor origin. The 
perpetual present of the subjective experience of modern consumption is the deferral of 
both past and future, the collapse of the experience of the temporal ‘now’ into the spatial 
‘here’ and an accompanying transformation of the understanding of causality. In modern 
consumption the ‘biographical fiction of the self’ (Ferguson, 1990) is denied a reality 
against which to declare its existence; the absence of a paramount reality means that 
subjective experience (Erlebnis) is divorced from the historical continuum and the linear 
narrative structuring of experience (Erfahrung) that might otherwise ‘organise’ it. The 
remainder of this thesis investigates the historical evolution of the capitalist mode of 
production as the transformation of the conditions under which the phenomenal forms of 
subjective experience occur. Chapter Three charts the historical development of the 
capitalist sphere of circulation and the emergence of the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption, 
which makes the transformation of the categories of phenomenal experience – space, time 
and causality – the key to a sociological critique of the socio-spatial construction of 
modern consumption.  
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Capitalism has found itself able to attenuate (if not resolve) its internal 
contradictions for a century, and consequently, in the hundred years since 
the writing of Capital, it has succeeded in achieving ‘growth.’ We cannot 
calculate at what price, but we do know the means: by occupying space, by 
producing a space.  
– Henri Lefebvre (1981), The Survival of Capitalism. 
 
Space always remains the actually ineffectual form, in whose modifications 
real energies are manifested, but only in the way that language expresses 
thought processes, which occur in words but not through words. […] The 
requirement of specific psychological functions for individual historical 
spatial formations reflects the fact that space in general is only an activity 
of the mind, only the human way of connecting sensory impulses that are 
unrelated in themselves into uniform interpretations.  
– Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Space, emphasis in original. 
 
The ‘economic inheritance’ that placed a psychologically-updated incarnation of homo 
œconomicus at the heart of the sociological investigation of ‘consumption’ remains a 
problem for the analysis of the ‘spaces of consumption’ – from agora to arcade, department 
store to shopping mall and theme park. While acknowledging the central role these arenas 
occupy in any chronological account of the contemporary capitalist consumption-relation 
the current chapter seeks to consider these ‘spaces’ or ‘sites’ of commodity-exchange other 
than as ‘stages’ in the developmental history of the ‘consumer society’ and its global 
expansion. Consequently, the techniques and strategies for highlighting the aesthetic, 
affective and representational aspects of the commodity-form, which were pioneered in 
these commercial spaces, are viewed as adhering to a capitalist ‘logic of accumulation’ 
(Harvey, 2001) that modifies Simmel’s five-fold account of ‘space’ to produce an analysis 
of the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption. This ‘terrain’ emerges as a ‘de-formation’ of the 
empty space of Newtonian mechanics (Ferguson, 1990) and appears in the late nineteenth 
century as a result of the transformation of the built environment and the ‘quasi-linguistic’ 
‘rhetoric of commodity-culture’ (Richards, 1991) pioneered in the ‘spaces of 
consumption.’   
 
The historical process that saw the emergence of modern ‘space’ supplant pre-modern 
place during the later nineteenth century, before being ‘de-formed’ (Ferguson, 1990) into 
the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption, is traced. The ‘spaces of consumption’ can no longer 
be considered merely as material manifestations of the sphere of circulation and exchange 
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where the techniques for expressing the ‘aesthetic illusion’ of the commodity-form (Haug, 
1986) were refined, although such techniques were undoubtedly honed there. The 
bourgeois subject conceived of ‘consumption’ as a means to further the project(ion) of the 
ego through the exercise of discriminating choice. The ‘spaces of consumption,’ on this 
view, were nothing more than archival warehouses in which were contained the raw 
materials of subjective refinement – a passive landscape of commodities, rather than the 
‘active mass’ (Ferguson, 1992) of the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption. The capitalist 
‘production of space’ (Lefebvre) can not be understood as the material basis for ‘lived 
experience’ (Minkowski, 1970). Instead, the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption, in its focus 
upon of the relationship between subjective and objective culture, investigates the 
relational ontology formed between environment and organism (Costall, 2004) is seen to 
have its origin in the interplay between socio-spatial practices and the capitalist logic of 
accumulation (Harvey, 2001).  
 
The ‘spaces of consumption’ that have traditionally made up the material component of the 
capitalist sphere of circulation and exchange should be considered as the ‘spatial 
expression’ of a ‘sociological fact’ (Simmel, 1997: 143 [1903]), a manifestation of the 
relation between being and having, rather than material structures that impose certain 
socio-spatial practices upon their inhabitants. These spaces or sites afford a variety of 
possible behaviours, from the ‘shopping’ of the law-abiding ‘citizen consumer’ 
(Trentmann, 2006) to the hanging-out of teenage ‘mallrats’ or the appropriations of 
nineteenth century thieves (Abelson, 1989) While the historical development of such 
‘spaces of consumption’ embodies an extension and concentration of the monetarisation 
and commodification of human existence, it also ‘affords’ new possibilities for expressing 
the relationship(s) between subjects and objects. These spaces do not offer solutions to 
problems of utility, the desire for pleasure or the pursuit of ‘identity’ through the monetary 
appropriation of goods, services or experiences, as imagined by economic theory. Rather, 
in the shift from arcade to magasin des nouveautés, from grand magasin to shopping mall, 
and beyond to the ‘themed environments’ of ‘postmodern’ cities, epitomised by Disney’s 
‘imagineering’ of New York’s Times Square (Hannigan, 1998), these ‘spaces’ reveal an 
increasing emphasis upon the immaterial and experiential dimension of the interaction 
between ‘shops’ and ‘shoppers.’  
 
In discussing the emergence of a distinctively modern and capitalist ‘space’ the increased 
circulation of industrially manufactured goods and the access to these conferred by the 
‘spaces of consumption’ – as a retail network – through the rational organisation of the 
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division of labour in both ‘consumption’ and ‘production’ becomes central. Rather than 
considering these eighteenth and nineteenth century ‘spaces’ as conduits for supplying a 
greater number, range and variety of commodities to an increasingly sophisticated and 
discerningly tasteful ‘consumer’ society – as economic theory implies – it makes greater 
sense to consider these ‘social forms’ (Lancaster, 1995) as spatial sites born of the 
coalescence of certain ‘representational’ strategies and techniques, which were aimed at 
enhancing the aesthetic affect of the commodity-form. Therefore, the sociological fact 
expressed spatially (Simmel) is the immanent coalescence of modern consumption, as 
‘space’ is transformed into terrain, through the operation of a ‘dynamic’ logic of ‘capitalist 
accumulation’ (Harvey, 2001 [1975]). This logic necessitates an ‘intensification’ and 
‘expansion’ of the social relations of the capitalist mode of production, effectively 
commodification, which supplements the five ‘fundamental qualities’ of space identified by 
Simmel (1997 [1907]). So, the ‘logic’ of capitalist accumulation serves to ‘de-form’ or 
concentrate the abstract ‘space’ of the market into the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption and 
the socio-spatial practices – the ‘forms of sociation’ (Simmel) – which these facilitate, 
specifically the relationship between subjective and objective culture, between being and 
having, between experience and environment. 
 
The sociological investigation of modern consumption, therefore, requires an analysis of 
the historical processes that underpinned the transformation of social space into ‘terrain.’ 
The ‘empty space’ of Newtonian physics and its geometry gave way to a terrain ‘de-
formed’ into existence (Ferguson, 1990; Massumi, 1993) and its geography of sociation. 
Fundamentally, space ceases to be the ‘empty’ location of social action and, instead, 
becomes a constitutive component and dimension of ‘lived experience’; the forms of 
phenomenal experience afforded to the subject are revealed as being contingent upon the 
availability and organisation of the terrain of modern consumption. Upon this terrain re-
presentations of value rather than ‘real’ objects or experiences seem to circulate, made 
available through the conjunction of, first, industrial (mechanical) and, then, digital 
technology, and an apparent privileging of exchange-value over use-value. However, the 
increased role of the immaterial or experiential dimension of the commodity-form (and 
related forms of sociation) must not be reduced to a nostalgic longing for the physical 
thing-in-itself. This all too convenient simplification of materiality (use) and immateriality 
(exchange) threatens to obscure the ‘affordances’ (Gibson, 1977; 1986) expressed by the 
relationship between objects and subjects, between being and having that will be explored 
in subsequent chapters. 
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Therefore, the shift from ‘spaces of consumption’ to terrain reveals the development of the 
techniques and strategies used to organise waged labour within the foregrounding of the 
aesthetic dimension of the commodity-form. Likewise, it indicates the need to trace the 
production and circulation of such commodities and to reveal the manner in which such 
commodities allowed new, modern forms of social interaction and subjective experience to 
emerge. The refinement of such ‘aesthetic productivity’ (Simmel) and the ‘representational 
value’ (Buck-Morss, 1993) it underpinned can be discerned in certain ‘exemplary 
instances’ (Kracauer) of the sphere of circulation and exchange – arcades, department 
stores, shopping malls and ‘themed environments’ – and their privileging of the abstract, 
rather than straight-forwardly functional, relationship of ‘affordance.’ Of course, in 
exacerbating the individual and subjective component of the experience of the commodity-
form the terrain of modern consumption can also be seen as conforming to the logic of 
capitalist accumulation discussed by Harvey (2001). Here the expansion and intensification 
of commodification, facilitated by the conjunction of capital and technology, now 
addresses each individual as a micro-market (not entirely dissimilar to neo-classical 
economics). However, this address, or interpellation, is not made upon the basis of utility 
but through an appeal to the affective aspect of existence, to the aesthetic dimension of 
experience.  
 
The terrain of modern consumption is now revealed as resembling description of the social 
as a ‘space’ of ‘circulation’ provided by Actant-Network-Theory (ANT); as a technology 
of (social) experience. The phenomenal forms of subjective experience can now be seen as 
being linked to the socio-economic forms of capitalist modernity, to paraphrase Marx: they 
are the surface phenomena that betray essential relations. However, they do not do so in an 
obvious and unproblematic manner: it is no longer possible to ‘drop a sounding’ (Simmel) 
that will reveal the cause of an effect (event). The emergence of the terrain of modern 
consumption, in large part due to the marriage of the material structures of the sphere of 
circulation and exchange and the ‘mature money-form’ (Simmel, 1990), necessitates an 
analysis of the production of capitalist ‘space’ or, more accurately, spatial experience that 
is irreducible to the pursuit of utility, however variegated or complex. The structures and 
socio-spatial practices of modern consumption are, therefore, revealed to be the ‘material’ 
manifestation or accretion of subjective experience, which, in turn, is born of an immersion 
in and engagement with the ‘logic’ of the capitalist mode of production.  
 
By extending Simmel’s (1997) ‘sociology of space’ through the ‘logic’ of ‘capitalist 
accumulation’ (Harvey) – as expansion and intensification addressed to the individual 
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(even when dealing with groups) – the role of the boundary (Simmel, 1997: 170-1 [1903]) 
is revealed as vital. The boundary (natural or social) is no longer simply interrupted by 
either bridge or door, but has become the spatial expression of a sociological fact: the 
permeability and mutability of capitalist space and its continual ‘de-formation’ into the 
terrain of modern consumption. Therefore, the history of the ‘spaces of consumption’ – 
from bazaar to arcade to grand magasin and beyond – must be viewed as a manifestation 
of the logic of capitalist accumulation, rather than the technical refinement of the delivery 
mechanism of capitalist production. Within these ‘spaces’ a new relationship between 
vision, representation, gender and public space was engineered (Crary, 1995; Friedberg, 
1993; Laermans, 1993; Ross, 1991; Zola, 1953; Ryan, 1994), which privileged the socially 
and historically novel: the commodity-form’s capacity to express nouveauté was forged in 
this crucible of commercial culture. The ‘aesthetic productivity’ (Simmel, 1997) that was 
the ‘stock in trade’ of such spaces sought to fine-tune the technical and stylistic means of 
creating aesthetic and affective experience.  
 
Unlike the ‘spaces of consumption’ the terrain of modern consumption is not reducible to a 
boundary capable of quantitative expression (whether in metres or miles) interrupted by 
‘doors’ or extended by bridges. Instead, it is a qualitative phenomenon possessed of a 
continually fluctuating ‘boundary’ that is both spatial and temporal. Upon this terrain there 
is no scope for the ‘completion’ of the bourgeois ego through the appropriation of the 
contents of the world (shopping) or the expression of this ego as a stable identity 
(consumerism). While the ‘spaces of consumption’ functioned as archival resources for 
bourgeois individuals who sought the satiation of desire through the pleasurable utility 
found in ‘collecting’ or shopping, the terrain of modern consumption merely provides a 
momentary crystalisation – as affordance – of the relationship between being and having. 
It is the spatial dimension of this historical transformation in the relationship between 
subjective and objective culture, between the physical environment and the phenomenal 
forms of subjective experience, which this chapter traces.  
 
The ‘Production’ of Capitalist Space 
Simmel (1997: 139-163) considered space to possess five ‘fundamental qualities’ through 
which spatial ‘expression’ was given to the ‘sociological fact’ of human life. These 
qualities ranged from: firstly, the ‘exclusivity’ that defined, through difference, a space 
into existence; secondly, the ‘dynamic character’ given by the social interactions that 
characterise a space; thirdly, the capacity for fixing the contents of social formations 
through the incorporation of immobile objects into social relations (epitomised by 
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Parliament or a police station); fourthly, intervals that signal difference as distance, 
expressed either as proximity or separation; and, finally, the mobility or dynamic aspect of 
the ‘contents’ of space that shape subjective experience. The character of space and spatial 
experience, therefore, is a combination of its generic type and its deviation(s) from this, the 
range of interactions that occur within it, the structures that arise to embody these 
interactions (and which endure), the negotiation of distance either within or between 
specific spaces, and the phenomenal forms of subjective experience participated in and the 
actions that arise within individuals and groups in response to these. This temporalisation 
of space and spatialisation of time asserts the relational nature of subjective experience as 
the individual consciousness functions as intersection, repository and embodiment of 
spatial and temporal events.  
 
Such spatial events, which also, obviously, unfold in time, possess a psychological value 
(Simmel) or ‘intensity’ (Latour) for the participant. Therefore, the forms of interaction or 
‘mobility’ displayed by human beings as they traverse space represent the embodiment of 
these values or psychological dispositions. For instance, in discussing ‘the stranger’ 
Simmel (1950) identifies three ‘sociological consequences’ of his or her ‘wandering’: 
1) ‘the separation from one’s accustomed milieu,’ 
2) ‘the momentary impressions and encounters held in common,’ 
3) ‘the consciousness of an imminent and definitive separation once more.’ 
 
Travellers, in this way, experience a kind of distance from ‘themselves,’ which is actually 
an interval separating them from their everyday social situation, their milieu. 
Consequently, the standards to which they have habituated themselves in the course of 
their normal social interactions appear inappropriate in new and different environments. In 
turn, the inapplicability of ‘everyday’ standards, values or forms of behaviour leave the 
temporarily ‘rootless’ individual susceptible to suggestion and open to an ‘intimacy or 
confession’ (Simmel, 1997: 163) otherwise unthinkable.  
 
The stranger, therefore, embodies a spatial estrangement from the everyday and for whom 
all social interactions will be, most likely, fleeting and unrepeated – hence the otherwise 
inexplicable openness. Thus, the occupation of unusual space becomes the experience of 
difference – manifested in forms of social interaction – born of the interruption or 
cessation of the everyday. The manifestation of social space was exemplified for Simmel 
by the modern metropolis, which resembled: 
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[…] a web or network of intersecting spheres of the division of labour, 
distribution, communications, the money economy, commodity exchange, 
intellectual and cultural circles.  
– Frisby, 1992: 100 
 
However, as Frisby observes (ibid: 100-1), this describes a ‘capital city, the focal point of 
the money economy,’ rather than an industrial city and its expanding suburbs, and the 
political and economic claims of those who inhabit them. Simmel’s emphasis upon the 
‘space’ of the sphere of circulation and exchange – of both individuals and commodities – 
revealed the spatial proximity and simultaneous separation of its seemingly autonomous 
contents. Spatial proximity here betrays its temporal component, the fleeting ‘co-presence’ 
(Jackson & Thrift, 1995) of disparate entities, each possessed of its own volition.  
 
This stress upon both distance and differentiation and its characterisation of particular 
spaces echoes Tarde’s (see Borch, 2005) discussion of the ‘primacy’ of Paris over the rest 
of France because of the nature of the interactions that occur there. Effectively, social 
space is produced through the interactions that it appears to contain and its boundaries 
become contingent upon the forms of sociation that occur at any point: the boundary, and 
that which it demarcates, represents the expression of a ‘sociological fact.’  
 
[…] the sociological boundary signifies a quite unique interaction, in which 
what is significant is the interactions woven on either side of the boundary. 
[…] The indeterminacy of boundaries may also be seen in the spatial 
framework of darkness, in which the narrowness and breadth of the 
framework merge together to provide scope for fantasy […].  
– Frisby, 1992: 105 
 
The boundary is both a spatial and a temporal event that is defined by the forms of 
sociation it contains and, as such, it is not necessarily a material structure and is 
experienced as a subjectively affective phenomenon: for instance, the psychological 
‘value’ of darkness. This ‘emancipation from space’ has been attributed to the role of the 
mature money economy, which in tandem with communication technologies ‘enable 
spatial differences to be overcome by time’ (Frisby, 1992: 107). This, in turn, echoes the 
‘annihilation of space by time’ discussed by Marx and taken up by Harvey (1989; 1999; 
2001) as the basis of the ‘capitalist logic of accumulation’ and its expansion and 
intensification of the market.  
 
Harvey’s (2001: 239-41) description of economic growth as derived form a dynamic 
process of expansion governed by the ‘capitalist logic of accumulation’ hinges upon three 
factors. Firstly, the existence of surplus labour and the ‘flexibility’ it imparts to the labour 
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force; secondly, the supply of raw materials in sufficient quantities, so as to allow the 
expansion of production; thirdly, a market capable of absorbing an increased supply of 
goods. The development of the sphere of circulation and exchange, as described by 
Simmel, is inseparable from these structural considerations within the realm of production. 
For Harvey, this indicates the dialectical integration of the spheres of ‘consumption’ and 
production, which results in the emergence of a ‘new plane of effective demand’ with an 
‘increas[ed] capacity to absorb products’ formed from the ‘complex mix of four 
overlapping elements’ (2001: 241). Firstly, the extension of the capitalist organisation of 
production, either into non-capitalist areas or the development of ‘specialist’ services or 
technologies geared to one specific aspect of existing production. Secondly, product 
innovation underpinning new ‘wants,’ ‘needs’ or expectations (such as public sector 
housing for the working class). Thirdly, an expansion of the ‘consumer’ market – although 
both Marx and Harvey tend to view such an expansion in population (spatial) terms, rather 
than the ‘consumerisation’ of ever-younger individuals (temporal). Fourthly, the 
geographic (as opposed to spatial) expansion into new markets – epitomised by 
‘globalisation.’ 
 
Harvey views the first three ‘elements’ as an ‘intensification of social activity, of markets, 
of people within a particular social structure,’ while the fourth concerns the ‘spatial 
organisation’ and ‘geographical expansion’ of the accumulation process (ibid: 242). The 
centrality of spatial expansion to the capitalist ‘logic of accumulation’ increases as 
intensification becomes ever more difficult through saturation of existing markets. It is in 
this manner that capitalism appears to tear down the barriers to its expansion and 
transgress its apparent boundaries, and the most obvious manifestation of this process is 
found in the sphere of circulation and exchange and the technological refinement of its 
capacity to deliver commodities to ‘consumers’ (Harvey, 2001: 242-3). The ‘constant 
continuity’ (Marx) in the transformation of value, from the commodity-form into the 
money-form, occurs at discrete intervals and in separate phases and so ensures the 
necessity of credit to underpin the whole process (spatially and temporally), from 
production to market and the recouping of value. While the ‘territorial division of labour’ 
(Marx) expresses the local nature of production in certain industries – for instance, the 
convenience of raw materials – population centres also encourage a localised 
‘consumption’ of goods produced nearby: increased transport links diminish this 
geographical fixity, while the de-localisation of certain industries and processes free 
production from its geographical origins, for instance, the production of ‘foreign’ lagers, 
such as Stella Artois or Red Stripe within the U.K. Such innovations produce a 
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‘concentration of production and of capital at the same time as it creates an expansion of 
the market for realization’ (2001: 246). As Harvey states: 
 
Capital thus comes to represent itself in the form of a physical landscape 
created in its own image, created as use values to enhance the progressive 
accumulation of capital on an expanding scale. The geographical landscape 
which fixed and immobile capital comprises is both a crowning glory of 
past capital development and a prison which inhibits the further progress of 
accumulation because the very building of this landscape is antithetical to 
the ‘tearing down of spatial barriers’ and ultimately even to the 
‘annihilation of space by time.  
- ibid: 247 
 
This, however, is to conceive of the capitalist economy delivering goods as discrete 
objects, as tangible phenomena, rather than extending into the realm of services and 
experiences, as its recent historical development has indicated. The construction of an 
infrastructure geared towards the delivery of goods, tangible or intangible, implies a 
concentration of ‘social wealth’ given objective form, such as roads or railways. However, 
it can also extend to the fibre optic cabling of housing estates for televisual or broadband 
purposes – the delivery of services and possible experiences, rather than objects. This 
alteration to the capitalist ‘landscape’ was unforeseen by Marx and is un-discussed by 
Harvey, and it now serves to concentrate access to goods and services – whether located in 
regional shopping malls or the ‘pipeline’ of fibre optic cabling – upon the terrain of 
modern consumption, which it constructs, as a form of historically novel experience.  
 
However, says Harvey (2001: 257), capitalism’s survival relies upon increased surplus 
value organised as private profit, therefore, the sphere of circulation and exchange must 
expand (spatially) and intensify (subjectively, as wants and needs). Any analysis of the 
spatial dimension of contemporary society requires an understanding of how ‘the “inner 
logic” of the capitalist mode of production, abstractly conceived, relates to the concrete 
realities, the phenomenal forms, of the historical process,’ and takes ‘account of the 
mediating influence of political, ideological, military and other structures which, although 
they must be generally organized so as to be coherent with the course of capital 
accumulation, are not uniquely determined by it’ (2001: 259). Harvey (ibid: 264) quotes 
Marx in Grundrisse: 
 
The creation by capital of absolute surplus value... is conditional upon an 
expansion, specifically a constant expansion, of the sphere of circulation… 
A precondition of production based on capital is therefore the production of 
a constantly widening sphere of circulation. Hence, just as capital has the 
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tendency on one side to create ever more surplus labour, so it has the 
complementary tendency to create more points of exchange.  
– Marx, 1973: 407-10, emphasis in original citation 
 
This has obvious implications for the geography of the market (expansion), by increasing 
production of existing consumer goods, by disseminating ‘consumer goods’ to a new 
audience, and by the innovation of the commodity-form and the ‘production’ of new ‘use 
values’ (intensification). ‘Monopoly’ capitalism represents the most effective means to 
ensure maximum return upon capital investment through a colonisation of the sphere of 
circulation and exchange. However, such a monopoly, where ‘pure commodification’ 
pertains, threatens a ‘bland homogeneity’ (2001: 396-7) and the ceding of difference and 
novelty to standardization. Therefore, the market seeks to position individual commodities 
in such a manner that a contradiction emerges between like commodities: novelty as 
difference in form, function, materiality, etc is required to distinguish a particular 
commodity. Here Simmel’s attempt to frame interactions through the concept of the 
boundary is useful since, in its emphasis upon shared features – typicality – it prioritises a 
discussion of form and the aesthetic dimension of experience (Frisby, 1992: 108).  
 
The relationship between subject and object ‘becomes aesthetic only as a result of 
increasing distance, abstraction and sublimation’ (Simmel, cited ibid) and this extends to 
the commodification of nature or one’s surroundings: 
 
The aesthetic distance implicit in the framed landscapes of experience in 
mass tourism are themselves aesthetic, even if merely sublime.  
– Frisby, 1992: 109 
 
For Simmel, aesthetic distance is found in nature, the work of art and also in the ‘works of 
human beings,’ fortuitously arranged – by which he tends to mean old cities that have 
arrived at their present arrangement over centuries. Here the apparent fortuity of 
arrangement is mitigated by a subjective appreciation of the whole or totality that these 
fragments combine to reveal. As Frisby states, ‘this is the aestheticisation of a feature of 
modernity – fortuitousness – that transcends the contradictions of modernity’ usually 
through the avoidance of the historically recent elements of metropolitan life (ibid: 110). 
This confers upon experience a ‘ “dream like” character’ which ‘possesses “the ambiguous 
beauty of the adventure that swims rootlessly in life” ’ (ibid), much as the subjective 
interaction with the sphere of circulation and exchange appears to deny the historical 
origins of its constituent elements. The distinction between nature, the work of art, the 
historical city and the modern metropolis appears founded upon the mobility of the 
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elements that combine to ‘form’ the whole – it is the emphasis on the movement and 
interaction of these elements that makes the metropolis confront subjective experience as a 
dynamic entity. As such, the aesthetic component of experience is not that of the beautiful 
but, rather, the sublime. For Frisby, it is ‘one of the tasks of Simmel’s analysis’ (ibid: 111) 
to reveal these forms and oblige them to undergo sociological analysis.  
 
The dynamic aspect of the modern metropolis and its capacity for aesthetic experience, of 
sublimity, echoes Harvey’s discussion of a dynamic integration and an always 
proliferating productive apparatus and the ‘expanded plane’ of the sphere of circulation 
and exchange (and its constituent components). The ‘physical landscape’ produced by 
capitalism is both ‘crowning glory’ and ‘prison,’ and the tearing down of ‘spatial barriers’ 
is, today, achieved as readily in ‘cyberspace’ as it is by the erection of transmitters and 
masts to carry wi-fi signals. The modern metropolis – whether contemporary or early 
twentieth century – is characterized by this circulation of people, money, goods and 
information and contradicts the ‘illusions of a questionable Gemeinschaft existence’ 
(Frisby, 1992: 112) that underpin a bourgeois nostalgia and longing for an unchanging 
authenticity of experience (a real reality). Instead, interaction in metropolitan space 
resembles participation within a group, the members of whom are all strangers to each 
other in some degree, and in which ‘the individual is only the executor of a certain 
function’ (Simmel, 1950: 317). Therefore, association between individuals proceeds upon 
the basis of ‘psychological anonymity’ and other subjects appear as objective phenomena, 
and relations with such subjects are ‘based exclusively on this objective content, which is 
neatly factored out of the whole relation’ (ibid: 318).  
 
Just as Baudelaire’s flâneur was ‘a prince always in possession of his incognito’ so, too, is 
the inhabitant of capitalist space where psychological individuation – through the ordering 
of the contents of the world (possessions) – is threatened by the ubiquity of mass-produced 
goods and services, by virtue of which the ego might announce itself. Simmel (1950: 335) 
explicitly links ‘large group dynamics’ with ‘the conditions of a money economy’ and its 
‘traffic in economic values.’ Money, claims Simmel, promotes secrecy: firstly, by its 
‘compressibility’ or abstraction of value; secondly, this abstraction makes nearly invisible 
the relations between actors, and; thirdly, its spatial reach and efficacy – and nowhere is 
this more evident than in the formation of the joint-stock company.  
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[…] the secret is a form which constantly receives and releases its contents: 
what originally was manifest becomes secret, and what was once hidden 
later sheds its concealment.  
– Ibid 
 
Or, as Simmel observed, ‘general affairs [become] ever more public, and individual affairs 
ever more secret’ (ibid: 336): amongst the hubbub of modern metropolitan existence it is 
individual psychology rather than economic affairs that is hidden from sight, unless the 
psychic ‘contents’ of the individual are to be discerned in the habits and garb of ‘the 
consumer.’ Indeed, it can be argued that in the tasteful display of discriminating choice the 
inner ‘secret’ of the individual is revealed, while remaining inexplicable: one either has 
taste or one does not, but its possession is there for all to witness. Thus, alongside secrecy 
and the secret, the role of adornment and display is crucial to the discussion of capitalist 
space – as it becomes ‘terrain’ – and the immersion in the socio-spatial practices of modern 
consumption. With the disappearance of the bourgeois individual into the secret realm of 
psychology, the inhabitant of contemporary capitalism must resort to public (social rather 
than psychological) assertions of identity, through the ‘modifications’ of space by the ‘real 
energies’ (Simmel, 1997) of subjects: that is, in the behaviours adopted, including the 
relationship with objective culture epitomised by fashion. The tendency for sociological 
accounts of ‘consumption’ to reduce this phenomenon to ‘lifestyle’ or ‘subculture,’ rather 
than to address the ‘laws of imitation’ (Tarde) that seem to govern this process is merely 
the spatialisation of homo œconomicus and his activities.  
 
The ‘spaces of consumption’ 
As Marx observes in Grundrisse (1973: 524), ‘the creation of the physical conditions of 
exchange […] becomes an extraordinary necessity for [capital].’ The expansion of the 
economic structures that supply goods and services – and the forms of interaction with 
individuals, groups, classes and communities that this implies – is both geographic and 
experiential. The combination of the capitalist logic of accumulation and the coalescence 
of forms of interaction or ‘sociation’ (Simmel) between individuals, or subjective and 
objective culture, has seen the ‘physical conditions of exchange’ echo the expansion of the 
capitalist system in that it has sought the ‘annihilation of space by time’ (Marx, 1973). The 
‘spaces of consumption’ and the practices they engendered, contained and nurtured appear 
to have bequeathed an apparent autonomy to the sphere of circulation and exchange in 
which the commodified products of the capitalist division of labour moved, appeared 
before ‘consumers’ and were appropriated and absorbed into the ‘life project.’ In fact, 
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nothing could be further from the truth: the ‘sphere’ of exchange was an inseparable 
element of the ‘totality’ (Marx) of the capitalist mode of production and the site of a 
gendered division of labour for both the ‘consumers’ and ‘producers’ of the nineteenth 
century retail experience, particularly the department store (Laermans, 1993; Miller, 1981; 
Ryan, 1994). The production of ‘consumption’ – and its spaces – mirrored the division of 
labour found in the factories of the industrial revolution in its rationalisation of complex 
tasks and the mechanisation of artisan crafts: the guild of shoemakers went the same way 
as that of the weavers. The ‘logic of capitalist accumulation’ (Harvey) had merely 
entrenched itself more deeply into the fabric of eighteenth and nineteenth century 
existence.  
 
The Pre-history of Modern Consumption – The Arcades 
Today the arcades of northern Europe are monuments to the history of ‘consumerism,’ 
relics whose value lies in their antiquity rather than their modernity. These spaces, once 
described as ‘the original temple of commodity fetishism’ (Benjamin), and whose shop 
windows and show cases displayed commodities of every kind and promised the 
distractions of alcohol, gambling, vaudeville and prostitution (Buck-Morss, 1993: 83) now 
house modernity’s detritus in the form of andenken, or souvenirs. Louis Aragorn’s 
description of the arcades in Paris Peasant (1980: 28-9) as ‘the true sanctuaries of a cult of 
the ephemeral, the ghostly landscape of damnable pleasures and professions’ conveys their 
sepulchral air and their role as a resting place for objects fallen from fashion, produced by 
dead labour and defunct social relations (Friedberg, 1993: 49).  
 
…the arcade, the primal, even auratic, threshold to the dreamworld of the 
nineteenth century.  Its entrance was a threshold to the waking dream.  
- Frisby, 1988: 210 
 
Benjamin’s (1999) argument that the shopping ‘arcade’ or passage signalled the advent 
and threshold of capitalist modernity and its ‘dreamworld’ (see also Buck-Morss, 1993; 
Frisby, 1988) acknowledged its spatial concentration of experience within a historically 
novel architectural form. These arcades, passages, or galleria (Italy) resembled 
 
[…] interior boulevards, like those they open onto. These passages, a new 
discovery of industrial luxury, are glass-covered, marble-walled walkways 
through entire blocks of buildings, the owners of which have joined 
together to engage in such a venture. Lining both sides of these walkways 
which receive their light from above are the most elegant of commodity 
shops, so that such an arcade is a city, a world in miniature.  
- Benjamin, cited Buck-Morss, 1993: 3. 
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Here, sheltered from the weather, the smell of the city and the sight of the poor, 
prospective customers strolled in search of distraction or some pleasing item; looking, 
lingering, but without the requirement to purchase that characterised the shops of the era. 
The arcade, as architectural form, spread quickly across northern Europe and displayed 
regional and city-specific variations upon the iron and glass theme, and came to represent 
participation in the cultural and economic currents of modernity (Giedion, 1975; 1995).  
 
The arcades had existed as monuments to the Parisian haute bourgeoisie’s style of life, 
deliberately flaunting the freedom from work discipline, the leisured use of time in the 
consideration, purchase and display of commodity objects. However, just as the world in 
which this class existed began to decline with the full impact of industrialization so, too, 
did the arcades begin to fall into disuse long before they crumbled physically, replaced by 
an other, newer incarnation of the sites and spaces of commodity capitalism. The ascension 
of the department store as the site in which the fetish character of the commodity assumed 
the quality of the dream meant that it, rather than the arcade, became the home of the 
commodity-form as phantasmagoria. The intimate scale of the arcades and narrow range of 
expensive goods, relative to the aspirations to universality of the department stores, marked 
them as being of their time. The crowd which the flâneur had followed in to the arcades 
had departed for the department store and he followed, prompting Benjamin to remark that 
in the department store the flâneur had found his ‘last haunt’ (Benjamin V. P. 562, cited 
Buck-Morss, 1993: 345).  In doing so, however, the flâneur has managed to remain with 
us, perpetually present: 
 
The flâneur thus becomes extinct only by exploding into a myriad of forms, 
the phenomenological characteristics of which, no matter how new they 
may appear, continue to bear his traces, as ur-form. This is the ‘truth’ of the 
flâneur, more visible in his afterlife than in his flourishing. 
- Buck-Morss 1993: 346 
 
The arcades represent the ‘spatial manifestation of a sociological fact’ (Simmel): the 
dramatic expansion in the ‘world of goods’ and the sphere of circulation and exchange 
born of the division of labour of industrial capitalism, the expansion of European imperial 
adventure and the ‘logic of capitalist accumulation’ (Harvey): the threshold of our 
contemporary modernity. The fact that between 1800 and 1830 seventeen arcades were 
built in Paris reveals their importance to the economic and social life of the city: their 
coincidence of architectural form, commercial acumen and entrepreneurial investment 
made them ‘the original temple of commodity fetishism’ (Benjamin) and, as such, 
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landmarks to be sought out by the burgeoning tourist industry of post-Napoleonic Europe 
(Adburgham, 1981).  
 
Within the arcade, those ‘little cities, microcosms of human activity, taste, desires, 
temptation’ (Saisselin, 1985: 26), the ‘paradoxical relationship’ between intérieur and 
extérieur (Frisby, 1988: 241) was played out. Here the commodity-form existed apart 
from, and seemingly unconnected to, the system of social relations that underpinned its 
production and distribution – either those of nature (the stench of the sewers, the weather) 
or of society (the pleas of the poor, or the threat of revolution). Upon this sheltered 
landscape composed of commodities – the ‘range of the seeable’ (Saisselin) or the ‘field of 
the visible’ (Friedberg) – an apparently autonomous ‘aesthetics of buying and selling’ 
(Saisselin, 1985: 19) was pioneered. Here the bourgeois individual was addressed 
simultaneously as both collector and ‘consumer’ and encouraged to appreciate the 
commodity-form for the visual and aesthetic impact it manifested. The exemplary 
participation in such displays by the flâneur, the ‘idler’ or ‘lounger’ who spent his day 
‘distracted by the spectacle of the city’ (Saisselin, 1985: 24) led, inevitably, to the arcades. 
The pursuit of his solitary anti-profession – the leisured renunciation of productive labour 
and work-discipline – allowed Jules Janin to assert, in 1843, that ‘we shall find our man in 
the Passage de l’Opera, at the hour when the rehearsal commences, and there, he sees 
passing, in every kind of dress, in satin shoes, in slippers down at the heel, and even 
without any shoes at all, the pretty danseuses, to who glory has not yet held out her hand, 
filled with laces and cashmere. Lounger! That word implies everything’ (cited, ibid). The 
arcades functioned as arenas for the display of self and commodities, not as a pre-cursor to 
the postmodern mall, but as a space for the (re-)presentation of bourgeois selfhood. 
 
In this miniature world, comprised of pleasurable distractions and promises of delight, both 
physiological and psychological, the arcades offered their inhabitants a historically novel 
form of experience, nouveauté. This was why the flâneur’s search for sensation and 
avoidance of modernity’s most terrifying aspect – boredom – had been centred upon the 
arcade, which epitomised the escape from the constraints of productive labour, the duties 
of the citizen, the bureaucratic administration of existence and the cares of everyday life. 
Within the arcade – as exemplar of the modern sphere of circulation and exchange – the 
conflation of the commodity-form and individual freedom, both psychological and 
physiological, was forged for those with the money to pay. The ‘freedom’ found in the 
public spaces of the metropolis, the tables of the casino or the arms of an arcade prostitute 
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promised a vertiginous immersion in sublime experience and allowed the ‘modern 
Tantalus’ to subordinate a quest for happiness to the search for excitement: 
 
The more that life is regulated administratively, the more people must learn 
waiting.  Games of chance have the great attraction of making people free 
from waiting. 
- Benjamin V: 178, cited in Buck-Morss 1993: 104 
 
The juxtaposition of such ‘freedom’ with the constraints of everyday existence revealed the 
opposition between the uncertain, exciting possibilities of ‘chance’ and its encounters and 
the statistical modelling of life advanced by scientific rationality (Richards, 1991; Seltzer, 
1992, 2002). However, such freedom was available only to those who greeted the 
commodity-form as its purchaser – those allowed the luxury of choice – rather than those 
suffered under the exigency of necessity: for instance, in the shape of the ‘mass article’ 
(Buck-Morss) of the prostitute, Benjamin (1999) discerned the most extreme example of 
the commodity-form; love for sale.  
 
Friedberg’s (1993) discussion of the ‘curious temporality’ of the arcade emphasises its role 
as a ‘space of transition’ in common with the galleria, the railway station or the ‘space’ of 
the promenade; it was a space of pleasure but also one of departure. By epitomising a 
removal or ‘interval’ (Simmel) removed from the temporal and spatial relations of the 
everyday the arcades served as a series of ‘elsewheres’ and ‘elsewhens’ (Friedberg). The 
passage represented a route into an un-real world, removed from the constraints of the 
quotidian, populated by ‘strangers,’ wanderers and casual acquaintances (Simmel), exotic 
objects and novel experiences. This was as true in the heyday of the arcades, in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, when they housed the novelties of an emerging 
modernity as it was when, in their late nineteenth and twentieth century afterlife, they 
resembled museums filled with the relics of an earlier epoch. Within these ‘curious’ 
passages the ephemera of an emerging global economy congregated and was displayed to 
an inquisitive public in search of the exotic. Goods were shown in new, large windows and 
piled high for inspection – more artfully than in the surrounding shops, but without the 
strategic address to ‘staging’ that would be the hallmark of the department store.  
 
The demise of the flâneur, the arcades and the markets of the poor were bound up with the 
re-shaping of Paris initiated by ‘Haussmannisation’ and its modernisation of the European 
metropolis: the arrival of city-centre appartements, wide boulevards, the grand magasin 
(or department store), urban parks and gardens, a new opera house, the dispersal of the 
working classes to the ‘red belt’ and the introduction of horse-drawn and steam-driven 
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transportation testified to the re-ordering of Parisian life with the advent of the Second 
Empire of Louis Napoleon. Haussmannisation, as the spatial expression of the sociological 
fact of bourgeois dominance, spelled the end for the mediaeval city (vieux Paris), banished 
the aristocratic indolence of the flâneur and dispersed the artisan class that had previously 
ministered to the aristocracy and the mercantile bourgeoisie. Likewise, this re-ordering of 
metropolitan space rendered the arcade redundant, not as an evolutionary step that was 
superseded but as a monument to a previous social formation that was to be overcome in 
the name of progress.   
 
Palimpsest, or the ‘Haussmannisation’ of Paris 
 
Cosmic proportions, monumental solidarity, and panoramic perspectives 
were the characteristics of the new urban phantasmagoria. All of its aspects 
– railroad stations, museums, winter gardens, sport palaces, department 
stores, exhibition halls, boulevards – dwarfed the original arcades and 
eclipsed them. These once magical ‘fairy grottos’ that had spawned the 
phantasmagoria went into eclipse: their narrowness appeared stifling, their 
perspectives claustrophobic, their gaslight too dim.  
– Buck-Morss, 1993: 92 
 
The ‘Haussmannisation of Paris was the State sponsored destruction of mediaeval Vieux 
Paris and its replacement with the urbanism (Buck-Morss, 1993) of the City of Light, 
‘capital of the nineteenth century’ (Benjamin). This process saw place, as the gradual 
accretion of historical ‘experience’ in physical form (as streets, statues and small-scale 
commercial operations) replaced by modern space, which was constituted by the absence 
of these markers of the historical process, their ‘emptying out’ (Prendergast). Palimpsest 
refers to the erasure and over-writing of a text, the literal up-dating or modernisation of an 
object – in this case, Paris in the mid-nineteenth century. Haussmannisation, as the ‘over-
writing’ of vieux Paris, represented the social, economic and political triumph of the 
bourgeoisie made manifest in spatial terms. Louis Napoleon and Haussmann sought a 
rationally planned and administered urban environment designed to produce a populace 
healthy, both physically and morally, in accordance with the Enlightenment vision of 
Nature and its prevention of the decay so often associated with city life. The agent of 
civilisation was to be the boulevard, a ‘tool of social, moral and governmental progress,’ 
which would open Paris ‘up to air, sun, and green on the one hand and uniform 
administration on the other’ (Vidler, 1985: 87), in contra-distinction to the medieval 
labyrinth of Vieux Paris and the Ancien Règime. Haussmann’s role as the Emperor’s 
Prefect allowed him the financial and political power to initiate the systematic destruction 
and rebuilding of Paris, as a mechanistic unity of diverse areas or components, each with 
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distinct functions. This physical and spatial rendering of a confluence of ideas imagined a 
Paris where urban space was conceived ‘and treated as a totality in which different quarters 
of the city and different functions had to be brought into relation to each other to form a 
working whole’ (Harvey, 1985: 75) within the social relations of the capitalist mode of 
production.  
 
The physical transformation of Paris had two aims: firstly, the destruction of the medieval 
city, and the potentially antagonistic history and social relations it embodied; secondly, to 
erect a fitting capital to the Imperial administration and its Enlightenment-inspired doctrine 
of Progress. The re-organisation of Paris through ‘the rental sorting of land to use’ (Marx) 
represented an attempt to eradicate the spectre of popular revolt (the proletariat) and to 
remove the monuments of previous social arrangements (the ancien regime), while 
announcing the political triumph of the bourgeois class. This displacement and forced 
relocation of both the working classes and the aristocrats of the Right Bank allowed the 
new public spaces of Haussmann’s Paris to emerge. These were characterised by a 
systematisation and abstract functionality in which the social relations of capitalism 
became determinant of spatial relations, through ‘a long-term management of urban space 
according to collectivist principles that were quite alien to the privatism of the traditional 
property owners’ (Prendergast, 1992: 171). Haussmann’s transformation of the spatial 
arrangements of Paris was, effectively, a manifestation of bourgeois fears and aspirations 
(Vidler, 1985) designed ‘to produce a coherent and stratified identity for modern Paris […] 
essentially a city without surprise’ (Prendergast 1992: 10). However, he actually achieved 
the opposite: Paris came to exemplify ‘the city as a place of increasing illegibility, in 
which “surprise” seemed to be the order of the day, and in which “identity,” psychic and 
social, would come to be perceived as uncertain and problematical’ (ibid).  
 
Imperial power, Enlightenment philosophy and the ‘logic’ of ‘capitalist accumulation’ 
(Harvey, 2001) had combined to produce in the ‘city of light’ a new, modern capitalist 
metropolitan space that was both a tourist destination and an inspiration to urban planners 
across the western world. The metropolitan spaces of London, New York, Philadelphia 
and, above all, Paris functioned as the site of intersecting social, economic, political and 
cultural networks or webs (Simmel) and the material manifestation of an expanded sphere 
of circulation and exchange (Marx, 1973; Harvey, 2001). The boulevards that swept 
through the city linking the financial district around the Bourse to the Assembly also ran 
between the Bois de Boulogne and Les Halles, circulating labour and commodities, power 
and pleasure just as blood circulated around the body. These boulevards ran to the new 
 151 
railway stations that stretched to the sea and the new steamships which transported the 
goods in the new global economy. This eradication of spatial constraints (national 
boundaries subsumed by Imperial conquest or rationalised by tariff or free-trade 
agreements, eaten up by the speed of steam, circumvented by the Suez canal, or 
vanquished by the telegraph) ensured that Paris, like the other Imperial cities of London, 
Vienna and, later, Berlin, lay at the heart of a global network of circulation and exchange 
which, in miniature, it replicated.  
 
The amalgam that was Haussmannisation, its conjunction of capitalism and metropolitan 
modernity, was founded upon the universalising of the principle of circulation: the 
mobilisation of subjects and objects, information and power and their interaction within the 
newly constructed spaces of Paris. Just as the longings of bourgeois hearts were expressed 
in the urban fabric of the city so, too, were the bourgeoisie themselves transformed by the 
processes that they had unleashed. The Third Republic and Second Empire forged new 
forms of ‘association’ – social, economic, political and cultural – which served as the tools 
that shaped life in the modern metropolis. Haussmann and Paris donated land while their 
commercial partners funded the construction work and, when necessary, credit facilities to 
the administration or its subsidiary commercial interests. This form of associated or 
finance capital paid for Haussmann’s army of workers, many of them dispossessed of their 
own homes by the work they undertook, equipped with pick-axe and plumb-line they 
participated in ‘an innovation born out of the particular structures of Empire and opposed 
to the traditional forms of land ownership and use’ (Harvey, 1985: 172). The operations of 
property speculators and joint-stock corporations temporalised modern space through its 
reformulation, as rents, mortgages and temporary investment.  
 
The best return upon investment came from the embourgeoisiement of previously run 
down areas, here new buildings or restored façades allowed increased rents to be charged, 
forcing out the working class in order to cater for the newly wealthy white-collar middle-
classes. The geography of modern Paris came to be dominated by this ‘rental sorting of 
land to uses’ as city centre locations, proximity to boulevards or rail stations, even 
department stores increased the value of space. The exodus of the working classes from the 
city centre was soon mirrored by that of industry, replaced by high-yield ventures such as 
stock-brokers, banks and finance houses. Paris became ‘a city in which the circulation of 
capital became the real imperial power’ (Harvey, 1985: 174). The commodity-form and the 
class which governed its production mingled upon the boulevards and in cafés, 
congregated in grands magasins and promenaded along the Bois du Boulogne, while the 
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poor, the artisans and the emerging urban proletariat were relocated to the outskirts of the 
city and ferried back into the centre by omnibus, metro or tram as required.  
 
This ‘unification of the world through monetization and commodity exchange’ (Harvey, 
1985: 178) threatened to reduce metropolitan existence to the socio-spatial relations of 
capitalist modernity. Haussmann had sought to make Paris a community founded upon 
spectacle, the money-economy, and new metropolitan spaces, in which the transiency of 
the collective was its defining character, and to focus economic activity around these new 
forms of sociation. Tourism, cafés, coaches, hotels all existed to service capital and labour 
in a similar, though distinct, manner to the banking and finance sector, resulting in the 
redefinition of concepts such as land, place and space. Anonymity, or ‘secrecy,’ ceased to 
be the preserve of the flâneur and became the defining quality of the boulevards, which in 
their embrace of transience demonstrated a ‘new anonymity of time,’ so that ‘in a very real 
sense nothing ever happens’  (Rice, 1988: 13). By overthrowing the socio-spatial 
arrangements of the previous era Haussmannisation removed land – as physical space – 
from its role in defining in psychological and social identity. ‘Land,’ as place, ceased to 
determine the geographical and social context of lived experience for the Parisian 
underclasses, the artisans or rentier, and for the aristocracy, to whom land had given not 
only their names and lineage, but also a physical connection to history. Place, as the 
materialisation of history and lived experience in artefacts, monuments and lived 
environment, was sundered from its historical origins and incorporated into the present of 
metropolitan modernity as space.  
 
Haussmannisation emptied ‘out the signs of history,’ and turned place into space 
(Prendergast, 1992: 179) by replacing the particular with the general, the specific with the 
abstract. The monuments, relics and living spaces of previous eras were demolished and 
the historical transience to which they were testimony was denied: the Left Bank 
aristocrats of the ancien regime, who had weathered the first Napoleon were now defeated 
by his nephew and his bourgeois supporters from the Right Bank. The physical 
manifestations of history as process, as a series of social relations subject to change, were 
torn down and replaced by monuments to the present and its political order. The origins 
and historical particularity of social ‘space’ was effaced, as the need for rational and 
systematic administration of the modern metropolis was made paramount. Whereas the 
aristocracy had previously derived their identity, title and wealth from the land 
Haussmannisation made speculation in ‘space’ the source of monetary wealth. The 
expansion of the sphere of circulation and exchange unleashed by Haussmannisation was 
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now characterised by the movement of people and things, money and information around 
the reconstructed Paris, and the cities that learned form its example. In cafés, on 
boulevards, at the opera or in the Jardins de Luxembourg the ‘community of the 
commodity’ (Prendergast, 1992) took shape. In the bureaucratically sanctioned, privately 
run spaces of the new ‘geometrique’ Paris the rational and edifying rule of the straight line 
and systematising vision of the world ruled, yet randomness remained, indeed, flourished – 
and while surprise did not lurk round every corner, as it had threatened to do in vieux 
Paris, uncertainty was everywhere. 
 
Unlike the riches derived from aristocratic estates or pre-industrial mercantile exchange, 
modern wealth was the result of speculation and commodity production. The mobility 
demanded by the realm of circulation means that metropolitan wealth ‘does not fix, root: 
in ceaseless circulation, it is not a “natural” extension of self, an index of belonging, an 
“indelible” trace of grounded being, what is “proper” to one in the sense of a “property” 
that is constitutive of identity and difference; rather - to speak in semiological terms - it is 
less an index than a sign, and like all signs, shadowed by the arbitrariness and instability 
that accompany a system of “representation” without secure foundations’ (Prendergast, 
1992: 180). The metropolis as the site of the circulation of such ‘wealth’ and the de-
materialisation it signifies becomes the terrain of ‘nomads’ (ibid: 182) and the site of a 
‘transcendental homelessness’ (Lukaçs). Identity is unhinged from the ‘land’ and from the 
social relations of ‘belonging’ it implies and, instead, is signified by the signs that adorn 
the metropolitan ‘consumer.’ The bourgeois project of identity production is here revealed 
as a socio-spatial practice that depended upon the extension of market relations to every 
aspect of human existence. Therefore, access to and the discriminating enjoyment of the 
contemporary manifestation of the commodity-form is the means by which the bourgeois 
individual reveals his or her taste and distinction.  
 
The Commodity Landscape 
Paris emerged as the site of metropolitan modernity in the wake of its transformation by 
Haussmannisation and the bourgeois revolution that this process embodied. This expansion 
of the sphere of circulation and exchange of the capitalist mode of production, and its 
transformation of ‘place’ or ‘land’ into a generic and abstract space, reveals the pre-history 
of the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption. The production of capitalist space within the 
confines of metropolitan modernity, as the realm of circulation, supports Simmel’s (1950: 
388) view of exchange, as the objectification of human interaction, the material 
embodiment of subjective values, such that ‘objective culture’ appears to possess a life of 
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its own. The capitalist commodity-form assumed the function of signifying values that 
were not born of the production process – as the medium for the, apparently, objective 
exchange of (inter-) subjective values, the contemporary commodity-form became a 
‘language’ (Simmel) or ‘rhetoric’ (Richards) utilised in contemporary socio-spatial 
practices. In the form of the department store, or grand magasin, the capitalist ‘logic of 
accumulation’ and its expansion of the sphere of circulation and exchange became an 
intensification of the market, brought about by the combination of monetarised social 
relations and the technologies of the industrial age.  
 
While the grands magasins of Paris seem to epitomise the process of modernisation and its 
embodiment of metropolitan modernity and the ‘spaces of consumption,’ their origins 
precede the Prefect of the Seine and the advent of the Second Empire. Crudely put, the 
department store, as a ‘social form’ (Lancaster, 1995), drew together the disparate 
elements of retail technology to be found in the emporia, bazaars, arcades and magasins 
des nouveautés of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. However, these truly 
modern spaces represented architectural innovation – from glass atria and display windows 
to the vast galleries of goods and electric lighting, escalators and lifts – and new 
possibilities for aesthetic effect bequeathed by these technological advances. Like the 
arcade before it, the department store was a form that would span Europe and expand to 
include the northern and eastern states of the fledgling United States during the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. In doing so, the department store, as a ‘space of consumption,’ 
contributed to the modernisation of the ‘public sphere’ (Habermas, 1979) in western 
Europe and north America. Its ’democratisation of luxury’ (Williams, 1982) ensured the 
objectification of human interaction through the expansion of capitalist exchange relations 
and, also, increased access to public space – and so metropolitan modernity in general – for 
the women of the middle class who, for the first time, could move around the city 
unchaperoned (Laermans, 1993; Ryan, 1994).  
 
The Modernisation of ‘Shopping’: the first department stores 
In 1824, Pierre Parissot opened La Belle Jardinière on the Quai aux Fleurs, near the 
Temple market in Paris, where he sold multiple pieces of ‘ready-made’ clothing in fixed 
sizes. In the absence of mechanized production techniques, he had instigated a rational 
subdivision of the cutting and preparation of cloth and adopted fixed, marked prices that 
lowered the costs of production in order to sell work wear to the lower classes, who did not 
demand the precise fit offered by tailored garments. This rationalization of the production 
of clothing was born of the requirement by the National Guard for a stockpile of ready-
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made uniforms classifiable by size (Perrot, 1994: 53).  By the mid-nineteenth century the 
demands made by increasing urban populations, state institutions, such as the national 
guard or a nascent civil service, created a mass market for such rationalised production 
operations, whether in France (Perrot, 1994, Benjamin, 1999) or in Britain (Richards, 
1991). Meanwhile, in Newcastle, in the north-east of England, the Grainger Market was 
completed by 1835.  This vast structure comprised four streets, which housed 243 retail 
units organized into alleys. Built as part of the redevelopment of central Newcastle it was 
Europe’s first planned city-centre development, pre-dating Haussmann’s Paris by twenty 
years (Lancaster, 1995: 8). The 1830’s witnessed the opening of Kendal Milne & Co.’s 
‘The Bazaar’ in Manchester with fixed prices, entrée libre and regular sales of remaindered 
stock sold from, by 1849, twenty-three departments.  
 
The department store was a modern edifice which could house the masses (Giedion, 1975; 
1995; Friedberg, 1993: 79-80), and was also a cultural phenomenon that represented ‘a 
monument to the bourgeois culture that built it, sustained it, marvelled at it, found its 
image in it’ (Miller, 1981: 3).  Within its walls the intermingling of production and 
‘consumption,’ labour and leisure, of the economic and the social took place on an 
unprecedented scale. This architectural expression of bourgeois modernity with its culture 
of the citizen-consumer as collector soon spread beyond Europe. In the United States of 
America the cities of the industrial north, especially the eastern seaboard, had, by the 
second half of the nineteenth century, seen drapers such as A.T. Stewart expand their 
business such that he was rumoured to be the richest man in New York.  By the 1860s 
Stewart’s success had been mirrored to some degree by John Wannamaker in Philadelphia, 
Filene in Boston, Potter Palmer in Chicago (which would become famous as Marshall 
Field’s), and Rowland Macy, also of New York (Lancaster, 1995). 
 
In Britain, France and America the department store’s emergence was linked to the 
‘consumer’ tastes of its largely white-collar, urban middle-class customers (Abelson, 1989; 
Lancaster, 1995; Miller, 1981).  Within this social group there existed significant 
variations in both income and propensity to spend on ‘consumer goods,’ dependent upon 
job security, class position and religious denomination.  Department store customers 
belonged largely to the white-collar class born of the expansion of administrative, 
commercial and professional services within an expanding capitalist economy (later 
studied by Kracauer, 1995) in which there was apparent an emerging tendency to utilise 
‘consumption goods’ as markers of social identity and class membership (what we would, 
today, term ‘consumerism’).  The role of the commodity in the construction, maintenance 
 156 
and erosion of social distance became central to the visual assertion of social and 
psychological identity (Laermans 1993: 80-2).  This became all the more important when 
the department stores began to differentiate their wares on the basis of the social strata 
from which they drew their customers. 
 
The architectural innovations of the department store revealed the supra-economic 
dimension to the socio-spatial practice of ‘shopping’ and the ‘consumption’ of which it 
was considered a part. As such, it confounded the orthodoxies of neo-classical political 
economy – the pursuit of marginal utility by the rational individual – and exposed the 
contradictions this discourse sought to reconcile – the pursuit of novelty rather than utility. 
Consequently, the ‘shopper’ or ‘consumer’ who inhabited the department store behaved 
irrationally in their disregard for the material construction, functional utility or ‘hedonic’ 
capacity offered by the goods sought, unless the desire for the particular item could be 
understood as the wish for difference, innovation and novelty of experience (nouveauté). 
The department store, therefore, promised the possibility of fulfilment for the bourgeois 
individual – by supplying the commodity (utility) necessary to complete their ego 
(identity) – while, simultaneously, dissolving this teleological project within a sublime 
array of alternative endings to the narrative project of selfhood. The desire, longing or 
nostalgia exhibited by the bourgeois individual, and epitomised in the figure of the 
collector, could no longer cathect with its object and the promise of completion, of totality, 
which this cathexis promised. Instead, the habitués of the department store found 
themselves among the ‘representations’ (Prendergast) and the ‘rhetoric of commodity-
culture’ (Richards, 1991).   
 
Duty & Distraction: Department Stores as Machines for Selling 
The nineteenth century was the age of the machine literally and metaphorically. Machine 
production revolutionized every aspect of life, including the retail experience for both 
shopper and shop assistant. Industrial production undermined the system of social relations 
that existed between artisan production and small-scale retail outlets leading to an 
increased rationalization of production, distribution and exchange. The extension of 
rational technology in the form of an increased division of labour altered the relationship 
between sales staff and the goods they sold. Staff could be paid fixed wages, hired and 
fired (as relatively unskilled and, therefore, plentiful labour) more frequently, and paid on a 
commission basis to induce greater sales. The specialisation inherent in the increased 
division of labour of the developing retail sector extended to the new field of window 
dressing and shop layout. The 1850s saw window dressing flourish in London and 
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‘dressers’ recognised as a distinct occupation, while the commercial utilisation of plate 
glass windows in Paris and the department stores of American cities after 1840 engendered 
a similar professionalisation of the practice (Adburgham, 1981: 96-8). This points to the 
increased importance of the visual presentation of the commodity form, of the display of 
individual commodities within particular settings and the production of these shopfloor 
settings as ‘spectacular’ or theatrical social spaces. The French grand magasin and the 
British and American department store symbolised the impact of industrial practices and 
machine production: both were metropolitan and primarily catered to the newly created 
urban middle-class white-collar bureaucratic and professional; both benefited from this 
increased customer base’s rise in income; the nascent global market fostered by 
innovations in transportation and refrigeration; the improvements in the industrial 
manufacturing process (Laermans, 1993: 80); as well as the emergent tendency to utilise 
‘consumption’ of goods to define social identity and class membership (‘consumerism’). 
 
The most telling description of these commercial operations is their description as 
‘machines for selling.’ Zola invokes the metaphor of the machine to describe such shops, 
he characterised his fictional department store, Au Bonheur des Dames, as ‘a machine 
working at high pressure, the impetus of which seemed to reach to the very displays 
themselves. They were no longer the cold shop windows of the morning; now they seemed 
to be warmed, and to be vibrating with the bustle inside’ (Zola, 1953: 21). This machine 
appeared capable of animating lifeless objects and arousing human passions, seeming to 
feed from the human movement it induced.  
 
[…] these passions of the street were giving life to the materials: the laces 
seemed to be shivering, then subsiding again […]; the very pieces of cloth, 
thick and square, were breathing, exuding a whiff of temptation, while the 
overcoats were drawing themselves up even more on the lay-figures, who 
themselves were acquiring souls, and the huge velvet coat was billowing 
out, supple and warm, as if on shoulders of flesh and blood, with heaving 
breast and quivering hips.  
- Ibid 
 
Life itself appears to extend to include the previously inanimate through a mechanics of 
exchange that governs the flow of a Newtonian ‘force’ (Ferguson, 1990; Seltzer, 1992): 
people and things, ‘consumers,’ commodities and employees were subordinated to rules of 
operation, laws and timetables that governed their movements. This motive force was not 
be understood in terms of subjective desire but as the operation of larger, social and 
‘statistical’ principles and adhered to a ‘meticulous division of labour, a super-imposition 
of several hierarchical levels of command, and a systematisation of the entire work process 
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[and] commitment to a production principle based on quantity and economy of costs and to 
a consumption principle based on self indulgence’ (Miller, 1981: 4).  
 
Infinity at hand: Department Stores & the sublime 
Architecturally the grands magasins were very imposing, externally and internally. Zola 
describes them ‘as an endless vista’ which could appear ‘gilded with light like a town, with 
its monuments, its squares, its streets,’ in which customers and even staff could lose 
themselves (1953: 10). Skeletons built of iron and glass allowed interiors to be hollowed 
out to reveal spaces composed of light and air, and so echo the boulevards of Haussmann’s 
Paris. Often the iron girders of the frame supported splendid façades, which announced the 
luxury which the shopper should expect to find within. New York’s A.T. Stewart’s 
‘Marble Dry Goods Palace’ opened in 1846 clad in specially imported Italian marble in 
order that it should attract its wealthy and fashionable clientele. Ferguson (1992: 29) 
identifies two distinctive aspects of the department store. Firstly, their ‘fundamental 
character’ is ‘sheer size: it is overwhelmingly extensive’ so that it ‘strove to represent itself 
as an entire world, self-sufficient and abundant. The consumer need go nowhere else, she 
(less often he) could wander aimlessly in an “Adam-less Eden” drawn from one part of the 
store to another by the spectacle of the commodity itself, by its endless variety and its 
infinite capacity to replenish itself.’ The department store here reveals its affinity with both 
the internal arrangement and architectural form of the world exhibitions, and the 
description of the Parisian arcades in an 1852 guidebook, which exhorted visitors to 
 
[think] of the arcades as interior boulevards, like those they open onto. 
These passages, a new discovery of industrial luxury, are glass-covered, 
marble-walled walkways through entire blocks of buildings, the owners of 
which have joined together to engage in such a venture. Lining both sides 
of these walkways which receive their light from above are the most 
elegant of commodity shops, so that such an arcade is a city, a world in 
miniature.  
- cited, Buck-Morss, 1993: 3. 
 
The second feature identified by Ferguson (1992: 29) was the techniques of display of the 
commodity-form and the consequent experience of the space by the ‘consumer.’ The 
windows were ‘larger, better lit and fuller of merchandise’ than the preceding magasins 
des nouveautés, and these windows demonstrated an ‘ “infinite variety of attractively 
displayed goods” that caught Freud’s eye during his first visit to Paris…’ (Ibid). 
Architecturally imposing and ‘overwhelmingly extensive’ in size and scale this ‘social 
form’ (Lancaster, 1995) bore the stamp of modernity in its hosting of an ‘infinite variety’ 
coupled to the sheer number of identical goods that mass production allowed. In the 
 159 
department store the sphere of circulation and exchange found physical expression, just as 
the expansion in ‘objective culture’ had found its expression in the halls of the world 
exhibitions (Benjamin, 1993; De Cauter, 1993) international trade fairs (Simmel) and the 
new public arena it constituted. 
 
The Ladies’ Delight 
Department stores as ‘public spaces’ were the arenas in which women moved most freely 
in the society of Second Empire France and Victorian Britain and the role these 
commercial spaces played in the transformation of the public perception of femininity and 
the female role in society cannot be underestimated (Nava, 1997; Showalter, 1998; 
Walkowitz, 1992; Wilson, 1985). However, the precise effects and the causes attributable 
are a matter of considerable debate. While Friedberg (1993) sees the department store as a 
vital component in the production of an urban, modern female subjectivity, which she 
terms the ‘flâneuse’ after the male flâneur, Wolff (1990) denies the possibility of such a 
subjective position arguing that the experience of ‘modernity’ is a definitively male 
experience. This debate complicates the possibility of a coherent and unified account of the 
experience of modernity as anything other than a gradual accumulation of fragmentary and 
partial accounts which detail the experiences of particular groups over a period of time.  To 
depart from the acceptance of the partial nature of historical truth would be to adopt a 
position that relied too heavily on a common-sense understanding of human action and, 
ultimately, to have recourse to notions of nature which are no more than class and gender 
bias rethought as ideology. 
 
The analysis of women and their role in the modern metropolis provided by Ryan (1994) 
builds upon Wolff’s thesis: that the explanation of modernity within social theory has been 
achieved at the expense of an account of the female experience.  This is due to the desire 
by the nineteenth century middle-class male to position his female kinfolk beyond the 
‘disordered’ public world in an ordered and circumscribed private realm.  It was ‘the 
assumption of the biologically constituted differences of the sexes’ that determined ‘the 
propriety of gender-differentiated behaviour, the necessity of the sexual division of labor 
and […] the regulation and control of the movement of women in the city’ (Ryan, 1994: 
44).  In large part, the respectability derived from the ‘invisibility’ of female members of 
the family was the means by which these women ensured the upkeep of their sexual 
reputation.  In France the distinction between the ‘fille publique’ (the woman of the streets) 
and the ‘femme honnette’ (the respectable married woman) bore directly on this question of 
visibility (Friedberg, 1993: 36). Although, for working-class women this problem did not 
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arise. The importance of working-class women’s income within the household necessitated 
that they inhabit a ‘niche in the emerging urban capitalist order’ by virtue of their 
relationship to the production process (Ryan, 1994: 55).  For Ross, the rendering of the 
department store by Zola demonstrates its ‘becoming the permissible public space for 
women’s social interchange, replacing in a sense both the church and salon’ (1991: xv).  
These are, of course, the spaces of social interaction through which specifically middle-
class women moved beyond the domestic realm, the working class were either invisible or 
irrelevant. The middle-class woman’s relationship with production only emerged in its 
final stage, as private or domestic ‘consumption.’ The department store was a machine for 
selling and it sold to Woman: here woman was a queen (Zola), and a devotee at a temple 
where she was ‘both goddess and worshipper,’ who sought distraction and found the 
commodity-form in all its new-found brilliance (Ross, 1991: xv). 
 
The omnipotence inferred by terms such as ‘queen’ and ‘goddess’ is simultaneously 
undermined by woman’s role as worshipper; this queen is addressed by objects rather than 
by subjects.  Women were seen as credulous creatures, manipulable by the cold-hearted 
men who owned and staffed these stores (Ross, 1991; Laermans, 1993).  Zola’s Mouret 
somewhat poetically attributed his immense success to ‘the exploitation of Woman.’ The 
weakness of women resembled that of children (Abelson, 1989: 151), without the rational 
carapace of masculinity their ‘weak flesh’ yielded to the desires deliberately cultivated by 
store owners and they found themselves overcome, enslaved by the ‘extravagances of 
fashion.’ The simple act of purchase became fraught with danger and the daily excursion to 
provision the home became a battle with temptation.  The origins of the tendency to 
temptation were, of course, biological.  Women’s menstruation and its effects, real or 
imagined, made their reason susceptible to bodily forces, such as biology and nature.  This 
in-built frailty, manifest as susceptibility to outside influence, could be clearly seen in 
operation in the department store.  The techniques of display and arrangement of 
commodities, the increasing aestheticisation of their design, the importance of the 
commodity-form in structuring the visual manifestation of social distance and difference 
would all play a part in the development in modern, wealthy women of the later nineteenth 
century of a mania for objects.  This passion for possession that swamped women’s reason 
ceased to be a crime and became a disease of the mind (Perrot, 1994; Saisselin, 1985) – 
physiological weakness manifested as psychological frailty.   
 
Woman’s ‘natural’ occupation, shopping as the provisioning of the home, assumed a 
pathological aspect.  As participation in the commodity economy became an increasingly 
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important marker of social status so it assumed ever greater prominence as an indicator of 
female accomplishment among the middle-classes. Skilful advertising campaigns 
announced the modern, progressive aspect of bought goods as against the traditional, 
homemade and apparently inferior alternative.  Values such as prudence and thrift gave 
way to extravagance as the department store prompted desires for all manner of goods, 
while beyond the store walls advertising campaigns in newspapers and periodicals, 
billboards and flyers conspired with the window displays which decorated the sides of city 
streets until virtually all public space was nothing more than a landscape of commodities 
(Abelson, 1989). The inhabitants of this landscape, female shoppers, with their all too 
delicate sensibilities began to exhibit some disturbing characteristics.  While it had always 
been accepted that the poor would steal out of a necessity that remained criminal and 
immoral, the rash of department store thefts during the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century was explicable only through recourse to a psychological and medical explanation 
of woman’s biology.  The frequency with which wealthy and otherwise respectable women 
were caught shoplifting (Abelson 1989, Perrot 1994) led to the evolution of ‘kleptomania’ 
as a medical condition in which a ‘distempered imagination’ caused people (women) to act 
in a manner they would otherwise refrain from.  Women as a consequence of their biology 
were assumed to have, at times, a weakened rationality and, as such, a diminished 
responsibility for their actions (Abelson, 1989: 180-5). 
 
At the heart of the commercial understanding of woman’s psychology lay a contradiction. 
Women as ‘good mothers’ and ‘good housekeepers’ had a responsibility to seek out quality 
goods at low prices, as ‘knowing consumers’; and yet, simultaneously, they were perceived 
as being susceptible to seduction either by men or by objects due to their impulsive natures 
– their actions being governed by emotion rather than reason. ‘Keen, cold-blooded males 
encouraged women to be what they were supposed to be, that is, “irrational,” “childlike” 
and “thoughtless” human beings’ (Laermans, 1993: 95-6). Ross (1991) discerns in Zola’s 
oeuvre the characterization of women as being overly susceptible to persuasion of one sort 
or another, and that this proclivity for unreflective action usually occurs en masse, whether 
in a department store or a crowd scene. Furthermore, in the writings of Gustave Le Bon 
and Gabriel Tarde these female crowds became potentially violent hordes fuelled by a 
desire that had escaped rational. This, says Felski (1995: 73), is the response of an 
autonomous and rational masculinity that felt itself to be under threat and which, as a 
result, sought to demonise that which it feared.  The crowd, then, as undifferentiated mass, 
as an entity capable of overcoming individuality of thought and action becomes antithetical 
to the autonomous, rational subject privileged by western thought. 
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Felski (1995: 77-80) goes on to argue, after Campbell (1987), that modern consumption is 
born of an ‘insatiable longing’ for ‘imaginary gratifications’ which, being imaginary, can 
never be satisfied merely transformed into repeated demands for novelty. The novelty does 
not reside in the tangible or physical properties of the particular commodity objects but 
with ‘the symbolic meanings and generalized aura of desirability with which the object-as-
commodity is invested’ (1995: 78).  Therefore, modernity as a desire-laden culture of 
objects threatens the discourse of rational and autonomous masculinity normally associated 
with artistic production that manifested itself as a disinterested appreciation, similar to 
Kantian aesthetics.  Instead, what emerges is a never-ending process of cathexis between 
subject and object, and this process is not capable of subordination to the will but, instead, 
appears superordinate – in this way mass culture threatens to make irrational and 
hysterical ‘consumers’ of us all, mass culture as a feminine culture (Huyssens, 1986). 
 
 
For Your Pleasure: Department Stores as Playgrounds for the Eye 
While purchase was the ostensible end of a shopping trip it was by no means its sole 
dimension: the department store invited the shopper to stroll, over several floors, through a 
landscape both composed of and populated by commodities, it ‘turned buying into a 
special and irresistible occasion. Dazzling and sensuous, the Bon Marché became a 
permanent fair, an institution, a fantasy world, a spectacle of extra-ordinary proportions, so 
that going to the store became an event and an adventure’ (Miller, 1981: 167).  ‘Shopping’ 
was understood to be as much a pleasurable leisure activity as it was the provisioning of a 
household: visual and tactile awareness was highlighted, surprise and novelty became 
essential structuring elements of the shopping experience (Wilson, 1985: 152). The layout 
of the stores themselves, not only their contents, changed frequently, items appeared in 
unexpected places, entire departments relocated overnight (mentioned by Zola’s Mouret 
and still practiced by Marks and Spencer’s).  Commodities had their use or ‘consumption’ 
staged using luxurious sets reminiscent of theatres, or ensembles of mannequins 
(Laermans, 1993: 91; Miller, 1981). 
 
While American stores sought to display goods in a European context, European stores 
played upon images of the exotic derived from nineteenth century notions of Orientalism 
and empire (Friedberg, 1993; Miller, 1981). However, it was just as likely that the displays 
of goods were designed so as to resemble nothing at all or, at least, nothing that was 
instantly recognizable as being of this Earth.  For Williams (1982: 71) this meant ‘anything 
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that expresses distance from the ordinary,’ while for Talmeyr (cited by Williams, ibid: 72), 
the grands magasins possessed the ‘unique merit, that nothing like them has been seen 
anywhere, that they resemble nothing!  They are absurd? […] This is also true!  But their 
quality is precisely to be absurd, in an order of ideas where it is logical to be so, and where 
the only absurdity as a result is to wish to be reasonable.’ The ‘department stores 
transformed merchandise into a permanent spectacle, into a show-like theatre of 
commodities’ (Laermans, 1993: 92) a tendency that continued into the twentieth century 
(Firat & Dholakia, 1998). 
 
Amidst the splendid décor the customer wandered through aisle upon aisle of desirable 
objects, carried along by the throng around them (rather than individual volition). When a 
respite was required, sustenance craved or a task arose that might necessitate leaving the 
store this, too, was catered for. Macy’s of New York provided writing tables and 
newspapers, and in 1879 opened a lunchroom, while Wannamaker’s in Philadelphia 
possessed its own art gallery, a refreshment bar, a post office and from 1892 onwards 
displayed paintings from the Parisian salons (Laermans, 1993).  In Chicago, Marshall 
Field’s store offered everything from glove cleaning to photographic portraiture and 
spectacle-grinding.  Parisian stores habitually stocked their writing rooms with the 
newspapers and periodicals of the day, notepaper, pens and ink used by the customers 
while their children were served grenadine by staff (Perrot, 1994: 61).  These ‘public 
services’ were another part of the department store’s arsenal aimed at denying the 
necessity of the outside world, the trumpeting of the store as the ‘universal provider’ as 
William Whitely of London had insisted (Lancaster, 1995: 21). 
 
In 1897 Baum founded Show Window, dedicated to in-store display and considered 
indispensable by Gordon Selfridge. Then, in 1900, he published The Art of Decorating 
Show Windows and Dry Goods Interiors (Leach, 1989: 109-110). The first two decades of 
the twentieth century saw the “trimmer” replaced by the “displayman”, and in-store display 
developed into a small department within the store’s operation that could employ up to 
fifty people.  The Americans were also first to introduce full-bodied mannequins, replete 
with heads, arms, hair and facial expressions, which could now assume ‘lifelike’ poses. 
This transformation in the representation of the then contemporary female form included 
the introduction of lifelike female mannequins into the new, larger shop windows, which 
broke with the tradition of ‘female statuary’ (Leach, 1989: 112-113). Women were now 
associated with individual luxury as often as they were with domestic chores, with 
participation in the new public space either as individuals or as representations produced 
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by new photographic techniques and deployed in advertising (Bowlby, 2002; Ewen, 1988; 
Friedberg, 1993). 
 
Why doesn’t the show window hold instead of a display – a play? A stage 
play. Where Mr Hat and Miss Glove are partners. The window a veritable 
peepshow stage. Let the street be your auditorium with its ever-changing 
audience. Has nobody tried to conceive plays for merchandise?  
– Frederick Kiesler, cited Krauss, 2003: 125  
 
Here the display of the commodity-form hints at the ‘sex appeal of the inorganic’ 
(Benjamin) but it is questionable whether the fusion of the animate with the inanimate – of 
actor and actant – ended at the store door. Instead, Kiesler, an ex-Bauhaus tutor, sought to 
apply the aesthetic techniques of the Expressionist avant garde to window displays. 
Minimal displays bathed in dramatic lighting effects bestowed upon commodities an 
importance and impact upon the imagination. The ultimate end of this process was to 
associate the goods displayed with other things and feelings, notably glamour, sensuality, 
luxury and stardom (Leach, 1989: 116). In the end display windows became the settings 
for fairy tales in which the commodity featured, visions of an alternative to the reality that 
the ‘consumer’ inhabited everyday, visions of an alternative the ‘consumer’ might 
somehow come to inhabit someday – a prospective ‘elsewhere’ and elsewhen’ (Friedberg, 
1993). Between 1895 and 1925 an American revolution in the ‘atmospherics’ of interiors 
took place. Goods were placed in ensembles, encouraging various purchases, the popular 
items along with the elevators and escalators were found at the back of the store or on the 
upper floors, necessitating the customer to move through the goods carefully arranged en 
route. The goods themselves were bathed in bright lights and backed by mirrors, even 
located within specially constructed interiors. The department stores themselves were 
under constant redecoration, often by classically trained artists well versed in the effects of 
colour.  Architects, such as the one time Austrian Secessionist Joseph Urban, applied their 
belief in the ameliorative powers of aesthetically designed spaces to the construction of 
commercial interiors (Leach, 1989: 119-23), while Kiesler’s assertion that ‘asymmetry is 
dynamic’ signalled an attempt to breathe life itself into the dead labour of commodities. 
 
In the absence of affordable transportation, the views of ‘elsewhere’ and ‘elsewhen’ 
offered by the department store interiors were, for many, the only opportunity to 
experience such sights (Friedberg, 1993). These ‘mythical worlds, each of equal value’ 
resembled the theatre and the movies in that ‘they saturated commodities and commodity 
environments with new meanings and excitements’ and, in so doing, ‘transported’ 
customers into spaces unlike anything they might inhabit in the course of the everyday 
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(Leach, 1989: 127). This emergent aesthetic eroded the dichotomies which for so long had 
structured American public life: ‘luxury and necessity, artificial and natural, night and day, 
male and female, the expression of desire and decoration produced a radiant sensual center 
at the heart of American cities, attracting thousands of people who were drawn not only to 
commodities but also to the sensual, fluid and radiant density of the center itself’ (Leach, 
1989: 132). 
 
Just as the size of the buildings and the opulence of the façades created an immediate 
impression, so, too, were the interiors calculated to the same effect. The wealth and luxury 
signalled by the architecture had to be instilled in every commodity offered for sale, no 
matter its size or price. This process began outwith the store itself, in the mind of the 
‘consumer.’ Metropolitan modernity in the nineteenth century was contemporaneous with 
the rise in the production of news-sheets, journals and periodicals and their appropriation 
by an expanding urban middle-class (Laermans, 1993; Richards, 1991). These publications 
were funded, in part, by the advertising of the expanding department stores, whose 
competition engendered innovations in the form, deploying ‘appealing catchwords, 
constantly repeated slogans, fictitious dialogues, unusual arrangements of type, zig-zag 
layouts etc’ (Richards, 1991). Adverts utilised innovations in chromolithography to make 
larger and more colourful posters, while postcards allowed attractive images of 
commodities to traverse the bureaucratic spaces of the postal network and travel far 
beyond their point of origin.  
 
The interiors of the department stores appeared to be a constantly re-formulated landscape 
of historical and cultural fragments, whether decorative or commodified, and confronted 
the ‘consumer’ as nouveauté. Here ‘dazzling decorations, architectural adornments, 
fairyland lighting and, first and foremost, a sophisticated display of mostly fashionable 
merchandise’ (Laermans, 1993: 91) ensured that the department store most closely 
resembled Aladdin’s cave. This fairy-tale space, removed from everyday experience, 
turned ‘shopping’ into an adventure (Simmel) within which the ‘consumer’ was immersed.  
 
Commodities are not arranged in a passive landscape upon which the 
discriminating searchlight of the ego might be turned to illuminate just 
those items best adapted to the “wants” of each particular customer. They 
constitute, rather, an active mass which overwhelms the ego, absorbs and 
transforms the observer, arousing in her completely new sensations.  
- Ferguson 1992: 30 
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This ‘active mass’ of goods and services acted directly upon the inhabitant(s) of such 
spaces and, through the manufacture of ‘new sensations,’ reveals the affective impact of 
objective culture upon subjective experience. The citizen-consumer and his or her 
connoisseurial pursuit of discrete objects and experiences, elements in the identity-building 
project of the bourgeois ego, could no longer impose the distance of desire between subject 
and object – upon which appraisal and valuation depended. Consequently, the bourgeois 
ego, as collector of objects and experiences, and the teleological project(ion) of self were 
interrupted as the phenomenal forms of subjective experience – space, time and causality – 
were modified or, more accurately, modernised.  
 
The department stores of the late nineteenth century gave spatial expression to the 
conjunction of the economic logic of capitalist accumulation and the aspirations of 
bourgeois culture and so engineered the communication of nouveauté through the medium 
of the commodity-form. However, in doing so, the relational ontology formed between 
environment and organism (Costall, 2004) transformed the relationship of ‘distance’ and 
qualitative distinction between subjective and objective culture. Rather than these 
‘cathedrals of commerce’ (Zola, 1953), and their  ‘dreamworlds’ (Williams, 1982) of mass 
culture being the highpoint of bourgeois culture and its project of the self, the department 
store was, instead, its high-water mark, after which this ‘world view’ would unravel and 
fragment. The metropolitan department store, as a ‘social form’ of late nineteenth century 
modernity, represented a coalescence of routines, regimes, representations and spatial 
practices: within these edifices shaped from iron and glass and pulsing with the power of 
electricity commodities acquired an aesthetic and affective dimension that they had 
previously lacked. The massive capital investment in buildings, labour, technique and 
technological innovation was directed towards the promotion of the immaterial aspect of 
the commodity-form and its insinuation into the life project of individuals and the 
phenomenal forms of subjective experience.  
 
The (Spatial) Construction of Social Meaning 
 
A phantasmagoria of politics had its source in the world expositions no less 
than a phantasmagoria of merchandise, wherein industry and technology 
were presented as mythic powers capable of producing out of themselves a 
future world of peace, class harmony and abundance. The message of the 
world exhibitions as fairylands was the promise of social progress for the 
masses without revolution.  
– Buck-Morss, 1993: 86. 
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The ‘promise of social progress’ was the realisation of the bourgeois world view in the 
forms of the built environment, whether as department store or metropolis. Within such 
spatial environments the confluence of ‘scopic regimes’ and representational practices 
forged within the arcades, department stores or boulevards were intended as the basis of 
new social arrangements. These, however, were not purely commercial in origin: the re-
presentation of the objective world offered by the panorama, the ‘collections’ of museums 
and the narration of ‘progress’ by the World Exhibitions also conspired to teach the leçon 
de choses and the new relationship between subjective and objective culture that this 
‘lesson’ signalled and sustained. In the public spaces of metropolitan modernity – 
epitomised by Paris after Haussmann – the traces of ‘historical experience,’ accumulated 
over centuries, had been swept away: the physical evidence of previous societal formations 
were dismantled, removed and replaced by monuments to the present and its political 
organisation, the emblem of which was the circulation of goods and people, information 
and money. Here the phantasmagoria of the bourgeois imagination were made material; in 
the panoramas of the late eighteenth century (Crary, 1995; Friedberg, 1993; Sternberger, 
1977), the world exhibitions that swept Europe and North America after 1851 (Benjamin, 
1999; Buck-Morss, 1993; Giedion, 1995) and the department stores of every major city in 
Europe and North America social relations assumed the form of representations. 
 
Phantasmagorias, panoramas, dioramas – devices that concealed their 
machinery – were dependent on the relative immobility of their spectators, 
who enjoyed the illusion of the presence of virtual figures. These 
apparatuses produced an illusion of unmediated referentiality.  
– Friedberg, 1993: 23 
 
Unlike the arcades or department stores, such technologies relied upon a static observer 
and facilitated a belief in the ‘unmediated referentiality’ between the world and its 
representation. However, the history of the ‘spaces of consumption’ is testimony to the 
increased mobilisation of the bourgeois ‘consumer’ and the emergence of a series of socio-
spatial practices centred upon bodily immersion in purpose-built environments. These 
environments, from arcade to department store and shopping mall, emphasised the role of 
re-presentation: that is, the increasingly mediated referentiality of world and representation 
as the result of an increased abstraction of experience. This re-negotiation of the relation 
between subjective and objective culture pioneered within the commercial and leisure 
spaces of late nineteenth century metropolitan modernity was, in fact, everywhere, albeit to 
varying degrees. Indeed, Crary (1995) sees a historically novel ‘perceptual paradigm’ 
emerge, rooted in discontinuity and available to experience through a ‘physiological 
optics’ and ‘subjectivity of vision,’ which distinguished the nineteenth century re-
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presentation of ‘reality’ from its seventeenth and eighteenth century predecessors (i.e., the 
stasis of the camera obscura). Likewise, Friedberg’s (1993) discussion of the historical 
development of the ‘mobilized’ and ‘virtualized’ gaze – a form of ‘imaginary flânerie’ – in 
which the body ‘is a fiction, a site for departure and return,’ emphasises the immersive 
experience of spectatorship.  
 
The Spaces of (Re-)Presentation 
The re-presentation of the world – as representation – through the arrangement of the 
‘fragments’ of objective culture, particularly the ‘world of goods,’ no longer signalled the 
totality of the ‘collection’ (Stewart, 1998). Instead, where the staging of history had 
previously sought to portray an underlying narrative – progress – the representation of 
nineteenth century culture was now characterised by variety, difference and novelty. The 
bodily immersion in the ‘imaginary flânerie’ of a ‘mobilized’ and ‘virtualized’ subjectivity 
(Friedberg, 1993) and its ‘physiological optics’ (Crary, 1995) meant that the individual 
experience of metropolitan modernity became a very public affair, further complicating the 
relationship distinction between intérieur and extérieur (Frisby, 1988). The technologies of 
representation made available by industrial capitalism as part of a series of socio-spatial 
practices further transformed the phenomenal forms of subjective experience through the 
increasing abstraction of the category of value. The mediation of the relationship between 
subjective and objective culture through the representations that constituted the ‘rhetoric 
of commodity-culture’ (Richards, 1991) forged a ‘beachhead’ upon the ‘terrain of the self’ 
(ibid) by utilising the ‘representational value’ (Buck-Morss, 1993) of the commodity-form.  
 
The ‘spaces of consumption’ of nineteenth century modernity, commercial interiors and 
public spaces, reveal the coalescence of certain traits that coloured subjective experience 
through their organisation of objective culture. The stress upon the visual form and 
arrangement of goods, of their display in shop windows and use in personal adornment and 
their ‘metonymic’ endowment with certain meaningful but immaterial qualities all served 
to highlight the ‘representational’ quality of the commodity-form. Likewise, the 
deployment of these artfully engineered strategies by ‘users’ or ‘consumers’ in the service 
of a consumerist project of identity served to disseminate these across social strata. 
However, the ‘constructions’ attempted occurred within a specific socio-historic context – 
that of the political triumph of the bourgeoisie and the economic ascendancy of its 
industrial and financial elements. The ‘spaces of consumption’ became arenas for the 
display of political and economic power translated into a ‘narrative’ effect: the story of 
progress and the rise of ‘civilisation’ (Elias). Within these spaces the temporal flow was 
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reconstituted, no longer did the past flow through the present toward the future in an 
uncomplicated fashion. Instead, the empty and ‘timeless’ conception of space derived from 
Newtonian mechanics was de-formed into the dynamic field of ‘space-time’ (De Cauter, 
1993; Ferguson, 1990; Kern, 1984) as described by quantum physics: the ‘terrain’ of 
modern consumption. 
 
Space as the ‘vessel of people and things (and their organisation) was ‘de-formed’ into 
terrain, an ‘active mass’ (Ferguson, 1992) constituted from its components.  Upon this 
‘terrain’ the ontological relationship between subjective and objective culture, between 
organism and environment, departed from the model of Cartesian dualism, epitomised by 
the ‘collector’ who ‘narrates’ the order of the word (in miniature) through the collection. 
Newtonian space had been the backdrop for the events of the panorama, Enlightenment 
curiosity cabinets and shops that were browsed by shoppers – in short, the locus the for 
dis-interested contemplation that Kant assigns to aesthetic experience, particularly that of 
the beautiful. Upon the terrain of modern consumption, however, the subject no longer 
surveys a panoramic landscape composed of discrete objects conjoined for aesthetic effect. 
Instead, the observing subject is, itself, an active ‘ingredient’ in this intoxicating mix (as 
can be seen from Abelson’s (1989) account of female thievery). Space ceased to be a 
neutral and affect-less phenomenon that simply provided the location for events. Rather, 
‘space’ became a component of a relational terrain that emerged from the interplay of 
(inter)subjective and objective culture and the possible relational ‘affordances’ (Costall, 
2004) that arise within the ontological relationship between organism and environment. 
 
From Space to Terrain 
The ‘spaces of consumption’ had been Newtonian, organised around a rational subject 
empirically observing and evaluating their contents – born of the same philosophical 
anthropology as homo œconomicus – in accordance with the panoramic ‘landscape’ of the 
bourgeois world view and the ‘consumerism’ it implied. However, the commercial 
refinement of techniques aimed at enhancing aesthetic experience of the commodity-form, 
its affect, meant that the subject – the putative ‘consumer’ – could no longer stand apart 
from and observe the ‘spaces’ they inhabited. ‘Lived experience’ (Minkowski, 1970), as 
the phenomenal forms of subjective experience, was now demonstrably inseparable from 
the material factors that constituted its apparent ‘context.’ For the ‘spaces of consumption’ 
this meant that the here-and-now of everyday experience and its juxtaposition to the 
‘elsewhere’ and ‘elsewhen’ (Friedberg) promised by the department store could no longer 
be conceived of as an ‘either/or’ proposition. On the contrary, this was now a relational 
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‘narrative’ of departure and return. The ‘beachhead’ upon the ‘terrain of the self’ forged by 
the ‘rhetoric of commodity-culture’ (Richards, 1991) can now be viewed as evidence of 
the demise of the bourgeois world view and its conception of the’ alienated’ subject, 
qualitatively apart from the world around it. 
 
Instead, the ‘rhetoric’ produced by the commercial culture of late nineteenth century 
metropolitan modernity must be seen as part of the relational interweaving of people and 
things, experiences and practices, that constituted the terrain of modern consumption. Here 
the ‘space-time’ of subjectivity is born of the physiological immersion within the ‘active’ 
(Ferguson) socio-spatial environment of metropolitan modernity and its stress upon 
affective intensity. Consequently, the terrain of modern consumption – as a socio-spatial 
phenomenon – is both the historical outcome of the logic of capitalist accumulation (from 
arcade to department store, shopping mall and internet) and a relational experience born of 
the meaningful ‘affordances’ that exist between subjective and objective culture, between 
organism and environment. This terrain, therefore, constantly re-inscribes the sociological 
experience of the boundary, and the subjective relation of distance and differentiation. 
This ‘quite unique interaction, in which what is significant is the interactions woven on 
either side of the boundary’ (Frisby, 1992: 105), stresses the particular (and contingent) 
organization of ‘space-time’: that is, its contents, or ‘affordances.’  
 
The boundary should no longer be considered a purely spatial phenomenon, rather it is a 
‘space-time’ event that is defined by the forms of sociation it contains, and is possessed of 
both a material and an immaterial component that are experienced as a subjectively 
affective phenomenon. The affective terrain of modern consumption is the continuous (re-
)generation of the ‘boundary experience’ within the context of metropolitan modernity, 
where a ‘continuous and un-definable overcoming’ and ‘radical uprooting’ of the 
metropolis occurs, leading to an ‘uprooting from the place (as a place of dwelling) 
connected to dwelling’ (Cacciari, 1993: 199).  
 
It is as though the city were transformed into a chance of the road, a 
context of routes, a labyrinth without center, an absurd labyrinth. […] the 
uprooting significance of this explosive radiating of the city. […] the 
Metropolis appears as the great metaphor of the calculating intellect devoid 
of all ends, whose Nervenleben (life of the nerves) is immersed in the 
succession of equi-valent cases. The architecture ‘without qualities’ of the 
Metropolis – a conscious image of fulfilled nihilism – excludes the 
characteristic of the place; in its project, every place is equi-valent in 
universal circulation, in exchange. Space and time are a-rithmetically 
measurable, detachable, and reconstructible.  
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– Cacciari, 1993: 200 
 
The historical transformation of the built environment has resulted in the modern 
metropolis being considered as the site of the experience of alienation and ‘transcendental 
homelessness’ (Lukaçs), defined against a bourgeois conception of an ‘authentic’ or 
‘concrete’ historical experience (Erfahrung) accumulated as tradition. 
 
The boulevards, parks, triumphal arches, department stores and winter gardens of 
Haussmann’s Paris, which set the pattern for modern metropolitan ‘space,’ were purchased 
at the expense of a historically constituted place born of tradition. In these arenas dedicated 
to the ‘community of the commodity’ (Prendergast) the empty and uniform ‘Newtonian’ 
space was filled with new forms of bourgeois interaction. Modern forms of administration 
(Weber), financial association (Harvey, 1985; 1989) and disciplinary control of the 
populace (Foucault, 1995; Seltzer, 1992) emerged to animate these lifeless ‘geometrique’ 
spaces (Baudrillard, 1989; De Cauter, 1993; Ferguson, 1990). In denying historical 
contiguity the nascent industrial bourgeoisie sought to monumentalise their political and 
economic ascendancy: in spaces emptied of the signs of historical process (place) this class 
prophesied the end of the teleological pursuit of identity, individual and societal. Within 
these ‘spaces of consumption’ would be found the objects required for the realisation of 
the bourgeois subject; the individual ego refined through the exercise of discriminating 
taste. In denying both tradition and revolution these spaces appeared to Benjamin to signal 
‘(t)ransiency without progress, a relentless pursuit of “novelty”,’ not ‘progress’ but its 
‘direct counter-part,’ – ‘Modernity,  the time of Hell’ (Benjamin, 1999; Buck-Morss, 1993; 
Frisby, 1992: 181). 
 
The conjunction of metropolitan modernity and the capitalist ‘logic’ of accumulation that 
led to the terrain of modern consumption signalled the end of the bourgeois world view, its 
faith in progress and the pursuit of happiness through the rational and utilitarian 
calculations of homo œconomicus. Just as the spatial distinction between extérieur and 
intérieur disappeared with the ‘spaces of consumption’ so, too, did the ontological 
distinction between subject and object – and with it went the secret interior ‘space’ of the 
psychological individual to be discerned in the exterior arrangement of tasteful 
commodities. The ‘lesson of things,’ first gleaned in the arrangements of objects in 
nineteenth century exhibitions and ‘dreamworlds’ have become an intrinsic part of the 
contemporary commodity-form, the ‘rhetoric’ and representational value of any 
commodity-object is now part of the mass media ‘terrain’ of modern consumption. The 
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‘spaces of consumption’ had threatened to become rooms without roofs, but the terrain of 
modern consumption has surrendered its walls (and with them the bridges and doors 
discussed by Simmel) in favour of the fluctuating form of the boundary.  
 
The Subjective Space of ‘Consumerism’ 
In the ‘spaces of consumption’ the autonomous subject of bourgeois philosophy had been 
schooled in the socio-spatial practices of ‘consumerism,’ the doctrine of progress and had 
sought ‘the pleasures of mastery over an artificially constructed world, the pleasure of an 
immersion in a world not present’ Friedberg (1993: 28); a world composed of possibilities 
in accordance with the will. Both space and time were organised around bourgeois desire 
as a ‘distance’ to be overcome, either by the money-form (Simmel, 1990) or scientific 
rationality (Ferguson, 1990), the media for the realisation of a ‘longed for’ (Stewart, 1998) 
identity, or totality. The role of the arcade, the department store, and the shopping mall or 
internet store was the annihilation of spatial distance through its temporalisation (Marx) in 
accordance with the capitalist logic of accumulation (Harvey, 2001). However, this is still 
to consider contemporary modernity within the conceptual framework of the ‘bourgeois 
world view’ and its associated terminology of ‘consumer,’ ‘consumerism’ and 
‘consumption’ as the means to realise the project of identity (ego). To do so would be to 
forego the opportunity to re-evaluate the role of the human being, the phenomenal forms of 
subjective life and the ontological framework. 
 
Upon the terrain of modern consumption at the heart of metropolitan modernity, however, 
the autonomous subject-as-consumer ceased to exercise dominion over the world of 
objects. Instead, in the ‘quasi-linguistic’ ‘rhetoric of commodity culture’ (Richards, 1991) 
such a conception of the subject had found its dissolution, as it failed to provide an 
Archimedean point from which to survey the objective world (history). In modern 
consumption the subject is obliged to assume relational form, as a locus for the 
coalescence of various ‘informational’ flows (see Dodd, 1994; Massumi, 1993; 2003) 
rather than Newtonian exchanges of ‘force.’ Consequently, the bourgeois project of 
identity, which underpins ‘consumerism,’ is antagonistic to the experience of the terrain of 
modern consumption. It is the technologies and practices of aesthetic affect, pioneered in 
the ‘spaces of consumption,’ which ultimately gave rise to such a terrain: ‘la leçon de 
choses’ had promulgated a stress upon appearance and the visible form of objects as the 
basis for the communication of ‘novel experience’ (nouveauté) through its embodiment in 
the commodity-form.  
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The structures that had housed this historical process had emerged alongside the discourse 
of ‘shopping,’ home to the socio-spatial practices that supported the bourgeois project(ion) 
of self and the pursuit of identity through the discriminating exercise of taste and 
distinction (‘lifestyle’). Here the bourgeois ego is its own cause, generating the ‘self’ 
through the appropriation and manipulation of commodity-objects on the basis of their 
semiotic content (meaning). The ‘theological problem’ of the commodity-form, its 
embodiment of the metaphysical category of ‘value,’ tackled in the world exhibitions 
(Richards, 1991) highlights the ‘representational value’ (Buck-Morss) of the commodity-
form in the negotiation of such an identity project. The construction of the ego through the 
management of the world of goods and services is taken up by Seltzer (1992) in his 
discussion of the literary re-presentation of subjectivity, and the stylistic shift from shift 
from Realism to Naturalism. The ‘possessive individualism’ of the bourgeois self, born of 
‘market culture,’ was focused upon the project(ion) of the ego through the artefacts of 
‘consumer culture.’ The ego ‘managed’ the externalised re-presentation of ‘self’ by 
utilising the world of goods found in the new commercial spaces of metropolitan 
modernity.  
 
The conversion of the masses into human beings (the mass production of 
individuals in mass culture) here links the desire for personhood with the 
demand for consumption and the demand for consumption with the 
demand for culture itself.  
– Seltzer, 1992: 129 
 
Realism depicted this attempt at ‘self-resemblance’ through a display of subjective 
autonomy revealed by the appropriation and management of the objective world. This 
described the management of the ‘interface of vision and embodiment figured as a violent 
exchange […] between the body and the machine’ (1992: 106) and a ‘making conspicuous 
of the body’ through the material modification of the ‘consumer body-in-the-abstract’ 
(1992: 63)  
 
Seltzer’s analysis of American Naturalist fiction discerns the replacement of an 
individualist ‘consumerism’ by a Foucauldian ‘disciplinary practice’ and the depiction of a 
culture in which events, actions and persons are reduced to ‘sheer physicality or 
materiality,’ while ‘bodies, individuals and the “natural” itself’ are abstracted into 
statistical or diagrammatic representation. This ‘dematerialized materialism’ or, after 
Stephen Crane, ‘transcendental Realism’ (1992: 14) describes the dissolution of the self-
generating ‘possessive individualism [of] market culture’ and the emergence of 
‘dividualism’: the comprehension of the body as the spatialised site of a series of ‘paths 
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and crossings’ or ‘relays’ between subjective and objective culture – a point of interchange 
rather than the ur-sprang of the autonomous individual.  Consequently, the soi-distant or 
secret psychic place (rather than space) of the ego disappeared within the ‘disciplinary 
individualism’ of ‘machine culture’ and its discursive formulation of an equivalence 
between person and personnation. The disciplinary individual inhabits ‘a double process of 
abstraction and embodiment’ that sees the body become the locus for a ‘field of practices’ 
best understood through ‘case histories of bodies, sexualities and populations’ (1992: 43). 
Instead of the Realist ‘prosthetic’ extension of the subjective will, through the 
appropriation of the ‘world of goods,’ the Naturalist position reveals the ‘intimate 
correlation,’ the ‘miscegenation’ of body and machine. This combination of subjective and 
objective culture saw the leçon de choses incorporated within the ‘disciplinary practices’ 
of modern subjectivity and captured in the representations of Naturalist fiction. This 
effacement of the distinction between interior and exterior, echoed the transformation of 
‘public’ space, particularly the ‘spaces of consumption,’ made material by Haussmann.  
 
The marriage of the capitalist ‘logic of accumulation’ (Harvey) and bourgeois 
‘enlightenment’ philosophy was expressed in the transformation of the built environment 
that underpinned the emergence of modern metropolitan space. Here the commercial 
refinement of strategies for emphasising the aesthetic impact of the commodity-form 
(representational value) at the expense of a denotative functional utility came to resemble a 
process of formal and visual evolution. However, the economic imperatives that fuelled 
this ‘evolution’ should not be disregarded; in the apparent naturalisation of ‘consumer 
society’ a historical transformation began, the consequences of which are still being 
experienced today. The historically novel relationship between subjective and objective 
culture heralded by the advent of metropolitan modernity ensured the demise of the 
‘bourgeois world view’ (Ferguson) and its theory of the psychological individual. The 
‘lived experience’ (Minkowski) of metropolitan modernity and its associated ontological 
framework necessitates a sociological engagement with the phenomenal forms of 




Today’s conjunction of metropolitan modernity and the contemporary capitalist mode of 
production appears far removed from the arcades, department stores and world exhibitions 
of the nineteenth century, and equally distant from the re-organisation of Paris orchestrated 
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by Haussmann and Louis Napoleon in conjunction with the financial and industrial 
factions of the bourgeoisie. In a world where city streets possess ‘Global’ video stores, 
twenty-four hour shops and ‘metro’ supermarkets the ubiquity and easy attainability of the 
commodity-form seems to make the ‘spaces of consumption,’ described above, appear 
anachronistic, even fantastic. As commodification has coloured ever-more aspects of 
everyday existence the pursuit of particular commodities in specialised locations threatens 
to become ludicrous, unless it occurs in the vast clearing-houses of Ikea, Wal-Mart, 
Amazon or E-Bay. In an era of catalogue shopping, telephone banking and keyboard clicks 
the ‘spaces of consumption’ seem to be everywhere and everywhen while offering 
everything imaginable, their previous exotic allure rendered blasé by ubiquity. The 
vanquishing of ‘distance’ performed by the arcades, department stores and exhibitions – in 
tandem with a logic of capitalist accumulation that sought the ‘annihilation of space 
through time’ (Marx) – on behalf of their patrons is now a mere fact of existence with, for 
instance, cuisines of innumerable cultures available to your door. 
 
Today much is made of ‘consumer choice,’ the range of goods, services and experiences 
available to the moneyed classes, and yet more is made of the ever-more unlikely, 
increasingly novel and straight-forwardly improbable forms that such ‘consumer’ choices 
assume. Mail order brides, antiquarian relics and virtual components for on-line gaming 
experiences vie with trips to Disneyland to consort with over-sized cartoon characters, 
‘romantic’ getaways to African safaris or the soon-to-be-available ‘space tourism’ reached 
from the north of Scotland as potential purchases in a world where the fantastic threatens 
to become prosaic. In contemporary culture the existence of virtually any commodified 
object, service or experience is not in doubt, only access to it remains to be negotiated, 
whether temporally, spatially or financially. The sphere of circulation and exchange 
discussed by political economy has become a debate about distribution and the means by 
which customers and commodities are conjoined. In a world of ‘consumers’ and their 
rights access to the commodity-form threatens to become the precondition of a whole and 
healthy existence, a belief that contemporary capitalist organisations are in no hurry to 
challenge. The twentieth century’s contribution to the history of the ‘spaces of 
consumption’ was the shopping mall, which sought to gather an array of prospective 
‘consumers’ under one roof through a marriage of economic acumen, cheaper prices and 
greater choice, and bourgeois nostalgia for the high-street of yesteryear.  
 
For the twentieth century the final transformation from the ‘spaces of consumption’ into 
the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption occurred with the proliferation of the shopping mall. 
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In the twenty-first century the omni-presence of what Gronow & Warde term ‘ordinary 
consumption’ has helped to focus attention upon the fleeting and experiential practices 
more often associated with tourism. Recent discussions of contemporary ‘consumption’ 
practices have highlighted the un-real aspects of ‘consumer’ behaviour and its motivations. 
‘Consumption’ is now discussed as comprising its ‘ordinary’ component – dealt with at 
Boots, the local Spar or car boot sale – and an altogether more exotic element, which 
involves visits to heritage sites, murder-mystery weekends (Rojek, 1993), ‘fantasy city’ 
tourism or visiting an ‘urban entertainment destination’ (Hannigan, 1998). They move 
forward in time to the shopping malls of today (Bauman, 1992; Ferguson, 1992; Lehtonen 
& Maenpaa, 1997; Shields, 1991; 1992) to the ‘non-spaces’ of  ‘supermodernity’ (Augé, 
1999) and the postmodern playgrounds of Disneyworld and Las Vegas (Gottdiener, 1997; 
Ritzer, 2001), beyond physical space itself into the virtual terrain of cyberculture (Luke, 
1999; Sassen, 1999). 
  
The Shopping Mall, Fantasy Cities and other Non-Spaces 
The shopping malls of the second half of the twentieth century were, coincidentally, 
interior extérieurs and did possess roofs. Just like the arcades of two hundred years before 
these were privately owned spaces and seemingly open to all who wished to walk down 
their wide aisles, but as with the passages some visitors were more welcome than others. 
The ‘disciplinary’ control of bodies in public spaces was nothing new (Foucault, 1995; 
Seltzer, 1992; 2002) but the emergence of ‘the mall’ as ‘the quintessential postmodern 
play-space’ Slater (1997: 192) required the rationalisation of labour and services, 
concentrations of capital and public/private partnerships that far exceeded those of 
Haussmann’s municipal programme. It took post-Fordism, the restructuring of the global 
economy, in conjunction with a larger ‘postmodern transformation’ of the city, shifting the 
emphasis from industrial production to service and entertainment based consumption, to 
usher in the era of the malls (Slater, 1997: 202). In their origin malls were an American 
phenomenon, beginning in Southdale, Arizona in 1954 and developing throughout the 
latter half of the twentieth century. Judt (1998: 317-26) sees the changing retail 
environment of Europe and the U. S. as resulting from a re-negotiation of the relationship 
between the city centre and its suburbs and governed by patterns of car ownership. The 
greater mobility offered by the automobile had to be traded against traffic jams and the 
search for parking, never mind the spectatorial pleasures discussed by Friedberg (1993). 
Malls set out to lure customers prepared to ‘browse’ rather than simply shop, enticing them 
with the ‘perfect’ range of shops under one roof that the gradual accumulation of 
‘mainstreet’ could not match (Judt, 1998: 333-6). 
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Shopping malls, importantly, cater to more than shoppers and house a variety of socio-
spatial practices, which, although they may have their roots in the flâneur strolling through 
the arcade, have evolved into contemporary forms of behaviour and become the object of 
academic study. The ‘time-geography’ outlined in the previous chapter stresses the varying 
modes or forms of interaction between subjects and objects (Jackson & Thrift, 1995: 214-
5) and the socio-economic surroundings within which interaction occurs. This has led 
studies of ‘consumption,’ especially those of Shields (1992), to focus on the socio-spatial 
context and their further relation to economic and historical forces in the formation of the 
socio-spatial practices of ‘consumers.’ As a result the relationship between time and space, 
of movement, understood as the speed at which sociation occurs emerges as a determinate 
element in the forms of social interaction. Jackson & Thrift characterise such forms of 
interaction as involving ‘co-presence,’ yet which are not ‘intimate’ and which, 
consequently, possess the character of ‘the encounter rather than the planned meeting’ 
(1995: 215, emphasis added). The ‘profoundly ecological’ nature of time-geography is 
aimed at registering the ‘momentary thereness’ of ‘interrelated presences and absences’ 
(Hagerstrand). Equally, Falk & Campbell (1997) draw upon De Certeau’s (1984) concept 
of ‘walking rhetorics’ to engage with the socio-spatial practices associated with 
contemporary consumption, particularly shopping (1997: 9), such forms of participation 
implying a link with the visual habits of the flâneur. As an interior extérieur the shopping 
mall, as a social form, abrogates a variety of socio-spatial practices that might otherwise 
exist beyond it, on the street or in the city centre (Falk & Campbell, 1997: 10). 
 
Alongside the shopping mall other social spaces of the sphere of circulation and exchange 
of capitalist modernity were developing. The post-Fordist restructuring of the global 
economy (Harvey, 1989) combined with a ‘postmodern urban condition’ (Dear, 2000) to 
facilitate the emergence of the ‘fantasy city’ (Hannigan, 1998), reached through the ‘non-
place’ of supermodernity, the airport (Augé, 1999). These new modern metropolitan 
locations, New York, Las Vegas, Los Angeles or London, were the destinations of choice 
for up-market tourists indulging in short ‘city-break’ excursions hoping to soak up the 
atmosphere of an exotic location in a few days without the disruption caused by a 
prolonged absence of the creature comforts that city-living bestowed. And, in order to 
reach these locations the ‘postmodern’ tourist was obliged to tarry a while in the non-place 
of the international airport having travelled hundreds, possibly thousands, of miles to 
occupy a structure more or less exactly like the one just vacated. These portals between 
‘elsewheres’ and ‘elsewhens’ are the result of the same systematising and rationality as the 
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department store and the shopping mall, and are identical to the rational framework that 
underpins the irrational and spectacular appearance of the ‘themed environment’ 
(Gottdiener, 1997) or the ‘new means of consumption’ (Ritzer, 2001). These elaborately 
constructed aestheticised spaces, epitomised by ‘lifestyle’ stores such as NikeTown, 
employ the ‘principle of the phantasmagoria’ to overwhelm the occupants of the sites and 
spaces of modern consumption (Leach, 1999: 44). Spectacle exists to compensate for the 
alienation and boredom endured in work, consumption and production are, as Marx 
asserted, moments in the same totality, as a result: 
 
… distraction as a form of leisure-time entertainment becomes the 
complement of a working day filled with meaningless repetition. […] 
Distraction becomes a form of business.  
– Leach, 1999: 77 
 
Leach here echoes Simmel’s (1997) Infelices Possidentes (Unhappy Dwellers), those 
metropolitans seduced through the eye by the city’s splendour and sensual distraction into 
a state of being in which life has ‘become terrible, fearful and tragic’ and ‘recreation and 
play [are] become satyr-like, orgiastic and sensually intoxicated’ (ibid: 260). From the 
earliest arcades through the panoramas and world exhibitions and along the boulevards to 
the department store, arriving in the shopping malls, themed environments and non-places 
of post-modern urbanism or a supermodernity that has eviscerated the historical markers of 
place, the participants in ‘modern consumption’ have occupied specifically designed 
spaces aimed at denying the ‘rationality’ of need and utility, and fuelling the fires of desire 
and fantasy. 
 
From Space to Time: the adventure in the playground 
The concluding section of this chapter outlines Simmel’s (1997) contribution to a 
sociology of space as the analysis of the forms of social interaction which colour and 
characterise the phenomenal experience of the spatial, effectively defining it into existence: 
‘space in general is only an activity of the mind, only the human way of connecting 
sensory impulses that are unrelated in themselves into uniform interpretations’ (1997: 138). 
Therefore, the investigation and description of modern consumption becomes the analysis 
of the experience of sites and spaces of the sphere of circulation and exchange by their 
inhabitants.  
 
The Commodity Landscape 
From the department store and its ‘pre-history’ in the arcades, or passages, and the World 
Exhibitions to the nascent metropolitan modernity of Haussmann’s Paris and on to the 
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shopping malls of the contemporary world, the spatiality of ‘consumption’ is fundamental 
to its description and analysis. The historical emergence of the ‘objective realm’ and the 
sphere of circulation and exchange, which were demonstrably absent from accounts of 
‘consumption’ in the previous chapter, are at the heart of modern ‘consumption’ practices. 
The sites and spaces of this ‘realm’ or ‘sphere’ themselves contribute to its apparent 
autonomy and its unification through the money-form as the seemingly ceaseless flow of 
the exchange of values. In contemporary culture the sphere of circulation and exchange 
seems to extend itself into every aspect of existence, facilitating colonisation by the 
commodity-form of the ‘terrain’ of the modern self (Richards, 1991) as well as the 
‘networks of power’ (Sassen, 1999) of digital space. Where Benjamin saw the inhabitants 
of modernity surrounded by phantasmagoria in the ‘dreamworlds’ (Williams) of 
‘consumption’ it is now a staple trope of science fiction to have the commodity-form 
invade the dream-space of sleeping or day-dreaming individuals. ‘Consumption’ 
throughout the modern period has encompassed ‘otherness,’ exoticism and tourism, at its 
heart has been the promise of an exotic alternative that can be understood temporally as 
novelty, nouveauté, (even when that novelty is premised upon the experience of antiquity), 
and spatially as a distance from the mundane, a removal from the everyday. The 
‘elsewhere’ and ‘elsewhen’ that Friedberg (1993) attributes to the virtual and mobile 
subjectivity of the (post)modern spectator is the inheritor of this modern tradition. The 
spatialisation of History, in the panoramas and world exhibitions, and its re-presentation as 
novelty in the form of commodity-signs communicating progress (De Cauter, 1993) 
demarcates an attempt to embody novelty, to present the unpresentable (Agamben, 1993; 
1999; Lyotard, 1992). The same logic and rhetoric underpins the task of representation 
undertaken by commodity-signs within the contemporary landscape. 
 
Going to the Mall?  
By describing modern consumption through the spatial metaphors of ‘landscape,’ ‘terrain’ 
and environment it is possible to avoid the distinction between interior and exterior, 
intérieur and extérieur, that has characterised much of the literature, allowing discussion of 
extensity without depth that captures the ‘depthless surface’ of postmodern culture and its 
‘simulations.’ The positing of a physical boundary demarcating ‘spaces of consumption’ 
from spaces that are not those of consumption would be to deny the active participation of 
human agents within the course of their own lives, surrendering them to the determinist 
exigencies of spatial phenomena. Instead, the constraints upon forms of sociation and 
interaction are more likely to derive from the private owners of these quasi-public spaces 
or from their employees. Miles (1998: 59-64) sees in shopping malls a problem of control, 
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the privatisation of the spaces of previously public activities such as economic exchange 
that can be traced back to the Greek agora, and of the homogeneity that accompanies 
control expressed as rationalisation in the Weberian sense. The problem of control 
becomes the problem of articulating an individualism through which one can discern a 
personal identity. The resulting consumerism, while appearing to provide some form of 
‘escape’ from ‘real life’ does not, largely because consumerism is such a fundamental facet 
of this ‘real life.’ Miles’ example is Disneyland/Disney World, which has been 
‘imagineered’ to instantaneously remove its inhabitants from the real world, thereby giving 
its ‘consumers’ exactly what they appear to seek: escapism. By problematising reality such 
spaces offer a ready solution in the form of participation in their illusion, thus satisfying a 
‘desire to consume the inauthentic in an increasingly simulated world’ (ibid: 64-6). 
Through such controlled illusionistic power, says Corrigan (1997: 181), ‘contemporary 
urban space [is] made safe for postmodernism’ through the abolition of classification and 
hierarchical distinction – once again the commodity-form becomes both medium and 
marker of social distinction, linking, through the human body and its experience of the 
spaces of consumption, being and having. 
 
The experience of the spaces of consumption, physiological and psychological, demands 
that its analysis approach ‘shopping both as practice and as physical sites’ involving ‘a 
double perspective; one which, on the one hand, thematizes shopping in its “original” 
economic role, and, on the other, places shopping in the broader context of public 
behaviour and public places. The former perspective … [recalls] the variety of shopping 
practices and sites which existed before the contemporary shopping centres and malls… 
The latter perspective should thematize the “genealogy of the (urban) public space”… 
especially… recent changes which have led to the contemporary shopping sites’ (Falk & 
Campbell, 1997: 10). Developing this, Falk (1994: 177) attempts to situate the ‘visual 
dimensions of shopping’ within the wider urban experience of public, usually leisure, 
spaces through an analysis of the different scopic registers (Lacan) and regimes (Metz) that 
such ‘street scenes’ support. The street is ‘not only a linear space of transportation’ but a 
‘complex of dynamic spatiality… constituted as an experience through the movement of 
the body and eyes of the passers-by: the flâneurs…’ The street functions as an 
‘experiential space’ facilitating a variety of ‘walking rhetorics’ (De Certeau, 1984) that 
function as ‘spatial narratives’ distinguishing between public and private spaces and the 
appropriate bodily and scopic behaviours. This leads Falk to theorise ‘recreational 
shopping’ (1994: 178-182) in which purchase has a ‘marginal role’ as ‘mere potentiality’ 
facilitating ‘other experiential dimensions of shopping’ and the pleasures that they offer – 
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such ‘shopping sites,’ department stores or shopping malls, actually offering a leisured 
relief from the ‘(over)stimulated urban milieu’ (1994: 183). Falk’s analysis implies a 
shopping for use, and utility, outlined earlier and its location within these ‘spaces of 
consumption,’ however, just as the flâneur met his end in the department store so, too, 
does such a set of shopping practices and their scopic equivalents cease to be defined by a 
particular bounded conception of space. Modern consumption has been liberated from 
three-dimensionality and possesses as many dimensions as it has ‘connections’ (Latour, 
1996). The ‘space of consumption,’ the sphere of circulation and exchange, does not exist 
solely in ‘real’ space but also in the abstraction of technology and information and the 
‘subjective apparatuses’ (Guattari, 1995) of its inhabitants. 
 
Ritzer (2001: 189) approximates this in his discussion of the ‘new means of consumption,’ 
displaying a debt to Debord, Vaneigem and the Situationist critique of the ‘spectacle’ in 
labelling shopping malls ‘distribution factories’ serving the ‘heightened unity of the 
spectacle,’ through which the ‘spectacle’ is ‘building its own society within the walls of 
[such] shopping malls and other new means of consumption.’ The ‘new means of 
consumption’ (drawn from Marx, Capital Vol. II) represent ‘the evolving integration and 
rationalization of the spectacle’ – these ‘[s]hopping malls, cybermalls, superstores and 
theme parks, among others, compete as elements of the dominant fraction of the spectacle’ 
(ibid: 190). Ritzer also sees the separation of certain spaces and sites of ‘consumption’ as 
important, citing cruise-ships and Las Vegas casinos (2001: 184) and links this to Disney’s 
theme parks and, more intriguingly, Celebration, the Disney sponsored and ‘imagineered’ 
town in Florida (discussed by Ross, 2000). In doing so Ritzer points up an interesting 
contradiction: just as the information superhighway, world-wide-web and wireless 
telecommunications revolution promise to link everyone and everything in a ‘connected’ 
world built upon the ceaseless flow of information certain spaces seem to deny such 
integration, and remain soi-distant, even as they draw upon these very technologies for 
their existence and form. Ritzer’s post-war chronology of the ‘new means of consumption’ 
(2001: 108) ties spaces such as McDonald’s franchises, shopping malls, cruise ships and 
casinos, ‘Eatertainment’ venues such as the Hard Rock café, theme parks and television 
shopping networks together through technological innovation. Such sites and spaces 
appear to be integral elements within the same system (arguably, the society of the 
spectacle), joined through information processing technologies such as the money-form 
(Dodd, 1994; Simmel, 1990), credit cards (Ritzer, 1995) and increased global mobility. 
The spectacle, then, is erected upon a very rational technological edifice and at its heart is 




While locating ‘the total commodification of interior space during the 1920s and ‘30s’ 
Gottdiener sees this process extend itself to environments, both interior and exterior, after 
WWII (1997: 141). From restaurants themed by nationality or region to Las Vegas casinos 
and their hotels, from the Mall of America by way of DisneyLand to late-twentieth century 
airports Gottdiener discerns the ‘theming of America’ and, by extension, the world as the 
coming-together of two processes: firstly, the construction of material environments within 
which people interact; and, secondly, these spaces being themed through the use of signs, 
symbols and motifs made meaningful by their role within popular culture. The ‘symbolic 
content’ of such spaces colours the user’s experience, usually pleasurably, over and above 
the specific activities participated in (ibid: 4-5). The emergence of such spaces throughout 
the late-twentieth century Gottdiener attributes to mass advertising and market 
segmentation in the service of semiotic consumption (ibid: 9-10). Just as ‘store 
environments… are but an extension of television, magazine, and newspaper advertising,’ 
so ‘the creation of themed environments as the envelope of commercial activity helps 
resolve the central economic concern regarding the link between commercial venues and 
our themed culture that is supersaturated by symbols or images’ (ibid: 70). Themes are 
marketing appeals that ‘connote’ something to the ‘consumer’ beyond the denotative 
function of the space they are occupying and the specific activity being undertaken, often 
for the purpose of entertainment but such environments, crucially says Gottdiener, are 
‘simulations of substantive symbols’ and ‘fundamentally disconnected from the use-value 
of the commodities with which they are associated’ (ibid: 75-6). 
 
Gottdiener plainly sees such decorative excess over function as extraneous, a superfluity 
that misleads or distracts ‘the consumer’ through its disregard, or marginalising, of the 
denotative function of the commodity and its utility. The description of the world’s largest 
shopping environment (ibid: 85), The Mall of America, outside Minneapolis, Minnesota 
centres upon its size (4 million square feet), the variety of shopping (400 shops) and 
entertainment options available, from eateries (45) to nightclubs and a theme park recalls 
the department stores as described by Ferguson (1992) and Benjamin (1999) more readily 
than it does the metropolitan airport with which Gottdiener compares it (1997: 91). While 
both rely upon a mass market and the technological innovations of the late-twentieth 
century for the use and operation of their interior spaces the shopping mall and airport 
remain distinct entities – although Disney did advise United Airlines on the design of their 
Chicago terminal (ibid: 93). Airports and shopping malls are similar in their highly 
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rationalised, systematic division of labour and the services that this delivers process 
enormous numbers of ‘transactions’ daily, both architectural forms centre upon service and 
retail operations housed in publicly used but, usually, privately owned or operated interior 
spaces utilising a language or ‘rhetoric’ based upon easy, direct and mass communication. 
Gottdiener (ibid: 99-100) distinguishes between malls and casinos because the former 
prioritises commerce and merchandising over entertainment while the latter promotes its 
‘ludic’ and ‘entertainment spaces, with merchandising as a secondary function’ with the 
‘fantasy themes’ connoted by the décor invoking exotic ‘elsewheres’ from Pharaoh’s 
Egypt to the Wild West of ‘Glitter Gulch’ in the same manner as the nineteenth century 
department store had Africa or the Orient (Friedberg, 1993). 
 
These themed playgrounds are fun: 
 
They entertain. In addition, they provide visitors with definite and 
enjoyable contrasts to their daily lives. Much of this experience is the result 
of re-creating an urban-style environment in a safe and nonthreatening but 
also very commercial atmosphere. The theme park as developed by Disney 
and others also offers people sharp contrasts with the constraints, 
regimentation, and normative burdens of their everyday existence. […], 
and even mouse ears can be worn without suspicious reactions from others.  
– Gottdiener, 1997: 114 
 
Participation in these spaces assumes the form of an ‘event’ or adventure (Simmel, 1959), 
nostalgically evoking a childhood innocence and freedom from care, an escape from 
adulthood through commercially facilitated play. Inhabitants of such spaces are transported 
‘over the rainbow,’ to a series of ‘elsewheres’ and elsewhens’ that allow the enjoyment of 
the ‘othering’ of oneself, experientially, temporally and spatially – an other ‘self’ free from 
and ‘beyond’ anxiety. 
 
… and non-spaces 
Beyond the seemingly hermetically-sealed environs of the shopping mall and themed 
playgrounds lie the streets of the major metropolitan areas that such spaces always 
approximate lying, as they do, within easy reach of their prospective inhabitants. And, just 
as the boulevards existed in symbiotic relationship with the grands magasin, so, too, do 
today’s pedestrian arenas exist alongside the mall. At the heart of this relationship is the 
‘tourist experience,’ an increasingly prominent aspect of modern life linked to ‘consumer 
activity’ (Lash & Urry, 1994; MacCannell, 1976; 1992; Rojek, 1985; 1993; Urry, 1990;) 
from its earliest origins (Shields, 1991) and sharing a technologically enhanced evolution 
(Schivelbusch, 1987; 1995) that extends as far as an imagined ‘America’ (Baudrillard, 
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1989) and ‘hyper-reality’ (Eco, 1986). The modern metropolis as tourist destination is 
described by Hannigan as a postmodern ‘fantasy city,’ an ‘urban entertainment destination’ 
rooted in ‘tourism, sports, culture and entertainment’ (1998: 2). Themed, branded, open 
twenty-four/seven, modular (offering the same chains as other UEDs), solipsistic (in its 
separation from the larger urban or metropolitan fabric) and ‘postmodern’ in its use of 
simulation, virtual reality and ‘spectacle’ and often favouring renovated urban fabric, such 
metropolitan spaces resemble theme parks and malls as closely as they do cities (ibid: 6-7). 
Expensive to inhabit even for short city-breaks these ‘fantasy cities’ resemble postmodern 
playgrounds for up-market ‘consumers’ inhabiting a global economy. They emerged from 
former industrial strongholds, such as Philadelphia, Boston and Baltimore, and their 
formula has been adapted for European cities such as Glasgow, London’s Docklands and 
Bilbao: a mix of public and private investment centred around post-industrial enterprises, 
often artistic, cultural or sporting, and followed by renewal of derelict industrial buildings, 
either refurbishment or gentrification resulting in the relocation of the existing inhabitants 
unable to afford the new rents (Hannigan, 1998; Zukin, 1982; 1987; 1995). 
 
In 1996, in New York, Nike opened the first of its NikeTown stores. Built on the site of a 
former European-style department store, Galleries Lafayette, this innovation in retail space 
symbolised the continual evolution of the shopping space in western culture. The 
convergence of shopping and entertainment in ‘lifestyle stores,’ such as NikeTown or, 
more recently, Donna Karan, continues and extends the spectacular element at the heart of 
modernity. Nineteenth century department stores were ‘cathedrals of commerce,’ which 
evolved to become the shopping mall and the early decades of the new millennium will be 
coloured by the relationship between the spaces of ‘experiential retailing’ and the brand 
names that build and operate them. New York’s NikeTown is located within a faux 
reconstructed gymnasium from the American 1930s or ‘40s. The interior is ‘a high-tech 
cross between a store, a museum and a media experience’ (Hannigan, 1998). Using short 
films ‘celebrating the spirit of sports’ and banks of video screens showing scores and 
sporting information the visitor feels themselves at the heart of a dramatic environment, 
constantly assailed by events as they unfold.  
 
The museum aspect is represented by scattered exhibitions, showcases 
displaying sports trophies and memorabilia and a Nike shoe museum with 
400 pairs of shoes which have been gathered over the years. The retail 
element of the store is muted: one can buy Nike products at Nike Town but 
the store exists primarily to promote brand recognition.  
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NikeTown finds its echo in every site purpose built for the contemplation of commodities 
and their ‘consumers.’ Just like the theme pub or sports bar, commodity-signs characterise 
such spaces, authenticate and legitimate them by implying a longevity and durability that 
people can and should put their faith in through the act of purchase, through their 
involvement in the sphere of consumption. Equally, the products sold in such flagship 
retail environments must be loss making (loss leaders), but it is not surplus-value that is at 
stake in such spaces. The notion that the consumption of goods and services is based upon 
the rational calculation of needs and their most efficient satisfaction, a dubious premise at 
best, is here given the lie. Rather, these spaces are about the experiences that the 
‘consumer’s’ presence affords: they are destinations, sights to be seen, rides to be taken 
and thrills to be sought. The ‘lifestyle’ stores of major branded goods are spaces of 
consumption within the sphere of circulation and exchange that offer up the experience of 
modern consumption distilled to its essence – they offer up the possibility of a vertiginous 
thrill made possible by the cybernetic amalgam of man and machine in technological 
harmony. If as Friedberg (1993) believes the ‘virtual’ and ‘mobilized’ spectator is the 
subject of modern consumption then the mode of transport adopted is neither car nor 
plane, it is not escalator nor rollercoaster it is the ‘apparatus of subjectification’ made 
possible by the technologically enhanced physiology of modernity and the occupation by 
this body of certain spaces within the physical manifestation of the sphere of circulation 
and exchange of capitalist modernity. 
 
Conclusion: Back to Our Endless Lives 
The historical and material processes that have deformed space into the ‘terrain’ of modern 
consumption have also played their part in transforming the subjective experience of 
capitalist modernity. The phenomenological forms of subjective experience, spatiality, 
temporality and causality, have transformed the relationship between people and objects, 
between actants (Latour). The spatialisation of time and temporalisation of space can be 
considered part of the production of a specifically modern and capitalist space in which the 
concept of physical boundaries or thresholds has become ever-harder to fathom as they 
have assumed immaterial form.  
 
The uninterrupted transformations of materials as well as energies brings 
everything into relationship with everything else and make one cosmos out 
of all the individual elements. On the other hand, however, the objects 
remain banished in the merciless separation of space; no particle of matter 
can share its space with another and a real unity of the diverse does not 
exist in spatial terms. 
- Simmel, Bridge and Door ([1903], 1997: 170-1) 
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The production of a capitalist conception of space (Harvey) has been the ‘deformation’ of 
Newtonian ideal or empty space, which has been described sociologically by Simmel. The 
marriage of ‘space’ and capitalist modernity and its logic of ‘accumulation’ must be 
understood as the outcome of a series of historical processes, aesthetic strategies and 
economic planning. It has become a space of ‘circulation’ in which subjects and objects 
combine in differentiated ways, across time and space. Consequently the subjective 
experience is that of space-time in which values circulate as if freed from their origins in 
production, signs distinct from their referents.  
 
When one sees Las Vegas at dusk rise whole from the desert in the 
radiance of advertising, and return to the desert when dawn breaks, one 
sees that advertising is not what brightens or decorates the walls: it is what 
effaces the walls, effaces the streets, the facades and all the architecture, 
effaces any support and any depth, and that it is this liquidation, this 
reabsorption of everything into the surface … that plunges us into this 
stupefied, hyperreal euphoria that we would not exchange for anything 
else, and that is the empty and inescapable form of seduction.  
- Baudrillard, Absolute Advertising, Ground-Zero Advertising in 
Simulacra and Simulation, (1994: 91-92), cited Leach 1999: 70 
 
Baudrillard highlights the aesthetic dimension to capitalist modernity and the manner in 
which the experience of modern consumption is best understood as the foregrounding of 
the aesthetic dimension of subjective experience, as pioneered within the department stores 
and developed on high streets, advertising hoardings, TV sets and in shopping malls 
around the world. Upon the terrain of modern consumption the psychological calculations 
of utility imputed to the ‘consumer’ by economic theory are exposed as inadequate. 
Instead, the collapse of the bourgeois world view, its dissolution through its spatial and 
temporal deformation, has transformed the subjective formulation of being; the subject has 
become a ‘site’ for the possibility of experience. Consequently, the concept of space and 
the language utilised in the description of spatial experience inherited from bourgeois 
culture have failed to describe the ‘modernisation’ of subjective experience precisely 
because of the inherent economic logic of capitalist space and the interactions it has 
‘housed.’ 
  
The production of the experience of modern consumption within capitalist modernity 
requires for its analysis a sociology that acknowledges the role of historical process and the 
participation of both human actors and inhuman actants in their mutually defining 
networks (Latour). Such ‘collective apparatuses of subjectification’ describe certain 
 187 
‘fundamental paths/voices [voie/voix]’ (Guattari, 1995: 18) and invoke particular historical 
lineages that extend to: 
 
the invention of new materials and energies, new machines for crystallizing 
time and, finally, to new biological technologies. It is not a question of 
infrastructures that directly condition collective subjectivity, but of 
components essential for a given setup to take consistency in space and 
time as a function of technical, scientific and artistic transformations.  
– Ibid: 21 
 
By extending Latour’s theories of ANT into the individual psyche through the ‘collective 
apparatuses of subjectification’ it is possible to efface the metaphysical distinction between 
subject and object, interior and exterior that so exercised Baudrillard through the 1980s 
(most notably in Fatal Strategies, (1990a) in English). It also becomes possible to include 
among the ‘apparatuses’ invoked by Guattari the role of the sites and spaces of modern 
consumption and the practices located within these. In this way the distinction between the 
subjective, inner, space and the objective, outer, space fails and the boundary or limit-point 
that the human body has historically represented is overcome. Subjectivity is, therefore, 
rooted in the experience of space as is the experience of temporal duration, which will be 





Chapter Four: New Times 
 
Playland is a country whose inhabitants are busy celebrating rituals, and 
manipulating objects and sacred words, whose sense and purpose they 
have, however, forgotten. And we should not be amazed if, through this 
oblivion […], they free the sacred, too, from its link with the calendar 
and with the cyclical rhythm of time that it sanctions, thereby entering 
another dimension of time, where the hours go by in a flash and the 
days are changeless.  
– Agamben, 1993: 70 
 
Introduction 
Accompanying the transformation in spatial experience born of capitalist modernity and its 
socio-economic structures was a similar ‘revolution’ in the experience of temporality. 
Inevitably this complicated the understanding of the modern subject and the formulation of 
the ‘biographical fiction of the self’ and its teleological project of improvement (Ferguson, 
1990). Alongside the rational, utility-calculating ‘consumer’ forged from the marriage of 
economic theory and Enlightenment philosophy there appeared a ‘playful’ subject, given 
to caprice and seemingly free from an internalised desire for self-improvement. This 
chapter charts the emergence and dissemination of the behaviours associated with this new 
subject of modern consumption and, in particular, the foregrounding of aesthetic 
experience, rather than economic calculation or utilitarian urges, as the motive for social 
engagement and participation in the capitalist consumption-relation. Crucially, this 
requires a consideration of the historically novel strategies capable of narrating subjective 
experience that emerged with the onset of capitalist modernity, especially the fate of 
‘experience’ as it had previously been understood.  
 
‘Modernity,’ as a self-conscious break with the idea of the past, implied either new, 
modern phenomena to be experienced, or a ‘modern’ form of experiencing, in addition to – 
and possibly born of – the novel experiences afforded by the technology of the age. 
Therefore, modernity, as an interruption of continuity and tradition, appeared to sever the 
historical link to both the forms of experiencing available to inhabitants of an earlier era 
and formulate new contents for modern form(s) of experience. For many this was a 
deleterious eventuality and prompted a distinction between historically concrete and 
authentic experience (Erfahrung) and an individuated and inauthentic shock-experience 
(Erlebnis), which persists to the present day. Indeed, for Benjamin, this was the ‘paradox 
of modern experience,’ which rendered ‘experience’ inexperiencible by leaving it 
inaccessible to conscious recollection and imprinting it upon the body, in a form of 
physiological register that could only be recovered indirectly, accidentally or through 
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oblique strategies (such as psychoanalysis). The nostalgic impulse at the core of this 
longing for ‘authentic’ experience, somehow denied to the inhabitants of capitalist 
modernity, is revealed as a – literally – backward-looking response, more usefully 
understood as a means to sell luxury goods to wealthy clientele in search of ‘the real’ 
(which, all too often, is located amidst the poverty and deprivation of others).  
 
Rather than re-assert such nostalgic conceptions of authentic or ‘real’ experience, to be 
recovered by the privileged classes, this chapter seeks to outline an alternative conception 
of subjective experience made available to those obliged to inhabit the ‘terrain’ of modern 
consumption. Here the failure of the bourgeois ego – despite the ideological efforts 
expended in promoting its participation in contemporary capitalism as ‘consumer’ – 
necessitates a re-consideration of the contemporary subject and the forms of 
phenomenological experience afforded by the commodity-form within capitalist 
modernity. This process begins with the rejection of the Germanic bifurcation of 
experience into a ‘historical’ and a modern, or an authentic and an in-authentic, 
formulation. Instead the multifarious forms of experience and their incorporation into the 
‘subject’ of modern consumption must be traced, both the process of their historical 
emergence and their consequences for the comprehension of contemporary capitalist 
modernity. Specifically, this requires an analysis of the forms of temporal experience and 
their role in the constitution of the modern subject as these forms are tempered, mediated 
and ‘afforded’ by an inescapable entanglement with the capitalist commodity-form.  
 
Modernity and the experience of the modern, modernité, emerge in contradistinction to 
previous eras: 
 
Modernity is a form of historical time which valorizes the new as the 
product of a constantly self-negating temporal dynamic. [… which] by 
producing the old as remorselessly as it produces the new, and in equal 
measure, it provokes forms of traditionalism the temporal logic of 
which is quite different from that of tradition as conventionally 
received. Both traditionalism and reaction are distinctively modern 
forms.  
– Osborne 1995: xii 
 
The temporal dimension of modern experience arises within the relation between the 
subject and the objects of modern consumption, thereby revealing the role of the 
commodity-form in the constitution of modernité. The previous chapter dispelled the 
notion that the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption was a landscape composed of passive and 
inert objects, commodities, which were only animated by the desire of ‘consumers.’ 
 190 
Instead, this ‘terrain’ is a fungible and dynamic topography, a surface upon which space 
and time cease to be distinct and more closely resemble the space-time described by 
quantum physics (Ferguson, 1990), and which implicates the observing subject in the 
events under observation. Therefore, the production of modernity, as the interruption, of 
tradition and continuity, is also the means by which its experience, as modernité, is born of 
discontinuity, of hiatus and caesura. 
 
This leads Charney (1998) to reject the conception of time as an empty form, denuded of 
its contents (the material of experience), and, therefore, the medium through which the 
absence of experience is ‘experienced.’ In place of the convenient antinomy of Erlebnis 
and Erfahrung Charney posits the idea of ‘drift’ interrupted by ‘peak moments’ of 
aesthetic experience understood as ‘self-awareness.’ Crucially, this formulation 
circumvents the either/or logic of polar opposites, such as those that underpin the ‘paradox 
of the modern,’ because it is the juxtaposition of the seemingly ‘empty’ drift that is the 
precondition of the convulsive moment of attention and involvement. Subjective 
experience, therefore, most closely resembles the narrative forms of cinema and the 
technique of montage, where meaning is produced through the juxtaposition of elements 
which produce and communicate difference. Such an appreciation of the ‘narrative’ form 
in which phenomenological experience arises within contemporary culture, when freed 
from the material constraint of the cinematic apparatus and its linear (teleological) 
mechanical operation, allows a re-consideration of the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption as 
the space-time topography upon which modernité occurs.  
 
The temporal ‘experience’ of modern consumption, therefore, is that of discontinuous 
‘peak’ moments, delineated against a background of seemingly empty subjective ‘drift,’ 
upon a ‘terrain’ composed of commodity-events that can only arise or occur when 
triggered by the participation of the subject. Rather than the teleological project of the 
bourgeois subject and its logic of personal improvement or ‘progress,’ the experience of 
the subject of modern consumption appears ‘playful,’ even arbitrary, and born of the 
limitless possibilities of engagement with the commodity-form. In this respect, the 
‘experience’ of modern consumption, as a moment of concentrated attention and 
awareness, comes to resemble modern conceptions of the sublime: 
 
[…] the moment of encounter [forges] a sublime moment in which the 
subject would be transported by intense evanescent feeling. The 
sublime moment generally occurs as the ‘spark’ produced by an 
unexpected moment of encounter; the unexpectedness heightens both 
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the intensity and the ephemerality of the sublime response. Stumbling 
[…] across an unanticipated configuration of elements, the subject is 
without warning seized by acute feeling that fleetingly removes him or 
her from the drift of daily experience.  
– Charney, 1998: 109 
 
Such a ‘moment of encounter’ arises not from the rational and utility-maximising 
cost/benefit analyses of the ‘consumer,’ attempting to compare like to like, but, instead, 
emerges from the ‘co-presence’ of the subject and the object of its attentions, from their 
mutual participation and constitution of an ‘event.’ The event, however, is always and 
resolutely unpredictable, just as it is always imminent, immanent and potential – because 
its precondition, the commodity-form, is everywhere. Importantly, the ‘event’ or 
encounter, as a form of experience, is neither authentic nor inauthentic, it is immersive and 
transformative, inasmuch as it modifies or alters the subject. This reveals the explanatory 
power of the term modern consumption and the paucity of ‘consumer theory,’ which 
imagines commodities as props for the staging of identity (see Seltzer, 1992). Modern 
consumption, by accepting the dynamic nature of the consumption-event and its power to 
modify the individual, its key temporal and narrative aspect, links being to having even if 
the majority of ‘encounters’ remain unrecognised, at the level of ‘drift,’ and unavailable to 
consciousness (in the manner of ‘shock-experience’).  
 
Modern consumption, then, can be considered to consist of both ‘drift’ and ‘peak 
moments’ (Charney) but the encounters upon which these are predicated are, themselves, 
reliant upon the ubiquity of the commodity-form in contemporary culture. The commodity-
form comes to serve as the medium for the transmission of ‘experience’ as well as its 
precondition. The relationship between being and having, which constitutes the subject, 
arises under the material conditions and historical circumstances of contemporary culture 
and the capitalist mode of production. Massumi (1993; 2003) has investigated the 
consequences of this state of affairs in his discussion of the ‘accident-event’ and the 
‘landscape of fear.’ Here discursive concepts and conventions – the understanding of 
‘human’ or ‘individual’ – overlap with the material conditions of contemporary capitalism 
to structure ‘affective experience’ and its consequences for the subject and the formulation 
of identity. Within this framework, ‘being’ is reconsidered, as becoming, and the notion of 
a stable self or identity that characterised earlier social formations, such as post-
Enlightenment bourgeois culture, is rendered untenable. Patently, then, for Massumi, there 
can be no teleological project of the self, no ‘consumer’ lifestyle to be constructed in the 
manner posited by sociological theories of ‘consumption.’  
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Rather, for Massumi (1993), the subject-position and capitalist commodity-relation are 
‘isomorphic’ and the dividual, rather than individual, emerges as the form of ‘being-
singular’ within contemporary capitalism, while, at the same time, this form is uncommon 
(it is not shared by others), it is the experience of singularity in extremis.  
 
The product, ultimately, is us. We are in-formed by capitalist powers of 
production. Our whole life becomes a ‘capitalist tool’ – our vitality, our 
affective capacities. […] our life potentials are indistinguishable from 
capitalist forces of production. […] the ‘subsumption of life’ under 
capitalism.  
– Massumi, 2003: 12 
 
Consequently, ‘the individual’ as understood by social, economic and political theory is 
rendered redundant; it has been undone by contemporary social, economic and 
technological conditions. In its place there emerges a species possessed of ‘only one living 
specimen’ produced through the ‘double movement’ of simulation and fabulation’ and 
underpinned by participation in the contemporary capitalist consumption-relation. 
Consequently, Massumi’s conception of being-as-becoming is revealed as resembling the 
relation between being and having, which, this thesis argues, lies at the heart of 
contemporary forms of subjectivity. The contemporary subject, the inhabitant of the 
‘terrain’ of modern consumption, is constituted by a ‘hinged’ relation (Massumi) between 
being and having and the experience of its temporal dimension is as ‘becoming,’ as a 
dynamic unfolding and constant transformation (rather than the rational, linear and 
teleological pursuit of a stable ‘identity’).  
 
The role of the commodity-form within this process is vital and usually over-looked 
(because it is perceived as the location of desirable objects, which may or not be fetishised, 
that will simply be chosen by ‘consumers’). Instead, the commodity-form must be 
understood as a constituent element in the ‘encounter’ between human subject and 
commodified object (service or experience), without the commodity-form – in its current, 
modern formulation – there would no ‘encounter’ of the kind described by Charney, no 
possibility of ‘sublime’ experience and no modification of the relation between being and 
having. The commodity-form, as the site of the communication of the experience of 
novelty, nouveauté, and of the experience of contemporary capitalist modernity, as 
modernité, possesses an ‘affective potential’ (Massumi, 2003) that directly contributes to 
the phenomenological forms of subjective experience, including the experience of 
temporality. Therefore, this chapter seeks to demonstrate the historical, material and 
technological processes that have brought this to pass and to determine the consequences 
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of these processes through an analysis of the forms of experience afforded to inhabitants of 
the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption.  
 
Considering modernité 
Modernité, as the experience of modernity, is the experience of temporality defined in 
opposition to an apparent continuity, it is the phenomenological experience of rupture, 
defined in the conjunction of space and time. Thus, modernity is the experience of space-
time understood as the opposite of all other, alternative temporal or social formations, 
whether those of Antiquity visited in the tours organised by Thomas Cook, bourgeois 
Enlightenment or the exotic ‘other’ colonised in the name of imperialism or global 
capitalism. Modernité was the experience of ‘fragments’ and was epitomised by the 
fleeting, fortuitous and contingent nature of metropolitan experience (Baudelaire) and 
expressed through technological modernisation and a variety of aesthetic modernisms 
(Frisby, 1988; Kern, 1983). Speed and instantaneity, the hallmarks of metropolitan 
modernity and its phenomenological experience, assumed the form of ‘suddenness’ 
(Bohrer, 1994), the interruption of historical or narrative continuity already identified at a 
societal level. Modernité’s phenomenological distance from all other social formations and 
their organisation of experience (Osborne, 1995), such as the rituals associated with 
‘primitive’ society that allow the comprehension of duration, transition and the passage of 
both group and individual history (Elias, 1992: 8-11), is the absence or interruption of 
tradition and traditional forms of experience (Erfahrung). This, claim Fritszche (2002) and 
Stewart (1998), manifests as nostalgia for the past, for ‘nature’ and a pre-lapsarian 
nominalism, in the face of the contingency of modernité. Modernity’s self-conscious 
immersion in a ‘new time,’ or neue zeit (Koselleck) that, bereft of telos, is experienced as 
an eternal present in which each moment possesses no more significance than any other – 
except in its quantitative determination as duration and intensity (Agamben, 1993; 
Deleuze, 1991). Bourgeois culture replaced the circular and directionless concept of time 
possessed by classical Antiquity and the linear temporality of Christianity – that ran from 
Creation to Apocalypse – with the logic of development, of Progress. Modernity now 
threatened such a temporal schema, and the experience of ‘time’ became that of an interior 
duration, a subjective phenomenon apparently distinct from the external world. 
 
The modern concept of time is ‘a secularisation of rectilinear, irreversible Christian time,’ 
divorced from its eschatological concerns in which the ‘representation of time as 
homogeneous, rectilinear and empty derive[d] from the experience of manufacturing work 
and is sanctioned by modern mechanics,’ and leads to the ‘experience of dead time 
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abstracted from experience, which characterizes life in modern cities and factories’ and its 
emphasis upon the empty, homogeneous instant (Agamben, 1993: 93-6). History had once 
implied Salvation or Utopia, some form of Progress towards a telos, however, Agamben 
sees, in modernity’s eternal present, a movement away from the sacred world of ‘myth’ 
and ritual, towards one in which ‘play’ becomes the pre-eminent mode of experience: ‘In 
play, man frees himself from sacred time and “forgets” it in human time’ (1993: 70). 
Forgetting, as the absence of historical memory, is the inhabitation of a world without 
philosophical ‘foundations’ (Nietzsche) or ‘grands narratives’ (Lyotard, 1984, 1992), a 
world composed of the experience of the present. Modernity’s apparent break with 
‘history’ and tradition in the late nineteenth century saw the emergence of ‘a sociology of 
modes of experiencing modernity’ that allowed the modern to co-exist alongside the 
traditional or older forms of social organisation. Frisby (1988: 13) observes that Tönnies’ 
distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft was not exclusive; rather ‘that 
Gesellschaft  “is only a transitional and superficial phenomenon” which one goes into “as 
into a strange country”.’  
 
Paradoxical Modernity 
For most theories of modernity and ‘consumption,’ the experience of ‘playland’ is that of a 
world in which the rites de passage are replaced by the ‘empty, homogeneous moment’ 
(Benjamin): the experience of modernity as a ‘qualitative category’ (Adorno), as 
modernité. The stroller on the boulevard, Benjamin’s ‘modern Tantalus,’ is free to patrol 
this ‘sphere,’ the ‘autonomous’ realm engendered by the money-form, where all 
experiences – gambling, purchasing a prostitute, flânerie or shopping in the grands 
magasins – are defined by their intensity and duration as pleasure (Erlebnis), rather than 
the ‘experience’ that they confer as a contribution towards maturity and its companion, 
death (Erfahrung). Experience is fragmented into the ‘shock-experience’ of modern 
metropolitan existence its intensity and duration registering upon the body (kinaesthesia) 
and rendered unavailable to conscious recollection or communication (Abbas, 1988; 
Agamben, 1993; Benjamin, 1999). The world of modern consumption, as a ‘playland,’ 
complicates the possibility of memory and, consequently, identity and the narration of 
experience: duration and intensity, boredom and excitement become the quanta and qualia 
of experience.  
 
The ‘paradox of the modern,’ the impossibility of ‘experience’ in its traditional forms, and 
the translation of the phenomenological forms of subjective experience into the 
‘inexperiencible’ (Agamben, 1993) means that it is registered physiologically (Abbas, 
 195 
1988; Agamben, 1993; Benjamin, 1999; Hetherington, 2003) and is ‘participated’ in as 
‘drift’ (Charney, 1998). In a culture whose ‘eternal present’ is removed from the progress 
of linear history there can only be temporal intervals of varying duration, these events, 
episodes or ‘adventures’ (Simmel) are the correlate of the ‘peak’ or ‘de-familiarizing’ 
moment juxtaposed to the experience of the ‘empty moments’ of the ‘drift’ of subjective 
experience (Charney). In the playgrounds of modernity, apotheosised in Tokyo (Barber, 
2001), it is bodily, rather than cognitive sensation, which is the locus of experience. This 
‘shock-experience’ serves as the predicate for a phenomenological study of contemporary 
culture and the centrality of the consumption-relation to any account of modernity. The eye 
ceases to be the conduit for modern experience (as impression) and, instead, becomes part 
of a kinaesthetic canvas upon which vertiginous experience impacts. Modern consumption 
requires a phenomenology that can incorporate the inexperiencibility of modern 
‘experience,’ specifically its failure to be absorbed within the teleological narrative of 
biography. 
 
From ritual to work, rest and play 
 
Time is now currency: it is not passed but spent.  
– Thompson, 1967: 61 
 
The emergence, refinement and subsequent spread of the clockwork mechanism and its 
adoption by the productive enterprises of industrial capitalism facilitated an irredeemable 
quantification and abstraction of the labour process that helped shift productive activity 
from the ‘task’ oriented work patterns of the ‘natural’ rhythms’ of agrarian or non-
industrial societies to the ‘work-discipline’ of industrial manufacture and the development 
of the wage-relation. It was no longer labour or even labour-power that was offered in 
exchange but labour-time: time was abstracted, commodified and offered for sale. The 
control over time that its money price afforded was the vital spark which fuelled the 
‘consumer revolution’ beloved by sociologists and historians of ‘consumption.’ 
Agricultural labourers who ‘irrationally’ traded disproportionate amounts of a season’s 
wages to purchase pocketwatches as markers of status (Thompson, 1967: 63-9; Glennie, 
1995) simply echoed their more fortunate employers, who purchased mantle clocks, in 
incorporating the regularity of ‘clock-time’ into the personal rhythms of the everyday. 
 
The emergence of the ‘age of the clock’ unified previously distinct practices within an 
advanced division of labour, incorporating specialist tasks into the synchronisation 
demanded by the factory system and its machine-governed work rhythms, and minimising 
 196 
interruptions due to the vagaries of Nature. The rationalisation and regularity of both the 
opportunities for employment and the tasks that comprised paid-labour sat at odds with the 
culture of artisan production and the seasonal fairs and religious holidays that had 
previously been observed. The gradual process that was capitalist industrialisation was an 
uneven and contested progression that sought to impose an increasingly formalised system 
of constraints and procedures upon those that fell within its ambit. The clock became an 
agent, or ‘actant’ (Latour), in the promulgation of capitalist relations and their attendant 
disciplinary practices and an opportunity for non-utilitarian expenditure, an example of the 
seemingly ill-considered freedom that the wage-relation conferred upon its adherents. 
Time and work-discipline are, therefore, of necessity, linked whether in the spread of 
capitalist industrial work practices (Thompson) or the role of schools, prisons and hospitals 
in the ‘disciplining’ of bodies within the civic spaces of the emerging public sphere 
(Ferguson, 1990). 
 
The literal incorporation of the labouring classes into the regimen of industrial capitalist 
society was neither uncontested nor uniform, nor was it a purely economic series of events. 
The refining of the techniques of organisation of the division of labour accompanied, at 
each step, an appreciation by those involved of what was at stake, forms of resistance and 
the rewards for participation (Thompson, 1972). The adoption of watches and clocks as 
indicators of status and social rank by the capitalist proletariat indicates that they were 
happy to enjoy the fruits of their waged-labour long before Henry Ford made this his 
explicit aim.  
 
The first generation of factory workers were taught by their masters the 
importance of time; the second generation formed their short-time 
committees in the ten-hour movement; the third generation struck for 
overtime or time-and-a-half. They had accepted the categories of their 
employers and learned to fight back within them. They had learned their 
lesson, that time is money, only too well.  
– Thompson, 1967: 86 
 
The distribution of the surplus created by the division of labour and the freedom to enjoy 
this surplus as desired has always rendered a discussion of ‘consumption’ political. Time, 
in becoming a commodity, is acknowledged as a scarce resource possessed of an 
opportunity cost. For, just as ‘clock-time’ signalled the adherence to a particular bodily 
regime, both in and out of the workplace, so, too, it announced a capacity to quantify both 
one’s own labour and the labour of others that appeared in the form of commodities. The 
sacrifice of time in production allowed its expenditure in ‘consumption’ (Cross, 1993), the 
money-form’s role as a store of value guaranteed this (Simmel, 1990), and the extension of 
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the money-form to include in its embrace every aspect of life allowed the relationship 
between time and value to permeate existence. 
 
By the 1830s and 1840s it was commonly observed that the English 
industrial worker was marked off from his fellow Irish worker, not by a 
greater capacity for hard work, but by his regularity, his methodical 
paying-out of energy, and perhaps also by a repression, not of 
enjoyments, but of the capacity to relax in the old uninhibited ways.  
– Thompson, 1967: 91 
 
Here the habits and rhythms of ‘nature’ enshrined by centuries of non-capitalist work 
routines and centred upon the ‘tasks’ at hand, whether communal or singular, and usually 
seasonal in their ordering are replaced by the particular physical and psychic demands of 
industrial capitalism and its work-discipline. Prolonged exposure to the temporal patterns 
of the machine engendered an awareness of the responses required, particularly by the 
owners of those machines: Saint Monday was neither revered by machinery, nor by its 
masters.  
 
A New Nature 
Time became a resource to be commodified and so, too, did Nature, which had ceased to 
be the regulative principle and governing metaphor conceived of by the Physiocrats. 
Nature was now being ‘de-differentiated’ into raw materials possessed of a marginal utility 
and opportunity cost. In this, time echoed the abstraction of labour in the wage-relation as 
it was emptied of its specific properties through its reification in money-exchange. The 
reduction of such qualitative differences to their quantitative expression (price) was 
facilitated by the contemporary conception of time as ‘empty’ and ‘homogeneous’ that can 
be seen in both Newton (Ferguson, 1990) and Benjamin. Capitalist modernity is better 
understood as the experience of space-time ‘deformed’ by its contents into specific 
commodity-experiences. Capitalist industrialisation and the mass production of 
commodities for the colonisation of the sphere of circulation and exchange centres upon 
nouveauté and the deliverance it affords from the boredom of ‘empty time’ – whether the 
deferred gratification of the ‘consumer’ or the ‘work-discipline’ imposed upon the 
producer: 
 
Endless waiting thus makes the finality of fate seem appealing. 
Boredom, however, is not escaped easily. It threatens the gambler, the 
drug user, the flâneur, and the dandy who appear to choose their own 
fate freely no less than the externally compelled workers at their 
machines who cannot.  
– Buck-Morss, 1993: 104-5 
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In denying Progress or eschaton, modern time becomes a series of ‘empty, homogeneous 
instants,’ a collection of moments qualitatively distinguished from each other only by 
virtue of the quantitative degree of difference. Modernity becomes for Benjamin a time of 
Hellish repetition epitomised in the figure of Sisyphus. On the one hand, history has been 
denuded of purpose or endpoint, and, on the other, every moment is defined only by its 
relative novelty rather than any overarching significance or purpose. Modernity can thus be 
characterised as ‘nihilistic’ and Benjamin as an inheritor of Nietzsche’s critique of modern 
life as ‘impoverished’ or ‘dis-enchanted’ (Weber), where life becomes the participation in 
a series of meaningless routines or rituals denuded of any mystical consequence (Frisby, 
1988: 35-6). Thus, for Benjamin, we are condemned to inhabit modernity and the modern 
‘consumption’ that is erected upon the framework of capitalist production and exchange is 
the sentence to be served – the punishment is not the absence of liberty, however, but its 
purposeless surfeit, experienced as ‘the phantasmagoria of modernity … [in] the calamity 
of humdrum existence’ (Benjamin, cited Frisby, 1988: 37). 
 
What is calamitous in the experience of modernity is its impossibility (Abbas, 1988; 
Agamben, 1993; Benjamin, 1968). Agamben sees Benjamin demonstrate that experience, 
is ‘no longer available to us.’ Modern man has ‘been deprived of his biography’: the 
capacity to construct a narrative that contains, explains and communicates the experience 
of being (1993: 13). Benjamin (1968) saw this as originating in the ‘catastrophe’ of WWI, 
where the ‘tiny, fragile human body’ is confronted by technological warfare and the 
mechanised production of death. Agamben, on the other hand, sees the ‘destruction of 
experience’ as existing at the level of the everyday; every aspect of modern existence 
seems remote from individuals and their experience: 
 
Neither the cloud of tear gas slowly dispersing between the buildings of 
the city centre, nor the rapid blasts of gunfire from who knows where; 
nor queuing up at a business counter, nor visiting the Land of Cockayne 
at the supermarket, nor those eternal moments of dumb promiscuity 
among strangers in lifts and buses. Modern man makes his way home in 
the evening wearied by a jumble of events, but however entertaining or 
tedious, unusual or commonplace, harrowing or pleasurable they are, 
none of them will have become experience.  
– 1993: 14 
 
Previously it was the mundane and the everyday that was the province of experience such 
that the excessive or unusual events that were the basis of seemingly fantastical tales 
resided there because they could not be contained within the realm of experience. In 
modernity the truths that are to be searched for and communicated do not lie within this 
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realm but beyond it; rather ‘it is the character of the present time that all authority is 
founded upon what cannot be experienced, and nobody would be inclined to accept the 
validity of an authority whose sole claim to legitimation was experience’ (ibid).  
 
In certain activities, such as drug addiction, it becomes possible to withdraw from the 
world so completely as to ‘discard’ all experience (Agamben, 1993: 16). The contents of 
personal experience cease to have a significance or value other than the expression of 
difference: the value of things is expressed by money-price or the quantitative 
determinations of science. Certainty, says Agamben (1993: 17-8), is ‘incompatible’ with 
experience understood as the qualitative modification or refinement of the individual 
through the accumulation of knowledge over time, and its transmission between 
individuals and across generations. Therefore, the slogan that replaces the maxim and the 
proverb is ‘the proverb of humankind to whom experience is lost’ (ibid: 14). The causal 
indeterminacy revealed by quantum mechanics here coincides with the threat to ‘affective 
intensity’ discussed by Massumi (1993; 2003): as the Cartesian subject threatens to 
disintegrate. The inhabitant of modernity no longer understands the world in terms of need 
or even desire, he or she no longer knows what they ‘require’ – only that existence, as 
presently configured, is unendurable. 
 
Experiencing the New 
For Agamben, the legend of the Holy Grail presents an opportunity to distinguish the 
consequences of ‘experience’ in the contemporary world. The Grail quest represents the 
search for the situation in which the unification of experience and knowledge is possible, 
as truth. The quest is therefore a pre-modern form because of the promise of truth it 
contains: unlike the modern world, where experiences are always available but their value 
(since they do not allow access to truth) is debatable; while the experience of ‘truth’ tends 
towards personal revelation and cannot be communicated to others, since they have not 
undergone the experience (not unlike psychoanalysis). In modernity, only the adventure 
holds out the promise of ‘experience’ because it ‘goes by the extraordinary and the exotic 
(in opposition to the familiar and the commonplace)’ (1993: 29). So, it is spatial or 
temporal distance from the everyday that  stamps events with sufficient novelty that they 
attain the character of ‘experience.’ Within the adventure the individual might yet attain 
some facet of unique experience different to and distinct from the normative description 
provided by the law-like generalities of scientific knowledge (and everyday life). 
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This apparent ‘loss of experience,’ its capacity to escape the psyche and consciousness was 
understood as a consequence of modernity, as a separation from Nature and an Arcadian 
past caused by the interruption of ‘tradition society’ by modernity. Its loss could be 
attributed to the French Revolution of 1789 Fritzsche (2002), or to the advent of 
industrialisation (the Arts & Crafts movement) or mass production of commodities and the 
consequences of this (the Frankfurt School). However, the nostalgic longing for an absent 
form of experience was itself symptomatic of modernité, since it is ‘the act of memory’ 
that creates the ‘gap between resemblance and identity’ (Stewart, 1998: 145). Only the 
belief in the absence of experience could prompt attempts at its recovery and the 
distinction between Erlebnis and Erfahrung. 
 
For the secular tradition of psychology this revealed ‘the crisis of the modern concept of 
experience – experience found on the Cartesian subject – [and] at its most salient in the 
idea of the unconscious’ (Agamben, 1993: 41). Indeed, the failure of such ‘unconscious 
experiences’ to constitute a ‘subjective experience’ is explained by its inability to be 
available to self-consciousness, hence the need for approaches, such as psychoanalysis, 
that could re-present the ‘lost’ dimension of experience to consciousness. For Agamben, 
the poetry of Baudelaire exemplified the attempt to ‘decipher the features of a new 
experience’ (ibid), one that was not necessarily available to self-conscious reflection. In 
the poet’s engagement with the world of commodities, ‘maquillage – the supremely 
inexperiencible’ (Agamben, 1993: 41), the nouveauté that underpinned the experience of 
capitalist modernity was revealed. In Baudelaire’s poetry 
 
[…], the search for the ‘new’ does not appear as the search for a new 
object of experience; instead, it implies an eclipse and a suspension of 
experience. […] Estrangement, which removes from the most 
commonplace objects their power to be experienced, thus becomes the 
exemplary procedure of a poetic project which aims to make of the 
Inexperiencible the new ‘lieu commun’, humanity’s new experience. In 
this sense the Fleurs du Mal are proverbs of the inexperiencible.  
– 1993: 41-2 
 
The concept of distance had underpinned the desire of the bourgeois subject for the objects 
of its attention – distance was there to be overcome, and this lent it its ‘magic’ (Benjamin) 
or ‘attraction’ (Simmel). The role of the market had been to provide a mechanism for the 
manifestation and overcoming of a ‘consumer’ desire based upon the distance between the 
subject and object, and the technical means to this end was the money-form. The goods 
desired by the bourgeois subject, themselves, represented a means to the overcoming of an 
other form of distance; by conforming to the logic of self ‘improvement’ the acquisition of 
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these artefacts and experiences allowed a belief in the ‘civilising process’ of bourgeois 
capitalism (the recovery of the wisdom of the Ancients and the scientific promise of 
Utopia).  
 
However, as Agamben’s reading of Baudelaire makes clear, the satisfactions sought in this 
process of civilised ‘consumption’ are rendered impossible precisely because the 
‘experiences’ they are believed to embody are inexperiencible. The annexation of the 
contents of the world, via the market, is insufficient to support the teleological project of 
selfhood, the refinement of the individual ego, because the objects that constitute the 
contents of the world have been estranged from their causal origins. The bourgeois project 
of self-improvement is confounded because the means of attaining ‘experience’ is denied 
to them, just as ‘their power to be experienced’ is denied to the objects themselves 
(Agamben, 1993: 42). This disjunction, between the formal promise of a means for the 
attainment of experience and the impossibility of that attainment also appears in Lyotard’s 
discussion (1984; 1992) of the realm of aesthetic representation and its relation to the 
‘postmodern.’  Here the concept of the ‘unpresentable’ bespeaks a ‘sublime relationship of 
the presentable with the conceivable’ in which two modes of representation ‘often coexist 
almost indiscernibly in the same piece, and yet they attest to a différend [an 
incommensurable difference of opinion] within which the fate of thought has, for a long 
time, been played out – a différend between regret and experimentation’ (Lyotard, 1992: 
20).  
 
Lyotard’s modern aesthetic is an aesthetic of the sublime but it is nostalgic, invoking the 
unpresentable as absent content while its form offers consolation and pleasure. The 
postmodern aesthetic becomes ‘that which in the modern invokes the unpresentable in 
presentation itself, which refuses the consolation of correct forms, refuses the consensus of 
taste permitting a common experience of nostalgia for the impossible, and inquires into 
new presentations – not to take pleasure in them but to better produce the feeling that there 
is something unpresentable’ (ibid: 22-3). In this it is reminiscent of the failure of ‘tasteful 
consumption,’ epitomised by the civilising effects of the leçons de choses, to conjure a 




The Enlightenment belief in Progress signalled an orientation towards the future that 
implied never-ending innovation as the pre-condition of material improvement (Utopia), 
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the technological mastery of nature paralleled by a corresponding refinement of ‘civilised’ 
values. The movement from past to present to future possessed a logic of improvement, a 
‘temporal matrix’ possessed of three distinct characteristics: firstly, the valorisation of the 
present over the past, wherein it is ‘possible for an event to change its identity according to 
its shifting status in the advance of history as a whole’; secondly, an open, indeterminate 
future characterised by its transcendence of the present, as it becomes the past; thirdly, the 
disappearance of the ‘present’ into a moment caught between the shifting past and an 
indeterminate future, ‘the present as the identity of duration and eternity’ – a perpetual flux 
(Osborne, 1995: 14). Modernity became ‘the product, in the instance of each utterance, of 
an act of historical self-definition through differentiation, identification and projection, 
which transcends the order of chronology in the construction of a meaningful present’ 
(ibid). 
 
The experience of modernity thus became the experience of the new, of nouveauté: with 
the degree of novelty indicating the progress or development of any particular society or 
individual. Modernity, on this reading, was a movement towards a definite but undescribed 
telos, or as a movement away from its origin. It is within this context that Osborne sees 
modernity and tradition as intertwined but competing ‘forms of historical consciousness’ 
and, after Benjamin, consider ‘modernity [as] in principle a destruction of tradition: 
[which] involves the inauguration new forms of historical consciousness, of necessity’ 
(1995: 115). Modernity defines itself as the present against the past and as the 
contemporary against the traditional – in an act of negation. Tradition as the maintenance 
of continuity prioritises the past over both the present and the future, determining both. 
However, ‘the continuity of tradition requires a constant exercise of authority’ (1995: 130) 
in order that it transmit itself into the future and be preserved, possibly in material form or 
through the assumption of styles deemed ‘classic.’ 
 
For Benjamin tradition is the preservation of cultural experience, a form of memory, and 
part of a political and cultural project in which the collector, necessarily, plays a vital and 
committed role. Modernity’s ‘destructive’ interruption of tradition denies these traditional 
forms  the power to communicate ‘authentic’ historical experience (Erfahrung) into the 
future (our present) and implies an act of forgetting. Knowledge of the experience of the 
past is lost to the present, its absence acknowledged by a nostalgic evocation of tradition as 
the dialectic other of modernity. Benjamin’s (1968) exploration of this, in The Storyteller: 
Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov [1934], builds to a description of a present in 
which the forms for the transmission (communicability) of experience are ‘dying out’ 
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(Benjamin). Tradition is seen to fail, to be interrupted, leading to ‘a crisis in the 
communication of experience (Erfahrung), in memory…in the very possibility of historical 
experience’ (Osborne, 1995: 135). Epitomised by the catastrophe of WWI the ‘youth’ of 
the present generation are alienated from the experience of previous generations and 
inhabit a present that appears divorced from the past against which it asserts its existence. 
For the inhabitants of modernity, modernité means the ‘paradox of the modern’ the 
inexperiencibility of the forms that experience had previously assumed – and history, as 
the locus of time-honoured notions of identity, is felt as an absence.  
 
The novel as the record of bourgeois subjectivity offered a ‘biographical model of closure,’ 
which fractured ‘once the lives of individuals become increasingly dependent upon the 
mediations of impersonal social forms, the logics of which remain opaque’ (Osborne, 
1995: 136).  
 
The contradictions of modern life do not stop with the division between 
subject and object; subjectivity is itself fragmented, each ‘sphere’ 
threatening the self with its own impossible vision of the world. The 
synthesizing power of reason has somehow evaporated from everything 
human; pored out of the self and into the world of ‘real,’ objective 
relations, into the commodity form, and into the scientific conception of 
nature. The human subject, thus ‘liberated’ from its constraint, finds 
itself in a world of unlimited inner freedom.  
– Ferguson, 1992: 209 
 
The money-form and the objective culture it facilitated (Simmel, 1990) acted as material 
factors that transformed subjective experience: reason no longer inhabited the subjective 
sphere, marshalling its interaction with objective world, instead it served as a reified 
framework for existence in which individual subjective experience unfolded. The 
seemingly solid forms of understanding, knowledge and expression offered by traditional 
society came to be described as ‘information,’ analogous to an ‘economy of abbreviation, 
both semantic and temporal: it must be readily intelligible, immediately plausible, and 
most important of all – corresponding to the interruptive, amnesiac temporality of shock – 
it “lives” only at “the moment in which it is new” ’ (Benjamin, cited Osborne, 1995: 136).  
 
Benjamin considered the ‘collector’ as a figure of resistance and saw in his utilisation of 
the bourgeois intérieur a retreat from the ‘the social space of modernity’ (Abbas, 1988) 
and the domain of Erlebnis. Such interiors assumed ‘the character of fortification’ in their 
resistance to the transience of the world without; there existence itself was encased (Frisby, 
1988, 245-8). The intérieur was where the collector succumbed to ‘the sex-appeal of the 
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inorganic,’ while, simultaneously, attempting to strip objects of their commodity-character 
and to restate their particularity and their contemplation, as art. This attempt to re-insert 
objects back into a historical process, to prevent their descent into ‘information, relied 
upon a connoisseur’s knowledge of tradition and its role in production. For Benjamin, the 
‘consumer’ was opposed to the collector, since the former merely understood the 
commodity as information and the production process as a validation of origins under the 
sign of authorship (Barthes, 1978; Foucault, 1970b). The commodity’s appearance as 
‘information’ echoed the use of language by ‘ “the poet [who] for the first time faces 
language the way the buyer faces the commodity on the open market. He has lost his 
familiarity with the process of its production […].” In this quotation on language, 
“production” refers of course to sign production…. There is nothing urgent enough to 
require the coining of words; it is simply a matter of choosing among words that are 
already there in accordance with the poet’s taste. A “literature without an object,” a poésie 
pure, now appears, to find its culmination in Mallarmé’ (Abbas, 1988: 221). 
 
The activity of the collector – a politicised appreciation – appeared to deny the ‘reduction’ 
to information, to a phenomenon of the real of circulation and exchange, of the artefact. 
However, historically, the figure of the collector emerges contemporaneous with the mass 
production of goods and their appearance in the ‘spaces of consumption’ discussed in the 
previous chapter. It is the retreat from these ‘social space[s] of modernity’ (Abbas) – the 
department store or the museum – that allowed contemplation of their individual qualities, 
rather than their degree of difference: 
 
The more specific the classification […] the more the heterogeneity of 
things becomes manifest. The collector is confronted by fragments which 
are impossible to arrange into any conceptual or temporal order. Cultural 
history is unwittingly revealed as a history of ruin, randomness, and 
disorder.  
- Abbas, 1988: 222.  
 
The simultaneous existence of an ever-increasing range and variety of objects and 
experiences alongside their ever-diminishing significance for the modern subject 
(Agamben) meant that the collector represented a backward-looking, even nostalgic, 
tradition. For Benjamin, the collector is a politically charged figure whose actions are not 
solely derived from the pursuit of personal pleasure and who in the act of collecting 
opposes the dynamic of modernity that separates commodified objects from their ‘pre-
history’ and origin: the collector thus seeks to ‘serve life’ (Abbas, 1988: 223). 
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The collector assumed a transcendent, totalising and panoramic perspective (de Cauter, 
1993; Stewart, 1998) regarding the ‘fragments of modernity’ (Frisby), and attempted to re-
insert artefacts back into tradition, and so avoid a merely ‘antiquarian history’ (Nietzsche) 
born of an accumulation of objects or facts. The collector’s recovery of those objects, facts 
and moments that had failed to be included within the official, canonised and transmitted 
history (ibid: 224) represented an act of commemoration aimed at circumventing the 
‘paradox of the modern’ (modern experience’s failure to afford experience of modernity). 
For Benjamin, this was inspired by Bergson’s investigation of mémoire pure (or Proust’s 
mémoire involontaire) and the relationship between memory and experience. In the 
endeavour to reveal those aspects of experience that were unavailable to the operation of 
(conscious) memory, Benjamin adapted Freud’s concept ‘shock defense’ from Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle to ‘psychologize and also to historicize Proust’s concept of involuntary 
memory’ (Abbas, 1988: 227).   
 
This allowed the distinction between two categories of ‘experience’ – Erlebnis and 
Erfahrung – the former was available for conscious recollection, while the latter registered 
upon the body, physiologically, but not psychologically, beyond conscious recollection. 
The importance of writers such as Baudelaire and Proust for Benjamin lay in their ability 
to bring into the light of day the contents of memory (experience) and communicate these 
through artistic form, as image, as narrative. The collector and the storyteller are therefore 
linked in their narration of culture, epitomised for Benjamin by Edward Fuchs and Nikolai 
Leskov respectively. The task of such writers was to communicate experience in such a 
manner that resisted the reification of the social relations of the present and to re-insert 
such experiences into a historical tradition. The objects produced by writers, artists or 
collectors do not submit entirely to abstraction, to novelty: just like the chiffonier these 
writers recovered the detritus of modern culture and pressed it into (re)use. 
 
[…] the contrast between the [modern] mode of information and the 
mode of storytelling is analogous to the contrast between consciousness 
and memory: information is shot through with explanation and does not 
survive the moment when it is new, while the story arouses 
astonishment and thoughtfulness and is open to interpretation and 
renewal.  
– Abbas, 1988: 232 
 
In forms, such as the story or the collected object, the possibility exists for experience to 
survive the ‘moment,’ rather than become information. This assertion of qualitative 
difference, against ‘information’ as the formal equivalence of everything, opposes the 
experience of a continuous succession of moments differentiated only in their form and 
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degree of difference, nouveauté. The reduction to a quantitative expression of difference 
(utility) between objects is the ‘de-differentiation’ of experiences (Lash & Urry, 1994; 
Rojek, 1993) and asserts failure of traditional forms of experience, prompting a nostalgic 
yearning for the products of traditional social relations as the location of ‘authentic 
experience.’ 
 
However, Abbas (1988), by agreeing with Agamben that language is the repository of 
subjectivity, and that consciousness is effectively spoken, sees the possibility of 
transcending the dissolution of subjectivity into an infinite series of moments. Language 
exists as ‘a more or less synchronic differential structure – but it is a synchronic structure 
with a memory. In the folds of its differences, traces of real experience are preserved,’ and 
as such allow a ‘sense’ of experience (1988: 235). Language (and the image) allow the re-
presentation of the world (mimesis) and, therefore, its re-telling: the ‘collector’ is engaged 
in a textual politics of interrogation, critique and transmission. Whether the ‘memory’ of 
authentic experience that language affords is sufficient to provide anything more than a 





Each generation experiences the fashions of the one preceding it as the 
most radical antiaphrodisiac imaginable. In this judgment it is not so far 
off the mark as might be supposed. Every fashion is to some extent a bitter 
satire on love; in every fashion, perversities are suggested by the most 
ruthless means. Every fashion stands in opposition to the organic. Every 
fashion couples the living body to the inorganic world. To the living, 
fashion defends the rights of the corpse. The fetishism that succumbs to 
the sex appeal of the inorganic is its vital nerve. 
- Benjamin, 1999: 79 
 
The assumption, by the commodity-form, of the task of narrating temporality, the passing 
of time, is evident within the concept of fashion. Equally evident, however, is the implicit 
threat that all time, all temporality, might be reduced to the commodified items of any 
particular era. In the absence of a panoramic viewpoint from which to narrate historical 
events, or the maintenance of cultural rites and rituals to serve as markers of time’s 
passing, both history and biography appear complicated, even compromised. Modernity as 
a self-conscious interruption of continuity and opposition to tradition imperils the concept 
of ‘history’ understood as causal factor, prompting Osborne to term modernity ‘a form of 
forgetting’ (1995: 137). The overt historicism of Benjamin’s collector, therefore, provides 
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a specific response to the experience of modernité and the failure of tradition (Osborne, 
1995: 139). However, historicism, as an expression of appropriateness echoes the 
collector’s critique of the present, even as it betrays its class position and allegiance. The 
periodicising of historicism abstracts historical events and social relations into styles: 
fashion self-consciously does the same.  
 
In this way fashion becomes a means of narrating the moments that chart the movement 
from then to now. Modernity’s exorcising of tradition, or its hiving-off of such traditions 
from their origins through their modernisation, undermines such ‘rites of passage’ even as 
they linger on anachronistically in contemporary culture (think of the traditional Scottish 
wedding with kilts, invented in the nineteenth century by a culture seeking Romantic 
escape from industrialisation). ‘Souvenirs’ from the past, national, ethnic or individual – 
often collected – now form the core elements of the narrative of self – biography – that 
defines phenomenological experience. Attainment of twenty-one years no longer sees 
adulthood conferred by the ‘key to the door’ but a party much like the one that greeted 
eighteen years and will mark thirty, forty or sixty-five. Biography is now divided 
quantitatively rather than qualitatively, the ‘de-differentiation’ (Lash & Urry, 1994) of 
individual existence, when compared to the ‘authentic’ experience of societies distant in 
time and space, seems to infer an impoverishment:  
 
[…] In modern life, these transitions are becoming ever more 
unrecognizable and impossible to experience. We have grown very poor 
in threshold experiences. Falling asleep is perhaps the only such 
experience that remains to us. (But together with this, there is also waking 
up).  
– Benjamin, 1999: 494 
 
The surging of experience over every threshold that previously marked the stages of life is 
evidence of the changed material and temporal structures that pertain upon the ‘terrain’ of 
modern consumption. Additionally, the ‘decomposition’ of the bourgeois subject and the 
demise of the ‘biographical fiction of the self’ is the failure of the relation of desire 
expressed as the pursuit of pleasure (Ferguson) to deliver ‘experience.’ 
 
 
It is in this sense that the commodity-form is deemed to empty out the qualities of the 
objects, services and experiences of which it is comprised and re-present them as quantities 
of utility, so ‘destroying’ their particular form (Simmel). This is a consequence of the 
development of the mature money-form and the generalised relations of exchange that it 
 208 
ushers in (Mead): any specific instance of the commodity-form starts to look very like any 
other, one more ‘event’ of purchase and ‘consumption.’ This is what prompts Simmel’s 
discussion of both the blasé and the cynical individual, for whom objects tend to 
interchangeable. This is the reduction of ‘language’ to a synchronic, rather than a 
diachronic, structure (discussed by Abbas) and the loss of the ‘folds’ of memory. The 
‘emptying out’ of the relationship between subjects and objects, imputed to the money-
form, is the denial or destruction of ‘real’ experience, Erfahrung, as it has historically been 
conceived.  
 
Barber’s discussion of Tokyo shopping district, Shibuya and its ‘presiding deity,’ Hello 
Kitty, ‘the terminally innocuous red-and-white cat that endlessly holds one paw up in 
blithe greeting’ (2001: 29), demonstrates this process. Here the ‘hieroglyph’ (Marx) of the 
commodity absorbs language, images and logos within a new pseudo-linguistic experience 
(see also Richards, 1991), where entities such as Hello Kitty endorse ‘everything – and 
every human existence and act – without exception’ (2001: 31).  Such ubiquity reduces the 
elements of language – words, phrases and proverbs – to components of the brand 
experience, divorces them from their historical origins, in an attempt to codify difference 
in a short-hand manner for easy visual assimilation. English or French words juxtaposed 
alongside Japanese Kanji, arranged for immediacy and effect, leaving grammatical 
coherence behind: effectively, language is hollowed out and allowed to float free of any 
referent and subordinated to the imperative of ‘consumption.’ Such ‘foreign’ words are re-
presented as graphic elements in the construction and communication of the value of a 
commodity-experience. The commodity-form assumes a new temporal rhythm, a 
momentary pulse of ‘information’ directed at the distracted attention of a passing, 
prospective, ‘consumer,’ as language is conscripted into the presentation of novelty and 
production of nouveauté, as a means of signify difference, of individuating commodity-
events. 
 
Language assumes a literal ‘shop-window quality’ in which its ‘aesthetic productivity’ 
(Simmel) is its only defining feature: under such conditions ‘experience’ can be considered 
as reduced to inexperience communicating a fleeting ‘glimpse’ of utility to the ‘consumer.’ 
Consequently, the commodity-form ceases to be a bearer of ‘experience,’ considered in the 
historical sense, since its capacity to encapsulate the diachronic element of life is 
diminished in favour of its aesthetic impact. The commodity-form presents itself as a series 
of instants or events in which a brief ‘participation’ is afforded to the ‘consumer,’ 
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however, unless these ‘events’ form the basis of ‘peak moments’ (Charney, 1998) they are 
destined to escape memory and avoid communication. 
 
This is not an Exit 
Within the sphere of circulation and exchange the commodity-form provides a series of 
narrative-events that do not subscribe to the accepted view of use and utility, as inherited 
from a critical tradition that owes a great debt to bourgeois philosophy and capitalist 
economic theory. Instead, the communication of ‘experience’ is no longer accessible by 
the conscious subject; rather, it impacts upon the body as an aesthetic phenomenon or 
event. The parapraxes in which Freud saw traces of experience resurface are now only 
indexical reminders of the body and its corporeal participation in existence. Upon the 
‘terrain’ of modern consumption the urban fabric seems alive, with the digitally animated 
walls of buildings projecting hoardings and adverts.  
 
 
The technological innovations in communication media underpin the space-time of 
‘terrain,’ in an ‘era in which, thanks to the use of new means of communication 
(especially, television), everything tends to flatten out at the level of contemporaneity and 
simultaneity, thus producing a de-historicization of experience' (Vattimo, 1988: 10). The 
demise of spatial and temporal distance in an all-embracing simultaneity is the loss of the 
‘point’ outside space and time, beloved of Archimedes, Descartes, Bentham and Newton: it 
is the loss of the subject set apart from the object. 
 
[…] nihilism is the consumption of use-value in exchange-value. 
Nihilism does not mean that Being is in the power of the subject; rather, 
it means that Being is completely dissolved in the discoursing of value, 
in the indefinite transformation of universal experience.  
- Vattimo, 1988: 22 
 
Being, is now no longer considered distinct from the world it inhabits – and expressed 
through ‘possession,’ as being and having.  
 
The constant transmogrification of the body and its meaning is an acceptance of its 
paradoxical irrelevance and centrality: the body is the locus of subjective experience, the 
screen upon which experience (Erlebnis) registers and so it is ‘flattened’ (Vattimo) and 
made depthless, while, at the same time, it is subject to increasingly microscopic regimes of 
maintenance and refinement as Pilates, free-weights or the Atkins diet. The body itself, 
while maintaining its materiality (or emphasising it) simultaneously abstracts (becomes 
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ecstatic) and ceases to be stage upon which commodities can be ‘arranged’ (Baudrillard). 
The ‘forced extraversion of all interiority’ combined with the ‘forced introjection of all 
exteriority’ implied by the ecstasy of communication leads Baudrillard (1988: 26-7) 
towards a new pathology of the present. In place of hysteria, the ‘pathology of the 
exacerbated staging of the subject’ and paranoia, as ‘the pathology of organization,’ there 
arises, today, ‘a new form of schizophrenia – with the emergence of an immanent 
promiscuity and the perpetual interconnection of all information and communication 
networks.’ In their place comes a ‘terror’ born of ‘an over-proximity of all things, a foul 
promiscuity of all things which beleaguer and penetrate him’ crossing the physiological 
boundary of his body. Such a schizophrenic cannot ‘produce himself as a mirror’ (subject), 
instead he or she is subjected to ‘an absolute proximity’ and ‘instantaneousness with 
things,’ which denies the ‘limits’ needed to found a conventional experience of self.  
 
Identifying Selves 
Whether the unhinging of the self from the body in the form of ‘drift’ (Charney, 1998) or 
the ‘decomposition’ of the self in the impossibility of its realisation (Ferguson, 1990) the 
‘experience’ of modernity is that of an ‘empty present.’ For Charney cinematic narrative 
forms are crucial to the comprehension and representation of ‘the general condition of 
subjective experience in the loss of presence’ (1998: 7) of contemporary culture. Cinema 
represents a technology dealing in ‘moments, fragments and absent presents’; upon time’s 
passing and the narration of this movement as a series of durations. 
 
[Cinema combined…] an ontology of representation and an 
epistemology of drift. The absence of tangible present moments gave 
rise to a culture of re-presentation in which experience was always 
already lost, accessible only through retrospective textualization. Re-
presentation as a mode of experience took the form of drift, which 
transfigured empty presence into a new modern epistemology. Drift 
aimed to re-present the experience of vacancy, the lived sensation of 
empty moments, the consequence and corollary of empty moments.  
– 1998: 7-8 
 
Drift describes the experience of temporality in which there appears to be no telos or 
directionality, experience that appears divorced from the contextual factors that would 
previously have been held to produce it. Drift is both ontology and epistemology: as the 
experience of the absence of causality and a ‘modern means of grasping experience – both 
by failing to grasp it and by acknowledging the inescapability of that failure’ (Charney, 
1998: 19-20). The failure of the mind to capture and inhabit the present moment, to 
apprehend it fully, saw the experience of the ‘present’ passed off onto the body, and the 
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present experienced corporeally rather than cognitively. For Charney, this allows the 
circumvention of the mind-body duality, drift as a form of experience denies the 
distinction between sensual and cognitive experience. The body is not a site for the 
experience of the present, of the temporal flow in its totality (as he accuses Husserl, 
Heidegger and Bergson of believing), instead: 
 
Between presence and non-presence, between body and mind, between 
the strictly positive and the strictly negative – between any rigid 
polarity – drift intervenes. 
Drift is the experience of the empty present, the empty present rendered 
as experience. 
Drift is how the empty present makes itself felt. 
To you. 
Drift is as close as you can get to feeling the empty present.  
– 1998: 24 
 
Charney traces the representation of the ‘present moment’ from eighteenth-century 
painting to the multiple perspectives of Cubism – away from contemplation toward an 
immersion that is felt as much as considered, and which, in turn, leads to the articulation of 
‘a privileged moment that could acknowledge the impossibility of a privileged moment’ 
(1998: 37). This focus upon the moment, its duration and intensity, was a concern shared 
by post-Kantian aesthetics and neo-classical economics, both Walter Pater and the 
inheritors of the ‘marginalist revolution’ (Gagnier, 2000): 
 
The moment provided a means to conceive of a pleasure so intense that 
it tapers off as soon as it is first felt. […] This momentary bliss 
resembles traditional conceptions of the sublime; but beginning with 
Pater […] the sublime moment was redefined for modernity as fully 
fleeting and fully physiological, a conception of pleasure that eventually 
played in Roland Barthes’s poststructuralist theories of pleasure.  
– Charney, 1998: 43 
 
The moment as a temporal event is defined against the temporal flow of which it is 
nominally part and in this it echoes Bohrer’s (1994) formulation of the ‘sudden’ as the 
temporal form in which the aesthetic event occurs. The sudden moment appears divorced 
from causality, it is unforeseen, and, as such, it is the appearance of novelty, because it is 
removed from all the events against which it is now defined. In its unfamiliarity it frames 
‘a peak instant of insight, marked off from drift’ born of ‘its dialectical relation to the 
familiar’ which ‘wanes and soon evaporates once the momentary shock of this disruption 
is felt’ (Charney, 1998: 43-4). The cinematic close-up epitomises this apparently 
instantaneous elevation from the background to the foreground of an otherwise 
unremarkable detail and the brevity of the moment. 
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Breton’s description of ‘convulsive beauty’ and the cinematic close-up were both a modern 
technological manifestation of excitement, moments of ‘attraction’ that announce 
themselves within the aesthetic totality were now written into the fabric of modern 
experience, the charged counterpoint to the drift that surrounded and defined them 
(Charney, 1998: 47). The cinematic re-presentation of the world assigned correspondences 
and causality but it did so in an optical dimension, in ‘a space unconsciously interwoven’ 
(Benjamin, cited Buck-Morss, 1993: 267). The snapshot and the close-up both employ a 
technological mechanism to fragment and thereby arrest experience by denying the social 
relations that are the context of the moment, which meant that for Kracauer they were the 
mirror of a society which also sought to deny these historical factors (Frisby, 1988: 155-7).  
 
Modernity’s origin in the interruption of tradition and the consequent loss of the forms of 
transmission of experience that traditional societies utilised, the ‘aura’ or ‘story’ 
(Benjamin), sees these very forms enter modernity as fragments of an earlier age. These 
techniques for concentrating attention – Charney’s ‘peak’ moments – are absorbed into the 
lexicon of technological apparatuses, into the mass media, and lent their significance by 
their intensity and duration - by their interruption of the flow of events, their shock-value.  
 
The intensity of feeling that defines shock placed emphatic brackets 
around the heightened moment in which shock is felt. If our lives 
consist of a series of moments that pass away before we can recognize 
and acknowledge them, the moment of shock returns to our sensation 
and perception, and after these to our consciousness, the immediacy of 
the present moment even as it inexorably slips away. Shock jolts the 
modern subject into tangible reawareness of the presence of the present.  
– Charney, 1998: 48 
 
Stewart’s discussion of the souvenir now begins to resemble the material form assigned to 
‘peak moments’ that are recalled from the past rather than experienced in the present, 
increasingly, however, it is the photograph that ‘captures’ memory. The photograph with 
its dissemination of ‘a cheap loathing for history’ (Baudelaire) assumed the task of 
capturing ‘peak’ moments from personal biography, technologically. The human 
‘storyteller’ is replaced by an assemblage of techniques given objective form – the camera 
– and to it ‘a different nature speaks […] than to the naked eye’ (Benjamin, cited Buck-
Morss, 1993: 267). Technology assumes the task of recording and transmitting the 
‘moment’ in the form of re-presentation, a temporal event ‘saved’ from dissolution.   
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However, the evanescent temporality of the event is not simply recorded by technology, it 
is also produced by it. The ‘emphatic moment’ of (self-)awareness, of presence in the 
present, is defined against its absence, against ‘drift.’ The exciting potential of the moment, 
its acute tension, was, in itself a sought after engagement, whether it was the possibility of 
an erotic dalliance glimpsed in the eyes of a passing woman (Baudelaire) or the gambler, 
modern descendent of the flâneur (Benjamin), who haunted the gaming tables as his 
precursor had the arcades: in search of novelty, possibility and distraction. The formal 
emptiness of the card-game echoes the ‘emptiness’ of modern life, each moment 
determined by its specific contents – by the deformation into ‘space-time’ (Ferguson) and 
its events. Benjamin’s ‘modern Tantalus’ transforms 
 
[…] the arcades into a casino, a gambling hall where he places the red, 
blue, and yellow chips of emotion on women, on a face that appears 
suddenly – will it return to his gaze? – or a silent mouth – will it speak 
to him? That which looks out at the gambler from every number on the 
green cloth – happiness – here winks to him out of every woman’s 
body, as the chimera of sexuality: as his type.  
- Benjamin, cited Buck-Morss (1993: 103)  
 
In the exchange of money, especially in gambling, the present is tinged with the future, 
with possibility, with excitement. Conversely, purchase is the sacrifice of all other future 
(alternative) uses of the money-form, the sacrifice of all other exchanges in return for a 
desired and pre-calculated utility. Gambling, however, provides a moment in which future 
possibilities can be apprehended without necessarily being comprehended. This is its 
ecstatic potential; it encompasses the infinite variety of future consumption-events it might 
fund. What the camera or souvenir seeks to preserve or recover the wager seeks to tempt 
into being, the emphatic or ‘peak’ moment in which the self can experience itself. The 
gambler asks God for what the photographer captures – a moment removed from all others, 
a residuum. 
 
The possibility of manufacturing and undergoing a moment of ‘lived experience’ is also 
dramatised in Stanislavsky’s ‘method’ of acting, since rather than rehearsing or revisiting 
the ‘moment’ the actor seeks to inhabit it, re-presenting it anew in each performance. The 
production of these ‘present moments’ is the outcome of a selection process that aims to 
produce a character through a regime of psychic and physiological routines of discipline, 
concentration, observation, breathing and gesture aimed at presenting a ‘self’ for public 
‘consumption.’ Echoing Foucault’s ‘technologies’ for the production a self through habits 
and practices, and Seltzer’s (1992) ‘staging’ of the self as ‘personnation’ through 
commodities, Stanislavsky’s method generates ‘peak’ or ‘emphatic’ moments in similar 
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fashion to those created by the ‘close-up’ of the camera and often in tandem. ‘In the ideal 
Stanislavskian performance, the actor will seem to be a person living and discovering each 
moment freshly, as if for the first time’ (Charney, 1998: 59). Actor and character merge in 
‘an endeavor of identification,’ (ibid) rather than the production of an identity that is fixed 
and immutable.  
 
The narrative continuity (identity) implied in the linear organisation of temporal 
experience and the qualitative distinctions between the phases and periods (thresholds) of 
biographical narrative no longer culminate in maturity (Agamben). Instead the rites de 
passages of capitalist modernity, accessed through the commodity-form, bear no relation 
to biological age or social role: e.g. bungee jumping, drug use or social network site 
membership.  
 
In the moment arises the notion of groundless repetition, of re-
presentations shorn of an originary present. It is not that we cannot 
conceive re-presentation because the present can no longer exist; rather, 
we can conceive nothing but re-presentations. We can no longer sustain 
any distinction between presence and re-presentation, because presence 
is always already a re-presentation of a vanished presence. The present 
and the re-present are the same thing.  
– Charney, 1998: 63 
 
The production of the aesthetic experience of ‘selfhood,’ as a moment of self-
objectification, highlights the non-linear temporality of the endeavour: the ‘sudden’ 
interruption of drift allows the apprehension of a totality that is not always comprehended. 
Such ‘shock is not a matter of ever more eccentric new eccentricities,’ but the ‘result of 
contents of consciousness that have not yet been processed’ (Bohrer, 1994: 78). Such 
abrupt ‘experiences’ are inexplicable and playful modifications of the subject: they possess 
no teleological value and are unreasonable in that they have no obvious causality, and so 
reside in appearances (ibid: 120-1). The ‘sudden moment’ is not grasped rationally as a 
utilitarian value, by the faculty of intellectual understanding, but as an aesthetic 
phenomenon. Defined by their aesthetic impact and apparently free of causal origins, such 
‘sudden’ moments resemble the play-form of social interaction, sociability (Simmel); they 
appear accidental and fleeting, the basis of an experience of identification, rather than the 
building blocks of ‘identity.’ 
 
Making up Stories 
The centrality of narrative techniques and generic conventions to the structuring of 
experience will be explored further in Chapter Five. However, such an ordering and 
 215 
filtration of phenomenological experience indicates the ways in which modernity, as a 
cultural formation, is fundamental to the forms of subjectivity implied in modernité and 
modern consumption. Charney’s observation of a ‘cinematic spectatorship before the 
apparatus’ implies the existence of cultural and aesthetic technologies, such as those 
pioneered in the department store, geared towards a ‘serialisation’ of experience. The 
‘mobilised subjectivity’ (Friedberg, 1993) of the inhabitants of capitalist modernity, with 
its production of ‘elsewhere’ and ‘elsewhen,’ registered the episodic structuring of 
experience as a series of aesthetic events that ‘lie at the heart of the phenomenology of 
Modernity’ (Rojek, 1993: 216). The displacement of the ‘excess,’ of those ‘contents of 
consciousness that have not yet been processed’ (Bohrer), onto the body revealed a 
kinaesthetics in which modernité assumed two forms: firstly, structured experience, the 
outcome of adherence to rules, demands or concentration, which became attention; and, 
secondly, unstructured experience, free from such demands, this was distraction, and, like 
the contiguity of boredom and excitement (Benjamin) these are complementary and 
mutually-defining forms of narrating experience. 
 
The apparatuses in which the generation, direction and refinement of ‘attention’ were 
objectified, in the techniques of industrial machinery, placed the deliberate manufacture of 
physiological and psychological disorientation, vertiginous experience, at the heart of the 
modern form of attention – excitement. The spatial organisation of the fairground or 
amusement park machinery produced an accompanying intensity of experience 
disseminated across a variety of machinic opportunities for ‘pleasurable torture.’ For 
Caillois (2001: 26), this surpassed ‘mere distraction, corresponding as it does more to a 
spasm than an entertainment.’ The ‘seeds, snares, and lures of vertigo’ were found in these 
playgrounds. In this ‘world of excited and noisy throngs, a debauch of colour and light, of 
ceaseless and exhausting motion to the point of satiety,’ the proliferation of exciting, 
unusual and immersive experiences acquired their significance through their juxtaposition 
to the everyday.  
 
This vertiginous removal from the quotidian is a carefully designed and staged effect, a 
series of events that overwhelm reason and rationality and address the body directly as 
sensation, producing ‘many related forms of fascination designed to disorient, mislead, and 
stimulate confusion, anxiety, nausea, and momentary terror, quickly transformed into 
laughter […] a sudden transition from physical disorder to ineffable relief’ (Caillois, 2001: 
134). The ‘spaces of consumption,’ inhabited by the ‘mobilised subject’ (Friedberg, 1993) 
of a ‘cybernetic culture’ (De Cauter, 1993), utilised industrial technology to engineer peak 
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moments of shock experience possessed of a vertiginous intensity. Consequently, contra-
Benjamin, modernity is not charged moments pregnant with possibility but, rather, the 
‘empty moments’ that define these into existence: distraction rather then attention, 
epitomised by the entertainment technology of the cinema, prompted ‘the rise of re-
presentation; the body as the center of perception, sensation, attention, and mobility; and 
the interplay between the momentary and the continuous, figured through peaks and 
valleys as the structure of motion and attention.’ 
 
Modernity’s welter of stimulation made attention more crucial yet less 
feasible. In maneuvering through hazards and distractions, the modern 
subject’s forward motion was predicated on attention as a linear focus 
that carved a path through time and space. Attention was in this sense 
visual: it describes those sensations or events on which we choose to fix 
our gaze, leaving others on the edge.  
- Charney (1998: 82) 
 
The visual organisation of distracted attention was at the heart of modern consumption’s 
amalgam of pleasure and technology (Crary, 1995; Friedberg, 1993; Seltzer, 1992), which 
sought to ‘discipline’ the metropolitan body and its experiences (Foucault, 1970b; 1995; 
Massumi, 1993). The ‘author-function’ (Foucault, 1970b) was utilised as a means of 
organising experience, both as producer – the ‘imagineers’ of Walt Disney – and 
‘recipient, or consumer’ and sought to refute the possibility of reverie.  
 
The erosion of the threshold between intérieur and extérieur by the ‘spaces of 
consumption’ produced a space-time environment of distracted attention in which ‘drift’ 
was corralled into ‘consumer’ experiences, regardless of whether these were offered for 
sale or not. In the absence of flânerie, the individual is subjected to interpellation as a 
‘consumer’ within the sphere of circulation and exchange, from the department stores to 
the shopping malls and their successors, such as Times Square. 
The experience of modern consumption is arranged kinaesthetically and exemplified in 
cinema, the ‘demon child of the overstimulated modern environment’ using techniques 
such as parallel-editing and the close-up to define and structure a ‘new form of attention 
[…] the link between the structural form of fragmentation and the perceptual and 
experiential form of attention’ (Charney, 1998: 85-6). Modern consumption arises from the 
interplay of peak and drift and only resolves itself into ‘consumption’ when the subject is 






[…] the moment of encounter [forges] a sublime moment in which the 
subject would be transported by intense evanescent feeling. […] 
produced by an unexpected moment of encounter […] Stumbling […] 
across an unanticipated configuration of elements, the subject is without 
warning seized by acute feeling that fleetingly removes him or her from 
the drift of daily experience.  
– Charney, 1998: 109 
 
The commodification of experience, especially temporal experience as nouveauté, echoes 
in economic form the sublime moment of aesthetic experience and provides an opportunity 
for an episodic removal from everyday temporal experience, such as the adventure 
(Simmel) and the tourist experience (Rojek, 1993). The ‘inexplicability’ of such moments, 
the ‘eccentricity’ of experience (Bohrer), causes them to resist comprehension – with only 
those phenomena that can be recalled by conscious memory made available to the subject. 
The commodification of goods and experiences and the attendant emphasis upon 
nouveauté renders experience ‘less’ memorable, in the same way that Simmel sees it 
prompt a blasé attitude and cynicism. In this way commodified experience ceases to serve 
as a prompt to maturity and the acquisition of experience in the sense described by 
Agamben (1993). 
 
So, knowledge of the self ceases to be the result of the teleological production of identity 
and becomes, instead, the experience of a series of apparently sublime moments of self-
identification (Charney, 1998: 109; Seltzer, 1992). The techniques of cinematic production 
now provide a vocabulary for the ‘manufacture’ of the experience of self, rooted in the 
temporal experience of difference. Here Charney’s (1998) description of cinematic 
spectatorship echoes Marx description of the commodity-form within the sphere of 
circulation in that representation is a re-presentation, and ‘reality’ as either origin or 
referent is divorced from ‘pure semblance. […] the phenomenon of a process taking place 
behind it' (Marx, 1973: 255). In both cases there is technological mediation that ‘frames’ 
this process, either the cinematic apparatus or the capitalist money-form, since both allow 
images of value to circulate and create the juxtapositions that allow sublime moments of 
self-awareness.  
 
Cinema’s annihilation of space within time echoes the wider experience of modernity by 
prising objects free from the historical processes that produced them. The drama of the edit 
or the close-up replicates the focus of the gelled light of a department store window (see 
Kiesler, 1993); the carefully crafted scene echoes the artfully-arranged tableaux of the 
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window-dresser. Cinema could use its ‘kino-eye’ (Vertov) in the search for a truth revealed 
by the camera or it could revel in its exploration of the visual possibilities of representation 
and offer ‘a hedonistic immersion in the present tense of experience’ (Charney, 1998: 127). 
Only in the self-objectifying moment is that immersion overcome: 
 
Through vertical montage, the viewer can appropriate momentary 
constellations of meaning as anchors in the film’s drifting mobility. 
Eisenstein’s theory ultimately suggested that cinema reflected the loss 
of presence by destabilizing a fixed center and by replacing it with a 
spectatorial drift that exploited putative moments as both the result of 
the collisions of montage and the sites of ‘vertical’ meaning.  
– 1998: 131 
 
Therefore, narrative progression, the subjective experience of temporality, proceeds via the 
principle of montage, in which the juxtaposition (combination of two images or events 
generates a third). Therefore, the subject does not extend itself ‘spatially’ – proceed by 
prosthesis (Shaviro, 1997) – but re-formulates itself in space-time. In the language of 
Latour (2001) the ‘monad’ is re-(de)fined by the changing relation between being and 
having as the moments of experience change the material of its constitution. The subject, 
therefore, experiences itself as a ‘self’ only under certain conditions – either the 
ideological interpellation required by ‘consumerism’, or the fleeting manifestation offered 
by the technological sublime of capitalist modernity. The subjective experience of self is, 
effectively, a re-presentation afforded as the subject moves ‘along a horizon of 
transformation and metamorphosis’ (Charney, 1998: 138) in which the ‘totality’ of identity 
is only ever glimpsed.  
 
The Accident-Event 
For Massumi (1993) this intersection of subjective experience and capitalist commodity-
form reveals the role of the ‘accident-event (and its avoidance)’ within contemporary 
culture. Under contemporary capitalism the relationship between the subject-form and 
commodity-form, is the hinged mechanism by which the ‘specific identity’ of individual 
‘consumers’ emerges from their latent, ‘generic’ identity as human beings. The ‘hinge-
commodity’ secures phenomenological experience in a present-tense that is constructed 
(wedged) between time-gone and time-to-come; the commodity-form, and its individual 
incarnations come to embody time. Not unlike Charney, Massumi sees the subjective 
response to such a ‘landscape’ or terrain as banality mixed with excitement, moments of 
biographical clarity in which the ‘self’ swims into view as de-familiarised instants that 
betray the absence of selfhood from everyday existence. In such moments the body is 
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made ‘real’ to itself again, it retreats from the ‘field of immanence’ and ceases 
momentarily to be virtual (discursively implied), merely the locus of potentiality. 
 
Subjective experience is shaped by involvement with the commodity-form and ‘being,’ as 
becoming, is determined by the interplay of emotion and character as the response to the 
determinations of life by the power mechanisms and commodity relations of the 
‘uninhabitable landscape of fear.’ In a later discussion, Massumi (2003) is keen to avoid a 
deterministic reduction of subjective experience to the consequences of socio-economic 
conditions and the prevailing power-relations. He describes the ‘affective possibilities’ of 
the moment and the ‘potential’ or possibilities afforded by participation in social 
interaction and, particularly, the commodity-form. Thus, ‘affective intensity,’ by linking 
the mind and body through the experience of being, becomes the means by which the 
body’s movement from one unit of temporal duration to another becomes the embodied 
experience of transition and all its (virtual) possibilities.  
 
A body doesn’t coincide with itself. It’s not present to itself. […] 
bringing its past up to date in the present, through memory, habit, reflex 
[…] means you can’t even say that a body ever coincides with its 
affective dimension. It is selecting from it, extracting and actualising 
certain potentials from it. [Affect, broadly, is] what remains of the 
potential after each or every thing a body says or does – as a perpetual 
bodily remainder. […] this perpetual remainder is an excess. […] a 
reserve of potential or newness or creativity that is experienced 
alongside every actual production of meaning in language or in any 
performance of a useful function – vaguely but directly experienced, as 
something more […]  
– Massumi, 2003: 4 
 
Reminiscent of both Charney on ‘drift’ and Pater’s formulation of the sublime (Gagnier, 
2000: 144-5), the bodily immersion in the experience of the present is expressed as the 
realisation of what had been potential and its affect upon the body and subjective 
experience. Therefore, experience is irreducible to the activities participated in and, 
contra-consumerism, there is no means to purchase experience directly – only an 
engagement or participation that affords the possibility of experience. For Pater this 
translates into a discriminating taste, akin to the economic theory of the period, in which 
judgement underpins an aesthetics of experience, which is capable of modifying the 
subject rather than ‘returning to zero,’ by satiating needs or wants in accordance with 
economic theory. Instead, the body is stolen away in ‘abduction’ (borrowed from C. S. 
Peirce), an immersion in the moment – ‘the passing awareness of being at a threshold’ – a 
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physiological register of experience that becomes part of a process of becoming (Massumi, 
2003: 5). 
 
The abstraction, re-presentation and communication of experience is also the precondition 
of ‘singularities of experience’ that in their ‘affective movements’ (intensity) convey the 
plenitude within which the individual is (virtually) immersed. Experience is thus given 
form in order that it can be consciously understood, narrated and communicated, while its 
aesthetic form contributes to the ‘affective potential’ that it may possess – its capacity to 
generate a moment of self-awareness within the subject. Simmel, in discussing sociability 
as the play-form of sociation, sees the adherence to certain rules (or formal properties) as 
necessary for the pleasure derived from the ‘departure’ from reality this allows. ‘Abductive 
participation’ as the phenomenal form of ‘experiencing the eventfulness and uniqueness of 
every situation,’ of ‘navigating movement’ (transition), ‘surfing the situation’ rather than 
‘commanding or programming it’ (Massumi , 2003: 7), resembles Simmel’s account of 
sociability, which ‘in its pure form has no ulterior end, no content, and no result outside 
itself […]’ (1997: 255).  
 
The ‘affective connection’ and ‘abductive participation’ offered in such moments leads 
Massumi to reformulate the relations of power between the individual and society as ‘a 
politics of belonging instead of a politics of identity, of correlated emergence’ rather than 
‘separate domains of interest attracting […] or colliding in predictable ways.’ In describing 
a disciplinary power that ‘produces not so much repressions as regularities’ (Massumi, 
2003: 9), which (in)forms the production of experience, of individuals Massumi could be 
talking about ‘consumerism’ as a means for individuals to ‘personate’ themselves in the 
manner described by Seltzer. The staging of self is rooted in (and routed through) 
‘exciting’ experiences and ‘experienced’ as an ‘aesthetics of consumption’ (Seltzer, 1992). 
The discourse of ‘consumerism’ and its teleological project of identity-building, through 
the annexation of commodities by the individual, relies upon the commodity-form 
delivering an amount of experience equivalent to its quantitative expression – its price. 
Therefore, within a consumerist discourse the purchase of an experience is assumed to 
equate to the incorporation of that experience within the identity-project as a contribution 
to the formation of a unique ego. 
 
Therefore, even the most radical, oppositional or unusual activity can be recuperated by the 
discourse of ‘consumerism’ and offered in exchange as a commodity, in the form of an 
event or ‘shock-experience.’ This is especially the case in a ‘network’ economy that tends 
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towards the immaterial and the experiential, and in which commodities are often 
assemblages of various copyrights and intellectual property purchased (hired) for the 
‘bundle of functions’ they embody. In this sense, interaction ‘experiences’ rather than 
objects are purchased, as ‘ways of affecting and being affected,’ for their re-presentation of 
‘use-value’ and its possible incorporation into a lifestyle project. In this way, the ‘affective 
possibilities’ of any object or experience are reduced to the service they perform within the 
production of identity, rather than understood as the incremental re-formulation of the 
relationship between being and having (Latour, 2001).  
 
Consequently, the ‘traditional’ distinction between Erfahrung and Erlebnis can be viewed 
as a nostalgic conception born of the conjunction of bourgeois philosophy and utilitarian 
psychology found in capitalist economic theory. The dialectical distinction necessary to 
describe contemporary forms of engagement with the capitalist consumption-relation are 
founded not in conceptions of utility but in the subjective forms of phenomenological 
experience, particularly in the experience of temporality. The on-going attempt at the 
colonisation of subjective experience by the ‘space-time’ of the capitalist sphere of 
circulation and exchange has produced a ‘terrain’ upon which either the teleological 
narrative project of the self, as ‘identity,’ or the dynamic constellation of the relation 
between being and having coalesces as identification. The search for a stable ‘consumer 
identity’ proceeds ‘by prosthesis’ (Shaviro, 1997), by the annexation of quantities of utility 
expressed as the qualities of objects, services and experiences. However, the ‘terrain’ of 
modern consumption born of the generalised relations of exchangeability (Mead) and the 
informational and ‘chronically mediatized’ money-form (Dodd, 1994) retains the promise 
and the possibility of unquantifiable qualia possessed by ‘experience.’ Indeed, Wikipedia’s 
succinct description of qualia as the ‘properties of sensory experience’ emphasises this.  
 
The seeming ubiquity of the ‘capitalized accident-form’ has rendered ‘virtual’ and 
immanent the stable boundaries and thresholds previously used in the demarcation of self, 
identity and subjective experience (Massumi, 1993: 27). The traversing of these is now 
recognised retrospectively, the rites and rituals that once narrated biography have been 
commodified – as potential experiences – that can only be ‘experienced’ after they have 
been ‘consumed,’ that is, once they have been subsumed within the project of ‘consumer 
identity’ and lifestyle. Only then can a conjunction of the commodity experience and the 
biographical event be subjectively grasped – otherwise the celebration of a birthday is 
merely a clutch of screaming children being driven around Glasgow city centre in a stretch 
limousine; or a hen-night hanging out of a converted fire-engine being chauffeured by a 
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scantily clad ‘fireman’ – just one more possible commodity-event available to anyone. 
This interplay between the commodity-form, as generalised exchange, and the generic 
human being, understood as ‘consumer,’ represents a site of production – governed by 
immaterial practices – prisons without walls and factories without gates.  
 
What emerges with the project of consumer-as-identity is a set of disciplinary practices and 
technologies, ‘check mechanisms’ (Deleuze), which structure ‘experience’ through the 
access (Rifkin, 2000) conferred, rather than limited, by the admixture of monetary wealth, 
class position and the asymmetries of power operating within contemporary society: it is 
empowerment. In lieu of traditional rites of passage twenty-first century capitalism power 
confers rights of passage – of movement as the means to ‘access’ variegated forms of 
experience. This is the ‘virtualization’ of the boundary or threshold (Massumi, 1993: 28) as 
a series of ‘local rigidifications’ that serve to delineate and demarcate the range of possible 
experiences within the ‘consumer’ model of identity. This occurs precisely because this 
model seeks to identify such commercially attained ‘experience’ with the shock-experience 
provided by capitalism (Erlebnis) given the impossibility of authentic experience under 
such socio-economic conditions (Erfahrung).  
 
New Life: Conclusion 
‘Consumption’ as the ‘essence’ of a modernity built upon the refinement of the self 
through the exercise of discriminating taste and judgement (Gagnier, 2000) represented the 
subordination of aesthetic experience to utilitarian considerations. The differentiation of 
the individual through personal distinction was that aspect of the bourgeois project of 
selfhood that was co-opted within the discourse of ‘consumerism.’ This relied upon the 
narration of personal biography as the pursuit of commercially produced goods – 
commodities – and a nostalgic evocation of a world and a conception of humanity that had 
existed prior to these social arrangements. The ‘consumer’ is the inhabitation of a 
discursive position founded in the complicated arrangement of time past with time to 
come, of a longing for what was but is no longer, a desire for this past based solely on its 
perceived absence. The ‘consumer’ longs for the overthrow of the socio-economic 
conditions that oblige s/he to live as a ‘consumer’ without realising that this is only 
impossible because these Arcadian or Utopian conditions have never prevailed (and so 
have never ‘gone away’).  
 
Consequently, contemporary formulations of the self, as ‘consumer,’ retain the conception 
of the individual as a biographical project that ‘proceeds by prosthesis’ (Shaviro), through 
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the annexation of commodity-experiences via the market as the means to narrate 
biography; to conceptualise the subjective experience of temporality. The consumer-self is 
a discursive and disciplinary phenomenon achieved through the ‘exercise’ of personnation, 
the presenting of the ‘self’ to the subject (Seltzer, 1992) as the outcome of effort expended 
and commodities ‘consumed.’ The subject-self, therefore, is a discursive position that has 
emerged in conjunction with and simultaneously to the capitalist production, distribution, 
circulation and exchange of goods. However, it is not simply a reductive and deterministic 
consequence of commodity-exchange and the relations of production and exchange, human 
beings, after all, make their own history but not under the conditions of their own choosing 
(Marx).  
 
It is useful to consider Massumi’s formulation and development of both the constraints and 
the ‘affective possibilities’ that emerge and co-exist with the social and economic relations 
of contemporary capitalism. If the teleological narrative of the consumer-self, identity as 
outcome of ‘consumption,’ is seen as an inadequate formulation then an alternative 
analytical device must be advanced. If the individual is considered as ‘a checkpoint trigger 
and a co-producer of surplus-values of flow,’ the ‘consumer’ is merely one possible 
subject-position, while the relations of power that operate within contemporary capitalism 
can be viewed as ‘manipulating [the] affective dimension rather than dictating proper or 
normal behaviour (Massumi, 2003: 14). In this way the ‘disciplinary power’ of Foucault 
proliferates even as it evaporates, assuming less material forms that simultaneously 
confirm and confound, ‘imitate and invent’ (Tarde), forms of behaviour and modes of 
experiencing. 
 
The daily regimens of production and ‘consumption’ merge in the ‘biographical fiction of 
the self’ (Ferguson, 1990) epitomised in the hygienic routines of the gym (Bauman, 2001: 
9-29) and their associated endorphin rush. It is in this sense that the ‘consumer’ is a 
narrative project under constant revision, it is a teleological pursuit composed of an 
apparently never-ending series of commercially attained and commodified events, or 
durations, the goal of which is ‘identity.’ The consumer-self is, therefore, a discursive 
device aimed at engineering a formal response to the threat represented by the myriad 
instances of the commodity-form and the possibilities it comprises. The production of the 
‘consumer’ as self-identity allows the maintenance of a stable, if impermanent, subjective 
formation capable of engaging with the ‘representation of limitlessness’ through the 
‘super-added thought of its own totality’ (Kant, cited Frisby, 1992: 143). In doing so, it 
reveals its origins in the nostalgic desire for the forms of experience it considers absent. 
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If, on the other hand, this reduction of the possibilities of becoming to the ‘local 
rigidifications’ (Massumi) of ‘consumer identity’ is rejected in favour of a description of 
the subject of capitalist modernity as the possible site for constant change and 
modification, then modern consumption seems a more appropriate term. Here the 
‘isomorphic’ relationship between the contemporary subject-position and the capitalist 
commodity-form ensures that subjective experience emerges from a dynamic and ceaseless 
process of interaction of ‘becoming,’ the relationship between being and having. Here 
identification replaces ‘identity,’ a process of perpetual transformation and complex 
temporal logic. The ‘hinged’ relation between subject and commodity-form (Massumi, 
1993) underpins the experience of ‘elsewhere and elsewhen’ (Friedberg, 1993) based upon 
the ‘virtuality’ of the subject in relation to the possibilities presented by the commodity-
form. The concept of the human individual as a specific identity is taken to an extreme, in 
which each human being moves from a being-specific to a multiple becoming-singular of 
the specific’: each subject is not only a ‘different’ individual but also a different type of 
individual.  
 
Consequently, the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption is composed of and experienced by a 
collectivity that is increasingly internally differentiated, a ‘changing constellation’ of 
‘singularized members,’ each a ‘species’ of which there is ‘only one living specimen’ 
(Massumi, 1993: 33). Such an extreme formulation of subjective difference is 
diametrically opposed to the presumption of shared experience that underpins theories of 
the bourgeois self and the construction of ‘consumer identity’ through the pursuit of 
lifestyle projects. ‘Consumerism’ presumes that since we can all buy identical mass-
produced goods we can all share (access) the same experiences, at the same time that it 
produces social differentiation through operation of individual, but necessarily never 
unique, taste.  
If simulation is the concrete irruption of a singular creature, fabulation 
is the abstraction of its example – an example exemplifying nothing 
(other than singularity).  
– Massumi, 1993: 34 
 
Movements of simulation (the activation of the pure copy, of the copy 
as such: deviation) and fabulation (the emission of the pure example, 
the exemplary as such: attraction) are two indissociable, mutually 




This first movement is ‘simulation’ the production of a ‘copy without a model’ (the 
individual as conceived of by Humanism); the second is ‘fabulation,’ the ‘production of a 
model without a copy’ (the ‘singularly mutated’). Simulation is a ‘becoming-singular’ and 
becoming-singular is ‘becoming a species of one,’ so ‘simulation can be thought of as the 
birth of a monster’ (Haraway): monstration. 
 
The dynamic that fuels this unpicking of the stable ‘consumer’ identity is the particular 
temporality of modern consumption born of the ‘isomorphic’ relation between subject and 
commodity-form. What Massumi terms ‘unlimited potential: virtuality unbound’ (1993: 
33) is exactly the proliferation of possibility, of experience in potentia, which is constituted 
by the inter-relation of subject and commodity-form (and which the subject-position of 
‘consumer’ seeks to deny). Therefore, the encounter or co-presence of subject and 
commodity-form is the means by which temporal experience is generated ‘suddenly’ 
(Bohrer) and momentarily, as a succession of durations, which as durées (Bergson) are 
qualitative and incommensurable phenomena (Deleuze, 1991). The dynamic temporal 
logic revealed in Massumi’s discussion of the relation between subject-position and 
commodity-form echoes Charney’s description of the ‘dialectical relation’ between ‘drift,’ 
as the familiar, and a ‘peak moment’ of self-awareness (Charney). 
 
The “individual” or actualised capitalist subject is the spark ignited, at 
the buying site/being site, by the friction between the generic and 
specific conditions of consuming existence […] Becoming is a cascade 
of simulations and fabulations that overspills buying. The dividual is 
fundamentally without purchase. It is a becoming-singular that exceeds 
specification, conjoined with a becoming-generic that splinters the form 
of identity.  
– Massumi, 1993: 35 
 
However, this process of cascading ‘becoming’ threatens to dissolve the nostalgic longing 
that underpins the bourgeois sense of self, and its desire for completion through the 
‘consumption’ of authentic ‘experience,’ by exacerbating the temporal dislocation between 
past, present and future. In formulating subjective experience at the intersection of being 
and having as the expression of a mutated singularity (unique becoming), the concept of 
modern consumption appears to undermine the concept of shared experience. If this is the 
case, then the problem of memory, individual and collective, and its conscious recollection 
seems to dissipate and become an unconscious set of ‘contents’ that may or not be 
accessible for recollection. 
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It is this apparent ‘decay of memory’ (Klein, 1997: 13) that produces the games of 
‘Playland’ (Agamben, 1993), played by those who have forgotten the rituals of traditional 
society, but whose ability to (re)produce themselves is not in doubt. For Klein (1997: 305-
11), ‘the alienation of memory’ makes capitalist modernity into a repository for 
‘impressions’ that underpin an unattainable ideal – that of an uncomplicated relationship 
with reality, its representation and comprehension. The revolutionary task of Benjamin’s 
collector is now revealed as simply a radical expression of bourgeois nostalgia, a 
hankering after a world that never was, imagined as the world (somehow) to come. 
Massumi recognises the implications of this state of affairs when he asserts: 
 
Yearning is the becoming-for-itself of the subject whose being-in-itself 
was bought. It is not an emotion (the content of a specific identity) nor 
even an affect (the inherence of an emotion in the body), but free-
floating affectivity: uncontained ability to affect and be affected. 
Yearning is a tendency without end; it is unexpiring, unself-consuming. 
It is a supplementarity of paradoxical movements, a kind of excess that 
is neither identified nor calculated, even fleetingly, let alone purchased 
or accumulated – that can be only embodied.  
– Massumi, 1993: 35-6 
 
‘Yearning’ appears here as pure potential, ‘free-floating affectivity,’ the phenomenological 
capacity for experience – the being-of-becoming – and the failure of the capitalist 
consumption-relation to reduce experience to a physiological capacity or emotional state. 
Yearning represents a contradiction in the capitalist ‘regime of subjectification’ (Guattari, 
1995) precisely because it affords the ‘incarnation of singularizing excess’ (Massumi), a 
surpassing of the capitalist ontology. The temporal dynamic to which human beings are 
subject on the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption, understood as the constant re-iteration of 
the movement from simulation to fabulation, describes the possibility of becoming ‘un-
human’ and so failing to be interpellated within the ideological and material structures of 
‘consumerism.’ 
 
In this way the temporal dynamic of capitalist modernity can be seen as having given birth 
to the subjective expression of a nostalgic longing and its attendant desire for completion, 
through the recovery of ‘authentic’ experience or the construction of new forms of ‘real’ 
experience. However, capitalist modernity also contained within it the ‘seeds, snares, and 
lures of vertigo’ (Caillois, 2001), the hallmarks of Massumi’s ‘yearning,’ and the antithesis 
of bourgeois nostalgia. Crucially, what is revealed is the appearance of this temporal 
dynamic within both the material and technological structures of capitalist modernity and 
its manifestation within the phenomenal forms of subjective experience: truly, the human 
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subject and the capitalist commodity-relation are ‘hinged,’ although not exactly in the 
manner described by Massumi (1993). Capitalist modernity ‘brought forth’ (in a quasi-
Heidegger-ian manner) both the subject-position of ‘consumer’ and the ‘subject’ of 
modern consumption; the former as a traditional/progressive political position, the latter as 
a transgressive ‘failure’ of the former.  
 
For both manifestations of the subject-position within capitalist modernity the relationship 
of past, present and future was central to the phenomenological forms of subjective 
experience and to the transmission of this experience in narrative form. The temporal logic 
of modernity, experienced as modernité, was ‘afforded’ by the apparent break with history 
(for instance, Fritzsche, 2002) or its nostalgic evocation (Stewart, 1998) while, 
simultaneously, that same modernity offered a surfeit of commodity objects, services and 
experiences. This juxtaposition of the absence of ‘real’ experience and the ubiquity of 
‘consumption’ opportunities, facilitated by the mature money-form and mass-production, 
either signalled the failure of Enlightenment values and the Progress they had embodied, or 
it entailed the need to re-think what being ‘human’ would mean in capitalist modernity. 
The spatial experience of distance, which was transformed by department stores, railways, 
steamships and paper money, mirrored the temporal experience of ‘distance, which was 
transformed by concepts such as Erlebnis and Erfahrung, telecommunications and 
widespread access to purchasing power (credit).  
 
The space-time ‘terrain’ of modernity does not resemble the traditional landscape or its 
panoramic representation; it does not correspond to a nostalgic evocation of reality defined 
by Adamic nominalism and the mapping of sign to referent. Consequently, the possibility 
of mis-representation emerges, of a spatial or temporal distance between the thing-in-itself 
and its re-presentation in narrative form (since it is absent and inaccessible to experience). 
Contemporary modernity, therefore, seems to embody an excess over reality, an 
inauthenticity or surfeit in which a surpassing of ‘reality’ is counterbalanced by an 
‘unconditional presentness’ (Simmel, 1997 [1911]). In modernity, the ‘present’ is both 
unavoidable and understood as somehow unavailable to subjective experience. Nostalgic 
desire for ‘authentic’ experience, the yearning for an unquantifiable experience of being 
and the interplay of ‘drift’ and ‘peak moments’ are now revealed as arising from the 
temporality of modernity. Further, because of this contradictory temporal logic, of 
proximity and unattainability, experience is inexplicable within the usual causal 
framework: it is ‘sudden,’ unpredictable and pregnant with ‘affective possibilities 
(Massumi, 2003), more akin to ‘play’ than the structured experience of work. It is to the 
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role of play as the means of comprehending causality within capitalist modernity and its 
consequences for the phenomenological forms of subjective experience that the following 






Chapter Five – PROFANE PLAY  
 
Property is exchanged, but no goods are produced…. Nothing has been 
harvested or manufactured, no masterpiece has been created, no capital has 
accrued. Play is an occasion of pure waste: waste of time, energy, 
ingenuity, skill, and often of money for the purchase of gambling 
equipment or eventually to pay for the establishment. 
- Caillois, 2001: 5-6 
 
Introduction 
Sociological explanations of ‘consumption’ have tended to extend analyses born of the 
realm of production to the sphere of circulation and exchange, notably the abstraction and 
generalisation of homo œconomicus to explain the ‘consumer,’ ‘consumer activity’ or 
‘consumer society.’ The failure to comprehend the qualitative transformation that occurs 
when the sphere of circulation and exchange morphs into the ‘terrain’ of modern 
consumption has meant an inability to appreciate the accompanying shift in the forms of 
phenomenological experience available to the subject. The historical and material 
processes that comprise this alteration in the nature of experience possess a spatial 
(Chapter Three) and a temporal (Chapter Four) aspect. In addition to the emergence of this 
distinctly modern form of phenomenal experience (modernité) of space and time there 
emerges an associated and complementary change in the subjective appreciation of 
causality. The ‘events’ that occur upon the terrain of modern consumption appear causally 
inexplicable within the confines of the rationality of the bourgeois world view, more 
closely echoing the description of ‘strangeness’ offered by quantum mechanics (Ferguson, 
1990). In place of the Newtonian physics of universally applicable laws, which explained 
the operation of empirical ‘reality,’ it is the concentration of affect in the ‘event’ and its 
subjective observation that appears to ‘describe’ experience. This circumvention of 
temporal progression (history) and spatial proximity (thermodynamic force) render the 
contents of subjective experience ‘sudden’ (Bohrer) and mysterious. Modern consumption 
and its terrain appear to exist independent of the temporal, spatial and causal relations 
which previously constituted ‘reality.’ This seeming ‘irrationality’ of modern consumption 
is what removes it from the realm of production and its teleology, re-presenting it as a 
‘playful’ phenomenon.  
 
This chapter argues that modern consumption must be viewed as the ‘play-form’ of the 
capitalist consumption-relation, which emerges under certain material and historical 
conditions, and defies the rational and utilitarian analyses inspired by the philosophical 
anthropology of economic theory. The economic emphasis upon the subject as ‘consumer’ 
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and user of utility is rejected and the attendant belief in ‘consumer demand,’ derived from 
these assumptions, as the cause of consumption-activity is refuted. Instead, modern 
consumption is seen as floating ‘free’ of a putative reality, born of the social relations of 
production, and rooted in a purely aesthetic engagement with the products, services and 
experiences contained within the contemporary capitalist commodity-form. Modern 
consumption, therefore, is closer to fiction than to ‘fact’ and defined against a normative 
view of reality. Consequently, participation in modern consumption implies a removal 
from the spatial, temporal and causal relations of such a reality and prompts the 
formulation of a vocabulary capable of expressing the subjective experience of such a 
phenomenon. 
 
A conjunction or affinity between capitalist modernity, as social formation, and the subject 
of modern consumption is asserted on the basis that both share an ‘organising principle.’ 
Specifically, modernity is defined as the interruption of the continuity and tradition that, 
tautologically, it interrupts: modernity is created through its suspension of its historical 
antecedent. Modernity considered as the interruption of historically prior forms of spatial, 
temporal and causal experience is seen to complicate the representation, narration and 
communication of subjective experience. In doing so the nouveauté and modernité 
discussed in the previous chapter can be linked to the transformation in spatial experience 
described in Chapter Three and extended into the analysis of causality found in the current 
chapter.  
 
The bourgeois belief that history had been denuded of its teleological progress while 
contemporary society was ‘out of Nature’ (Burke) and removed from the tradition and 
continuity that had underpinned the forward movement of history prompted a nostalgic 
longing for what was ‘absent.’ This resulted in the bifurcation of experience, as Erlebnis 
and Erfahrung as a response to the perceived alienation of the bourgeois ego. However, 
this nostalgia did provide a means of ‘staging’ the ‘magic of distance’ and articulating the 
causal logic of bourgeois identity – desire as the cause of self-development and 
psychological refinement with the measure of progress attained revealed in the preferences 
of ‘consumer’ choice. This commodity-based staging of the self, its ‘personnation’ 
(Seltzer, 1992), allowed the social stratification of desire as the display of taste and 
distinction. Commodities served as representations, as re-presentations of inner 
experience, through their production of a ‘mirror-image’ of the self (Baudrillard, 1988). 
However, such strategies of self-representation were inherited from a pre-industrial era 
prior to the mass-productions of goods, the ‘democratization of luxury’ (Williams, 1982) 
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in the department stores and the generalisation of exchange through the commodity-form 
and its special case, the mature money-form. Under these material conditions, which 
emerged with metropolitan modernity, and the technological innovations in mass media 
and transportation the capacity for stratifying social class through the medium of goods 
and services became problematic, as Simmel observes in his discussion of fashion. 
Quantitative profusion, ease of attainment, replacement or alternative satisfaction made it 
very difficult to have personal choice as the motor of self-development.  
  
Again, the use of commodities by ‘consumers’ in pursuit of utility, as the means of 
displaying self-development, was confounded by the role of the multiple and its popularity 
– often precisely because of what it was deemed to signify. Fashion operated on the 
principle that commodities were re-presentations of social values, images, and that certain 
objects were of greater value (socially, economically, etc) than others because of this. 
Individual commodities became ratios (Mead), expressions of the relative value of certain 
things, rather than the economic form assumed by certain desirable properties bestowed in 
production. Consequently, the staging of the self, its personnation, was complicated 
because Value in the sphere of circulation and exchange was no longer guaranteed by its 
origins in production. The commodity-form and its contents appeared to be free of this link 
to their origins, their relative value defined by conditions within the sphere of circulation 
and exchange. Necessarily this complicated the staging of bourgeois self-development and 
the construction of a stable identity built upon the exercise of reason and rational 
calculation. 
 
Ferguson (1990) sees this ‘decomposition’ of the bourgeois ego lead to ‘dread,’ while 
Vattimo (1988) sees ‘nihilism’ accompany the relativisation of the bourgeois self within 
exchange. This refutation of the causal motive of identity left the formation of the self 
subject to external factors, social economic or technological. Seltzer (1992) sees a shift 
from the ‘market individual’ of bourgeois culture to a ‘disciplinary individual’ caused by 
discursive phenomena rather than internal, psychological ones. Psychological identity, 
self-awareness, more closely resembled a process of ‘managing’ experience in an attempt 
to generate moments of selfhood. Charney (1998) extends this position by terming such 
self-awareness contingent upon favourable conditions and, therefore, entirely beyond 
individual control (no matter how intensely desired). Charney sees a new form of 
‘distracted’ experience emerge within modernity, which he describes in cinematic terms, as 
‘drift’ punctuated by ‘peak moments’ of intense or focused attention. These ‘peak 
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moments’ afford the subject an experience of self because they re-present the present to 
the individual and thereby highlight their relative rarity.  
 
Arguably the nostalgic longing for authentic experience (Erfahrung) is a debased form of 
this peak moment, an opportunity to articulate the experience of selfhood through its 
absence rather than an intense experience of its present-ness. Certainly, this would explain 
the desire to recover a form of experience that would allow a re-assertion of the bourgeois 
conception of the ego and its sense of self. This return to the  ‘biographical fiction of the 
self’ (Ferguson, 1990) and its identity of self within the ‘realm of consumption’ would 
represent, for many Marxist theorists, the correct interpretation of ‘final consumption’ 
(Fine & Leopold, 1993; Fine, 1995).  By re-connecting the realm of production with the 
sphere of circulation and exchange ‘consumption’ would re-acquire ‘causation.’ This 
rehearses the discussion of ‘quotation’ by Stewart (1998), which utilises earlier periods 
through their quotation, thereby spanning the temporal distance, as a means of valuing the 
‘fragments of modernity’ (Frisby).  
 
The task of the re-collection of such fragments – or quotations – of the past fell to the 
collector (Benjamin), who sought to circumvent the shock-experience of capitalist 
modernity by re-inserting artefacts back into their context of origin – of re-connecting 
‘consumption’ with production. This ‘cataloguing’ of the products of the past in the 
present reveals a politics of (re-)presentation in which the ‘panoramic perspective’ (de 
Cauter, 1993) would allow the comprehension of a totality, a formal appreciation, of the 
artefact. This, in turn, would allow a reversal of the fragmentation (interruption) of the 
continuity of (the social relations of) tradition and the alienation that is deemed to derive 
from the advent of capitalist modernity: 
 
The precondition of commodity circulation is that they be produced as 
exchange values, not as immediate use values, but as mediated through 
exchange value. Appropriation through and by means of divestiture 
[Entausserung] and alienation [Verausserung] is the fundamental 
condition. … Circulation is the movement in which the general alienation 
appears as general appropriation and general appropriation as general 
alienation. 
- Marx (1973: 196) 
 
This interruption of previously existing social relations – modernité – and the severing of 
the link between signs and their referents (between commodities and their production) was 




The experience of modernity, modernité, was itself distinct from that of previous social 
formations (for instance, Simmel discusses the emergence of the blasé attitude) in that the 
commodity-form assumed a greater role within subjective experience and social life. 
Commodity-objects could no longer be considered neutral artefacts possessed of varying 
degrees of utility, instead, the commodity-form was a means of accessing experience and a 
medium of its narration and communication. Stewart’s (1998) discussion of the ‘miniature’ 
and the ‘toy’ is instructive here because it highlights the way in which commodity-objects 
were freighted with social significance and re-presentational value, which, in turn had 
consequences for temporal, spatial and causal experience. In constructing the ideological 
and linguistic operations or exaggerations of ‘toys’ and ‘miniatures’ a relation of distance 
is generated that transforms the object, shifts it along a different axis. In these operations 
the spatial determination of form (size) occurs in such a way that function, as utility, is 
altered. Objects re-presented as either toys or miniatures are translated into ‘signs’ whose 
referents are the working originals. For instance, the relation between a working pistol and 
a toy gun, the ‘toy’ echoes the original but at a distance, the form may be identical but the 
function and utility are ‘shifted.’  
 
The toy and the miniature are aesthetic representations, they re-present a formal echo of 
use and function that has been transformed (most obviously in scale). As such, they offer a 
shift or translation from the ‘real’ world of working artefacts, measured as a distance from 
denotative function and production, and into the domain of ‘play,’ of re-presentation, 
circulation and exchange. Play, therefore, is a shift, translation or ‘exaggeration’ of certain 
properties of an object or objects, it requires their re-imagining through the interruption of 
the relationship of sign and referent forged within the concept of ‘production for use.’ The 
objects of ‘play’ no longer conform to their ‘natural’ or ‘real’ purpose, their function has 
changed, because in their translation they have severed the link to their own origins at the 
level of function and scale, while retaining it at a formal or representational level. 
Therefore, the use to which such objects are put is defined by their context.  
 
The world of play is one of constant labile transformation characterised by a vertiginous 
immersion and ‘excitement’ that means that the ‘self can not locate itself’ (Ferguson, 
1990). The activities of play are autotelic, rather than teleological, they belong to an ‘un-
real’ world, insofar as they as they are freed from their origins in production and the 
specification of function and utility engrained there through the labour of production. 
Instead, the ‘toys’ of play resemble the contents of the sphere of circulation and exchange 
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in that their temporal duration, spatial organisation and ‘sudden’ (Bohrer) causality appear 
to have nothing to do with the social relations that brought them into existence. The events 
of the playworld echo the ‘peak moments’ of self-awareness described by Charney and 
derive their significance from the distance and difference from the world of quotidian 
‘reality.’ However, just as play has rules then, so, too, do ‘peak moments’ possess an 
internal structure and narrative form that allows them to communicate experience to their 
participants. In this sense they are fictive rather than false (un-real is still a relation to the 
real) and these conventions allow them to be recognised, entered into and understood.  
 
Significantly the generation of such ‘playful’ interludes within the sphere of circulation 
and exchange, as commodities, and the translation to the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption 
that this implies, is fundamentally unpredictable. The prospective ‘consumer’ can never 
know in advance precisely which event, moment or interaction will allow the immersive 
participation and vertiginous revelation of ‘self-awareness.’ That said these ‘abductive’ 
moments (Massumi, 2003) are the products of the capitalist division of labour and the 
result of disciplinary techniques and technologies harnessed to the imperative of surplus 
value. In this sense, such moments resemble the experience of gambling: they are 
unpredictable, pregnant with potential reward (aesthetic sensation and its purchase), an 
immersive ‘abduction’ from the everyday, and entirely mutable but repetitive (every 
‘hand’ played is formally identical but constituted differently).  
 
Gambling is a hand-to-hand encounter with Fate… The stake is money, in 
other words, immediate, infinite possibilities…. Perhaps the next card 
turned, the ball now rolling, […]. Yes, that little bouncing ball holds 
within it acres of good land and roofs of slate with sculpted chimneys […]; 
it contains treasures of art, marvels of taste, jewels of price, the most 
exquisite bodies in all the world, nay! […] The fascination of danger is at 
the bottom of all great passions. There is no fullness of pleasure unless the 
precipice is near. It is the mingling of terror with delight that intoxicates…. 
- Anatole France, cited by Benjamin, 1999: 498 
 
The discontinuous temporality of modern consumption means that the future is always in 
doubt, satisfaction is never guaranteed, and despite the implicit promises of mass 
production formal repetition still affords differentiated experience. Consequently, 
prediction or causation is never assured, it is always only statistically probable. Therefore, 
the search for meaningful moments of ‘peak’ attention, or self-awareness, defined against 
the ‘de-differentiated’ (Lash & Urry) experience of ‘drift’ means that the bourgeois 
concept of identity, as a stable self or ego, must give way to an extended process of 
identification. So, contemporary subjective experience is dis-continuous, non-linear, 
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autotelic and internally differentiated in the manner of ‘play.’ In this the experience of the 
subject repeats the formulation of modernity given by Baudelaire – as fleeting, fortuitous 
and contingent. The socio-spatial phenomenon of modern consumption constitutes a 
‘terrain’ upon which both the quantitative and spatial concentration of exchange relations 
and a qualitative and temporal intensification of the subjective experience of these 
relations emerged.  
 
The phenomenal forms of subjective experience, the temporal, spatial and causal relations 
of modernité, generate the ‘abductive participation’ (Massumi) in modern consumption as 
an apparent flight from ‘reality,’ the vertiginous immersion in a ‘peak’ moment of self-
awareness is predicated upon this removal from drift. However, unlike the ‘quotation,’ 
which presumes a paramount reality that produced the quotation, which can be referred to, 
modern consumption does not rely upon such a temporal, spatial or causal antecedent. The 
experience of modern consumption is only generated in the de-form-ation of the here-and-
now, it is a relation of simultaneity, rather than linearity (either spatially or temporally) and 
its own cause is unknowable. Therefore, modernity’s relationship to earlier or 
geographically separate social formations is echoed in subjective experience, it is 
interruption, a falling away or falling into a re-presentation of experience predicated upon 
the articulation of difference, rather than linear distance. 
 
For Massumi the constant re-formulation of being, the ‘becoming of being,’ is a ‘cascade’ 
generated by the double movement of ‘simulation’ and ‘fabulation,’ which propels or 
dislocates the ‘dividual’ (as against the individual) beyond or through the position of 
‘identity.’ This constant deviation from identity as the experience of difference is 
reminiscent of Vattimo describing how ‘Being’ is ‘dissolved in the discoursing of value’ 
(1988: 22) and the concept of a stable identity, inherited from bourgeois psychology, is 
revealed as untenable, other than as a nostalgic retreat into the reassurances of 
‘consumerism.’ Both Massumi and Vattimo describe the material processes of the sphere 
of circulation and exchange in capitalist modernity, a realm within which either the 
‘terrain’ of modern consumption or the discourse of ‘consumerism’ will predominate at 
any moment within the subjective experience of any individual. In the ‘consumption’ of 
‘consumer society’ a nostalgic longing for the bourgeois ego and the identity upon which it 
is premised, for the unification of ‘biology and symbol’ (Stewart, 1998) prevails. Where 
the immersion in the ‘abductive participation’ and ‘affective potentialities’ (Massumi, 
2003) of modern consumption hold sway the phenomenal forms of subjective experience 
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allow becoming to overflow ‘being’ and the deformation of the subject – as identification, 
not identity – occurs.  
 
Costall (2004) re-works Gibson’s (1977; 1986) theory of affordance to describe an 
‘ontological relationship’ born of the relation between organism and environment that 
explains why the uses of any object, commodity or not, can never be instilled during 
production. In this spatio-temporal relationship the affordances offered by the conjunction 
of subject and object, user and artefact, are defined by the situation rather than form, 
function, materiality or subjective volition (although all of these will have a bearing upon 
the variety of uses afforded). It is possible to link the dynamic differentiation of the subject 
from itself, developed by Massumi, and the relational interaction between animal and 
organism, discussed by Costall and ecological psychology, through the concept of 
‘possession,’ itself adapted from Simmel (1990). ‘Possession,’ in this sense,’ distinct from 
purchase or a utilitarian concept of use is the relation between the subject, being, and the 
object and its qualities (having), expressed as affordance. In this way, the relation of 
affordance constructed between the subject and the commodity-object modifies ‘being’ 
through the re-formulation of possession.  
 
Crucially, ‘the mediating role of artifacts’ (Verbeek, 2005) as the ‘co-determination’ of the 
world is not a neutral process since these artefacts emerge as part of capitalist modernity. 
The ‘transformations of the ways in which reality can be present for humans’ (ibid: 197) 
are historically specific and the role of the contemporary commodity-form should not be 
underestimated. The commodity-form within capitalist modernity allows the  ‘technical 
mediation’ (Latour) of the relation between people and things; it provides the medium 
within which the juxtaposition of ‘drift’ and ‘peak moments’ of self-awareness exists, 
through the seemingly arbitrary co-location of the de-differentiated form and the intense 
sensorial appreciation of aesthetic experience offered by a ‘peak moment.’ Therefore, the 
interruption of ‘drift,’ as the intense aesthetic experience of ‘self,’ emerges from the 
affordance of subjective experience of ‘possession,’ which further differentiates the subject 
from its previous temporal and spatial incarnation: this differentiation is apprehended but 
never comprehended, it is experientially undergone but its cause is never apparent (indeed, 
it can only be understood at the level of principle, never at the level of specific instant).  
 
The deformation of the subject, as its spatial, temporal and volitional ‘movement away’ 
from ‘itself,’ and into an unspecified ‘elsewhere’ and ‘elsewhen’ (Friedberg, 1993) is 
triggered, or not, by this relation to the commodity-form, the experience of the 
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contemporary consumption-relation. However, this is neither an ‘escape’ nor the 
experience of being a postmodern ‘émigré from the present’ (Rojek, 1993), since both 
positions presume either a paramount reality (after Schutz) or an underlying present to 
which a return is always, at least theoretically, possible. Indeed, in terms of the 
‘sociological project’ it is easier to consider modern consumption, as outlined in this thesis, 
as the ‘play’ form of ‘consumption’ as bequeathed by economic theory. In this it resembles 
Simmel’s discussion of ‘sociability’ as the play-form of sociation (social interaction), an 
equally autotelic form of interaction and one that is removed from a discussion of the 
‘contents’ of experience. Modern consumption echoes sociability in its emphasis upon 
aesthetic, rather than utilitarian, concerns and the subsequent ‘departure from reality’ and 
the necessity of producing a stable identity. The playful logic of ‘abductive participation’ 
and ‘affective potentiality’ generated by affordance shifts or modifies the subject through 
the reformulation of the relation between being and having expressed through ‘possession.’ 
Therefore, the ‘subject’ of modern consumption begins to resemble the ‘dividual’ in whom 
‘becoming-singular […] exceeds specification’ at the same time as ‘a becoming-generic 
[…] splinters the form of identity’ (Massumi, 1993: 35). 
 
The immersion of the subject within ‘objective culture’ (Simmel) requires a 
reconceptualisation of the relation between ‘being and having’ (Latour, 2001, see also 
Simmel, 1990), in which possession replaces acquisition – the accumulation of objects as a 
collection (identity). The playful inhabitant of the anti-landscape of capitalist modernity is 
subject to the same alchemical transformation as the non-human ‘actants,’ in place of 
identity a logic of identification born of the labile metamorphosis of play predominates. 
The bourgeois ‘self’ is now consigned to history as a subject-position that is untenable 
within contemporary culture, the re-unification of ‘biology and symbol,’ as identity relies 
upon a ‘reality’ that is inaccessible to the dwellers of a fictive domain. The ‘self’ of 
bourgeois thought is now merely a spectre that haunts the present, its teleological project 
unrealisable. The superseding of identity by identification and the consequent demise of 
the telos of the bourgeois self spelled the end for the narration of the life-course of the 
unified ego, its biography.  Where once memory allowed the recollection and hierarchical 
ordering of the events of experience (biography) now, in the absence of an immediate 
account of causality, there is only a multiplicity of events the meaning of which alters from 





Modern Play: the kingdom of misrule  
Play as the opposite of work and the antithesis of its productive teleology is neither limited 
to human beings nor the modern era, since both animals and ‘primitive’ cultures play – as 
did the Greeks of antiquity (Huizinga, 1955 [1938]). However, the opposition between 
work and play, between productive and un-productive labour, between the rational pursuit 
of utility and the expenditure of energy in irrational enjoyment is, itself, a formulation of 
the modern era. Huizinga, for instance, sees play originate in the ‘sacred sphere,’ and 
extend itself into the everyday through ritual activity: 
 
The rite or “ritual act” represents a cosmic happening, an event in the 
natural process. The word “represents,” however, does not cover the exact 
meaning of the act, at least not in its looser, modern connotation; for here 
“representation” is really identification, the mystic repetition or re-
presentation of the event. The rite produces the effect which is then not so 
much shown figuratively as actually reproduced in the action. The 
function of the rite, therefore, is far from being merely imitative; it causes 
the worshippers to participate in the sacred happening itself. As the Greeks 
would say, “it is methectic rather than mimetic.” It is a “helping-out of the 
action.”  
– 1955: 14-5, emphasis in original. 
 
For the ‘modern’ world of bourgeois society play characterised the absence of the rule of 
reason and the exercise of rational judgement in the pursuit of purposeful and productive 
ends, usually figured as utility. Work, training and education functioned as both the visible 
sign of such rationality and the means to instil or refine it. Hence children were educated, 
‘primitives’ were trained (civilised), and the working class were employed. Only in this 
fashion could ‘self-development’ be assured against the profitless dissipation of 
expenditure, luxury and un-productive ‘consumption.’ Play, as the exaggeration and labile 
transformation of ‘reality’ through imaginative rather than physical labour offered an 
‘escape’ that would later be appropriated by the technology of capitalist modernity, and 
epitomised by its tourist industry (Rojek, 1985; 1993). Thus, Ferguson sees in play an echo 
of the ‘physiological anarchy’ of fun, the antithesis of the instrumental rationality of 
bourgeois society; while Rojek sees the rise of organised sporting activity in nineteenth 
century Britain as a similar attempt to divert play’s revolutionary approach to the 
organisation of reality, lest it leak over into political rebellion. Play as the antithesis to 
work or productive enterprise recalls earlier times and alternative social formations that 
adhered to different value-systems. As a ‘dis-interested’ or autotelic activity play has no 
end or telos; it exists only for itself: in disdaining to act upon the world in deliberate 
fashion play and the ‘play-space’ within which it unfolds more closely resemble a ‘fiction’ 
than reality.  
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Play, in its widest sense, is non-utilitarian and opposed to the strictures of ‘civilisation’ 
(Huizinga): it represents subjective freedom. Play, however, has rules. It retains an internal 
structure and coherence that facilitates participation and distinguishes play-activity from 
all other ‘everyday’ or productive activities. Indeed, it is the voluntary adherence to play’s 
rules which transports the ‘players’ into the ‘space-time’ of the play-world. Play in 
annexing or circumscribing the contents of the ‘real’ world to which it is opposed through 
the ‘rules of the game,’ re-instates a nominally causally comprehensible world. In play, 
says Caillois (2001: 8): ‘Rules themselves create fictions.’ Play’s rules, like the rites and 
rituals of the sacred sphere, distinguish it from ‘everyday’ reality, while simultaneously 
relying upon that reality as referent. Modern play, therefore, is the recovery of that which 
has been excluded from or suppressed by bourgeois society; modern play may no longer 
connect humanity to the Gods as part of the sacred sphere (Huizinga), but it does offer the 
opportunity to re-shape or circumscribe reality: 
 
In play all things become possible – or rather, nothing has yet become 
impossible. The ‘object world,’ variously differentiated as the toys 
effortlessly conjured into being by the momentary exigencies of a game, is 
dissolved and re-formed without limit. Play treats the ‘objective’ 
characteristics of the world as the paraphernalia of fun.  
- Ferguson, 1990: 12 
 
The marginalisation of play, as the province of the young, and its commodification, as 
leisure, highlight its ability to transport the individual out of or beyond ‘reality’ for a 
limited time. It is exactly this capacity that saw bourgeois culture in its ascendancy re-
assign play to the immature (individually or culturally), the insane or a decadent 
aristocracy, none of whom could be looked to as models of developed or modern 
rationality. Play’s gift of transport was sacred (as myth) and later dangerous (as the 
absence of reason) but it would eventually come signify an ‘escape’ (Rojek, 1993) to an 
‘elsewhere’ or ‘elsewhen’ (Friedberg, 1993) achieved through the ‘consumption’ of the 
commodity-form. 
 
Play, as an activity and a way of ‘being’ in the world marks out a ‘play world’ or ‘play 
space’ (Huizinga) to be inhabited – it necessitates a distance from the world of everyday 
reality and the productive rationality that holds sway there. The inhabitation of the space of 
play and its logic implies participation, likewise, in a ‘temporality’ of play. For Stewart 
(1998), this causes a relocation to the ‘infinite time of reverie’: a time of ‘consumption,’ as 
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exchange and circulation, rather than production. Play, even when dependent upon the 
rules of the game, is always irreducible to ‘reality’: 
 
The structure of play and reality are often identical, but the respective 
activities that they subsume are not reducible to each other in time or 
place. They always take place in domains that are incompatible.  
– Caillois, 2001: 64 
 
In the time and space of play the world of objects bends to the will of the subject, 
absolutely, or, at least, within the prescription of the ‘rules of the game.’ In the fantasy of 
play matter becomes malleable and the causes of its metamorphosis are the demands made 
upon it by subjective desire or its temporary manifestation, the wish. In play the 
correspondence between materiality and utility, between substance and function dissolves 
– just as the ‘chronically mediatized’ modern money-form circulates as information. This 
is the rule that holds in the ‘fictive’ world of play – a realm where no mere law can remain 
inviolate. 
 
Toys and Small Things: the keys to the kingdom 
Access to the realm of play is facilitated by the toy, that object which has ‘left behind’ its 
function in order to serve as a transportation device: for instance, the police telephone box 
that serves as Doctor Who’s Tardis or the wardrobe that allows children access to Narnia 
(which can not be reached deliberately). Play’s ‘disregard for the objective characteristics 
of the world’ (Ferguson, 1990) threatens to make toys of any and every object, regardless 
of its formal properties: tales of children’s preference for wrapping paper rather than the 
toys it contained are more than apocrypha. In play the ‘toy’ is first and foremost an object 
torn from reality and integrated into the ‘second reality’ (Caillois) of the play-world. The 
toy is the object that navigates between the worlds of science and fantasy; between the 
world of production where causality is apparent and results in predictable outcomes, and 
the world of ‘consumption’ in which things circulate or exchange but where nothing is 
‘harvested,’ ‘manufactured’ or ‘created’ (Caillois, 2001: 5-6). This passage between 
worlds is simply more easily facilitated (and comprehended by adults) when the toy is 
recognisable as a copy or model deriving from an ‘original’ in the ‘real’ world.  
 
The child’s toy stands at the intersection of play and reality and represents a relation of 
distance. The role of the toy can be expressed spatially, in this manner, because it is a scale 
model of a real object (even a putatively real object if we include the Millennium Falcon). 
The toy is then an unreal inhabitant of a reality that it metonymically announces but can 
never, metaphorically, represent. This makes it the ideal training tool with which to 
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introduce the immature ‘player’ to the habits of the real world of adults, toys become 
training implements and aid in the disciplining of the body (Foucault). The key to this 
undertaking is found in the spatial relation of size and the distance that it signifies: the 
reduced object ‘speaking’ to the smaller version of humanity through a diminution in scale 
and an increase in signification (Stewart, 1998). The miniature introduces a 
 
[…] divergent relation between meaning and materiality: the problem of 
describing the miniature. [Which] in its exaggeration of interiority and its 
relation to the space and time of the individual perceiving subject, 
threatens the infinity of description without hierarchization, a world whose 
anteriority is always absolute, and whose profound interiority is therefore 
always unrecoverable. Hence for us the miniature appears as a metaphor 
for all books and all bodies.  
– Ibid: 44 
 
The miniature exists as a realistic re-presentation, but it is not ‘real,’ just as the toy ‘works’ 
(lights flash and sounds are emitted) but it does not function in the same way as that which 
it so closely resembles in all but size. The toy as a miniature is a cultural relation 
predicated upon a distance from ‘reality’ or ‘nature,’ it answers to human needs, desires or 
wants rather than the laws of physics or evolution (Stewart, 1998). In the miniaturisation 
process the world of ‘reality’ is abstracted and, obviously, reduced in order that it can be 
manipulated. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of dolls, long the playthings of 
aristocratic adults before they passed into the hands of children.  
 
In the mechanical toy, Stewart (1998: 57) sees ‘the possibility of a self-invoking fiction 
which exists independent of human signifying processes,’ as an abstraction and a shrinkage 
of the ‘real’ world. As such, the toy represents a means for the entry into ‘fantasy’ and an 
escape from reality – the world of purposive action and productive enterprise (work). In 
this surrender of utilitarian potential the miniature becomes ‘cultural,’ doubly so in the 
case of the industrial miniature: 
 
In the miniature railroad we have a reduction of scale and a corresponding 
increase in detail and significance, and we are able to transcend the 
mechanical as well as the natural that forms its context. In the further 
miniaturization of the table-top train set, we have an access to simultaneity 
and transcendence completed. Correspondingly, the natural has moved 
from the forest to the individual trees of the park to the synthetic trees, 
barn, cows, and farmers of the train set’s landscape.  
– Ibid: 58-9 
 
Here miniaturisation is a relation of exaggeration, a ‘distance’ from the real expressed 
spatially through size, and for Stewart this distance represents a distance from the relations 
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of production that pertain in ‘reality.’ The toy is the means by which entry to an alternative 
space-time continuum, or other world, is affected. It is through the ‘toy’ that the relation 
and distance between play or the game and reality can be traced, because in contemporary 
society the absolute distinction between reality and play (as the falling away of the former 
during the latter) is never entirely accomplished. The relation of signification that Stewart 
sees as exaggeration is an abstraction from ‘reality’ considered spatially – and can be 
realised in the miniature or the gigantic. In the realm of play an object sheds its denotative 
function and, consequently, that object’s utility for the play world or space can no longer 
be defined in terms of its materiality or its properties – in the removal from the world of 
purposes and rationality a distance is created that is no longer the distance upon which 
bourgeois desire was predicated. 
 
The Threat of Play 
The fundamentally disruptive power of play, its capacity to interrupt reality threatens the 
bourgeois subject, its world and the object-relations upon which it is founded. However, 
play does not simply threaten this ‘world’ it threatens all worlds: play undermines the 
ontological primacy of the ‘paramount reality’ (Goffman) against which all other worlds 
are defined as fictional (and therefore unreal or less-real), dissolving the ‘text’ into a 
‘tissue of quotations’ (Barthes). The quintessential relativism of play exposes and 
undermines the privileged position accorded to authenticity in order to allow nostalgia to 
function: in this respect it echoes Osborne’s (1995) description of a modernity continually 
re-founding itself in its declaration of opposition to and recovery of tradition (discussed in 
Chapter Four). Again, as Barthes points out, there is no ‘degree zero’ of language, there is 
no privileged position outside of the text upon which the commentator can assume in order 
to produce a neutral evaluation of a text. The possibilities for observation implied in the 
panorama (de Cauter, 1993; Sternberger, 1977), the World Exhibition (Benjamin,), the 
panopticon (Foucault, 1991) or the collection (Stewart, 1998) are revealed as operations of 
power exercised in the construction of a viewpoint, an authorial transcendence. It is this 
that play disrupts when it reveals there is no one world upon which to gaze and that 
nothing is definitive, merely defined.  
 
Historically, if Reason as the inherent possession of the ‘ideal-type’ bourgeois subject 
could be glimpsed and grasped in the external world, it was visually coded in the landscape 
of commodities, a landscape that was as carefully tended as any picturesque intervention 
into the wilds of nature or department store ‘show window.’ In this way, Reason abridged 
the sublime terror contained in nature and also the technological sublime that industrial 
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capitalism threatened to unleash. The perfect bourgeois ‘consumer’ was, then, the 
developed individual who could exercise discriminating reason in the guise of taste. 
Mastery of the passions revealed the judgement required to ascertain and satisfy the needs 
of the individual, needs which were measured against the scale of the body; either the 
‘stomach’ (Adam Smith) or the capacity for pleasure (Jevons). Thus homo œconomicus 
exercises taste as marginal utility when engaging in the bourgeois project of self-creation 
through the ordering of the world. The money-form at first appeared to be the perfect tool 
for the expression of this desire. However, its ‘levelling effect’ and capacity to ‘destroy’ 
form (Simmel) allowed the emergence of a rational framework within which the bourgeois 
ego would dissolve, and with it would go the ‘objects’ stored in its collections and upon 
which the transcendence of the world was premised. 
 
The Construction of Distance 
When discussing the ‘power of money’ Marx notes that its ‘universal property’ – exchange 
value – allows it to ‘make contradictions embrace.’ The money-form, as a tool, can 
conquer distance by extending the reach of the subject, appropriating not only objects but 
emotions and opportunities, even effacing the ugliness of the male face through the 
purchase of female beauty. Where Marx discusses prostitution, today we might consider 
cosmetic surgery, but money is still the vital ingredient. This is because money, in 
conjunction with the commodity-form, alienates and abstracts certain properties from their 
original location – either in space (trade) or time (labour-power). The money-form allows 
the conquest of time and space, of distance, and in the service of pleasure the conquest of 
distance is the transportation of the individual (or their senses or emotions) from the 
mundanity of the everyday to other, alternative realms, whether in the department store, 
the holiday trip or cinematic spectatorship. Both money and play possess the ability to 
effect such transportations and the transformations in experience which accompany them. 
The attraction or charm of distance, which money-purchase collapses, was the means by 
which desire was previously figured, usually as the utility conceived of and attained by the 
sacrifice of its price (alternative uses). However, whereas entry to the ‘playworld’ 
(Huizinga) is attained through the separation of the ‘player’ from reality and its concerns, 
modern consumption relies upon the objective framework of capitalist exchange relations 
to allow the world to fall away. The relative ease of purchase of even the rarest and most 
expensive goods or experiences saw Simmel consider cynicism and the blasé attitude as 
outcomes of the mature money economy. When this is combined with the productive 
power of contemporary capitalism and the sublime array of commodities it affords, then 
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the traditional notion of desire (as distance to be overcome) and its role in the constitution 
of the bourgeois subject is rendered problematic.  
 
Modern consumption mirrors ‘play’ in making the boundary or threshold a qualitative 
rather than a quantitative phenomenon, in rendering it as an experience that is not defined 
by the physics of reality. The exotic lurks around every corner and is always, immediately 
available, neither space not time separate the subject from the object of their desire (wish).  
From e-bay to the PS2, historical relics or alternative versions of past, present and future 
are available for increasingly immersive (virtual) participation. The departure from reality 
achieved by crossing the ontological threshold into the ‘un-real’ playworld of modern 
consumption has been commodified as the experience of ‘fictive worlds’ (Stewart), world 
exhibitions (Benjamin, 1999; de Cauter, 1993), cinematic spectatorship (Friedberg, 1993) 
and, obviously, tourism. The pursuit of novel experiences as a response to the perceived 
homogeneity of the quotidian has a long history, especially amongst the wealthy or 
aristocratic strata of society. However, it is with the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie that this 
was formalised in enterprises such as Thomas Cook’s tours in the mid-nineteenth century; 
its industrialisation occurred with the mass participation of the working classes, for 
example, in ‘wakes weeks’ holidays to Blackpool. Benjamin, in the Arcades Project (1999: 
77), cites Simmel discussing and comparing fashion to trips taken by the bourgeoisie in the 
late-nineteenth century: 
 
The accent of attractions builds from their substantial center to their 
inception and their end. This begins with the most trifling symptoms, such 
as the … switch from a cigar to a cigarette; it is fully manifest in the 
passion for traveling, which, with its strong accentuations of departure and 
arrival, sets the life of the year vibrating as fully as possible in several 
short periods. The … tempo of modern life bespeaks not only the yearning 
for quick changes in the qualitative content of life, but also the force of the 
formal attraction of the boundary – of an inception and end. 
 
While the attractions of novelty are apparent so, too, are those of the boundary and the 
sense of closure or finitude that it affords, the imposition of an endpoint to experiences 
makes their duration observable, even poignant. Reality as the location of everyday 
experience – what Stewart terms ‘lived experience’ – is defined by its opposite. By 
crossing a threshold or boundary novelty of experience, nouveauté, is attainable and the 
promise of escape is from the obligations, routines and limitations of the everyday is 
revealed. The attractions of modern consumption and the capitalist commodity culture that 
underpins it are born of the alterity which commodity-experiences contain and promise 
participation in.  
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The Aesthetic Dimension of Existence 
 The production of distance within the sphere of circulation and exchange of capitalist 
modernity can be juxtaposed to the role of distance (as desire) associated with the 
bourgeois society and world view that preceded it. An ‘aesthetics of experience’ can be 
observed, preoccupied with the ‘problem’ of representing experience, which is now being 
explicitly commodified, appears. Gagnier (2000: 135-7) describes a late nineteenth century 
emphasis upon pleasurable stimulation as the basis for an aesthetics centred upon the body. 
Such phenomenal or ‘lived’ experience can either provide an empirical veracity, the true 
experience of the world, or signal a surrender to pleasurable excess that prevents 
comprehension of a ‘deeper’ reality. The epistemological question of how the world was to 
be understood extended from science to economics and art. In a footnote, Ferguson quotes 
Nietzsche in The Gay Science: 
 
We operate only with things that do not exist: lines, planes, bodies, atoms, 
divisible time spans, divisible spaces. How should explanations be 
possible at all when we first turn everything into an image, our image! It 
will do to consider science as an attempt to humanise things as faithfully 
as possible: as we describe ourselves more and more precisely… in truth 
we are confronted by a continuum out of which we isolate a couple of 
pieces…. The suddenness with which many effects stand out misleads us; 
actually, it is sudden only for us. In this moment of suddenness there is an 
infinite number of processes that elude us.  
- 1990: 216n 72, ellipses in the original citation. 
 
Access to a ‘primordial’ reality or an authentic realm of being – to a real world – becomes 
at best impossible and at worst a conceit. The phantasmagorical allure of the commodity 
fetish certainly seemed to appeal to an irrational and libidinal economy of excess rather 
than the utilitarian considerations of political economy or its critics, such as Marx. Indeed, 
Marx’s discussion of the relationship between ‘essential relations’ and ‘phenomenal forms’ 
of the capitalist mode of production focused upon just this issue, which is central to the 
analysis of modern consumption. The role and importance of individual phenomenological 
experience must be analysed in light of the structural relations that order and (in)form that 
experience. Only in this way can the meaningful actions of individuals be grasped as 
anything other than the selfish pursuit of utility, pleasure or identity (including lifestyle) 
and be seen as the predominant means of participation in contemporary culture. 
 
The ‘magic’ or ‘attraction’ of distance, upon which bourgeois desire is predicated, is a 
nostalgic longing for a return to the paradisiac social relations of an era now lost and the 
authentic experience to be found there.  For Stewart, this leads to an opposition between an 
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increasingly technologically-mediated and mechanically or digitally produced sphere of 
images and a physiologically rooted sphere of face-to-face and personal interaction 
because in such face-to-face interaction (communication) a definitively social set of 
actions, gossiping, flirting, joking and introducing people exist that ‘maintain, manipulate, 
and transform the ongoing social reality from which such individual genres have arisen’ 
(1998: 16). 
 
Authenticity and Abstraction   
The ‘culture of things’ emerges when the bourgeois world of the sovereign or ‘market’ 
individual is eroded, when the human subject no longer presides over reality in an 
uncomplicated fashion. The ontological transformation narrated by Vattimo (1988) centres 
upon the primacy of exchange and the incorporation of the subject within its ambit. This 
occurs in two ways: firstly, the apparent loss of historicity, of provenance, which signals 
the complication of a notion of authenticity; secondly, the ‘de-materialisation’ of the 
commodity-form in which exchange, and the calculation of utility, are focused upon 
‘experiences’ contained within the commodity-event rather than the object’s material 
properties. This second aspect can be termed the ‘sign-value’ (Baudrillard), 
‘representational’ (Buck-Morss) or ‘staging value’ (Bohme) of the commodity. The 
capitalist money-form and the social relations of the mode of production underpin the 
emergence of the ‘culture of things’ as a ‘culture of human beings’ (Simmel) through the 
abstraction that the commodity-relation manifests, thereby ‘divesting’ both subjects and 
objects of their specific or unique qualities and rendering them generic, differentiated only 
by degree, with their specificity expressed quantitatively, through price.  
 
Money ‘infinitizes’ space. It allows all existing commodities to enter into 
relations of exchange. It is indifferent to the physical limitations of space. 
In the place of the qualitatively differentiated human ‘space’ it constructs 
an ideal, empty extension through which can pass every possible 
commodity. Money, therefore, ‘is the absolutely alienable commodity, 
because it is all other commodities divested of their shape’ [Marx]. Labour 
power, on the other hand, has a special relation to time. It similarly divests 
human time of all its ‘irrational’ qualities and substitutes for it an 
absolutely uniform duration, an infinite extension containing all possible 
interactions.  
– Ferguson, 1990: 161 
 
This abstraction confers upon the commodity-form an apparent autonomy (Marx) while 
severing ‘biology’ from ‘symbol’ (Stewart, 1998), matter and materiality from meaning, 
through the divorce of personal biography (understood as the cause of the coalescence of 
subjectivity, as the self or unified ego) from the kinaesthetic forms of phenomenal 
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experience. Thus, being slips its anchor (the bourgeois formulation of the self) and enters 
the realm of exchange alongside the products of the body’s labour(-power) – the 
commodity-form. The money-form is the mediation that facilitates the equation of subject 
and object, the arrangement of the subject as object, here differentiated as the apparently 
infinite series of possibilities that makes itself (virtually or potentially) available. These 
‘virtual’ possibilities extend beyond objective culture to humanity itself, specifically the 
figure of woman: ‘Love for the prostitute is the apotheosis of empathy with the 
commodity,’ says Benjamin (1999: 511), and cites Delvau referring to the lorettes of 
Montmartre, ‘They are not women – they are nights’ (ibid: 496). Women become events to 
be participated in rather than people with whom intimacy is desired. The purchase of these 
‘nights’ is the means by which they are removed from the biographies of the individuals 
concerned, both buyers and sellers, just as in gambling each hand, or coup, is separate in 
space and time from those that precede or succeed it: history is present only in the barest of 
traces, money left to wager, cards not dealt from the pack. Each time the game begins it 
starts anew, the experience of gambling resembles that of the adventure described by 
Simmel (1950): a bounded episode removed from the events and moments that surround it, 
distanced from the everyday. ‘The lack of consequences that defines the character of the 
isolated experience <Erlebnis> found drastic expression in gambling’ (Benjamin, 1999: 
512).  
 
The same is true of the inorganic realm, where money sheds its substantial significance and 
is abstracted into information, as the coloured chips used to make wagers in casinos. The 
transubstantiation of the money-form allows value to circulate free of the conditions under 
which it was produced, as an abstract event within an a-historical present, from which 
history, tradition and biography are absent and akin to the ‘ecstasy of communication’ 
discussed by Baudrillard. Modernity possesses no transcendental referential guarantee and 
so the ‘free play’ of signifiers, to acknowledge Agamben’s (1993: 73-4) re-working of 
Levi-Strauss, ‘transforms [historical] structures into events’ breaking the putatively 
organic connection between past and present.  This is what leads Agamben to assert that 
just as ‘modern man has been deprived of his biography, his experience has been likewise 
expropriated’ (1993: 13).  However, rather than seeking an explanation for this in historical 
ruptures, such as the French Revolution of 1789 (Fritzsche) or the catastrophe of WW I 
(Benjamin), Agamben considers it a consequence of the ubiquity of ‘events’ available to 
modern subjects, events sufficiently lacking in quality and consequence that they can not 
be ‘translated’ into experience.  It is the apparent ‘banality’ of the events of quotidian 
existence that distinguish them from ‘experience’ and ‘divorces’ them from not just 
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knowledge but, importantly, authority, since all such events are more or less comparable, 
equivalent. 
 
The qualitative differentiation/quantitative de-differentiation of moments and the events 
that they constitute ensures that an identity, a totality (collection), founded in experience 
can never be realized.  Instead, the experience of the present is the experience of a variety 
of ‘alternatives’, of ‘ways of escape’ (Rojek) from that very present – the extension of the 
principle of difference to temporality. Such transport to ‘elsewhere’ and ‘elsewhen’ 
(Friedberg), which was previously found in the exotic removal of the department store and 
its tableaux, is now more readily discernible in the theme parks, shopping malls, city 
breaks and budget flights of the contemporary sphere of circulation and exchange of 
capitalist modernity. This leads Rojek to reconsider Schutz’ appropriation of William 
James’ psychology for a sociological ethnomethodology in which the concept of a 
‘momentary émigré’ from the present through participation in certain ‘action places’ 
allows a possible circumvention of the mundane reality of ‘lived experience’. By 
disavowing the pivotal role of a ‘paramount reality’ against which the ‘multiple lifeworlds’ 
of each alienated individual can be measured as a deviation by degree it is possible to see, 
as Rojek does in Baudrillard’s discussion of Disneyland, a postmodern space, with no 
‘world’ location or ‘action place’ as any less real or more imaginary than any other.  
Disneyland, the West Edmonton Mall and the twin hearts of downtown Tokyo, Shibuya 
and Shinjuku, are all ideologically and materially constructed entities in which the ‘time-
space compressions’ that Harvey (1989) associates with postmodernity and post-Fordist 
flexible accumulation can be seen as descended from the department stores of metropolitan 
modernity. Mead’s insistence that the economic realm is governed by the ‘essential reality’ 
of exchangeability, which includes subjectivity, sees subjective causality (the will) and 
economic causality become indistinguishable in the money-form. As such, this ‘collapsed’ 
causality becomes the means by which the traversal of the space and time of the terrain of 
modern consumption is achieved in the absence of the bourgeois subject and its causal 
principle (the biographical self). The transport or escape to an elsewhere or elsewhen is 
thereby reduced to the instantaneous reflex of the will, the acquisition of an ‘event’ 
(material commodity or not) through the money-form.  
 
In making causality instantaneous money transforms the attainment of objects and 
experiences, and re-aligns the relation between being and having. Exchange ceases to be 
about the utility that goods or experiences impart and, instead, relates to the ‘objective 
fact’ (Simmel) of possession. Possession, however, is now imminent and immanent; 
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possession is a potential power and, as such, implicates the future in the present. The 
money-form allows the degree of uncertainty in the future to be minimised and controlled 
through the relation of possession, through its reduction of the teleological steps to the act 
of purchase – money, therefore, expands the reach of subjectivity across an entire 
spectrum, spatialising it by rendering it homogenous.  
 
In money, the mind has created a form of the greatest scope which, 
operating as pure energy, increasingly separates the poles of the mind, the 
more unified it represents itself – that is, as mere money, which rejects 
every specific determinateness.  
– Simmel, 1990: 246 
 
The de-differentiation of individual instances of the commodity-form, the rejection of 
‘determinateness,’ recalls the description of the empty moments of ‘drift’ and their abstract 
relation to place, locality and history, and the specific or defining characteristics of any 
particular group. Massumi’s characterisation of the individuality of contemporary 
subjectivity, which is manifest in the crossing of boundaries – spatialisations of 
temporality – recalls the participation in the commodity-event discussed above, and echoes 
Rojek’s revival of the ‘momentary émigré’ who escapes the reality of the present moment. 
Rojek’s émigré not only flees ‘reality’ but also, in continually doing so, becomes a 
constant émigré, or stranger, to the abstract and generic formulation of the human.  
 
The apparent autonomy and objective character of ‘events’ on this terrain are registered, 
subjectively, as interactions – or possible interactions – with the commodity-form.  As was 
noted earlier, ‘possession’ now describes a relation (both actual and potential) between 
being and having.  The future is therefore contained entirely within the present –and for 
Massumi, at least, this is the promise made by adverts for contemporary commodities.  The 
imminent and immanent commodity-event demarcates its virtual existence, as a possibility 
or avoidance – and attains objective form in the selling of insurance policy and, to a lesser 
extent, pensions and investments.  The money-form allows the extension of the subjective 
will into the future in an attempt to shape the imminent and immanent present, while the 
individual remains in the here-and-now.  The act of purchase, by objectifying immaterial 
exchange-values, realises the otherwise abstract, contingent and virtual.  Thus, Massumi, 
deliberately or not, merely extends Simmel’s analysis of the role of the money-form in 
miserdom, extravagance, cynicism and the blasé attitude by assigning to it an active role in 
the form and constitution of contemporary subjectivity.  For instance, the blasé individual 
desires ‘the attractions of life’ that his blasé-ness denies. From this contradiction, 
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[…] there emerges the craving today for excitement, for extreme 
impressions, for the greatest speed in its change – [the attempt] to meet the 
dangers or sufferings in a situation by the quantitative exaggeration of its 
content.  
– Simmel, 1990: 257 
 
Here Simmel concurs with Stewart that exaggeration is the social relation that 
bestows significance, it causes an interruption between the sign and its origins in 
production.  
 
Nostalgia and its Souvenirs 
 
Nostalgia is a sadness without an object […] Nostalgia, like any form of 
narrative, is always ideological: the past it seeks has never existed except 
as narrative, and hence, always absent, that past continually threatens to 
reproduce itself as a felt lack. […] nostalgia wears a distinctly utopian 
face, a face that turns towards a future-past, a past which has only 
ideological reality.  
– Stewart, 1998: 23 
 
Bourgeois society had to ‘forget’ its historical predecessor and its world view (happiness) 
in order to assert its own validity and refute its transience and simultaneously assert its 
own progress and development (Ferguson, 1990). This creates a distance that allows the 
contemplation of tradition and its idyllic unification of ‘biology and symbol’ expressed as 
a nostalgic desire (Stewart). Nostalgia seeks a lived space where there is no ‘crisis of the 
sign, emerging between signifier and signified, between the material nature of the former 
and the abstract and historical nature of the latter, as well as within the mediated reality 
between written and spoken language’ (Stewart, 1998: 23). The separation between the 
thing and its representation, whether linguistic or visual, can be viewed as analogous to the 
distinction between an ostensibly immutable use-value and the negotiated (interpreted) 
exchange-value of an object or experience. When this is translated into the discourse 
around ‘consumption’ the debate within political economy that centred upon the ‘natural 
price’ of seemingly immutable use values – corn to replenish the body and the substantial 
significance of silver for storing value – can be seen as a staging of exactly this ‘confusion’ 
(see also Bohrer’s (1994) discussion of the double and the unheimlich in eighteenth 
century German romantic literature).  
 
This accords with the assertion by Baudrillard that there is no longer any ‘drama of 
alienation’ from the body, only the ‘ecstasy of communication’ that is the hallmark of the 
terrain of circulation and exchange. Bourgeois nostalgia is prompted by the intuition of in-
authenticity when ‘experience’ is perceived as dis-continuous with the understanding of 
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self – which is threatened by the loss of origins, real or imagined, and the denial of the 
possibility of a unique identity. The concept of ‘self’ falls victim to the phenomenon of 
‘de-differentiation’ more normally associated with the commodity-form and the types of 
utility it affords. For Stewart, this arises through predominance of exchange-relations 
within the capitalist mode of production and elicits a counter-strategy based upon the 
accumulation of unique objects (collection) and the (re)construction of a putative reality 
through detail.  Thus, the present submits to the (nostalgic) evocation of the past – as the 
locus of authentic experience (authored by God) where sign and referent were identical – 
and its cataloguing (Stewart, 1998: 27-8). The distaste for the antiquarian (mis)use of 
history espoused by Nietzsche stems from this refusal to acknowledge the conditions 
which bourgeois economic supremacy had unleashed upon the world and re-appears in 
Benjamin’s discussion of the retreat into the intérieur. The ‘happiness’ that Ferguson sees 
suppressed as the pre-condition of the emergence of bourgeois ‘pleasure’ is now sought 
after through the actions of the collector, or, more accurately, the act of recollection of 
what has been ‘lost.’ 
 
Everything seems out of nature.  
– Edmund Burke, Reflections of the Revolution in France, cited 
Fritzsche (2002).  
 
Fritzsche, meanwhile, sees modernity (inaugurated by the events of 1789) as the absence 
of tradition and the distance from ‘home’ and ‘nature’ as recalled by bourgeois culture.  
The lack of an identity between bourgeois culture and its putative origins or ‘initial 
conditions’ becomes the distance upon which nostalgic desire is predicated: experience of 
market society becomes the experience of inauthenticity, the relativisation of values, of 
Value, which has its conclusion in the discussion of exchange by Vattimo (1988; 1993). 
This effort to re-present (literally) the past by a process of material accumulation is the 
attempt to overcome temporal distance (history) through spatial representation, epitomised 
in the museum, and to re-unite ‘biology and the symbol’ in the future, through the 
department store.  
 
Bourgeois nostalgia came to focus upon the absence of ‘lived experience,’ the ‘experience’ 
of a relation of distance from the space and time of authentic historical experience 
(Erfahrung) and its pre-lapsarian social relations. The bourgeois project, in this sense, was 
the recovery of harmonious society: an Enlightenment inheritance evident in many of the 
philanthropic responses to the perceived excesses of nineteenth capitalism, ranging from 
Robert Owen’s New Lanark (Scotland) and New Harmony (U.S.A.) to the Arts and Craft 
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movement’s archaeology of mediaeval England’s craft industries. Reality, real life, as the 
guarantor of ‘lived experience’ – as the identity between events and their meaning or 
significance – was seen by eighteenth and early nineteenth century bourgeois society as 
irredeemably lost to the past. Life was, in Burke’s sense, ‘unnatural’ and experienced at a 
distance or remove. The metropolitan life and mass consumption of nineteenth century 
modernity signified this rupture, while simultaneously offering the technological means of 
its overcoming. This would be achieved through the escape from capitalism’s division of 
labour – which threatened the intellect (Adam Smith) – into an Arcadian past or utopian 
future; to the virgin lands of the new world or the resolution of class conflict through the 
manufacture of a land of plenty in Europe and the consequent democratisation of luxury 
that this would afford.  
 
Bourgeois nostalgia for the ‘nature’ or ‘home’ which had been lost, whether in the events 
of 1789 (Fritzsche) or the development of a seemingly autonomous sphere of circulation 
and exchange (Stewart, 1998), corresponds to the ‘rupture’ of tradition, and the continuity 
of temporality, which Osborne sees as fundamental to the concept of modernity as 
historical epoch. In place of this rupture lay the accumulation of detail – the catalogue – 
the quantitative resolution of a qualitative problematic, through recourse to narrative 
strategies of desire and progress, of personal and social development. The means to narrate 
continuity in the face of discontinuity represented an attempt to re-found ‘lived experience’ 
through the apparent reconstruction of that which was deemed absent: collection became 
the act of (re)collection. Tradition, as the accumulation and re-integration of fragments 
under the ‘sign’ of the whole becomes the assertion of memory as historical force, as 
organizing and narrative principle: the narration of continuity, of biography, personal or 
social. Fritzsche asserts that nostalgia ‘haunts’ or ‘stalks’ modernity as its double since he 
views the Revolution of 1789 as the founding rupture that transforms the aristocratic and 
bourgeois subject, imbuing it with a nostalgic longing for ‘home’ and ‘nature.’ The money-
form’s ‘levelling effect’ and the de-differentiation of the commodity-form, through the 
pre-dominance of formal equality in capitalist-exchange, ensures that the ‘play of 
difference’ between matter and meaning precludes the re-unification, as totality, upon 
which nostalgia is premised.  This echoes Benjamin’s reading of Proust’s discussion of 
recollection, and its distinction between voluntary and involuntary memory: 
 
And so it is with our own past. It is a labor in vain to attempt to recapture 
it: all the efforts of our intellect must prove futile. The past is hidden 
somewhere outside the realm of, beyond the reach, of intellect, in some 
material object … which we do not suspect. And as for that object, it 
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depends on chance whether we come upon it or not before we ourselves 
die.  
– Proust, cited in Benjamin, 1999: 403 
 
Therefore, the ‘machinery of narration’ came, increasingly, to deal with ‘irretrievable loss; 
disconnection from remembered lifeworlds; exhaustion of tradition; a fugitive, fleeting 
experience of the present; and an often ominous anticipation of the future’ (Fritzsche, 
2002: 6). The bourgeoisie presided over a world from which they felt alienated, and this 
absence was perceived as temporality.  Capitalist modernity floats free of the historical 
events that helped usher it into being, it is severed from history (as Nature), as the 
transcendent referent that underpins and guarantees meaning and produces a stable, 
hierarchically ordered system of language and experience. The commodity-culture of 
capitalist modernity can now be seen as antithetical to nostalgia, in its historical sense, as a 
bourgeois longing for an authenticity of experience rooted in previous social formations. 
Seltzer (1992) sees in the shift from Realist to Naturalist fiction, and their respective 
depictions of selfhood, an attempt at ‘personnation’ – a ‘staging’ of the subject as a 
coherent self and agent. The change from ‘market’ to ‘disciplinary’ society marking a 
change in the context within which subjectivity is organised and experienced. The 
dissolution of the bourgeois subject and the totality it represented – the unified ego – 
served to sever phenomenological experience from the events that produced it (history as 
biography) and, consequently, threatened the agency of the individual by denying the 
autonomy of the subject in a world of objects. 
 
In this way the experience of modernity, modernité, fuses with the constituent elements of 
the terrain of modern consumption and appears divorced from the social relations that form 
the infrastructure that allows its operation: the machinery and cabling that facilitate digital 
networks or the labour that supports transport systems, such as railway engineers, 
motorway service station personnel or air traffic control operations. The inter-relation 
between people and things discussed by Latour under the rubric of ‘actant-network theory’ 
represents one such attempt to forge a sociological re-unification of subjective experience 
and the vast network of goods, services, labour, knowledge, structures and habits that 
facilitate the forms which experience assumes for the contemporary subject. Here, what 
threatens to disappear or ‘melt’ into the sphere of exchange (signs) is re-examined in an 
attempt to uncover its material existence. 
 
The nostalgic remembrance of an uncomplicated (less mediated) past based upon physical 
proximity suggests that the differing temporalities bound up in modern consumption – the 
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temporality of production, the temporality of inclusion in experiences and events (such as 
the narrative of a film) and the temporality of ‘consumer’ participation – are conflated (see 
also Latour, 1996).  What these lead to, says Stewart, are ‘generic conventions’ used to 
structure narratives of both unfolding and ‘consumption’ – for instance, the writing and 
reading of a book.  So, it becomes possible to view the self-referential and parodic 
activities of various ‘postmodern’ pursuits, most obviously cinema, as the ‘playful’ 
representation of an absent reality:  
 
[…] it is the very productivity and self-referentiality of these cinematic 
signs, their absolute erasure of a physical referent, that renders their 
excessiveness tolerable for an audience.  
- (1998:11) 
 
Here representation is sundered from re-presentation, as a denotative signification is 
foregone, in the irredeemable separation of the referent from the sign – and the dissolution 
of nostalgia as a causal relation within the ’free-play’ of signs. The distance upon which 
bourgeois desire had been predicated (and which could be overcome, at least theoretically) 
is now replaced by an ideological act of signification – exaggeration. Any distance now 
constructed is produced in the removal from reality (as the system of referents), as an 
innovation that ‘exaggerates’ this notion of distance through a stylistic or generic 
differentiation. This corresponds to Simmel’s insistence upon the primarily visual impact 
of the fantastic or overtly stylized presentation of objects – whether Italian landscapes, the 
applied arts or the ‘Scottish boys.’ 
 
Representation is no longer the unproblematic re-presentation of reality, however, neither 
is it merely the abstraction of the referent as the sign, nor is it the abstraction of labour-
power in the commodity. Instead, this ‘dematerialisation’ is the effacement of the origin 
upon which distance could be presumed, it is the abandonment of the contents of reality 
and their representation as mere form or appearance, and the entry into the sphere of both 
circulation and exchange and the sublime economy of aesthetic experience. The absence of 
‘origin’ is signified as a displacement that is given form as generic and conventional 
innovation (play), as the commodity-event. A bourgeois nostalgia for the experience of the 
authentic, which has somehow escaped the commodification process of capitalist 
modernity, manifests itself in the circumvention of abstraction (inauthenticity): as the 
plethora of backpackers seeking to avoid the ‘beaten track’ and discover the real America, 
India or China and engage in face-to-face encounters with the ‘real’ inhabitants of those 
cultures such ‘travel’ is revealed as simply a nostalgic expedition into their own culture’s 
fantasies of authentic experience.  The commodification of history as heritage and other 
 255 
cultures as the promise of authentic experience is well documented (Rojek, 1993; Urry, 
1990; MacCannell 1976; 1992), as is the seeming distaste for the apparent inauthenticity of 
hyper-reality and its institutions – whether Disneyland or Michael Jackson – variously 
observed (Baudrillard, 1989; Eco, 1986; Augé, 1999). 
 
The revelation of reality through its re-presentation (documentation) presumes a relation of 
identity between matter (referent) and language (sign) that, when missing, can be rebuilt, 
whether in the individual self seeking ‘fulfilment,’ the cartographer or the collector seeking 
specimens that exemplify the type, the genre. Representation, on the other hand, is the 
‘play’ of difference: 
 
The utilitarian vision of an ordinary language perfectly mapped upon the 
material needs of the everyday is a vision of language before the Fall: 
speaking from the heart or from nature as the vox populi is mythically able 
to do.  
– Stewart, 1998: 17 
 
For the bourgeoisie tradition was the absent guarantor of this identity. However, the 
impossibility of a ‘degree zero’ of language (Barthes) is the simultaneous impossibility of 
tradition and its authority in capitalist modernity – unless it is imposed as a totalitarian 
project. Tradition as the presence in the present of an authentic past, whether as Arts and 
Craft antique, literary canon or mot juste, is the attempt to assert identity, to undo the 
transience of history and force it to submit to wilful organisation: antiquarian heritage or 
utopian progress. The purpose of the quotation, claims Stewart, is to invoke the past, as 
traditional authority, and so legitimate the projects of the present, whether radical or 
reactionary (for Benjamin quotations were ‘robbers’ stealing the convictions of the reader). 
Sociability, as discussed by Simmel, relies upon the grounding of the quotation by 
‘reality,’ producing an aesthetic phenomenon without collapsing into an ‘empty symbol’ or 
stylisation when the connection to the everyday is severed. 
 
Unlike quotation, fiction’s ‘reframing’ of the world is an ‘imaginary repetition’ of ‘reality’ 
rather than a direct reference, it is a mutually defining relation of difference: as such fiction 
cannot be ‘secondary’ or ‘auxiliary’ to reality. Fiction unfolds ‘in a world simultaneous to 
and “outside” everyday life’ and so ‘interrupts the narrativity, the linearity of that life’ 
(Stewart, 1998: 21). Fiction both draws from ‘reality’ and lends to it many of the 
conventions and narrative techniques that inform experience, particularly the narrating of 
‘personal-experience’ through its genrefication as biography. The narrating of the 
individual life-history relies upon generic conventions such as character, incident and 
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action, since it is through these narrative devices that the momentary ‘emigration’ from the 
‘present’ is structured as experience. In this way the de-differentiation of everyday reality 
is opposed through an ‘escape’ (Rojek) from its spatial and temporal structure, into the 
‘elsewhere’ and ‘elsewhen’ of a spatially anterior and temporally simultaneous ‘world’ – 
that of play. ‘Play,’ therefore, assumes a relationship to the everyday world of ‘reality’ that 
is analogous to fiction or, more accurately, the fictive and shares similar narrative and 
generic conventions, which structure the experiential involvement of the individual. When 
these structuring conventions intersect with the remains of personal ‘biography’ (after the 
dissolution of bourgeois selfhood) they can be seen to resemble the ‘personnation’ that is 
the response to the ‘thrill and panic of agency’ and its attempted performance (Seltzer, 
1992; see also Seltzer’s discussion of the non-person, 2002).  
 
The intuition of the absence of authentic experience of identity – Ferguson deems it an 
impossibility – produces the nostalgic desire or longing (Stewart) for the ‘remembered’ 
past, now lost. This, of course, is not a memory but an attempt at (re)collection, the 
production in the present of a putatively real past opposed to a present coloured by 
transience: it is fictive. What can not be directly experienced (lived) is remembered, 
memory is narrated. Kracauer (1995: 129-140) sees the occupant of the ‘empty space’ of 
the present as a bourgeois individual who experiences the absence of the ‘absolute,’ the 
possessor of a ‘soul’ that has liberated itself from God, theology and tradition until ‘in the 
age of materialism and capitalism, it becomes ever more atomized and increasingly 
degenerates into an arbitrary chance construct.’ 
 
This ‘exile from the religious sphere’ induces the horror vacui, the fear of emptiness, 
which individuals must endure whilst they await a salvation that they will not seek and are 
unable to embrace. 
 
In the most recent past, people have been forced to experience their own 
insignificance – as well as that of others – all too persistently for them to 
believe in the sovereign power of any one individual.  It is precisely this 
sovereign power, however, which is the premise of the bourgeois literature 
produced during the years preceding the war.  
- 1995: 101-2 
 
So, it is the lives of politicians, rather than poets, which allow transmission of ‘historical 
experience’ through the biographical account of the events of the age – rather than the 
‘sensualism’ (Valéry) of the subject. There exists in the lives of ‘great men’ the possibility 
of asserting once more the ‘market individual,’ against the ‘disciplinary individual’ 
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(Seltzer), who represents the statistical forces that deny the unique personality. This 
attempt to reconnect individual experience with historical process, as understanding, is the 
last vestige of the nostalgic desire to re-unite materiality (reality) and meaning (language), 
and so produce an identity between history and its ‘lived experience.’ Indeed, Kracauer 
sees the producers of such biographies seeking a ‘bourgeois hinterland’ in a tactical 
avoidance of their real situation, caused by ‘world events’. Thus, biography is the last 
throw of the dice for bourgeois identity, the attempt to reconcile the self and lived 
experience.  
 
Lived Experience  
The expropriation from ‘reality’ found in the ‘toy’ and the ‘miniature’ (Stewart) is echoed 
in Baudrillard’s (1988) discussion of ‘ecstatic’ forms, especially contemporary 
architecture. The ‘obscenity of the real,’ its production of ‘architecture and the creation of 
super-objects such as Beaubourg, Les Halles or La Villette – which are literally advertising 
monuments (or anti-monuments)….’ is a ‘demonstration of the operation of culture, of the 
cultural operation of the commodity and that of the masses in movement.’ Urban 
architecture has become ‘huge screens upon which moving atoms, particles and molecules 
are refracted’ where ‘public’ space has been ‘replaced by a gigantic circulation, 
ventilation, and ephemeral connecting space’ (Baudrillard, 1988: 19-20).  
 
We no longer partake of the drama of alienation, but are in the ecstasy of 
communication.  
– Baudrillard, 1988: 22  
 
Alienation is unavailable to ‘experience’ because the material conditions that underpin it 
do not coagulate upon the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption. Thus, for Stewart, the sphere 
of circulation and exchange of the commodity-form is the antithesis of lived experience, so 
the terrain of modern consumption represents an un-real arena in which a form of ‘life’ is 
played out in which face-to-face interaction, in all its guises, is absent. Upon this terrain 
both the Arcadian past and the utopian future are unavailable and individual experience 
operates under the guiding principle of exaggeration, an ideological form structured 
through generic narrative conventions that no longer retain physiological experience as its 
referent. The life course of the individual is seen as having been divorced from that which 
in other societal formations, distant in space or time, traditionally assured the direction of 
time’s arrow. Here Rojek’s discussion of Goffman reveals the problematic notion of a 
‘paramount reality,’ any departure from which is a merely temporary aberration and 
capable of recovery. If the concept of a ‘paramount reality’ and its physiological frame is 
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surrendered then the subject has no promontory from which to ‘gaze’ upon the world of 
representations. The panoramic gaze of the bourgeois subject-self collapses in the 
‘obscenity’ of modern consumption and the ‘ecstasy’ of the ‘death of experience’ (de 
Cauter, 1993), making problematic the figure of the collector and the possibility of 
collection as an act of ‘quotation’ of tradition, other than as a conservative gesture in the 
face of rupture and upheaval (Agamben, 1999).  
 
Souvenirs 
The souvenir is the spatio-temporal embodiment of bourgeois desire, of nostalgic longing 
for the reconciliation of sign and referent and the ‘totality’ of experience that this would 
imply. The satiation of this nostalgic longing had been predicated upon participation in the 
world of goods, as the logic of personal (subjective) development and mastery of the object 
world – whether in the department store or the collection. As Ferguson (1990: 194) 
observes, the ‘pursuit of pleasure has nothing to do with sensuous gratification,’ but is 
rather, the ‘mechanism of individuation; the principle by which the self emerges from the 
flux of consciousness.’ The souvenir, for bourgeois culture, was the object-form that had 
promised to overcome the longing for authentic social relations and the harmony that they 
signified. The abstraction inherent in the commodification process ‘empties out’ the 
contents of the object, relieving it of its burden of significance and its relationship with a 
referent – thereby divorcing it from an ‘authentic’ social formation and the function that it 
had performed there in the service of lived experience.  
 
The bourgeois souvenir can be distinguished from a historical relic – a piece of the ‘true 
cross’ or a ruined city of antiquity – since such an object belongs unequivocally to the past, 
to alternative social formations and cultures. The bourgeois souvenir is a nostalgic totem of 
a longed for social formation or historical era. The souvenir signals the distance between 
past and present, between the interior constructed by the collector for the ‘idealization of 
objects’ and the ‘impossibility of a private life’ in the modern metropolis after Louis 
Philippe (Benjamin, 1999: 19-20). However, the ‘transmission’ of culture or tradition 
implied by the quotation or collectible object (souvenir) is complicated by the loss of the 
‘alienation value’ (Agamben), which previously defined such artefacts and the activities 
they underpinned. Therefore, the ‘non-traditional’ culture of bourgeois society is 
characterised by the attempt to span or overcome the ‘distance’ between the authentic and 
unmediated past and its experience in the present, or what Agamben (1999: 107) terms the 
‘act of transmission and the thing transmitted.’ So, what bourgeois society seeks to 
transmit is ‘culture,’ a culture whose hallmark is ‘alienation value’ and which signals the 
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non-identity of origin and experience. In the case of the souvenir the distance of alienation 
value is given objective form that parallels Stewart’s (1998) discussion of the toy and the 
miniature, where the identity between use and exchange, materiality and meaning, form 
and function, is transformed.  
 
The spatial reduction of the original to the miniature signals the removal of utility and 
function, the shift from the ‘time of production to the time of consumption,’ from ‘the 
domain of the gift, where exchange is abstracted to the level of social relations and away 
from the level of materials and processes’ (Stewart, 1998: 144). By moving beyond use the 
souvenir enters onto the terrain of the sphere of circulation and exchange, it shifts to the 
playworld of the elsewhere and elsewhen, as a literalisation of distance – as a sign. In this 
way the souvenir re-presents nostalgic desire and assigns it a role in the constitution of the 
bourgeois subject – as the means of bridging distance. The failure of society’s memory, its 
act of recollection, is the denial of unification, of identity between sign and referent – the 
resulting distance becomes the precondition of nostalgic desire. The coagulation of 
nostalgic desire in the form of the souvenir is the cathexis of the subject with the object 
world, in an age founded upon an unbridgeable gap between the two. Thus, nostalgic 
longing is intrinsic to the bourgeois subject both as a means of self-production and 
individuation through the manipulation of the object realm. In this case the souvenir – as 
the objective form of temporal distance (history) – has assumed primacy.  
 
The Dissolution of Desire 
 
For the nostalgic to reach his or her goal of closing the gap between 
resemblance and identity, lived experience would have to take place, the 
erasure of the gap between sign and signified, an experience which would 
cancel out the desire that is nostalgia’s reason for existence.  
- Stewart, 1998: 145 
 
The bourgeois project of selfhood, to which nostalgic desire and its evocation in the form 
of the souvenir was so central, however, was doomed to failure. The attempt to realise the 
self relied upon memory marshalling, recollecting, events and experiences in such a way as 
to afford to the ego a unity that appeared entirely untenable: 
 
Pleasure is a relation of desire, a movement towards the completion of 
the self. But the self is infinitely extendable, so the object world 
continually takes on more attractions. It is a movement which cannot 
be completed. We cannot find, in pleasure, the cessation of desire.  
- Ferguson, 1990: 205 
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An infinite world composed of an infinite array of objects and experiences did not bode 
well for the bourgeois self, the standardisation of experience divorced from traditional 
authority, and undermined the hierarchical ordering of ‘meaningful experience.’ 
 
The pursuit of pleasure, or virtue, or faith, is conceivable as the search for 
selfhood. It is to discover ourselves in the object world that we act with an 
underlying consistency of motive. When this process of self-discovery 
becomes undermined by the intuition of the nothingness that lies at it send, 
then we become filled with dread.  
– Ferguson, 1990 
 
The sphere of circulation and exchange in capitalist modernity is the (im)material 
manifestation of the impossibility of bourgeois selfhood and authentic experience. The 
money-form as the medium for the generalisation of the absolute relativity of all values 
within this sphere acts to ‘dissolve’ the desiring self, to reveal the practical impossibility of 
its attainment through the relativisation of Being into exchange Vattimo (1988). The 
translation of an identity-position into a relation of identification, from the bourgeois to the 
contemporary era, sees the relativisation of all values, even that of the self and the agency 
that had previously been considered its hallmark (Seltzer, 1992). 
 
The bourgeois subject attempted to marshal the contents of memory into a coherent 
biography of selfhood, just as the collector organised the elements of the collection into a 
narrative that explained historical events: both were acts of (re)collection aimed at 
producing an identity between causal factors and their effects, signs and referents, matter 
and meaning. The ‘terrain’ of modern consumption constructs the experience of intensity 
through the relation of ‘exaggeration’: whether it is bungee-jumping from ever-higher 
points or travelling to ever-more remote or dangerous locations. Equally, the inverse of this 
is the purchase of an insurance policy that quantifies the risk involved as a premium to be 
paid, where novelty, contingency and difference are reduced to number and rendered as 
price.  The (accident-) event (and its avoidance) becomes, on the one hand, the locus of 
excitement and an intensity of ‘lived experience,’ and on the other, a quantifiable 
probability proffered for mass subscription.  In this way, ‘authentic experience’ as the 
subjective experience of particular or extreme phenomena, removed from the everyday, is 
commodified, and so abstracted, formalized and reproduced, as an ‘event’ available to all 
who wish to participate – there are several ‘extreme sports’ TV channels catering to 
exactly this situation. 
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Subjective experience ceases to be unique and identification rather than identity becomes 
the means by which biographical events are valued by the individual – as a narrative 
device for the negotiation of temporal ‘events.’ Both Simmel (1990: 278) and Agamben 
(1993: 17-9) conclude, but by different routes, that the traditional concept of experience 
founded upon the unique individual is lost, traded for mathematical exactitude and 
machinic reproducibility. The demise of the taste and discrimination of the bourgeois 
individual sees novelty, rather than beauty, become the order of the day:  
 
Beauty is a kind of corpse. Novelty, intensity, strangeness, – in a word all 
the values of surprise have supplanted it. Crude excitement is the ruling 
mistress of contemporary minds; and the actual purpose of any work is to 
tear us from the contemplative state, […]. People [seek] the most unstable 
and immediate characteristics of the psychic and sensitive life. The 
unconscious, the irrational, the temporary which are, […], denials or 
negations of the intentional and sustained forms of mental activity, […]. 
One hardly ever sees any more a product of the desire for perfection.  
– Valéry, 1964: 111 
 
The ‘autonomy’ of the bourgeois subject as ‘producer’ had relied upon the perceived inner 
unity (totality) of its character as the motive force or cause of its conduct (the revealed 
preferences of economic theory). However, this unity dissolves into fragments capable of 
an apparently limitless number of re-combinations as subjective experience extends itself 
throughout space and time.  
 
Perfection as the telos of development underpinned the ethos of self-mastery and bourgeois 
discrimination through the denial of fripperies (the critique of aristocratic luxury) or play 
(the province of fools, children and savages). This was productive labour as the (re)making 
of both world and self. The demise of the bourgeois world view in the face of modernity’s 
mass culture produced nostalgic desire.  For the inhabitants of the mass commodity-culture 
of a technologically-enabled modernity the ‘biographical fiction of the self’ was an 
increasingly inapplicable concept.  Instead, argues Vattimo (1988: 22-3), there emerges a 
‘nihilism’ of the subject, in which ‘Being is completely dissolved in the discoursing of 
value, in the indefinite transformation of universal experience.’ Any lingering desire for a 
‘self’ or ‘Being’ that resides solely in the subject must be seen as a nostalgic and 
retrogressive delusion.  Technology functions, for Vattimo, as the ‘chronically mediatized’ 
money-form does for Dodd (1994), in dissolving the apparent immutability of being into a 
‘value’ which circulates within networks (both technological and financial) of information 
and exchange.  
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In the world of immersion, authorship is no longer the transmission of 
experience, but rather the construction of utterly personal experiences.  
– Laurel, 1996: 1.06 
 
All values, even those of Being itself, sacred to the secular scientific culture underpinning 




The ‘heroic’ manifestation of subjective distance from the world of objects allowed the 
author, artist or collector – through the exercise of critical judgement – to forge the ‘magic 
of distance’ (Benjamin). However, the ‘democratization of luxury’ (Williams) epitomised 
by the ‘mass consumption’ of the department store, produced a reification of exchange, 
uniting disparate objects, experiences and values, within the ‘mediating instance’ (Simmel) 
of the money-form and a ‘culture of things.’ Here no thing and no-one stood apart or 
distant from the world – with the exception of the art-object. 
 
the essence of the work of art… is to be a totality for itself, to require no 
relationship to an external entity, to weave each of its threads back once 
more to its focal point. In so far as the work of art is that which otherwise 
only the world as a whole or the soul can be: a unity out of individual 
elements – it encloses itself as a world for itself against all that exists 
external to it.  
– Simmel, cited Frisby, 1992: 140, emphasis in original. 
 
The reification of exchange in the money-form bestowed upon the specific instances of 
exchange (acquisition) a ‘spectral objectivity’ (Marx), which became ‘ “the embodiment of 
a pure function” – they play with values just as the aesthetic judgement “exercises 
functions… purely formally” ’ (Frisby, 1990: 142). The autonomy of the aesthetic realm of 
image, appearance and form parallels that of the sphere of circulation and exchange, in 
which economic values are given form as images of value circulate, divorced from their 
utilitarian contents begins to emerge. This, in turn, leads Frisby to consider the distinction 
made by Kant, in The Critique of Judgement, between the beautiful and the sublime. 
 
The beautiful… is a question of the form of the object, and thus consists in 
limitation, whereas the sublime is to be found in an object even devoid of 
form, so far as it immediately involves, or else its presence provokes, a 
representation of limitlessness, yet with a super-added thought of its own 
totality. Accordingly the beautiful seems to be regarded as a presentation 
of an indeterminate concept of understanding, the sublime as a 
presentation of an indeterminate concept of reason. Hence the delight is in 
the former case coupled with the representation of Quality, but in this case 
with that of Quantity.  
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– Kant, cited Frisby, 1992: 143 
 
Frisby poses the question of whether what Simmel says of the beautiful, in respect of art 
(formal limitation), can be discerned in the relation of the sublime to the sphere of 
circulation and exchange. No longer tied to the material object (form, materiality and 
function) the experience of the sublime resembles both the labile transformations of ‘play’ 
and the ‘spectral objectivity’ of the monetised commodity-form – in none of these 
instances is the cause of the aesthetic experiences discernible or available to 
understanding. 
 
Aesthetic experience appears to Simmel to offer the possibility of ‘liberation’ and ‘release 
from the dull pressure of things, the expansion of the joyful and free self into things, the 
reality of which usually oppresses it’ (Frisby, 1992: 144). The ‘autonomous movement of 
things,’ regardless of the intercession of human beings, which it had been the task of 
modern art to represent, emphasised the distance between subjects and objects. The 
liberation of the contents of the world from the utilitarian purposes that had ostensibly 
underscored their production signalled their escape from use, through the distance of 
abstraction, and their representation as aesthetic values.  
 
The more remote for the species is the utility of the object that first created 
an interest and a value and is now forgotten, the purer is the aesthetic 
satisfaction derived from the mere form and appearance of the object.  
– Simmel, cited Frisby, 1992: 146 
 
The escape from origins (utility, materiality and function), in this sense, marks the entry 
into the aesthetic sphere where adornment and ornamentation are to be found, not least in 
the ‘applied arts’ where general use or ‘plurality’ heralded the technical refinement of style 
and ‘stylisation.’ The aesthetic sphere as the realm beyond use – of autonomous objects 
divorced from human purposes – recalls the ‘freedom’ from function of the toy. Here the 
world is no longer composed of referents supporting a system of signifiers and is, instead, 
simply the ‘free play’ of these signifiers and their infinite possible signifieds. 
 
While, previously, the picturesque had served to contain the sublime terror of nature 
through the production of the landscape, this is no longer tenable:  
 
Just as in ‘The Philosophy of Landscape’ Simmel virtually declares that 
the metropolitan ‘cityscape’ (Benjamin) cannot be a landscape, so in the 
museum devoted to the display of work of art (that are themselves framed) 
the totality is itself incapable of being ‘framed.’  
– Frisby, 1992: 147 
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Metropolitan existence is rooted in a technological rather than a natural sublime, or rather 
technology is indivisible from nature in the manner once advanced by bourgeois science. 
The myriad competing impressions and stimuli that comprise metropolitan life now 
resemble Simmel’s description of aesthetic experience as ‘the mere image of things, […] 
their appearance and form, regardless of whether or not they are borne by a graspable 
reality’ (cited Frisby, 1992: 136). Metropolitan experience is, then, governed by two 
aspects, quantitative profusion – the sheer number of objects and experiences encountered 
– and, the qualitative momentary. Metropolitan experience can therefore be found in 
concentrated form in the museum, gallery, World Exhibition or department store, since the 
possibility of totality, of a frame for existence and experience, and the consequent ordering 
and evaluation of the world that such distinctions make possible, is feasible only when 
experience is represented spatially rather than temporally. This is the logic of the collection 
as discussed by Stewart (1998), where the identity and therefore the meaning and value of 
an object relies upon its relation with the referent, which it signifies, remaining unchanged. 
 
By dis-articulating the sign from its referent the commodity is ‘liberated’ from reality and 
the material, spatial and historical constraints that shaped its production (cause): the ‘initial 
conditions’ that pertained at its origin no longer inform the role and meaning of the 
commodity-event. On the fictive terrain of the playworld the material object slips the 
bonds of physical form, it is liberated into a realm where its circulation and exchange is 
governed not by causal laws but by the labile possibilities and playful transformation of its 
significance. The value of the commodity-sign is now dependent upon the absence of its 
referent (the origin as production history). Utility as proposed by economic theory is a 
redundant concept because it is rooted in a hierarchy of needs and wants that are 
superfluous in a world ruled not by formal limitation (beauty) but sheer profusion, the 
representation of a sublime limitlessness. In place of the appreciation of beauty, the 
evaluation of objects by subjects is the experience of being as exchange, as ratio. 
Therefore, the aesthetic pleasure that underpins the bourgeois theory of self as unique 
identity and its ‘perfectibility’ dissolves in the face of the relativisation of ‘Value’ found in 
the money-form and the sublime transformation of play. Ferguson sees this as a shift 
within the internal organisation of the bourgeois psyche: 
 
Excitement, an internally decomposed state within which the ‘self’ cannot 
locate itself, is the enjoyment of modernity and the modern form of 
enjoyment. It is inherently unpredictable and related to the ‘object world’ 
in an arbitrary fashion. […] In an excited state, the psyche no longer 
‘knows itself’ and manages to throw off every pretension to seriousness.  
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- 1990: 218 
 
The psyche now resembles the commodity-sign in that it is alienated not just from the 
conditions of its origins (the possibility of nostalgia) but also from the possibility of the 
recovery of this previous (ego) state. The imminent decomposition or fragmentation of the 
bourgeois self in the face of the commodity-culture of capitalist modernity can also be seen 
in Seltzer’s (1992: 18) discussion of the ‘thrill and panic of agency, at once extended and 
suspended’ heralded by the increasing extension of technology into every sphere of life.  
 
Simmel, sociability and play 
The aesthetic dimension of life for Simmel, found in his discussion of Kant, lies in the 
form which things assume, the formal representation of the contents as ‘the mere image of 
things,’ ‘their appearance.’ The aesthetic dimension is contrasted with the reality of 
existence, in ‘the lightness and freedom of play,’ in its formal appearance rather than the 
‘reality-contents of life’ (cited Frisby, 1992: 136). The formal unification of diverse, even 
contradictory fragments in the aesthetic totality parallels the relation between the 
individual and the supra-individual (the universal), a subjective valuation appearing to the 
subject as possibly shared through its being rooted in a ‘universal’ value.  
 
Simmel posits that ‘the feeling with respect to art of being released from 
every detail and one-sidedness of existence perhaps emerges out of the fact 
that a boundlessness of the individual element, as emanating from a central 
point and on which the work of art rests, is brought to life in us, and indeed 
not with the confusion of fortuitous associations but rather, in each case, 
in typical and meaningful forms of relations, attractions and connections 
of conceptions.’  
– Frisby, (quoting Simmel), italics in original citation, 1992: 137. 
 
As Frisby observes, this ‘somewhat abstract formulation acquires a concrete form in 
Simmel’s discussion of sociability (Geselligkeit) as the play form of society (Gesellschaft), 
as a form of sociation unburdened by any specific content’ (ibid). 
 
Simmel’s attempt to discern the aesthetic dimension to every type of ‘sociation’ leads him 
to an analysis of formal similarity expressed in ‘the fact that in every play or artistic 
activity there is contained a common element not affected by their differences in content’ 
(1949: 254). In sociability even the individual personality must be restrained in order to 
facilitate interaction with others – the bourgeois ideal of a fully realized individual ego, the 
personality, must be suspended and accorded a formal role rather than allow unrestrained 
selfhood. The rules that shape sociability are, therefore, restraints that rein in a subject, 
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unlike the money-form that extends the subjective will through its use a tool for 
abbreviating the steps in the sequence of causality/attainment. 
 
Sociability, as the abstract form of social interaction, ‘distils, as it were, out of the realities 
of social life the pure essence of association, of the associative process as a value and a 
satisfaction. […] all sociability, even the purely spontaneous, if it is to have meaning and 
stability, lays […] great value on form, on good form’ (1949: 255). And sociability, like 
play, has as its essence ‘that it makes up its substance from numerous fundamental forms 
of serious relationships among men, a substance, however, spared the frictional relations of 
real life; but out of its formal relations to real life, [it…] takes on a symbolically playing 
fullness of life and a significance which a superficial rationalism always seeks only in the 
content’ (ibid). So, 
 
Sociability is, then, the play-form of association and is related to the 
content-determined concreteness of association as art is related to reality. 
[…] Since sociability in its pure form has no ulterior end, no content, and 
no result outside itself, it is oriented completely about personalities.  
– 1949: 255 
 
This abstraction away from the material position of the participants and the subsequent 
presumption of equality, ‘is a game in which one “acts” as though all were equal […] This 
is just as far from being a lie as is play or art in all their departures from reality’ (1949: 
257). Here the social world of bourgeois interaction echoes the formal exchange of 
economic sphere, in which actors and commodities meet in formal equality for the 
purposes of exchange. In the social sphere, in the apparent autonomy of sociable exchange, 
this is not a ‘lie’ but it might be considered a fiction. Governed by ‘the immediate play of 
its forms’ the ‘sociological play-form’ becomes a ‘social game’ that ‘is played not only in 
a society as its outward bearer but that with the society actually “society” is played’ (1949: 
258). Such interactions (and coquetry is another) have no end other than their perpetuation 
and enjoyment, since to bring them to a conclusion, to accord them purpose, would cause 
them to cease and return the participants to reality. When straightforward pursuit or 
infatuation intervenes then such interaction between the sexes ceases to be a form of 
sociability in the particular sense defined by Simmel. 
 
It lacks that free interaction and equivalence of the elements which is the 
fundamental condition of sociability. […] Coquetry…has left behind the 
reality of erotic desire, of consent or denial, and becomes a play of shadow 
pictures.  
– 1949: 258 
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By abandoning telos sociability echoes the ‘freedom’ from purpose of play, sociability 
becomes something to be practiced and accomplished, capable of refinement through an 
ever-greater understanding of and adherence to its rules. The perfect moment of 
‘sociability’ is that the geo is subordinated (or subsumed):  
 
… in which the subjectively individual as well as the objectively 
substantive have dissolved themselves completely in the service of pure 
sociability.’  
- (1949: 259-60). 
 
Participation in this rule-governed activity resembles, says Simmel, artistic practice and a 
distance from the concerns, values and activities of the everyday world, signals the 
departure from ‘reality’ and entry into the aesthetic sphere. However, in leaving the reality 
of everyday life sociability, like artistic endeavour, risks being cut off from the conditions 
that produce it, reducing it to an empty re-presentation. 
 
All sociability is but a symbol of life, […]; but even so, a symbol of life, 
whose likeness it only so far alters as is required by the distance from it 
gained in the play, exactly as also the freest and most fantastic art, the 
furthest from all reality, nourishes itself from a deep and true relation to 
reality, if it is not to be empty and lying. If sociability cuts off completely 
the threads which bind it to real life and out of which it spins its admittedly 
stylized web, it turns from play to empty farce, to a lifeless schematization 
proud of its woodenness.  
– 1949: 261 
 
The aesthetic dimension is premised upon its distance from the everyday, its elevation to 
an other sphere, such that it is the distance from the everyday that bestows upon the 
aesthetic its affect In this way the aesthetic object is freed of its denotative function and the 
qualities represented by or contained within its material properties – just as the toy is. 
However, if the aesthetic object is not to be ‘reduced’ to the status of a toy it must not be 
cut-off entirely from the reality that bore it. Typically,  
 
[…] if we weld certain elements taken from the whole of being into a 
realm of their own, which is governed by its own laws and not by those of 
the whole, this realm, if completely cut off from the life of the whole, can 
display in its inner realization an empty nature suspended in the air; but 
then, often altered only by imponderables, precisely in this state of 
removal from all immediate reality, its deeper nature can appear more 
completely, more integrated and meaningful, than any attempt to 
comprehend it realistically and without taking distance. According as the 
former or the latter experience predominates, will one’s own life, running 
its own course according to its own norms, be a formal, meaningless dead 
thing – or a symbolic play, in whose aesthetic charm all the finest and 
most highly sublimated dynamics of social existence and its riches are 
gathered.  
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– Simmel, 1949: 261 
 
The severing of the connection between the ‘life’ of an object and ‘reality.’ and the 
subsequent denial of the possibility of commenting upon reality, of ‘comprehending’ it, 
recalls the process of the commodity-form and its alienation from the conditions of its 
production as it enters the sphere of circulation and exchange. The ‘artistic play’ created by 
reality ‘as from a distance’ is the hallmark of a world divided ontologically between 
subjects and objects (see the discussion of Dant, 1999 in Chapter Two), it is the world of 
the ‘sovereign’ or ‘market individual’ (Seltzer, 1992) and not as Simmel feared ‘the culture 
of human beings’ as the ‘culture of things.’ 
 
Staccato 
The failure of biographical narrative as a means to explain participation in the world 
mirrors Agamben’s (1999) description of the difficulties facing the transmission of 
aesthetic experience in contemporary culture. The loss of ‘history,’ as the biographical 
narration of individual and group, deprives humanity of its ‘reference points.’ Such a 
failure of ‘transmission’ of experience leaves the individual  
 
wedged between, on the one hand, a past that incessantly accumulates 
behind him and oppresses him with the multiplicity of its now-
indecipherable contents, and on the other hand a future that he does not 
yet possess and that does not throw any light on his struggle with the past.  
- 1999: 108 
 
The interruption of ‘traditional’ temporality produces an ‘accumulated culture [that] has 
lost its living meaning.’  
 
Suspended in the void between old and new, past and future, man is 
projected into time as into something alien that incessantly eludes him and 
still drags him forward, but without allowing him to find his ground in it.  
- Ibid 
 
The constant caesura of meaning, from moment to moment, is the catastrophe of narration, 
the subjective experience of which is best described as vertigo – the dizzying feeling 
undergone when the physical immersion of the body in an event or experience deprives the 
sensory faculties of an external reference point that would facilitate orientation.  
 
Where economic theory had postulated a utility-maximising, if occasionally fickle, 
psychological individual and the various versions of cultural studies, from Bourdieu (1984) 
to Dant (1999) envisage a modern-day Prometheus shaping the stuff of the world in 
accordance with a subjective desire for identity. Modern consumption, by contrast, must be 
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seen as the contemporary medium for inter-subjective association in the absence of the 
Cartesian distinction between subject and object, which has previously served as the 
‘referent’ for the experience of signification or meaning. The ‘dissolution’ of the subject 
into the momentary instances of identification, the coalescence of subjectivity in 
association with ‘object culture’ – as ratio – betrays the absence of any utilitarian, libidinal 
or psychological a priori.  The bourgeois subject is now a historical anachronism that 
lingers as a disembodied spectre that stalks contemporary commodity culture, it is now a 
stylised abstraction that exists in the absence of the conditions that prevailed at its origin 
and presided over its historical production. The bourgeois subject, previously imagined as 
the ‘origin’ of the twin axes of ‘consumption activity’ and its mathematical representation, 
is now only a notional point of departure from which subjective identification is always ‘in 
retreat.’  
 
Here There Be Monsters (Mutants and Machines) 
The nostalgic attempt to re-found selfhood through the manipulation of the object world 
described by Seltzer (1992) must now be replaced by the constant ‘deformation’ 
(Ferguson) of subjectivity as it continuously re-combines and re-forms at the intersection 
of generic and specific identity through the interstitial action of a commodity ‘hinge’ 
(Massumi, 1993). This conjunction of materiality and meaning, is the condition of 
phenomenological experience in the post-bourgeois era. This is why Seltzer’s description, 
borrowed from Foucault, of the supplanting of the ‘market’ individual by the its 
‘disciplinary’ successor stresses the (re)-production of the individual by factors that arise 
outside of the subject and its traditional limit-point – the body. Indeed, the self and its 
‘vessel’ are now acted upon by external factors that exceed those previously accepted – 
class, historical events, even genetics. The power of contemporary ‘discursive systems’ to 
(mis-)shape the subject, to produce identifications, signals the end of the humanist 
conception of self-mastery that underpinned the bourgeois formulation of individual 
identity. Modern consumption, therefore, becomes the means by which the absence of the 
factors previously held to produce identity is negotiated and, as such, is the antithesis of a 
‘cultural studies’ approach that valorises individual choice (critical ‘consumerism’) as the 
basis for a politics of identity and a fantasy of resistance (see Hebdige, 1979; Fiske, 1989). 
The human body in contemporary capitalist commodity culture is the point of intersection 
between subjective and objective culture, and this intersection or point of exchange is not a 
battleground to be fought over according to historically inherited rules concerning the 
production of a self via the mastery of inherent drives. Rather, the body has become the 
site of the intersection of subject and consumption-relations and the register for the 
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constant de-formation of subjective identity – as identification – through the operation of 
discursive power.  
 
‘Phenomenological’ or ‘lived experience’ now performs the simultaneous and 
contradictory function that Stewart (1988) accords it in the form of the quotation: it is both 
more ‘real’ than its mediated counterpart, but it is also absent – and upon this absence rests 
its authority, the authority of the real over the false, the authentic over the fake. However, 
Stewart’s analysis does not account for the transformed role of the body outlined above, or 
for the radically different comprehension of causality that holds sway in capitalist 
modernity. Therefore, the body as the ostensible location of authentic or ‘lived’ experience 
that is received phenomenologically (un-mediated) is itself a fantasy or fiction born of the 
bourgeois era. On this argument the body simply serves as the physical manifestation of 
and simultaneous connection to a ‘paramount reality’ (Rojek) from which excursions into 
un-reality can be organised, in cars, glass-bottomed boats, roller coaster cars or fancy dress 
costumes. The Archimedean point from which the bourgeois subject surveyed (surveilled) 
the landscape of the world has dissolved into the simultaneity of space-time. The 
disordered subject of contemporary capitalist modernity sits at the centre of a ‘globalised’ 
world and enjoys an immersion in the greatest concentration of material wealth, possible 
opportunity and technological innovation the planet has ever seen.  This disordered subject 
neither simply disintegrates completely, nor lapses into schizophrenic multiplicity, 
precisely because of the framework within which it operates.  The contemporary 
arrangement of technology, global finance, information networks and militarized personnel 
maintains the framework within which modernity is experienced, not as a historical epoch 
or distinctive set of socio-spatial relations but as a qualitative category (Adorno) – as the 
intersection of subjective and objective culture.  
 
In foregoing reality, paramount or otherwise, capitalist modernity establishes a fictive 
domain, the terrain of modern consumption, where, in place of scientific laws it is the 
‘rules [that] create fictions’ (Caillois) which link causes to effects. In liberating subjective 
experience from the framework of tradition and its narrative conventions, modern 
consumption de-natures the relationship between psyche and physiology that had 
previously underpinned humanist thought, from philosophy to economics and psychology. 
‘Human beings’ no longer inhabit the terrain of modern consumption: they have been 
supplanted by the ‘potential mutants’ of Baudrillard or the ‘cyborgs’ of a technologically-
enabled ‘machinic culture’ (de Cauter). Modernity has estranged ‘humanity’ from the 
social relations of the bourgeois era that brought it to pre-eminence and sought to 
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universalise it. Modern consumption necessitates a reconfiguring of subjective and 
objective culture, with Agamben (1999: 110) proposing a ‘melancholy’ successor to 
Benjamin’s ‘angel of history’ imagines a topography strewn with objects which ‘have lost 
the significance that their daily usefulness endowed them with,’ instead they are ‘charged 
with a potential for alienation that transforms them into the cipher for something endlessly 
elusive.’ In modernity, objects no longer possess the ‘promesse de bonheur,’ the capacity 
to satisfy subjective desire, whether understood as psychological lack, bodily need or 
spiritually and morally edifying experience. The modern object is unable to ‘communicate’ 
the past (tradition), either as aesthetic experience or the narration of its own production. In 
this Ferguson’s concept of ‘excitement’ intersects with the principle of ‘de-differentiation’ 
of the commodity-form (Lash & Urry) and Massumi’s theorisation of fear as the ‘if’ and 
‘but’ of the ‘accident-event (and its avoidance).’ Modern consumption, therefore, is the 
engagement with the temporal present under the conditions of modernity, it is the 
phenomenological form of experience available in a world divorced from its past and 




Capitalist modernity’s liberation of the present from both past and future is the 
simultaneous production and maintenance of the playworld of modern consumption, which 
the ‘post-human’ subject of a non-bourgeois culture inhabits. The sociological analyses of 
this modernité will not be achieved using the intellectual assumptions of previous social 
formations. The study of modern consumption requires the abandonment of outmoded 
concepts and the ontology from which they derive. Specifically, the phenomenological 
categories of time, space and causality must be re-thought in order to appreciate the 
transformed relation between subjective and objective culture and the subsequent 
experience of the logic of identification in contrast to the pursuit of identity as telos. 
‘Consumption’ has seemingly been dis-articulated from its own cause – production – and 
comes to resemble the description of play, ‘as an occasion of pure waste,’ offered by 
Caillois (2001), in which exchange occurs as an apparently autonomous activity. The 
absence of production as the origin and defining moment implies a transformation in the 
apparent nature of the object (or service), usually figured in terms of functionality. That is, 
the object or service ceases to be defined by the specific qualities instilled within the 
production process and its function shifts, undergoes metamorphoses, in accordance with 




Production no longer depends – or appears no longer to depend – upon a 
voluntaristic commitment on the part of all those whose activities are in 
fact required for its daily reconstruction. Demanding no more than passive 
assent it persists rather from neglect than from sedulous activity. It is as if 
the goal of mechanical efficiency (the reciprocal interdependence of 
rationality and production) had been achieved once and for all, releasing 
the subject into a new ‘liberated’ existence outside of all exterior necessity.  
- Ferguson, 1990: 47-8 
 
Just as subjective desire is ‘liberated’ by the operation of the mature money-form (Simmel) 
so, too, is the commodity-form freed of its earthly bonds assuming a ‘metaphysical 
subtlety’ (Marx) as it escapes the realm of production for the terrain of modern 
consumption. In doing so it acquires a 'semblance of autonomy' as the commodity-form 
ceases to be a 'definite social relation between men […] and assumes […] the fantastic 
form of a relation between things.' The commodity-form echoes the toy in its malleability 
and susceptibility to metamorphosis, its ‘function’ and ‘utility’ now determined by the 
interaction of the subjective will and the ‘particular circumstances of the moment’ 
(Simmel). No longer is the calculation of value the prerogative of the rational subject 
informed by a ‘cost of production’ theory borrowed from political economy. The money-
form and the ‘difference engine’ of capitalist production are just as likely to conspire in the 
availability of ‘loss leaders’ and habit-forming fashions as they are a bargain to be 
stumbled over – an extension to the ever-present temporality of contemporary 
‘consumption’ activities underpins modernité rather than discrete needs.  
 
The liberation from history (origins) enjoyed by both subject and object is the 
manifestation of being-in-exchange, as the ‘daily traffic of bourgeois life’ (Marx). The 
commodity-form is experienced as ‘effect,’ ‘appearance’ or event, as an aesthetic 
phenomenon in its ostensible transcendence of its determinate contents. However, as 
Frisby’s reading of Simmel infers, it is not the realm of the beautiful to which the 
commodity-form speaks in its transmission of aesthetic experience, but that of the sublime. 
The widespread availability of goods and services made possible by the marriage of an 
advanced division of labour and technologies of mass (re)production facilitates a 
‘cybernetic culture’ (de Cauter, 1993) in which the subject experiences the life-course not 
as a teleological project, but as a series of discrete moments or ‘instantaneous’ events. The 
‘contents’ of experience are, in this fashion, are incomprehensible within the rational 
causal framework formulated as a bourgeois self precisely because they are commodity-
events rather than ‘objects’ per se. Commodity-events are the subjective interaction with 
the objective dimension of capitalist modernity mediated by the sphere of circulation and 
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exchange: as such the ‘contents’ of the world are recognisable in their alienation from 
tradition (as in the case of the souvenir or collectible) but no longer reveal through their 
cause (production) a relation to the past (history and origin) and the project of ‘identity’ 
built upon it. The present, thus, appears as a constellation of moments, an endless 
firmament of entities moving in splendid isolation through adherence to laws or rules 
incomprehensible to the naked eye. The events of experience appear to be autonomous, 
floating free of the forces – social, economic or historical – that have produced them.  
 
The terrain of modern consumption should, therefore, be considered as an anti-landscape, 
a topography irreducible to its physical constituents, rational processes and financial 
frameworks, where in the absence of laws of operation of the ‘system of the world’ 
(Ferguson), there are now only the rules of the game.  So the ‘suddenness’ mentioned by 
Nietzsche becomes ‘the sign of discontinuity and non-identity,’ of an interruption to 
‘reality’ understood in temporal terms as the ‘aesthetic boundary’ of the ‘pure event of 
perception’ (Bohrer, 1994: vii-viii).  The sudden is the ‘denatured’ moment that stands 
apart from the process that brought it into being, contradicting historical continuity – in 
this way it is modernity in miniature – the fragment freed from its relation to the totality, 
leaving only cognitive apprehension rather than rational comprehension.  Appearance, 
image or representation can no longer be taken to mirror ‘reality’: aesthetic experience is 
not unproblematically true (liable only to ideological trickery or incomplete knowledge) 
and incommensurable with anything other than itself.  Thus, the aesthetic experience 
derived from any particular ‘commodity-event’ has little or nothing to do with the 
(economistic) conception of utility that derives from material factors or the socialised 
labour of its production: instead, it exists as a possible (virtual) event that is realised in 
‘contradistinction’ (Mead) to all other possible events.  The value of any such event 
derives from its incommensurability, its aesthetic effect, and, if it is ‘technological,’ the 
future possibilities it contains, affords or promises (Massumi). 
 
The ‘events’ of modern consumption are now no longer even un-natural – the basis of 
bourgeois nostalgia – they are simply strange and redolent of ‘chaos’:  
 
Where classical mechanics had explained a change in state through the 
application of force upon a body, a ‘physics of contact,’ resulting in an 
exchange similar to that of the market, quantum mechanics simply 
revealed how fundamentally strange were the unseen relations that 
governed the operation of the observable world.  
– Ferguson, 1990: 229-30  
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Identity as the relation between cause and effect, between the thing and its self, has been 
superseded: and the dream of their reconciliation has become redundant. Identification is 
the acceptance of the continual deformation of the subject within the immersive experience 
of the social relations of capitalist modernity. This generates a grammar for the experience 
of the ‘fictive’ terrain of capitalist modernity and governs the ‘transportation’ or émigré-
ation from reality that authors such as Rojek see as the hallmark of modern life, the 
repeated inhabitation of a fleeting ‘elsewhere’ or ‘elsewhen’ (Friedberg, 1993). Reality, as 
conventionally understood, becomes merely the nominal point of departure, of de-
formation, from which a further excursion onto the terrain of modern consumption is 
facilitated. Reality is no longer paramount because it is no longer real, in the sense that it is 
the location of referents for the signs that exist within the sphere of circulation and 
exchange. Phenomenological experience, which occurs in the absence of reality, is 
structured by the grammatical operation of the rules of the ‘fictive,’ rather than the laws of 
science or the desires of the psychological ego: modern consumption is the ‘absence of 
experience’ (Agamben), the inhabitation of Playland. Playland as the un-real terrain of 
modern consumption is a topography of (non)experience the prominent features of which 
are the ‘accident-event (and its avoidance)’, boredom, novelty (nouveauté), which generate 
the ‘excitement’ discussed by Ferguson through the ‘contradistinction’ (Mead) generated 
by their simultaneous inclusion within the mature money-form.   
 
However, as was previously noted, the capitalist money-form and the attendant 
commodification process results in the ‘de-differentiation’ of qualities, their formal 
equivalence expressed purely as a quantitative declension. This places possibility at the 
heart of the commodity-experience, ‘excitement’ is juxtaposed to boredom as the promise 
of nouveauté and modern consumption is inseparable from the unpredictability of the 
encounter with the commodity-form, and the possibility of ‘joy’ therein. The location of 
the unpredictable pleasures of possibility and its pursuit were previously the department 
store, carnival, bourse or gambling parlour. Today sees the entire terrain of modern 
consumption bedecked with opportunities to seek the embrace of chance, whether in the 
retail units of a shopping mall, its themed restaurants or the offices of an insurance firm 
supplying mortgages, pensions or life cover. In each of these ‘spaces’ the immaterial 
possibilities of the future are given form in the present through the commodification of 
chance by capitalist enterprise – as the ‘accident-event (and its avoidance)’ (Massumi). 
The temporal form given to the present’s anticipation of the future is indistinguishable 
from the nineteenth century gambler’s search for ‘wealth without labour,’ either in the 
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bourse or at the gaming table; it is simply rendered ‘instantaneous’ in terms of both cause 
and duration. 
 
The possible ‘de-differentiation’ of every moment or commodity-event becomes the credo 
under which modern consumption unfolds, whether for the flâneur, the ‘modern Tantalus’ 
of the boulevard, or the gambler who sought 
 
… the communion with number, in which money and riches, absolved 
from every earthen weight, have come to him from the fates  
– Benjamin, 1999: 489-90 
 
In this manner the money-form facilitates travel in time as readily as it does space, by 
allowing the future to flow into the present just as the distant becomes near in the era of 
capitalist globalisation.  
 
Gambling, like the insurance industry and the capitalist money-form itself provide a form 
for the apprehension of ‘the protean world of possibility’ (Ferguson, 1990: 243), realised 
as events.  What distinguishes the money-form, as the special instance of the commodity-
form, is that it contains, virtually, all possible ‘events’ in which the subjective will can be 
realised.  
 
The indeterminacy relations, the deep unpredictability of matter, the failure 
of strict causality, the irreducible ‘weirdness’ of the quantum world could 
only be grasped if we supposed that prior to its termination in an 
observable ‘event,’ the fundamental constituents of nature existed in their 
own peculiar play world; both ‘here’ and ‘there,’ both ‘now’ and ‘then,’ 
only relinquishing the freedom of inherent possibilities when forced to do 
so by the experimenter’s conscious probing. […] The mathematical 
formalism of probability theory introduces ‘something standing in the 
middle between the idea of an event and the actual event.’ It is a ‘strange 
kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality’ 
[Heisenberg].  
- Ferguson, 1990:  237 
 
In this world of exciting ‘events’ the self, as the unified ego, has its biographical narrative 
dissolved into a seemingly random succession of moments.  The rules that govern this 
sphere allow the functioning of the fictions that populate the playworld and create the 
contemporary ‘self’ as an organizing principle for experience (in its generic sense) and 
allows the formation of an ‘identity-position’ that is unique to the individual.   
 
The ‘dispersal of the ego’ within the money-form (Ferguson, 1990) is a dissolution into the 
near-numberless possibilities contained there and the generation of an ‘inner freedom’ 
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(Simmel) of the subject to navigate these moments of opportunity, characterised as 
excitement, boredom, novelty or mere potential. The ‘choices’ of modern consumption 
become trajectories within the ‘field’ of the money-form, which contains all possible 
manifestations of the commodity-form as future-events that are realised in the present as 
events or their negative, the ‘avoidance’ of the event. This is the playful logic of 
possession rather than the calculating logic of accumulation, it is the subordination of the 
claims of causality and identity to the free-play of effects experienced as events.  
 
Objects are, and remain, something for themselves which resists their 
complete integration into the sphere of the self and allows the most 
passionate ownership to end in dissatisfaction. The possession of money is 
free of this hidden contradiction that exists in all other kinds of possession. 
[…] It is only money that we own completely and without reservations; it 
is only money that merges completely into the function we assign to it.  
- Simmel, 1990: 327-8 
 
The money-form as the reification of exchange asserts the functional significance of the 
commodity-form over its substantial or material dimension. The sphere of circulation and 
exchange is the domain in which this phenomenon allows the disintegration of its 
bourgeois predecessor and the subject is dispersed as Being enters fully into exchange 
(Vattimo). Inhabitation of the terrain of modern consumption sees the subject participate in 
the potentialities of the ‘chronically mediatized’ money-form (such as e-bay or a global 
investment fund) and deny the ‘Newtonian’ physics of production. Instead, the experience 
of modern consumption accords with the indeterminacies of quantum mechanics and its 
‘playful’ conception of causality. Just as Ferguson (1990) sees money as a ‘quantum 
phenomenon’ capable of making ‘reality’ both ‘hypothetical and provisional’ so, too, is the 
experience of the commodity-form. Money as the spatial and temporal locus of imminent 
and immanent pleasure becomes the ‘ideal commodity,’ replacing the cigarette avowed by 
Oscar Wilde (Gagnier, 2000). The momentary ‘cathexis’ between subject and object in the 
commodity-event escapes rational accounting due to its lack of temporal causality 
(production), there is simply the fleeting and fortuitous instant within which subjective 
existence, being, is once more re-formulated as event. 
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Thesis Conclusion: The Invention of Habit 
 
...the laws of memory are subject to the more general laws of habit. Habit 
is a compromise effected between the individual and his environment [...] 
the guarantee of a dull inviolability, the lightning-conductor of his 
existence. […] Breathing is habit. Life is habit. Or rather life is a 
succession of habits, since the individual is a succession of individuals [...] 
The creation of the world did not take place once and for all time, but takes 
place every day.  
– Samuel Beckett, in Proust, 1931 
 
The distinction between ‘consumption’ as part of a project of individual identity project 
and the terrain of modern consumption as the means by which access to the forms of 
contemporary experience is made possible is fundamental to this thesis. At its core lies the 
rejection of the assumptions of economic rationality, utility maximisation and 
psychological desire for identity deemed to be the birthright of the inhabitants of 
contemporary culture. This conjunction of utilitarian psychology and bourgeois nostalgia 
for a pre-lapsarian past underpins the vast concentrations of energy, wealth and productive 
labour around the globe harnessed by the social relations of capitalist production. In the 
commodified products of the contemporary amalgam of labour, capital and technology are 
found the ostensible prompts to further ‘consumption,’ to greater indulgence and the 
formulations of desire deemed fundamental to the production of self and the maintenance 
of psychological and social identity. The need to question a narrative that ties humanity so 
obviously to a socio-economic system capable of creating environmental disaster on an 
irreversible scale has never been greater – even sociological theory can play a part. Indeed, 
the role played by this thesis is achieved by exposing the utilitarian suppositions of 
economic rationality to sociological critique and, in turn, pursuing the manifestations of 
this economic inheritance across the social sciences and their disciplinary approach to the 
study of ‘consumption.  
 
This allows the ejection of the figure of the ‘consumer’ the discursive construct that stands 
at the heart of contemporary discussions of the capitalist consumption-relation and the 
limits of what may be done in its name. Consequently, the bourgeois individual whose 
desire for utility and identity was conjoined in the pursuit of biographical selfhood, the 
manifestations of taste, distinction and lifestyle may be rejected as inadequate. In it  place 
an altogether different version of humanity may be proposed, one rooted in the experience 
of individuation rather than the construction of ‘identity.’ However, the contours of such a 
novel figure must be discerned and the forms of experience that shape his or her existence 
require to investigated and accounted for. This is the reason behind the 
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‘postphenomenological’ approach borrowed from Verbeek (2005). By addressing the 
phenomenological categories of space, time and causality (and, implicitly, materiality 
through the engagement with the commodity-form) it is possible to begin to map the 
inhabitant of the terrain of modern consumption and the manner in which they live through 
an emphasis upon the use(s) to which they put the objects and experiences that share their 
world. 
 
Indeed, this concept of sharing the world with the non-human actants who make up the 
‘missing masses’ of any theory of society (Latour, 1992) is fundamental to this thesis. In 
adapting the relationship of affordance from its origins in anthropology and its more recent 
development within environmental psychology (Costall, 2004), it is possible to consider 
the dependence upon the material world by patterns of contemporary interaction, but also 
by the operation of subjectivity itself. The relation of ‘mutual constitution’ or ‘coshaping’ 
proposed by Verbeek in the context of technology allows an acknowledgement of the 
contingent nature of human experience, its reliance upon the objective dimension of 
existence for the experience of the subjective. However, neither the discussion of actants, 
affordance or ‘coshaping’ has emerged from an analysis of the capitalist consumption-
relation or been applied within an examination of the material and historical factors that 
colour its contemporary manifestation. This is why chapters three, four and five are themed 
as they are, to provide the historical perspective capable of discerning the development of 
modern consumption as a historical process, rather than a convenient juxtaposition to the 
‘consumption’ discussed in chapters one and two. Further, by using the relationship 
between actants – human and non-human alike – to develop a sociological application of 
affordance that is actively generated by the relationship of ‘coshaping’ it is possible to 
analyse the phenomenal forms of subjective experience available to the participants upon 
the socio-spatial terrain of modern consumption.  
 
In applying ‘affordance’ as a tool of sociological and historical research the opportunity to 
focus upon forms of interaction, experiences facilitated and habits or behaviours adopted 
or adapted, rather than the desiring behaviour of psychological individuals, arises. Such an 
opportunity is crucial if the logic of ‘consumer culture’ and the (re-)presentation of identity 
as the externalisation of subjective experience  are to be avoided. Instead, the commodity-
form as the medium for the transmission of modern experience invites a re-consideration 
of the limits and possibilities of human subjectivity within social relations of the current 
global division of labour. The commodity-form, as technology of experience, becomes the 
means by which the mediation of space-time events, the relation of affordance forged 
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between subjective and objective culture, is made available to contemporary humanity 
(with all the limitations upon access and, so, experience that this implies). However, in 
rejecting the concept of personal development through the refinement of individual taste, 
in accordance with prevailing norms, a tantalising possibility does emerge – a very limited, 
very specific freedom to be oneself, if only because the individuation at the heart of 
modern consumption makes this unavoidable. The relationship between being and having 
expressed as ‘possession’ is one of becoming: 
 
Although becoming in this context extends certain movements begun in 
capitalism, is in many ways an extension of capitalism, the two paths part 
in the end. […]. Becoming is a cascade of simulations and fabulations that 
overspills buying. The dividual is fundamentally without purchase. It is a 
becoming-singular that exceeds specification, conjoined with a becoming-
generic that splinters the form of identity.  
- Massumi, 1993: 35 
 
The production of ‘monsters’ (Haraway) and ‘mutants’ (Baudrillard) made possible by the 
collapse of the humanist orthodoxy under the weight of the socio-economic conditions it 
helped nurture makes a fitting counter to liberal admonishments urging ‘fair trade’ or 
‘moral’ and ‘ethical consumerism.’ Rather, in the inexorable logic of the dialectical 
interplay of ‘fabulation’ and ‘simulation’ (Massumi, 1993) all manner of wondrous 
creatures are born, and they are born of their own experiences rather than the desire to 
press into service the commodified labour of others.  
 
The ‘playland’ experienced by the inhabitants of the ‘terrain’ of modern consumption 
offers no possibility of escape; there is no revolution on the horizon (although scarce 
resources are only getting scarcer). However, humanity, that agglomeration of species 
possessed of only one specimen must not retreat into a bourgeois nostalgia and dream of 
other, better days when ‘things were better’ (or, at least, not so bad), nor must we seek to 
flee, neither exotic locations nor mountain fastnesses will provide succour. Instead the path 
lies before us, never behind, only by refusing to capitulate to a ‘consumerist’ ideology and 
its culture of consolation, of relative advantage and comparative financial well-being will 
the future present itself to us. In the ‘yearning’ for experience and subjective 
transformation that expresses the surfeit of ‘becoming’ over being there exist unlimited 
opportunities to de-form the subject, to continually differ from our ‘selves’ as we refuse to 
settle for a self purchased over counters, from catalogues and via the click of the mouse at 
a web store. It is in the uses of things and the uses that things make of us that the future 
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